Sanford v. Schofield et al
Filing
153
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 132 . Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/10/15. (Todd, James)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
GERALD A. SANFORD, SR.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
DERRICK SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 12-2685-JDT-tmp
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Gerald A. Sanford, Sr., an inmate who was formerly confined at the West
Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”), filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. On March 19, 2013, the court severed the claims against Phillip Seals, Sergeant David
Breece, Sergeant David Gary, Corporal Charlie Jones, Officer Tibbs, Officer Brewer, Jason
Staggs, Bruce Coats, Sergeant Amanda Staggs, Sergeant Jason Clendenion, Ronnie Williams,
Warden Jerry Lester, Deputy TDOC Commissioner Jason Woodall, and TDOC
Commissioner Derrick Schofield that allegedly arose from events that occurred at the Turney
Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”) and transferred those claims to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee; dismissed the claims based on actions
at WTSP against Defendants Corporal Lawson, Corporal Hankins, Officer Blackwell,
Deputy WTSP Warden Wayne Carpenter, Unit Manager Margaret Smith, Assistant TDOC
Commissioner Jason Woodall, WTSP Assistant Warden Tommy Mills, and former TDOC
Commissioner Reuben Hodge; and ordered service of process on Officer Brian Taylor,
Officer Jelks, Officer Josh Lovelady, Corporal Maubry,1 Captain Sharon Wilson, and Nurse
Jane [DE# 10]. On July 8, 2013, Nurse Jane and Corporal Maubry were dismissed from the
action [DE# 32]. On November 15, 2013, the court granted Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily
dismiss Carla Jelks as a defendant [DE# 60].
Defendants Lovelady, Taylor, and Wilson (the only remaining defendants) have filed
a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [DE# 132]. Plaintiff has filed a response
to the motion [DE# 150].
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is
GRANTED.2
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’–that is,
pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Revised Rule
56(c)(1) provides that “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” is
required to support that assertion by:
(A)
citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers or
1
Defendant Corporal Maubry’s correct name appears to be “Corporal Mawby.” The complaint and
docket sheet use the spelling “Maubry,” and, therefore, the court has also used that spelling in this order.
2
Because the court has considered matters outside the pleadings, the court has decided the motion
under the summary judgment standard.
2
other materials;[3] or
(B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.
“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)” the district court may:
(1)
give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
(2)
consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(3)
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials–
including the facts considered undisputed–show that the movant is
entitled to it; or
(4)
issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
In Celotex Corp., the Supreme Court explained that Rule 56:
mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there
can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled
to judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to
which [he] has the burden of proof.
3
“A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a
form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Additionally, Rule 56(c)(4) specifically
provides that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge,
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on
the matters stated.”
3
477 U.S. at 322-23. In considering whether to grant summary judgment, “the evidence as
well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986);
see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986)
(same).
A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence [presented by the non-moving
party] is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably
asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict[.]”
Id. at 252; see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56[(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). However, the court’s
function is not to weigh the evidence, judge credibility, or in any way determine the truth of
the matter. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. Rather, the inquiry is “whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 21, 2011, WTSP Officers Taylor,
Jelks, and Lovelady arrived at his cell to transport him to the property room. Plaintiff alleges
that, when he advised Defendant Lovelady that his wrists required a bigger set of handcuffs
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or two sets of handcuffs, Lovelady slammed the pie flap on his hands. Plaintiff further
alleges that, after he was handcuffed, Defendant Lovelady began bumping him as they were
walking, even though he asked Defendant to stop. When Plaintiff complained about
Defendant Lovelady’s actions, former Defendant Corporal Maubry grabbed Plaintiff by the
handcuffs and shoved Plaintiff into a corner with Defendant Lovelady’s assistance. Plaintiff
alleges that former Defendant Maubry and Defendant Lovelady attempted to choke him and
pulled and twisted on the handcuffs. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Taylor was present
during the assault but failed to intervene.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilson took him to the nurse, who denied him medical
care. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wilson limited the number of pictures taken of his
injuries. Plaintiff allegedly did not receive medical treatment until he was transferred to
another institution and continues to need treatment for the injuries that he sustained. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Wilson was on notice of abusive conduct by Maubry and Lovelady
but failed to discipline them or control their behavior.
