Benson v. Stock et al
Filing
5
ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, ORDER DISMISSING CASE, ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 6/17/2013. (Anderson, S.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
(
)
(
)
(
Plaintiff,
)
(
)
(
vs.
)
(
)
(
ASSOCIATE WARDEN STOCK, et al., (
)
)
(
Defendants.
)
(
)
(
RONNIE J. BENSON,
No. 12-3092-STA-tmp
ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 20, 2012, Plaintiff Ronnie J. Benson, Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) register number 12405-076, an inmate at the Federal
Correctional Institution in Memphis, Tennessee (“FCI Memphis”),
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct.
1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971). (ECF No. 1.) After Plaintiff filed
the required documents (ECF No. 3), the Court issued an order on
January 11, 2013, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.)
The Clerk shall record the defendants as FCI Memphis Associate
Warden
First
Administrator
Name
D.
Unknown
Franklund,
(“F/N/U”)
who
was
Stock;
Health
incorrectly
sued
Services
as
“D.
Franklin”;1 Assistant Health Services Administrator J. Hargrove;
Dr. N. Naimey; and S. Branch, C. Rodriguez, and R.C. Gaia, all of
whom are nurses.
The complaint alleges that, on September 2, 2011, Plaintiff
went to the medical department “complaining of a growth above his
right eye that hurts and interferes with his vision and hampers his
(Plaintiff) ability to sleep.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) He was provided no
medication or relief. (Id.) Plaintiff returned to the medical
department on September 30, 2011, complaining about his right eye
and stating that he was suffering “consistent pain.” (Id. ¶ 9.) “At
this time 9-30-11 Plaintiff was seen by a different MLP (mid-levelprovider). During this evaluation the MLP could not determine the
nature of the growth and informed Plaintiff that a consultation
would be submitted referring Plaintiff to an outside specialist.”
(Id.) Plaintiff received no other treatment at that time. (Id.)
Plaintiff
returned
to
sick
call
on
January
5,
2012,
complaining that the growth was increasingly painful. (Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff asked that a biopsy be performed because there was a
history of cancer in his family. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff “was
informed by medical staff that his condition has been properly
evaluated by medical staff (nurse practitioner/Clinical Director)
and a diagnosis of Sebaceous Cyst has been recorded in Plaintiff
medical records.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Also on January 5, 2012, Plaintiff
learned that the Utilization Review Committee (“URC”) denied the
1
The Clerk is directed to correct the docket to reflect the correct
spelling of Defendant Franklund’s last name, which was obtained from Plaintiff’s
inmate grievance. (See D.E. 1-2 at 2.)
2
request for an outside consultation on the grounds that Plaintiff’s
complaint concerned a preexisting condition and the procedure was
cosmetic in nature. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff avers that, “[o]ther than
a
clinical
observation
and
a
measurement
taken
by
nurse
practitioner of Plaintiff growth above his right eye, Plaintiff
have [sic] not received or provided any further treatment by
qualified
medical
staff
to
lessen
Plaintiff
[sic]
pain
or
condition.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff learned that medical staff had
denied his request for a biopsy. (Id. ¶ 15.)
The complaint asserts two claims. Count One asserts a claim
under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in
compensatory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages on that
claim. (Id. ¶ 23.) Count Two asserts a violation of Plaintiff’s
right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26.)
Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 on that
claim. (Id. ¶ 26.)
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards
3
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50
(2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 55557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-66, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court consider[s]
the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679,
129 S. Ct. at 1950; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3, 127 S.
Ct. at 1964-65 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a
claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair
notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the
claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any
complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470
(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
1831-32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989)).
4
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§
1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from
whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes
allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose
factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. §
1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim,
where a judge must accept all factual allegations as
true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have
to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations
as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct.
