Coleman v. United Health Group, Inc. et al

Filing 51

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 47 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Chief Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 3/6/2013. (McCalla, Jon)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

LATOYA COLEMAN,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
) No. 2:12-cv-02156-JPM-dkv
)
UNITED HEALTHCARE SERVICES,
)
INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OR, IN THE ALTERNAITVE, MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial
Dismissal or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, which was filed on January 9, 2013.

(ECF No. 47.)

Plaintiff responded in opposition on January 11, 2013.
No. 48.)

(ECF

Defendant did not file a reply.

For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Dismissal or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
I.

BACKGROUND
This action involves claims of harassment, discrimination,

and retaliation in the employment context pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (“§ 1981”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006), and the
Tennessee Human Rights Act (the “THRA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 421-101 to 4-21-1004 (West 2012).

(Am. Compl., ECF No. 35, ¶ 1.)

This action also involves claims alleging violations of the
Family Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2006).

(Id.)

On March 24, 2008, Plaintiff Latoya Coleman (“Plaintiff” or
“Coleman”) was hired as a Sales Coordinator by Defendant United
Healthcare Services, Inc. (“United Healthcare”).
Discrimination, ECF No. 47-2 at PageID 197.)1

(Charge of

While employed by

United Healthcare, Coleman’s supervisors included Walter
Harrison (“Harrison”) and, after Harrison left United
Healthcare, William Bosarge (“Bosarge”).

(Id. at PageID 196-97;

see also Am. Compl., ECF No. 35, ¶¶ 8, 28.)

On May 31, 2011,

United Healthcare terminated Coleman’s employment.

(Charge of

Discrimination, ECF No. 47-2 at PageID 198; see also Am. Compl.,
ECF No. 35, ¶ 40; Def.’s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 47-1, at 2.)
While employed by United Heathcare, Coleman filed two
Charges of Discrimination with the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”).

On September

27, 2010, Coleman filed a Charge of Discrimination that was
given the EEOC charge number of 490-2010-03004.

1

(ECF No. 47-2

The Court cites to “PageID” numbers when documents with the same Electronic
Case Filing Number are not consecutively paginated.

2

at PageID 196.)

In that Charge of Discrimination, Coleman

stated that “I believe that I have been discriminated against
due to my race, Black [sic] and retaliated against for filing an
internal complaint regarding denial of promotions based on race
in violation of [Title VII].”

(Id.)

On May 23, 2011, Coleman filed a Charge of Discrimination
that was given the EEOC charge number of 490-2011-01779.
No. 47-2 at PageID 197.)

(ECF

In that Charge of Discrimination,

Coleman stated that “I believe that I was retaliated against for
filing a previous charge of discrimination (EEOC charge # 4902010-03004)” because “[i]n March 2011, I received a lower
evaluation rating which caused me not to receive a bonus.”
(Id.)

On May 31, 2011, the date of her termination, Coleman

amended her May 23, 2011, Charge of Discrimination to include
the allegation that “Mr. Bosarge told me I was terminated
because I allegedly submitted falsified doctors’ excuses and
FMLA paperwork.”

(ECF No. 47-2 at PageID 198.)

On February 27, 2012, Coleman filed a timely pro se
Complaint in this Court (the “Original Complaint”).

(Compare

Dismissal and Notice of Rights, ECF No. 47-2 at PageID 199, and
Dismissal and Notice of Rights, ECF No. 47-2 at PageID 200, with
Original Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff used a pro se

complaint form, which stated that the action was “brought
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for
3

employment discrimination.”

(ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.)

Plaintiff

indicated, by choosing certain options printed on the complaint
form, that United Healthcare “terminated plaintiff’s employment”
and “failed to promote plaintiff” due to her race and sex.

(Id.

¶ 9.)
In support of the claims in her Original Complaint, Coleman
alleged that someone “called me a ‘Coon’ more than once in
writing/emails,” and “urinated on my mail at work.”

(Id.)

