Stiger v. Johnson et al

Filing 91

ORDER granting 55 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 5/27/2014.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

Vervita Stiger,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
Cheyenne Johnson, Shelby
County Government, and
Shelby County Tax Assessor,
Defendants.

No. 11-2794

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before

the

Court

is

the

September

3,

2013

Motion

for

Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) by Defendants Cheyenne Johnson
(“Johnson”),

Shelby

County

Government

(“Shelby

County”),

Shelby County Tax Assessor (collectively, “Defendants”).
ECF

No.

55.)

accompanying
Material

On

September

Memorandum

Facts.

(ECF

of
No.

5,

2013,

Law
59.)

and

Defendants
Statement

Plaintiff

(“Stiger”) responded on November 11, 2013.
Defendants replied on November 25, 2013.

Background

(Mot.,
their

Undisputed

Vervita

Stiger

(Resp., ECF No. 69.)
(Reply, ECF No. 71.)

For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I.

of

filed

and

Stiger is a former employee of Shelby County Government
(“Shelby County”).

(Def. SUMF, ECF No. 59 ¶ 1.)

elected Shelby County Assessor of Property.

Johnson is the

(Id. ¶ 2.)

She

replaced Rita Clark as Assessor effective September 1, 2008.
Stiger brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Johnson

denied

Stiger

procedural

due

process

and

retaliated

against her by stripping her of duties and denying her a job
reclassification after Stiger campaigned for Johnson’s opponent
in the Shelby County Assessor election.

(Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶

35.)
During
progressed

her

years

to

working

the

Abstractor/Administrative
Technician.

for

Shelby

positions
Technician,

(Def. SUMF ¶ 5.)

County,

of
and

Stiger

Abstractor,
Administrative

In 2008, Shelby County retained

an independent contractor, Fox Lawson & Associates LLC (“Fox”),
to conduct a salary and job classification review of all the
positions in the Shelby County Assessor’s office.

(Id. ¶ 6.)

Employees were asked to prepare a written Position Description
Questionnaire

(“PDQ”)

responsibilities.

identifying

(Id.)

Stiger

their

job

participated,

duties

and

preparing

a

written description of her job duties and responsibilities as an
Administrative Technician.

(Id.)

Fox concluded that the duties

Stiger was performing were in line with her classification as an
Administrative Technician.

(Id. ¶ 9.)
2

At

some

point,

Stiger

was

assigned

to

work

under

the

supervision of Margaret Culver, the manager of the Information
Technology

(“IT”)

Department.

(Id.

¶

10.)

Under

Culver’s

supervision, Stiger was assigned several different duties and
responsibilities, including running queries and supervising and
training

employees

in

the

Pictometry

Group.

(Id.

¶

11.)

Stiger’s responsibilities with the Pictometry Group ended when a
project concluded in 2008.

(Stiger Dep., ECF No. 59-1 at 27.)

Effective September 12, 2008, Stiger was transferred from the IT
Department to the Residential Reappraisal Department to assist
Chuck Blow.

(Def. SUMF ¶ 14.)

Under Chuck Blow’s supervision, Stiger was responsible for
mileage,

attendance,

leave

forms,

coordinating

conference room, and running queries when asked.
The

term

database.

“query”

describes

(Id. ¶ 17.)

a

search

for

use

of

the

(Id. ¶ 19.)

information

in

a

When a query involves several different

databases, it becomes more complex and requires a higher level
of expertise.

(Id.)

Stiger’s Performance Evaluation for the

period from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009, states that she
“construct[ed]

simple

queries.”

(Id.

¶

16.)

Stiger’s

job

duties did not change while she was under Blow’s supervision.
(Stiger Dep., ECF No. 59-1 at 33.)
In 2008, Johnson and Bill Giannini were seeking election to
the Assessor’s office.

(Def. SUMF ¶ 23.)
3

Stiger campaigned for

Giannini.

(Id. ¶ 25.)

Stiger remembered an incident in which

Johnson saw Stiger campaigning for Giannini.
No. 59-1 at 47.)

