Hawkins v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. et al

Filing 88

ORDER granting 71 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting Report and Recommendations 83 . Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 11/18/13. (Anderson, S.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
AYANNA N. HAWKINS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
No. 12-2325-STA-cgc
)
INTERSTATE BLOOD BANK, INC.,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is the United States Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (D.E.
# 83) that Defendant Interstate Blood Bank, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment (D.E. # 71) be
granted. Plaintiff Ayanna N. Hawkins, who is acting pro se, has filed a timely objection to the
Report, and Defendant has filed a response to Plaintiff’s objection. Having reviewed the Report,
Plaintiff’s objection, and the parties’ summary judgment briefing, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The Court hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge’s report of the following procedural and
factual background, to which neither party has raised any objection: Plaintiff filed a Complaint
against Defendant Interstate Blood Bank, Inc., Judith Upton, and Karen Winchester, alleging that
these parties racially harassed her and terminated her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII

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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The Court dismissed sua sponte
Plaintiff’s claims against Winchester and Upton pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because
Title VII does not give a remedy against co-workers or supervisors in their individual capacities.
Only Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. remained as a defendant. Defendant filed its motion for summary
judgment on August 30, 2013, and Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on September 27, 2013,
to which Defendant filed a reply on October 10. 2013. Plaintiff filed a document purporting to be
a sur-reply (D.E. # 82) on October 24, 2013. As Plaintiff’s sur-reply was filed without leave of
Court and the Local Rules only authorize the filing of a response by the non-moving party, the
Magistrate Judge declined to consider it in preparing her Report and Recommendation.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy on March
3, 2010. (Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1.) The Bankruptcy Court dismissed
the petition in November 2011 for failure to make payment plans. (Id., Ex. 2.) Plaintiff filed a
second Voluntary Petition for Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in December 2011, this time with the
assistance of counsel. (Id., Ex. 3.) Plaintiff submitted her schedule of assets the following month
and marked “none” next to the box asking for identification of “[o]ther contingent claims of every
nature” in Schedule B— Personal Property. (Id., Ex. 4.) Plaintiff did not include anything regarding
her discrimination claim in her Statement of Financial Affairs, nor did she otherwise identify her
potential claim anywhere in her schedules. (Id.) Plaintiff went on to verify, under penalty of perjury,
that the information in her schedules was true and correct. (Id.) Ultimately, the bankruptcy court
entered an order confirming Plaintiff’s proposed plan on March 19, 2012. (Id., Exs. 5, 6.)
Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) on July 15, 2011, alleging discrimination on the basis of race. Plaintiff filed
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her charge before she filed the second petition. Plaintiff admits that she omitted her discrimination
claim and that the Bankruptcy Court adopted the proposed Chapter 13 plan. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 6.) On September 6, 2013, after Defendant had filed its
Rule 56 motion arguing judicial estoppel, Plaintiff amended her Schedule B— Personal Property and
Statement of Financial Affairs to include her discrimination claims in this lawsuit. (Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 18.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
a United States Magistrate Judge may hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense and
enter a recommended disposition along with proposed findings of fact.1 A party may file specific
written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition.2 The Court must “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to
which objection is made.”3 After reviewing the record, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify
the proposed findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.4 Moreover, the Court need not
review, under a de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the report and recommendation to

1

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1).

2

§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). In her timely objections, Plaintiff has
requested that the Magistrate Judge reconsider her Report. Pl.’s Objs. to the Mag. J.’s Rep. &
Recommendation 3. Because the Court is reviewing the Report, reconsideration of the Report is
unnecessary.
3

§ 636(b)(1)(C).

4

Id.
3

which no specific objection is made.5 Rather, the Court may adopt the findings and rulings of the
magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed.6
ANALYSIS
The Court hereby ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant judgment as a matter of law on
grounds of judicial estoppel.7 As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, “[t]he doctrine of judicial
estoppel is designed to prevent a party from prevailing in one phase of the case on an argument and
then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”8 The Magistrate Judge
concluded that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applied in this case because (1) Plaintiff has assumed
a position in her judicial Complaint that is contrary to one she asserted under oath in the bankruptcy
proceedings; (2) “the bankruptcy court adopted the contrary position either as a preliminary matter
or as part of a final disposition;” and (3) Plaintiff’s omission did not result from “mistake or
inadvertence.” Based on the undisputed material facts in this case, the Court finds that all of the
elements of judicial estoppel are satisfied at summary judgment.
The Court holds that no genuine dispute exists as to the first two elements of judicial
estoppel. First, Plaintiff has taken inconsistent positions in her judicial Complaint and before the

5

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

6

Id. at 151.

