Johnson v. Shelby County Department of Corrections et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING 14 DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 10/11/2013. (Todd, James)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CAREY C. JOHNSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SHELBY COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 11-3009-JDT-dkv
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Carey C. Johnson, Jr., filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On December 4, 2012, the court
dismissed Shelby County as a defendant and ordered service of process for Officer Birdsong.
Defendant Birdsong has filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [DE# 14].
Plaintiff has not responded to the motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s
motion is GRANTED.
Because the court has considered evidence outside the pleadings, the motion will be
treated as a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he burden on the moving party may
be discharged by ‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986). Revised Rule 56(c)(1) provides that “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or
is genuinely disputed” is required to support that assertion by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers or
other materials;[1] or
(B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)” the district court may:
(1)
give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2)
consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3)
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials–
including the facts considered undisputed–show that the movant is
entitled to it; or
(4)
issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court explained that Rule 56:
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there
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“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that
would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Additionally, Rule 56(c)(4) specifically provides that
“[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.”
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can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled
to judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to
which [he] has the burden of proof.
477 U.S. at 322-23. In considering whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence as
well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)
(same).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence [presented by the non-moving
party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably
asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict[.]”
Id. at 252; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56[(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). However, the court’s
function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of
the matter. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the inquiry is “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
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sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
The fact that Plaintiff did not respond does not require granting Defendant’s motion.
Nevertheless, if the allegations of the complaint are contravened by Defendant’s evidence
and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those facts, then summary
judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 65 (6th Cir. 1979).
Plaintiff was formerly confined at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center. He
alleges that Defendant forgot to take him to medical for his insulin and medicine for four
days in a row. On the fourth day, Defendant stated, “Man I just forgot you[’]r[e] not going
to die right.” Complaint at p. 2. Plaintiff allegedly asked if Defendant could take him, but
Defendant refused because it was time for shift change. Later that day, Plaintiff allegedly
became very ill.
Defendant has presented the following evidence in support of his motion. Plaintiff’s
grievance, which was filed on June 23, 2011, states that he did not receive his insulin on June
18, 19, and 20. Def’s Exhibit 1. The complaint states that, on June 24, 2011, “the guards” did
not take him to get his insulin. Plaintiff never filed a grievance stating that Defendant failed
to take him to get his insulin. Def’s Exhibit 2. Furthermore, Defendant was not on duty where
Plaintiff was housed on the dates specified in the grievance, other than working a shift on
June 24, when he was not the officer assigned to transport inmates to other buildings. Def’s
Exhibit 4.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA), an inmate seeking to maintain an
action challenging prison conditions must first exhaust all available administrative remedies.
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42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
A natural reading of the statute suggests that its application requires
consideration of three simple questions. First, is plaintiff “a prisoner confined
in [a] jail, prison, or other correctional facility?” If not, the statute is
inapplicable. If so, a second question must be considered: Is the plaintiff suing
under § 1983 respecting “prison conditions?” If not, the statute is inapplicable.
If so, a third question must be considered: Did plaintiff exhaust “such
administrative remedies as [were] available” before plaintiff “brought” his
action? If question three is answered in the negative, plaintiff is in violation of
the statute and the court is required to dismiss plaintiff's suit.
Cox v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2003). The duty to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other
wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2003). Moreover, the PLRA requires proper
exhaustion; accordingly, before initiating a lawsuit, the prisoner must comply “with an
agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90
(2006).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense
that must be proved by the defendant. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). Inmates are
not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Id. Under Jones, the
plaintiffs are not required to allege with specificity the facts relating to their grievances. See
Shire v. Greiner, 2007 WL 840472, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.) (because defendants did not offer any
proof that plaintiff failed to exhaust remedies, “they have failed to meet their evidentiary
burden and cannot rely on the PLRA exhaustion requirement as a basis for the dismissal of
any of [plaintiff's] claims”). Moreover, a plaintiff who files a complaint while a prisoner but
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who is later released must still satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the PLRA. Cox v.
Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2003).
Additionally, a prisoner must specifically mention the involved parties in the
grievance to make prison officials aware of the problems so that the prison has a chance to
address the claims before they reach federal court. Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651, 653 (6th
Cir. 2006); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001); accord Harbin-Bey v. Rutter,
420 F.3d 571, 581 (6th Cir. 2005); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2003);
Vandiver v. Martin, 2002 WL 31166925, at *2 (6th Cir.) (“The issues [plaintiff] may raise,
and the defendants he may name, in his lawsuit are limited to the specific issues raised, and
the specific individuals mentioned, in his grievance.”).
In the present case, Defendant has properly presented the affirmative defense of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. It is undisputed that Defendant
was not named in Plaintiff’s grievances. It is also undisputed that he was not the transport
officer (and on some dates was not on duty) on any of the dates that Plaintiff allegedly did
not receive proper medical care. Consequently, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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