Jones v. Accredo Health Group, Inc.

Filing 15

ORDER denying 7 Motion to Strike. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 04/10/2013.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

MALINDA S. JONES,

Plaintiff,
v.
ACCREDO HEALTH GROUP, INC.,

Defendant.

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No. 12-3016

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE

Before the Court is Defendant Accredo Health Group, Inc.’s
(“Accredo Health”) January 17, 2013 Motion to Strike.
Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 7) (the “Motion.”)
to

strike

any

Commission’s

reference

(“EEOC”)

and immaterial.

to

the

Equal

reasonable

cause

Accredo Health seeks

Employment
finding

impertinent

(Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 9.)

Accredo Health replied on February 12, 2013.

(Rep. to Resp.,

For the following reasons, Accredo Health’s Motion

is DENIED.
I.

as

Opportunity

Plaintiff Malinda Jones (“Jones”) responded on

January 31, 2013.

ECF No. 12.)

(Def.’s

Background

Jones
Americans

is

suing

with

Accredo

Disability

U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.

Health

Act

for

violations

Amendments

Act

of

the

(“ADAAA”),

42

Jones suffers from Muscular Dystrophy,

a degenerative muscle disease that damages the musculoskeletal
system.

(Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 1.)

Accredo Health allegedly

refused

to

Jones

hire

and/or

provide

with

reasonable

accommodations when she sought employment as a pharmaceutical
technician (“PT”).

(Id. ¶¶ 9-33.)

Jones prays for injunctive

relief, damages, and an order compelling Accredo Health to hire
(Id. at 6.)

her as a PT and provide reasonable accommodations.

On August 22, 2012, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to
Sue

with

a

finding

of

reasonable

cause

to

believe

that

violations of the ADAAA had occurred (the “EEOC finding”).

(Id.

¶ 8); (see also Notice of Right to Sue, ECF No. 1-4.)

Relying

on Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Sixth
Circuit precedent, Accredo Health argues that all references to
the

EEOC

finding

immaterial.

should

Jones

be

stricken

argues

that

Accredo

as

impertinent

Health’s

argument

and
is

premature; the exclusion of EEOC determinations, Jones argues,
is an evidentiary decision made on a case-by-case basis.
II.
“The

Standard of Review
court

may

strike

from

a

pleading

any

redundant,

immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(f).

to

“It

is

well

settled
2

that

motions

strike

are

disfavored and should be granted only when the allegations being
challenged are so unrelated to the plaintiff’s claim as to be
unworthy of any consideration . . . and that their presence in
the pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial to
the moving party.”
U.S.

Dist.

(internal

Zampieri v. Zampieri, No.: 3:08-CV-290, 2009

LEXIS

92152,

citation

and

at

*6

(E.D.

quotation

Tenn.

marks

Sept.

30,

omitted);

2009)

see

also

Anderson v. United States, 39 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Rule 12(f) should be “resorted to only when required for the
purpose of justice” and when “the pleading to be stricken has no
possible relation to the controversy”) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).

The party seeking to strike bears

the burden of providing “the Court any reason why [the] language
is

immaterial,

impertinent,

or

scandalous.”

Copeland

v.

Hussmann Corp., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1023 n.11 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
III. Analysis
Accredo Health argues that the EEOC finding is impertinent
and

immaterial.

precedent

that

Accredo
an

“EEOC

Health

relies

on

Sixth

cause

determination

Circuit

carries

an

evidentiary value of practically zero” and that a court “should
be free to adopt a general rule that refuses to admit these
cause determinations in any sort of trial, whether to the court
or a jury.”

See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS

26263, at *24, 37 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1995); see also Sails v.
3

Rockwell Automation, No. 2:12-cv-02220-STA-cgc (W.D. Tenn. June
6, 2012) (Claxton, M.J.).

Jones argues that the Motion should

be denied because: (1) the relevance of the EEOC finding is an
evidentiary issue that should be considered on a case-by-case
basis; (2) Accredo Health will not be prejudiced by denying the
Motion; and (3) the EEOC finding is not asserted as a factual
averment, but rather as a necessary statement establishing that
she has exhausted her administrative remedies.
Impertinent and immaterial are terms of art.

Immaterial

claims “are those lacking essential or important relationships
to

the

claim

Servicing,

for

LLC,

relief.”

No.

Simms

4:08CV01480

v.

ERW,

Chase

2009

U.S.

Student

Loan

Dist.

LEXIS

28977, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2009) (citation omitted).
“Impertinent claims are those that do not pertain to the issues
in question.”

Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp., 870 F. Supp.

962, 977 (E.D. Mo. 1994)).
“‘In deciding whether to strike a Rule 12(f) motion on the
ground

that

the

matter

is

impertinent

and

immaterial,

it

is

settled that the motion will be denied, unless it can be shown
that

no

evidence

admissible.’”

in

support

of

the

allegation

would

be

Slicker v. Southwest Airlines, No. 2:09-CV-11217,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103218, at *14 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2009)
(quoting

Lipsky

v.