7

Defendant also sought judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. The
Magistrate Judge did not reach the merits of those claims because the judicial estoppel issue is
dispositive. Likewise, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s Title
VII claims because she is judicially estopped from pursuing the claims.
8

Mag. J.’s Rep. & Recommendation 5 (quoting White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership,
Inc., 617 F.3d 472, 476 (6th Cir. 2010)).
4

Bankruptcy Court. Although Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC in July 2011, Plaintiff did not
list the potential claim in her bankruptcy petition in December 2011. In other words Plaintiff’s
bankruptcy petition “essentially stated that [her discrimination] claim did not exist” and her judicial
Complaint in this Court took a contrary position.9 These facts satisfy the first element of judicial
estoppel. Second, the Magistrate Judge found that the Bankruptcy Court had adopted Plaintiff’s
contrary position. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed Plaintiff’s proposed plan in March 2012.
“[W]hen a bankruptcy court—which must protect the interests of all creditors—approves a payment
from the bankruptcy estate on the basis of a party’s assertion of a given position, that, in our view,
is sufficient judicial acceptance to estop the party from later advancing an inconsistent position.”10
Thus, the second element of judicial estoppel is also met.
With respect to the third element, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation
and concludes that Plaintiff’s omission was not mistaken or inadvertent. The Court’s analysis
focuses on whether (1) Plaintiff lacked knowledge of the factual basis of the undisclosed claims; (2)
Plaintiff had a motive for concealment; and (3) the evidence indicates an absence of bad faith. The
bad faith inquiry looks closely at Plaintiff’s “attempts to advise the bankruptcy court of her omitted
claim.”11 The Magistrate Judge decided that Plaintiff did not lack knowledge of the factual basis of
her undisclosed Title VII claims and had motive for concealment. The Court agrees. Plaintiff had
already filed a charge of discrimination some months before she filed her Chapter 13 petition in
December 2011. Plaintiff obviously knew about the facts that gave rise to a colorable Title VII.

9

White, 617 F.3d at 479.

10

Id.

11

Id. at 478.
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Plaintiff argues in her objections that while she knew about the relevant facts, she had not filed her
suit and did not know whether the Court would dismiss her suit. However, the filing of the suit and
its ultimate merits is not relevant to the question of whether Plaintiff knew about the facts giving rise
to a possible Title VII claim. Clearly Plaintiff had knowledge of the underlying facts of her Title VII
claims, as her summary judgment briefing shows. Plaintiff’s memorandum states that her managers
“created a hostile and offensive work environment for Plaintiff on or about November 2010 until
May 9, 2011.”12 Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s objection on this point is not persuasive.
Moreover, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s proposed conclusion that Plaintiff has not
shown an absence of bad faith. The Magistrate Judge focused on Plaintiff’s attempts to correct her
bankruptcy filings and found that Plaintiff only amended her petition one week after Defendant filed
its motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed its Rule 56 motion on August 30, 2013, and
Plaintiff moved to amend her Chapter 13 petition on September 6, 2013. There is no other evidence
that Plaintiff had attempted to amend her bankruptcy filings at any time prior to the filing of
Defendant’s dispositive motion arguing judicial estoppel. Additionally, the record shows that when
Plaintiff received her right-to-sue letter (D.E. # 1-1) from the EEOC on January 30, 2012, the
Bankruptcy Court had not yet confirmed her proposed plan. The Bankruptcy Court entered its order
confirming her Chapter 13 plan (D.E. # 71-13) on March 19, 2012, and Plaintiff filed her judicial
Complaint on April 25, 2012. These circumstances also tend to show that there is not an absence
of bad faith in this case.13 Therefore, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation on the bad
faith issue.

12

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 2.

13

White, 617 F.3d at 482.
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In her objections, Plaintiff requests an opportunity to defend her credibility on the issue,
arguing that the “Court, along with the Defendant, has tried to discredit Plaintiff and destroy her
credibility.”14 The Court would simply state that in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the
Court cannot and does not make credibility determinations.15 The Court’s task at summary judgment
is to determine whether Defendant has shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and whether Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the judicial estoppel issue.16
In support of its Rule 56 motion, Defendant has adduced evidence showing that Plaintiff failed to
include her Title VII claims in her bankruptcy filings. As the non-moving party, Plaintiff has the
burden to offer proof that she should not be judicially estopped from prosecuting her Title VII
Complaint before this Court. Plaintiff can make this showing in any number of ways, for example,
by proving that she attempted to correct her bankruptcy filings or that she had no motive to conceal
her Title VII claims.
However, for the reasons already discussed, Plaintiff has not carried her burden to survive
summary judgment. This is not to say that Plaintiff lacks credibility; the Court merely concludes that
Plaintiff has not adduced relevant evidence to show that her mistake in omitting her Title VII claims
from her bankruptcy filings was simply inadvertent. Plaintiff has asserted that she made a mistake
in omitting her Title VII claims from her bankruptcy filings because she had not yet filed her suit at
the time she prepared her Chapter 13 petition and she did not yet know whether her suit would be

14

Pl.’s Objs. to the Mag. J.’s Rep. & Recommendation 2.

15

Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 379 (6th Cir. 1994).

16

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Canderm
Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharms, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988).
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meritorious. Even accepting these facts as true, they do not show that Plaintiff should not be
estopped from litigating her Title VII claims in this forum.17 Therefore, Plaintiff’s objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation are overruled.
Having reviewed the Report, Plaintiff’s objection, and the parties’ summary judgment
briefing, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and GRANT Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: November 18, 2013.

17

Plaintiff further argues in her objections that she is prejudiced as a pro se litigant.
However, Plaintiff has not shown why her lack of counsel in this case is relevant to the issue of
judicial estoppel. As is clear from the record, Plaintiff has filed a number of papers vigorously
prosecuting her interests in this matter. Plaintiff has now had a full opportunity for discovery. It
also appears that Plaintiff filed her Chapter 13 petition and amended her filings in September
2013 with the assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Plaintiff’s pro se status has any bearing on the judicial estoppel issue.
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