(Stiger Dep, ECF

During a joint campaign event on July 15,

2008, a coworker of Stiger’s submitted an anonymous question to
Johnson, read by the moderator, asking: “Ms. Johnson, how are
you going to handle the lawsuits that have been filed against
the

office?”

(Palmer

Dep.,

ECF

No.

59-1

at

12.)

Johnson

responded, “I will deal with them and there will be some changes
made.”

(Plaint. SUMF, ECF No. 69 ¶ 28.)

According to Stiger,

Johnson made that statement while looking in the direction of a
group

of

Giannini

supporters,

including

Stiger,

with

language and tone that Stiger thought were notable.

body

(Stiger

Dep., ECF No. 47.)
In

February

2010,

Shelby

County

announced

an

Administrative Aide position in the Assessor’s office.
SUMF, ECF No. 59 ¶ 36.)
for

directors

and

conducting

evaluations,

neither

of

which

(Id. ¶¶ 41-

Stiger applied for the position, but did not receive it.

(Id. ¶ 39.)
Blow

(Def.

Duties included coordinating meetings

Stiger performed under Chuck Blow’s supervision.
44.)

open

and

On May 13, 2010, Stiger sent memoranda to Chuck

Lorie
the

Ingram-Glenn

manager

of

Human

office.

(Id. ¶¶ 48, 51.)

(“Ingram-Glenn”),

Resources

department

in

who
the

was

the

Assessor’s

In her memoranda, Stiger requested a

job study of her position as Administrative Technician.
4

(Id. ¶¶

48, 53.)

Stiger stated that many of her responsibilities were

the same as those of an Administrative Aide, but conceded that
she

did

not

currently

conduct evaluations.

coordinate

meetings

for

directors

or

(Id. ¶ 50.)

On June 14, 2010, Ingram-Glenn sent Stiger a memorandum
explaining that Fox had performed a review of Stiger’s duties in
September 2008 and determined that she was working within her
job classification.

(Id. ¶ 54.)

Ingram-Glenn explained that

she had compared the duties from Stiger’s PDQ with those of the
Administrative Aide position and there were several differences.
(Id.)

On June 21, 2010, Stiger sent Ingram-Glenn an email about

“the next grievance step,” and Ingram-Glenn responded that the
next level was “to file with an elected official.”
54.5.)

On

June

24,

2010,

Stiger

sent

Johnson

a

(Id. ¶

memorandum

“requesting a detailed review of my current job description that
is located in my personnel file, with the Administrative Aide
position that was recently filled.”
Johnson

sent

Stiger

an

email

(Id. ¶ 54.6.)

explaining

that

In response,
Ingram-Glenn’s

immediate supervisor and director were the next level to request
a review and that Johnson was forwarding Stiger’s request and
attached documentation to them.
On

June

25,

2010,

(Id.)

Johnson

sent

Johnson

Saulsberry

(“Saulsberry”), an administrator with the Assessor’s office, an
email asking him to review Stiger’s request.
5

(Id. ¶ 55.)

On

June 28, 2010, Saulsberry sent Stiger a letter stating that
Ingram-Glenn’s findings were consistent with the recent study
conducted

by

Fox

and

that

Saulsberry

had

reviewed

Stiger’s

request and had reached the same conclusion as Ingram-Glenn.
(Id. ¶ 56.)

In August 2010, Johnson decided against requesting

that Shelby County’s Compensation Division conduct a review of
Stiger’s job.

(Id. ¶ 60.)

That decision was the first thing Johnson ever did that
Stiger considered unfair.

(Id. ¶ 60.)

Stiger believes that she

was retaliated against for her support of Giannini in the 2008
political race by not being “given due process like the ladies
in personal property.”

(Id. ¶ 65.)

According to Stiger, those

women were given desk reviews by Shelby County’s Compensation
Division when they requested them, but Stiger’s desk review was
conducted by Ingram-Glenn.

(Id. ¶ 66.)

Stiger does not argue

that Johnson improperly influenced Ingram-Glenn in conducting
her review of Stiger’s position.

(Id. ¶ 61.)

Johnson never

said anything to Stiger that led her to believe that Johnson
would

retaliate

against

Stiger

for

(Stiger Dep., ECF No. 59-1 at 43.)
else

ever

suspended

Stiger

campaigning

pay,

demoted

transferred her to an unpleasant work location.