In their motion, Defendant argue that they did not violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. In
support of their argument, Defendants have presented the following statement of undisputed
facts [DE# 132-9.]4
Plaintiff was told by Officer Lovelady that he needed to pack his belongings because
4
Neither the complaint nor Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion is verified. Furthermore,
Plaintiff has presented no affidavits to rebut Defendants’ statement of facts.
5
he was going to be transported to another institution. Lovelady Affidavit, ¶ 3.5 When Officer
Lovelady returned to Plaintiff’s cell to retrieve him, Plaintiff refused to be handcuffed. Id.
¶ 4. Officer Lovelady left to inform Captain Wilson that Plaintiff was refusing to be
restrained. When Lovelady returned, another officer had managed to restrain Plaintiff. Id. ¶
5. However, Plaintiff was upset because Officer Lovelady would not allow him to be
restrained in front of his body and would not use two sets of connected handcuffs, which
Plaintiff contended were necessary due to his large size. Id. ¶ 4.
Eventually, Plaintiff was removed from his cell and was being escorted to the
transportation area when he started hollering, cursing, and causing other inmates in his pod
to become unruly. Id. ¶ 8. When Officer Lovelady placed his hand on Plaintiff’s elbow,
Plaintiff became irate and yelled at Officer Lovelady to get his hands off him. Id. Other
inmates began to holler and kick on their cell doors; Plaintiff tried to jerk away from the
officers and then attempted to “walk-through” Corporal Maubry, who was assisting
Defendant Lovelady. Affidavit of Norman Layne, TOMIS Incident Report. Because Corporal
Maubry had repeatedly asked Plaintiff to stop his abusive behavior and then Plaintiff
assaulted Corporal Maubry, it was necessary for the officers to take Plaintiff to the ground
to regain control of him. Id. Captain Wilson was summoned to assist in handling the
situation.
Plaintiff was examined twice by prison medical staff, pursuant to TDOC policy.
5
The notarized copy of Defendant Lovelady’s affidavit is found at docket entry number 136-2.
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Affidavit of Sharon Wilson, ¶ 3. Immediately after Plaintiff was taken to the ground, he was
seen in his unit by Nurse Collins. Plaintiff’s Medical Record, p. 1. Plaintiff complained that
his wrists hurt because the handcuffs were too tight, but his skin was intact, and there were
no marks on his wrists. Id. Nurse Collins noted that there was room between the handcuffs
and Plaintiff’s wrists. Id.
Plaintiff was seen again at 8:45 in the prison clinic. Id. p. 24. Nurse Collins “observed
cuff’s [with] room to move, [no] marks noted. Assessed inmate and sent back to cell.” Id.
There is no mention of cuts, bleeding, or injuries to any other part of Plaintiff’s body in the
record. Id.
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits
the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain upon prisoners. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319-20 (1986) The unjustified infliction of bodily harm on a prisoner by a correctional
officer gives rise to a claim under § 1983. Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.
1992); Franklin v. Aycock, 795 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1986). However, the mere fact that
a prisoner was subjected to physical contact does not, by itself, show an Eighth Amendment
violation, Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1986), and the good faith use of
physical force in pursuit of valid penological goals rarely, if ever, violates the Eighth
Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
In order to show an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must prove both that he
suffered an objectively serious injury and that the defendants acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind in applying the force complained about. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
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825, (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991). With respect to the subjective element of an Eighth Amendment claim, the core
inquiry is “whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. Courts
have recognized that the use of force in such a volatile and dangerous setting as a prison
facility is sometimes unavoidable. Id. at 6.
In the present case, Defendants have presented unrefuted evidence that Plaintiff was
taken to the ground with the least amount of force necessary, only after he became unruly,
attempted to jerk away from the officers escorting him, and attempted to “walk through” an
officer. Defendant Officer Lovelady used only the force necessary to maintain order in the
prison and, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Taylor was present when Officer
Lovelady began assaulting him by “bumping” into him. Plaintiff also alleges that Officer
Taylor told him, “Hold on, I’m trying to get you out of here as fast as I can,” but never told
Officer Lovelady to stop and did not intervene when Officer Lovelady allegedly assaulted
him. However, in his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Officer Taylor, “never laid a finger
on him,” Sandford Depo., p. 24, l. 5, 6, and that Officer Taylor just stood in the hallway
watching him get assaulted. Id. p. 22, l. 20. Later, he testified that Officer Taylor might have
assaulted him, but he was not sure. Id. p. 30, l. 9-11.