She

also alleged that Harrison “attempted to get me into a hotel
room” and “stated sexual advancements [sic] towards me.”

(Id.

¶ 10.)
Coleman also alleged that she was not promoted due to her
race.

She alleged that someone “told me that I would not be

promoted because I was young & black.”

(Id. ¶ 9.)

She also

alleged that “in 2010 Walter Harrison discriminated against me
by saying he is a ‘Red Neck’ & I am a funny ‘coon’ because I
wanted a job promotion.”

(Id. ¶ 10.)

Furthermore, Coleman alleged that Harrison offered to trade
sex for a promotion:

Harrison “stated [sic] if I was with him

one on one I could receive a promotion.”

(Id.)

Regarding her termination, Coleman alleged that she was
retaliated against for reporting Harrison’s conduct.

Coleman

alleged that, after Harrison left United Healthcare, Harrison’s
“manager became my manager & he was upset with me for filing my
4

1st EEOC Charge against [Harrison] so he terminated me while I
was on intermittent FMLA [sic] for stress [sic] he retaliated.”
(Id. at 10.)
Furthermore Coleman alleged that she was terminated after
being accused of forging a document:

“I filed two charges with

[sic] EEOC [sic] they retaliated against me by forging my
doctors [sic] name on an accommodation form & pinning it on me.”
(Id. ¶ 9.)
On November 8, 2012, Coleman, with the help of counsel,
filed her First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”).
(ECF No. 35.)

In her Amended Complaint, Coleman asserts claims

for racial harassment in violation of § 1981 and sexual and
racial harassment in violation of Title VII and the THRA; racial
discrimination and retaliation for failure to promote or
transfer her in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the THRA;
retaliatory discharge in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the
THRA; and denial and abuse of her FMLA rights.

(Id. ¶ 41.)

In support of the claims in her Amended Complaint, Coleman
alleges that Harrison referred to her as a “coon” (id. ¶ 16) and
that she “received mail in her office mailbox wet with urine”
(id. ¶ 22).

Coleman further alleges that “Harrison made

numerous sexual advances towards Plaintiff, including asking
Plaintiff to come back to his hotel room” (id. ¶ 13), and that
“Harrison wrote Plaintiff that he was going to Outback
5

‘Coonhouse’ and that his ‘dessert will be my banana in your
split’” (id. ¶ 12).
Coleman also alleges that she was not promoted, or
transferred to a different position, due to her race.
alleges that:

She

“Harrison stated that Plaintiff’s efforts at

transfer to a different position would be futile because:

‘face

it your [sic] super young, black and you don’t communicate
effectively . . . . . [sic]’

Harrison stated that Plaintiff was

a ‘funny coon’ and that he was ‘a proud redneck.’”

(Id. ¶ 16

(first alteration in original).)
Furthermore, Coleman alleges that Harrison offered to trade
sex for a promotion.

While Coleman was visiting United

Healthcare’s Brentwood office, Coleman alleges that:

“Harrison

requested that Plaintiff allow him to visit her hotel room so
that they could be ‘one-on-one.’

Harrison then offered ‘quid

pro quo’ favors — that in exchange for ‘one on one in the
hotel,’ Plaintiff would be promoted to Sales Coordinator over
Tennessee.”

(Id. ¶ 10.)

Regarding her termination, Coleman alleges that Bosarge was
upset with her because she reported Harrison’s conduct.

Coleman

alleges that: “Harrison’s boss, [Bosarge], resented Harrison
being terminated and placed the blame for that result upon
Plaintiff’s complaints against him” (id. ¶ 28), and that, “[i]n

6

May 2011, Bosarge yelled at Plaintiff that she had ‘made a white
man lose his job’” (id. ¶ 29).
Furthermore Coleman alleges that she was subsequently
terminated for forging an FMLA accommodation form.

Coleman

alleges that Bosarge was responsible for the forgery:

“Bosarge

. . . took Plaintiff’s confidential medical information and
prepared a fictitious FMLA accommodation request form.