6

Giannini.

Neither Johnson nor anyone

without

64.)

for

her,

or

(Def. SUMF ¶

Michael

Lewis,

Shelby

County’s

Human

Resources

Administrator since November 2007, has explained that under the
Compensation Policy in effect from July 1, 2009 to June 30,
2011, Lewis was responsible for determining whether to request a
job evaluation from the Compensation Division.

(Id. ¶ 77.)

Under the Shelby County Compensation Policy for 2009 to 2010,
the “Procedure to Request a Job Evaluation” required that:
A written request to the Human Resources Administrator
from the Elected Office, Division Director or Chief
Administrative Officer or their designee to evaluate
the position for proper classification must be
provided.
(Comp.

Pol.,

ECF

No.

59-3.)

Since

Lewis

has

been

the

HR

Administrator, he has received no written request for a job
evaluation,

for

Stiger

or

any

other

employee,

that

requirements set out in the Compensation Policy.
78.)

No

granted

an

Shelby

County

employee

the

policy

in

place

right

to

insist

conducted of his or her position.

the

(Def. SUMF ¶

during
that

(Id. ¶ 80.)

met

this
a

period

study

be

Stiger’s claim

that Shelby County policies provide that “[e]mployees may also
request a review of their position allocation if they submit
their

request

through

their

document dated October 1987.

department

comes

(ECF No. 69-16.)

Stiger retired on June 30, 2011.
II.

head”

Jurisdiction

7

(Def. SUMF ¶ 21).

from

a

This

Court

U.S.C. § 1331.

has

federal

question

jurisdiction

under

28

Stiger brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging violations of procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment and unlawful retaliation for engaging in
protected speech under the First Amendment.
III.

(ECF No. 1-1 at 9.)

Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court shall

grant a party’s motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Civ. P. 56(a).
to

the

court

opportunity

for

A defendant can meet this burden by pointing out
that

the

plaintiff,

discovery,

has

essential element of her case.
Asbury

v.

Fed. R.

Teodosio,

412

F.

no

having

had

evidence

to

sufficient
support

an

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1);

Appx.

786,

791

(6th

Cir.

2011)

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
When

confronted

with

a

properly

supported

motion

for

summary judgment, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Civ.

P.

56(c).

A

genuine

dispute

for

trial

See Fed. R.

exists

if

the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff.

See Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d

463, 467 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
8

The plaintiff must “‘do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts.’”

Phelps v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680

F.3d 725, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

The

plaintiff may not oppose a properly supported summary judgment
motion by mere reliance on the pleadings.

See Beckett v. Ford,

384 Fed. Appx. 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 324).

Instead, she “must adduce concrete evidence

on which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in [her]
favor.”

Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2000)

(citations omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

The court

does not have the duty to search the record for such evidence.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller,
889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989).

The plaintiff has the duty

to

the

point

out

specific

evidence

in

record

that

sufficient to justify a jury decision in her favor.

would

be

See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1); InterRoyal Corp., 889 F.2d at 111.
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an
integral

part

designed

to

determination

of

the

secure
of

every

procedural shortcut.”

Federal
the

Rules

just,

action[,]

as

a

speedy,
rather

whole,
and
than

which

are

inexpensive
a

disfavored

FDIC v. Jeff Miller Stables, 573 F.3d

289, 294 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
9

IV.

Analysis
Defendants argue that Stiger cannot establish violations of

the

Fourteenth

and

First

Amendments

because

Stiger

had

no

property interest in a review of her job responsibilities by
Shelby
failure

County’s
to

Compensation

request

employment action.

a

review

Division

and

does

constitute

not

because

Johnson’s
an

adverse

Stiger argues that a reasonable jury could

conclude otherwise.
To state a § 1983 claim for violation of procedural due
process, a plaintiff must show that she had a property right in
the

benefit

she

was

denied.

Cleveland

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985).
created

by

the

understandings
state law.”

Constitution,

that

stem

Id. at 539.

from

but
an

Bd.

of

Educ.