1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be
liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
Before the recent onslaught of pro se prisoner
suits, the Supreme Court suggested that pro se complaints
are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972) (per
curiam). Neither that Court nor other courts, however,
have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials
in pro se suits. See, e.g., id. at 521, 92 S. Ct. at 596
(holding petitioner to standards of Conley v. Gibson);
Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.) (duty to be
less stringent with pro se complaint does not require
court to conjure up unplead allegations), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 434, 78 L. Ed. 2d 3366 (1983);
McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir.1979) (same);
Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237 (D.D.C. 1987) (pro se
plaintiffs should plead with requisite specificity so as
to give defendants notice); Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D.
122 (D. Md. 1981) (even pro se litigants must meet some
minimum standards).
5
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown
v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming
dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim
which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th
Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Secretary of Treas.,
73
F.
App’x
836,
837
(6th
Cir.
2003)
(affirming
sua
sponte
dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and
stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required
to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S.
225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as
counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v.
Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to
affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of
action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be
overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral
arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who
come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising
litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 461, 181 L. Ed. 2d 300 (2011).
Plaintiff’s claims arise under Bivens, which provides a right
of action against federal employees who violate an individual’s
rights under the United States Constitution. “Under the Bivens line
of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action
6
against federal officials for certain constitutional violations
when there are no alternative processes to protect the interests of
the plaintiff and no special factors counseling against recognizing
the cause of action.” Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 466
(6th Cir. 2010).
The Complaint contains no factual allegations against any
named
defendant.
It
is
unclear
whether
Defendants
Branch,
Rodriguez, and Gaia are the MLPs referred to in the complaint. The
members of the ULP are not identified. When a complaint fails to
allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570.
The
attachments
to
the
Complaint
reflect
that
Defendant
Franklund responded to Plaintiff’s Attempt at Informal Resolution.
(ECF
No.
Franklund
1-2
for
at
2-4.)
failing
Plaintiff
to
take
has
no
action
valid
in
claim
response
against
to
his
administrative complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative
complaint does not cause or contribute to the [constitutional]
violation. A guard who stands and watches while another guard beats
a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an
administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does
not.”). The Complaint does not allege that Franklund was a member
of the ULP or had any role in denying the request for an outside
consultation.
7
The attachments indicate that Defendant Naimey examined the
growth on Plaintiff’s forehead during one of his sick call visits.2
The Complaint does not adequately allege that Defendant Naimey’s
treatment of Plaintiff violated the Eighth Amendment. “The right to
adequate medical care is guaranteed to convicted federal prisoners
by
the
Cruel
and
Unusual
Punishments
Clause
of
the
Eighth
Amendment, and is made applicable to convicted state prisoners and
to pretrial detainees (both federal and state) by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d
868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). “A prisoner’s right to adequate medical
care ‘is violated when prison doctors or officials are deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs.’” Id. at 874
(quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001));
see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2004)
(“The
Eighth
Amendment
forbids
prison
officials
from
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain on an inmate by acting
with deliberate indifference toward the inmate’s serious medical
needs. . . . Prison officials’ deliberate indifference violates
these rights when the indifference is manifested by . . . prison
guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care
for
a
serious
medical
need.”)
(internal
quotation
marks,
2
Id. at 5 (“The only medical staff I have been seen by has been PA’s
and a brief visit by Doctor Naimey who didn’t look at me more than a few seconds
before dismissing me.”), 9 (“Being momentarily in the presence of a medical
provider does not constitute an evaluation of my condition. NONE of the medical
staff that I have been seen by qualify as a medical provider qualifying to
determine whether the growth is a minor cyst or a malignant cancer growing on my
forehead. It may well be that this is nothing more than a cyst, however, without
proper evaluation by a QUALIFIED staff or a specialist, there is no way to make
that decision. I may not be a doctor, but I know that to know if a growth is
cancerous or beniegn [sic] requires that a biopsy be performed on the patient.”).
8
alterations & citation omitted). “Although the right to adequate
medical
care
does
not
encompass
the
right
to
be
diagnosed
correctly, [the Sixth Circuit] has long held that prison officials
who have been alerted to a prisoner’s serious medical needs are
under an obligation to offer medical care to such a prisoner.”
