Cameron v. Nelson, Inc.
Filing
43
ORDER granting 39 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 3/28/2014.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
Willie Cameron,
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Plaintiff,
v.
Nelson, Inc., a Tennessee
Profit Corporation, and Willie
Nelson, individually,
Defendants.
No. 12-2702
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff Willie Cameron (“Cameron”)
filed this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
against
Defendant
Nelson,
Inc.,
seeking
unpaid
liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
No. 1.)
adding
(Compl., ECF
On July 9, 2013, Cameron filed an Amended Complaint
Willie
“Defendants”)
Nelson
to
the
(“Nelson”)
action
retaliation under the FLSA.
6.)
overtime,
(together
and
with
alleging
Nelson,
one
Inc.,
count
of
(Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 at 1, 5,
Before the Court is Cameron’s December 23, 2013 Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (the “Motion”).
(Mot., ECF No. 39.)
Defendants have not responded and the time do so has passed.
For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
Cameron asks the Court to grant summary judgment that (1)
Nelson was Cameron’s employer within the meaning of the FLSA,
and (2) Defendants are a covered “Enterprise” under the FLSA.
(Mot. at 2.)
Because Defendants have not responded, Cameron’s
Statement of Undisputed Facts is accepted for purposes of the
Motion.
See L.R. 56.1(d).
Nelson, Inc. was incorporated in Tennessee in 2000.
Undisp. F., ECF No. at 3.)
(Stat.
Nelson is the sole owner of Nelson,
Inc., and controls its finances and operations.
(Id. at 2.)
Cameron worked as a heavy equipment operator for Nelson, Inc.
from August 2011 through January 2012.
by
the
hour
and
was
entitled
overtime hours worked.
Because
Cameron
to
(Id.)
overtime
Cameron was paid
compensation
for
(Id.)
asserts
claims
under
federal
law,
this
Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Summary judgment is proper if no reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.
See Wasek v. Arrow Energy
Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The FLSA defines “employer” to include “any person acting
directly
or
indirectly
in
the
relation to an employee . . . .”
interest
of
an
employer
in
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (accord
Dole v. Elliot Travel Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.
1991) (“[T]he FLSA require[s] the courts to define ‘employer’
2
more broadly than the term would be interpreted in traditional
common law applications.”))
Nelson owned and controlled Nelson,
Inc., acting directly in its interest in relation to Cameron.
Nelson qualifies as Cameron’s employer under the FLSA.
The
FLSA
defines
“Enterprise”
to
mean
“the
related
activities performed . . . by any person or persons for a common
business
purpose.”
29
U.S.C.
§
203(r)(1).
engaged in commerce” is subject to the FLSA.
An
“enterprise
Herman v. Fabri-
Centers of America, Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2002).
Defendants
were
engaged
in
commerce
with
a
common
purpose,
qualifying as an Enterprise subject to the FLSA.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
So ordered this 31st day of March, 2014.
s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.______
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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