Property rights are not
by

“existing

independent

rules

source

such

must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.
[She] must have more than a unilateral expectation of
it. [She] must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it.
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
This Court has found that state law and Shelby

County’s compensation policies do not “create a property
interest in a job study – much less a job study that must
be

conducted

by

the

or
as

For a plaintiff to have a property

right in a benefit related to government employment, she:

(1972).

v.

Compensation

10

Division.”

Elion

v.

Shelby County Government, No. 08-2411-P, 2012 WL 7110531,
at *8 (W.D. Tenn. 2012).
No

reasonable

jury

could

conclude

that

Johnson

violated

Stiger’s Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by
failing to request a job study by the Compensation Division.
Stiger had no legitimate claim of entitlement to such a study.
Shelby

County’s

Compensation

Policy

specifies

the

opposite,

stating that job evaluations must be requested by the elected
official, the Chief Administrative Officer, or their designee.
Even

if

the

policy

from

1987,

stating

that

an

employee

may

request a job evaluation, had been effective in 2010, it would
not imply that Stiger was entitled to that evaluation.

See

Golden v. Town of Collierville, 167 F. App’x 474, 478 (6th Cir.
2006) (“[I]f an official has unconstrained discretion to deny
the benefit, a prospective recipient . . . can establish no more
than a ‘unilateral expectation’ of it.”)
To state a § 1983 claim of First Amendment retaliation, a
plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in constitutionally
protected speech or conduct, (2) the employer took an adverse
employment

action

against

her,

and

(3)

there

is

a

causal

connection between elements one and two.

Rorrer v. City of

Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1047 (6th Cir. 2014).

The parties do not

dispute that Stiger’s participation in the political campaign

11

against

Johnson

was

constitutionally

protected

speech

or

conduct.
An adverse employment action:
constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision
causing a significant change in benefits.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
“A mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities”
is

not

enough

to

constitute

an

adverse

employment

action.

Choulagh v. Holder, 538 F. App’x 432, 439 (6th Cir. 2013).
To establish a causal connection, “a plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence from which an inference could be drawn that
the adverse action would not have taken place” had the plaintiff
not

engaged

in

the

protected

activity.

Nguyen

v.

City

Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000).
[W]here some time elapses between when the employer
learns of a protected activity and the subsequent
adverse employment action, the employee must couple
temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory
conduct to establish causality.
Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th
Cir. 2008); see also Edmond v. State of Tenn. Dept. of Prob
&

Parole,

(“Generally,

386

F.

temporal

App’x

507,

proximity

establish a causal link.”).

514
alone

(6th
is

not

Cir.

2010)

enough

to

See also Charles v. Baesler,

910 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he Constitution

12

of

must

not

be

trivialized

by

being

dragged

into

every

personnel dispute in state and local government.”)
No reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson’s failure to
request a job study by the Compensation Division was an adverse
employment action.

Stiger was not demoted or stripped of job

responsibilities, and there is no evidence a job study by the
Compensation

Division

would

have

resulted

in

a

significant

change in Stiger’s employment status for the better.

Stiger

admits that her job duties did not include multiple duties of an
Administrative

Aide.

Ingram-Glenn

found

that

Stiger

was

properly classified as an Administrative Technician, and Stiger
admits

that

there

is

no

evidence

that

Johnson

negatively

influenced that finding.
Even if Johnson’s failure to request a job study by the
Compensation Division constituted an adverse employment action,
no

reasonable

jury

could

conclude

that

there

was

a

causal

connection between Johnson’s decision and the protected activity
or that Johnson’s decision was retaliatory.

Stiger’s protected

activity occurred in July 2008, and Johnson’s decision not to
request the job study occurred in August 2010, a lapse of more
than

two

conduct.

years.

There

is

no

other

evidence

of

retaliatory

Johnson never said anything to Stiger that suggested

Johnson would retaliate against Stiger, and Stiger has adduced
no evidence that retaliatory animus existed.
13

See Belew, 205

F.3d at 895.

Johnson’s decision not to recommend the job study

was not unusual.

No job study by the Compensation Division had

been requested since at least November 2007.
No reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants violated
Stiger’s Fourteenth and First Amendment rights.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.
So ordered this 27th day of May, 2014.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr._ ___
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14