In order to establish that Defendant Officer Taylor violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
right based on a failure to intervene, Plaintiff must show that Defendant was aware of facts
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which would have alerted him that there was a substantial risk that another person was going
to seriously harm Plaintiff. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838(1994); Quigley v. Tuong
Vinh Thai, 707 F. 3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013); Turner v. Scott, 119 F. 3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.
1997). Thus, Plaintiff must show that Officer Taylor was actually aware of the substantial
risk of serious harm that would have been caused by the excessive force, Defendant was
deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk of serious harm, and Defendant had the
opportunity and means to prevent the harm from occurring. Id.
Defendant Officer Taylor is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not
established the elements of a failure to intervene claim. There is no evidence in the record
that Plaintiff was punched, kicked, or choked, and the medical record reflects no discernable
injury immediately after the incident. Plaintiff’s Medical Record, pp. 1, 24. Officer Taylor
cannot recall seeing Plaintiff being subjected to excessive force, nor does he recall any
incident at all, involving Plaintiff. Taylor Affidavit, ¶ 3. Because there is no evidence that
Plaintiff was subjected to unjustified force or that Officer Taylor witnessed the force and had
an opportunity to prevent it, the court grants the portion of Defendants’ motion seeking
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Officer Taylor.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Captain Wilson escorted him to the prison infirmary
to see a nurse but purposely had “limited pictures taken” of his injuries. He also alleges that
she refused to remove his handcuffs so that his alleged injuries could be photographed. He
further alleges that he could not receive proper medical treatment because of the handcuffs.
Defendants have presented unrefuted evidence that Captain Wilson was called to the
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unit after incident to assist with getting Plaintiff to medical, photographing his injuries, and
ensuring that the requisite paperwork was completed. Wilson Affidavit, ¶ 7. Captain Wilson
brought the camera to photograph Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 8. There is no evidence that Captain Wilson
deviated from prison policy in regard to photographing a prisoner’s injuries.
Captain Wilson escorted Plaintiff to the clinic and did not observe any injury to him
or his wrists. Wilson Affidavit, ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s medical records show that the prison nurse,
Nurse Collins, examined Plaintiff and found no injuries. Nurse Collins found that Plaintiff
had adequate room in between the handcuffs and his wrists. The claim that Captain Wilson
prohibited
the
nurse
from assessing
Plaintiff’s
injuries
is
refuted
by
the
Accident/Incident/Traumatic Injury Report and the nurse’s notes, both recorded within
fifteen minutes of the use of force. Plaintiff’s Medical Record, pp. 1, 24. As noted by
Defendants, handcuffs are not such a device that could conceal an injury, if there actually
was one. Any injuries could be seen without having to remove the restraints. Moreover,
prison policy prohibited Captain Wilson from removing Plaintiff’s restraints based on his
security classification.
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, (1976). This is true whether the indifference is manifested by
prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment
once prescribed.” Id. As such, deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is the proper
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standard for Eighth Amendment claims based on a refusal to provide medical treatment. Id.
at 105. In the present case, the unrefuted evidence shows that Captain Wilson was not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
Finally, Plaintiff complains of the manner in which Captain Wilson handled his
grievance. He alleges that she was negligent “for not acknowledging the assault and denial
of medical care in the grievance.” Allegations that a defendant mishandled a grievance or
failed to investigate a complaint fail to state a claim under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199
F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). A “combination of knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and
failure to respond or remedy the complaint is insufficient to impose liability upon supervisory
personnel under § 1983.” Henry v. Pogats, 1994 WL 462129, at *2 (6th Cir. 1994). Therefore,
Captain Wilson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim, as well as the
deliberate indifference claim.
Defendants have presented unrefuted evidence that they did not violate Plaintiff’s
rights and, therefore, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendants’
motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment [DE# 132] is GRANTED. The clerk is
DIRECTED to enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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