Bosarge

forged Plaintiff’s doctor’s signature to make it appear
genuine.”

(Id. ¶ 36.)

for the forgery:

Coleman also alleges that she was blamed

Bosarge “claimed that Plaintiff had prepared

[the forged FMLA accommodation request form] and that she, not
he, had falsified her physician’s signature” (id. ¶ 37), and
“[t]he falsified FMLA paperwork (by Bosarge) was the basis” for
Plaintiff’s termination on May 31, 2011 (id. ¶ 40).
II.

ANALYSIS
In its Motion, Defendant requests that the Court dismiss

Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual- and racial-harassment claims and
Plaintiff’s THRA claims:
Plaintiff’s [THRA] claims (Counts I(b), II(c) and
III(c)) are untimely, and Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies in relation to the
Title VII [sexual- and racial-] harassment claims
(Count I(c)).
Accordingly, Defendant respectfully
requests that the Court dismiss Counts I(b), I(c),
II(c) and III(c) of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 47 at 1.)

7

The Court addresses, in turn, the standard of review,
Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual- and racial-harassment claims, and
Plaintiff’s THRA claims.
A.

Standard of Review
In its Motion, Defendant requests the Court to act pursuant

to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56
(“Rule 12(b)(1),” “Rule 12(b)(6),” and “Rule 56,” respectively):
[Defendant], pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
(6), moves the Court to dismiss portions of this
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, respectively.
In the alternative, Defendant
moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
56, as there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
(ECF No. 47 at 1.)
The Court briefly explains the standards of review under
Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6), and Rule 56.
1.

Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party can assert a defense to a

claim due to the court’s “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction”
over the claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

“Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) are categorized as
either a facial attack or a factual attack.”
Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 2012).

McCormick v. Miami

“A facial attack on

the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint

8

questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading.”

O’Bryan v.

Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

“Under a facial attack, all of the

allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.”
693 F.3d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).

McCormick,
The

complaint “must contain non-conclusory facts which, if true,
establish that the district court had jurisdiction over the
dispute.”

Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 440

(6th Cir. 2012).
“[A] factual attack . . . raises a factual controversy”
regarding the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Gentek Bldg.

Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th
Cir. 2007).

“Where . . . there is a factual attack on the

subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint, no
presumptive truthfulness applies to the allegations” in the
complaint.

Id.

“Under a factual attack . . . the court can

actually weigh evidence to confirm the existence of the factual
predicates for subject-matter jurisdiction.”

McCormick, 693

F.3d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In its review,

the district court has wide discretion to allow affidavits,
documents, and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve
jurisdictional facts.”

Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at

330.

9

In the case presently before this Court, Plaintiff claims
that the Court has federal-question jurisdiction over her
§ 1981, Title VII, and FMLA claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006),
and “supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, including the [THRA claims].”
(Am. Compl., ECF No. 35, ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff also claims that this

Court has diversity jurisdiction over her claims, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (2006), “because the controversy is between ‘citizens’
of different states with an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000.”
2.

(Id.)

Failure to State a Claim
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court can dismiss a claim for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
In assessing a complaint for failure to state a claim,
[a court] must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well pled
factual allegations as true, and determine whether the
complaint
“contain[s]
sufficient
factual
matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”
Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 416 (6th Cir.
2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
3.

The Summary-Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
10

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Chapman v. UAW Local

1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012).

“In considering a

motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

Phelps v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F.3d 725, 730 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

“The central issue is ‘whether the

evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.’”

Id. (quoting Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).
B.

Plaintiff Concedes Her Title VII Sexual- and RacialHarassment Claims, so Those Claims Are Dismissed.
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff failed to exhaust

administrative remedies in relation to her Title VII sexual and
racial harassment claims.”
at 3.)

(Def.’s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 47-1,

Regarding her sexual-harassment claim, Defendant argues

that “Plaintiff has not filed a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC based on sex discrimination and/or harassment.”
at 3.)

(Id.