Commonwealth

United

Corporation,

551

F.2d

887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976)); see also Hyland v. Homeservices of
4

America, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-612-R, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47503,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2007)).
especially

be

avoided

proceedings.”

at

such

Evidentiary questions “should
a

preliminary

stage

of

the

Slicker, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103218, at *14

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

If material is stricken

on admissibility grounds, the complaint should be “pruned with
care.”

Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Accredo Health seeks to strike the following:
7.
On May 24, 2010, Ms. Jones filed a charge of
disability discrimination against Defendant Accredo
with the [EEOC].
The charge – attached hereto as
Exhibit 1 – was filed within three hundred (300) days
after
the
alleged
unlawful
employment
practice
occurred.
8.
On August 22, 2012, the EEOC issued a Notice of
Right to Sue (Conciliation Failure) with a finding of
reasonable cause to believe that violations of the
ADAAA occurred.

(Compl. ¶¶ 7-8.)
Accredo

Health

argues

that

Sails,

a

case

from

this

district, supports striking all references to the EEOC finding.
In Sails, the court struck portions of the following language:
11. Plaintiff thereafter received a Notice of Right
to Sue within 90 days from the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission dated February 1, 2012, in
which the EEOC determined that there was reasonable
cause to believe that violations of the statute
occurred which she received three days later on
February 4, 2012.
. . .

5

19.
After
a
complete
investigation
the
EEOC
determined that Plaintiff’s pay is unequal to her male
counterparts and issued a finding that there is
reasonable cause to believe Rockwell violated the
statute.
Sails, No. 2:12-cv-02220-STA-cgc, at 2 (emphasis in original).
The court struck Paragraph 19 in its entirety and the underlined
portion of Paragraph 11 because an “‘EEOC cause determination
carries an evidentiary value of practically zero.’”

Id. at 2-3

(quoting Ford Motor Co., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 26263, at *37).
The court in Sails relied on Ford Motor Co., a case in
which the Sixth Circuit addressed whether it was permissible for
a district court “to institute a blanket rule [excluding EEOC
See Ford Motor Co., 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS

case determinations].”
26263, at *25.
court

could

The Sixth Circuit concluded that a district
adopt

a

blanket

rule

because

“EEOC

cause

determination[s] . . . present[] evidence of discrimination that
the

EEOC

considered,”

adduced at trial.”

which

“[p]resumably

Id. at *26-27.

.

.

.

[w]ould

be

In other words, EEOC cause

determinations are often excluded on grounds of redundancy, not
relevancy.

Id. at *27 (“Much of that same evidence could be

adduced at trial, and therefore the admission of the EEOC cause
determination referencing it would be redundant.”).
The court did not overrule or call into question Weems v.
Ball Metal and Chem. Div., 753 F.2d 527, 528, n.1 (6th Cir.
1985), in which the Sixth Circuit concluded that an EEOC cause
6

determination “in the sound discretion of the trial court, may
be admitted into evidence.”

Indeed, Ford Motor Co. discusses

Weems, concluding that, although there is no per se rule in
favor

of

admissibility,

district

general rule of inadmissibility.
App. LEXIS 26263, at *25-26.
Motor

Co.,

combined

with

a

evidentiary

matters,

suggest

courts

are

free

to

adopt

a

See Ford Motor Co., 1996 U.S.
The court’s statements in Ford

district

court’s

that

admissibility

in

of

EEOC

cause determinations can occur on a case-by-case basis.

See

Jordan
109159,

v.
at

Krystal
*3

Co.,

(E.D.

the

discretion

1:09-CV-142,

Tenn.

Oct.

12,

2010
2010)

U.S.

Dist.

(citing

LEXIS

Wright

v.

Columbia Sussex Corp., No. 3:06-CV-190, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
28096, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 7, 2008)).
Allegations about the EEOC finding should not be stricken.
Accredo Health essentially asks the Court to make a preliminary
evidentiary ruling before the parties have had an opportunity to
conduct

discovery

or

gather

their

most

effective

evidence.

Evidentiary questions “should especially be avoided at such a
preliminary stage of the proceedings.”

Slicker, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 103218, at *14 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Jones’ allegations about the EEOC finding are relevant and not
prejudicial because the finding is contained in a right-to-sue
letter

from

the

EEOC,

the

receipt

of

precedent to filing a Title VII action.”
7

which

“is

a

condition

Rivers v. Barbeton Bd.

of

Educ.,

143

F.3d

1029,

1031

(6th

Cir.

1998).

As

trial

approaches and the parties’ proof develops, Accredo Health may
seek a direct ruling on the admissibility of the EEOC finding by
moving in limine for its exclusion.
IV.

Conclusion

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Accredo

Health’s

Motion

is

DENIED.
So ordered this 10th day of April, 2013.

s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr._______
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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