Regarding her racial-harassment claim, Defendant argues

that, “[w]hile Plaintiff filed a race discrimination claim with
the EEOC for failure to promote, at no time did Plaintiff file a
[racial-] harassment claim.”

(Id. at 5.)

11

“Before a plaintiff may sue under Title VII in federal
court, she must first exhaust her administrative remedies, one
component of which is timely filing a ‘charge’ with the EEOC.”
Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 507-08 (6th Cir.
2011).
[I]n order for an EEOC filing to constitute a “charge”
that
is
necessary
to
exhaust
an
employee’s
administrative remedies under Title VII, the filing
(1) must be “verified” — that is, submitted under oath
or penalty of perjury, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.3(a); (2) must
contain information that is “sufficiently precise to
identify the parties, and to describe generally the
action or practices complained of,” id. § 1601.12(b);
and (3) must comply with [Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 398, 402 (2008)] — that is,
an “objective observer” must believe that the filing
“taken as a whole” suggests that the employee
“requests the agency to activate its machinery and
remedial processes.”
Williams, 643 F.3d at 509.
In her Response, however, Plaintiff concedes her Title VII
sexual- and racial-harassment claims:
Plaintiff’s racial harassment claims are already
encompassed by the longer statute of limitation
afforded to her under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
And her
sexual harassment claim is encompassed by her timely
filing under the THRA. . . .
So, rather than engage
in a tedious ‘scope of charge’ argument, Plaintiff
concedes the racial and sexual harassment claims under
Title VII.
She does not concede any other claims
under Title VII.
(ECF No. 48 at 3.)
Plaintiff concedes that she has not exhausted her
administrative remedies regarding her Title VII sexual- and

12

racial-harassment claims, so Defendant is entitled to relief
regarding those claims.

Plaintiff concedes that she did not

“first exhaust her administrative remedies” regarding her
sexual- and racial-harassment claims because those claims were
not within the scope of the Charges of Discrimination that she
filed with the EEOC.

See Williams, 643 F.3d at 507-09.

As a

result, Plaintiff does not “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” regarding her Title VII sexual- and
racial-harassment claims, and Defendant is entitled to relief
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

See Dudenhoefer, 692 F.3d at 416

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Since dismissal of the sexual- and racial-harassment claims
is appropriate2 under 12(b)(6), the Court need not consider
whether those claims could survive summary judgment under Rule
56.
Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 47), therefore, is GRANTED
regarding Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual- and racial-harassment
claims.

Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual- and racial-harassment

claims, therefore, are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2

Relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is inappropriate because “exhaustion is not
a jurisdictional prerequisite” for Title VII claims. See Hill v. Nicholson,
383 F. App’x 503, 508 (6th Cir. 2010); Wrobbel v. IBEW, Local 17, 638 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 792 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

13

C.

Plaintiff’s THRA Claims Are Not Time-Barred and, Therefore,
Are Not Dismissed.
Pursuant to Tennessee law, “[a] civil cause of action under

[the THRA] shall be filed in chancery court or circuit court
within one (1) year after the alleged discriminatory practice
ceases.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d); Booker v. Boeing Co.,

188 S.W.3d 639, 648 (Tenn. 2006).

District courts in the Sixth

Circuit apply this statute of limitations to THRA claims.

See,

e.g., Cline v. BWXT Y-12, LLC, 521 F.3d 507, 511 (6th Cir. 2008)
(affirming the district court’s application of the one-year
limitation established in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d)).
Defendant argues that all of Plaintiff’s THRA claims are
barred by the one-year statute of limitations because those
claims were not raised until Plaintiff filed her Amended
Complaint:
[A] THRA suit must be filed within one year of the
date that the alleged unlawful conduct ceased. Given
that Plaintiff alleged, for the first time, a
violation of the THRA in her November 8, 2012 [sic]
Amended Complaint, any unlawful conduct that allegedly
occurred prior to November 8, 2011 [sic] is barred by
the applicable statute of limitations. . . .
[The]
violations [of the THRA claimed by Plaintiff] are
alleged to have occurred on or prior to May 31, 2011.
As these claims are outside of the limitations period,
Plaintiff’s THRA claims are barred.
(Def.’s Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 47-1, at 3 (citations omitted).)
Plaintiff relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c)(1)(B) to argue that her “THRA claims under the Amended

14

Complaint relate back to the original filing date of February
27, 2012 [sic] and, being well inside a year of Plaintiff’s
termination, are timely filed.”

(Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 48, at 2-

3.)
The Court first determines whether Plaintiff’s THRA claims
relate back to the date of the Original Complaint and then
determines whether Defendant is entitled to relief under Rule
12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6), or Rule 56.
1.

Plaintiff’s THRA Claims Relate Back to the Date of the
Original Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c)(1)(B).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B),3 “[a]n

amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
When applying this standard to the facts of a given
case, we give meaning to those terms “not by generic
or ideal notions of what constitutes a ‘conduct,
3

When a state statute of limitations would otherwise bar a claim, federal
courts apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to determine if a claim
relates back to the time of the original pleading. See Hageman v. Signal
L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 483-85 (6th Cir. 1973) (applying Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 when an Ohio statute of limitations would have barred a
claim); Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Cong. Mortg. Corp., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 n.4
(5th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 15(c)’s relation back doctrine, though it has the
ultimate effect of ‘tolling’ limitations, is considered by this court to be
purely procedural and is thus governed by federal law.”); 19 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4509 (2d ed. 1996). Even if
state law were applied, Plaintiff’s claims would relate back. See Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 15.03; Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 33
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

15

transaction, or occurrence,’ but instead by asking
whether the party asserting the statute of limitations
defense had been placed on notice that he could be
called to answer for the allegations in the amended
pleading.” The Rule also must be interpreted in light
of the “fundamental tenor of the Rules,” which “is one
of liberality rather than technicality.”
Hall v. Spencer Cnty., Ky., 583 F.3d 930, 934 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Bledsoe v.
Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 516 (6th Cir. 2007) and
Miller v. Am. Heavy Lift Shipping, 231 F.3d 242, 248 (6th Cir.
2000)).
In the case presently before this Court, Harrison’s and
Bosarge’s treatment of Plaintiff while Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant, as alleged in the Original Complaint, is also the
basis for Plaintiff’s THRA claims in her Amended Complaint.
(Compare ECF No. 1, with ECF No. 35); see also supra Part I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B), Plaintiff’s
THRA claims relate back to the date of the Original Complaint.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint “merely asserts a new legal theory
arising out of the same occurrence[s] as asserted in the
original complaint,” so “Defendant[] had adequate notice of the
nature and scope of the allegations in the amended complaint.”
See Hall, 583 F.3d at 934 (holding that a new constitutional
claim related back because it was based on the same pattern of
conduct identified in the original complaint).

16

2.

Defendant’s Argument Is Meritless, so Defendant Is Not
Entitled to Relief.
Defendant is not entitled to relief under Rule 12(b)(1),

Rule 12(b)(6), or Rule 56.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),

Defendant’s argument regarding the statute of limitations is
meritless and does not affect the Court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s THRA claims.

Pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), Defendant’s argument regarding the statute of
limitations does not affect Plaintiff’s ability to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face” regarding her
THRA claims.

Dudenhoefer, 692 F.3d at 416 (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted).

And, pursuant

to Rule 56, Defendant’s arguments regarding the relevant statute
of limitations do not establish that there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law” regarding Plaintiff’s THRA claims.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Chapman, 670 F.3d at 680.
Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 47), therefore, is DENIED
regarding Plaintiff’s THRA claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Dismissal or, in the Alternative, Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.

17

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED regarding Plaintiff’s Title
VII sexual- and racial-harassment claims.

Those claims are

hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Defendant’s Motion is DENIED regarding Plaintiff’s THRA
claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 6th day of March, 2013.
/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON PHIPPS McCALLA
CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

18