Johnson, 398 F.3d at 874 (internal quotation marks & citation
omitted).
The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires
that a prisoner have a serious medical need. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at
895; Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1994). “[A]
medical need is objectively serious if it is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious
that
even
a
lay
person
would
readily
recognize
the
necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897
(internal quotation marks & citations omitted); see also Johnson,
398 F.3d at 874. In this case, Defendant Naimey concluded that the
growth on Plaintiff’s forehead is a sebaceous cyst. “Sebaceous
cysts
are
not
dangerous
and
can
usually
be
Http://www.ncbi.nim.hih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH1845/.
ignored.”
It
is,
therefore, questionable whether Plaintiff has a serious medical
need. Batts v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., Civil Action No. GLR-122414, 2013 WL 210620, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 17, 2013); Carter v.
Prasad, Civil Case No. 07-cv-15379, 2009 WL 346355, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 10, 2009). There is no allegation that the cyst was
9
infected, painful to the touch, or draining.3 Therefore, it does
not appear that the objective component of an Eight Amendment
violation has been satisfied.
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment
violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with
the requisite intent, that is, that he or she had a “sufficiently
culpable state of mind.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114
S. Ct. 1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 302-03, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2326, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991),
501 U.S. at 297, 302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison
officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial
risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834, 114 S. Ct. at 1977; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S. Ct. at
2326-27; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32, 113 S. Ct. 2475,
2480, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,
1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,
814 (6th Cir.
1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76,
79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835,
114 S. Ct. at 1978. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the
Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
3
Although Plaintiff asserts that the cyst was painful, the grievance
response, which was based on a review of his medical records, reflects that
Plaintiff told the MLPs who examined him that the cyst was not painful. See ECF
No. 1-2 at 3 (“A review of each evaluation’s documentation reveals during each
examination you reported a pain scale of zero (0), and each evaluation failed to
reveal any indication of tenderness, or discharge from the area.”). Notably, each
of Plaintiff’s inmate grievances assert that medical providers did nothing to
rule out cancer, not that they were deliberately indifferent to his pain.
10
of confinement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
This approach comports best with the text of the Eighth
Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”;
it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or
omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk
of harm might well be something society wishes to
discourage, and if harm does result society might well
wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such
concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely
objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have
perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,
cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of
punishment.
Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations
omitted); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d
789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the
face of an obvious risk of which they should have known but did
not, then they did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
This is a case in which a prisoner received some medical
treatment but he contends that a more appropriate treatment was
withheld from him. “‘[T]hat a [medical professional] has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not
state a valid claim . . . under the Eighth Amendment.’” Dominguez
v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 L. Ed.
2d
251
(1976)).
“The
requirement
that
the
official
have
subjectively perceived a risk of harm and then disregarded it is
meant to prevent the constitutionalization of medical malpractice
claims; thus, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must
11
show more than negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment.”
Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703. “When a doctor provides treatment,
albeit carelessly or inefficaciously, to a prisoner, he has not
displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but
merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation.” Id.; see also Johnson, 398 F.3d at
875. The Sixth Circuit has
suggested that a physician’s provision
of grossly inadequate care may satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard, Terrance v. Nw. Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834,
843-44 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d
416, 424 (6th Cir. 2006), but, in a later decision, the Sixth
Circuit clarified that the plaintiff must prove that the physicians
were subjectively aware of, yet disregarded, the risk, Perez, 466
F.3d at 424. “‘[D]eliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious
harm
to
a
prisoner
is
the
equivalent
of
recklessly
disregarding that risk.’” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836, 114 S. Ct. at 1978).
The Sixth Circuit has addressed the means by which a
prisoner can establish deliberate indifference in such cases:
Although the plaintiff bears the onerous burden of
proving the official’s subjective knowledge, this element
is subject to proof by “the usual ways.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970. Thus, the Supreme Court noted
that it was permissible for reviewing courts to infer
from circumstantial evidence that a prison official had
the requisite knowledge. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970.
Moreover, the Court warned, a prison official may “not
escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely
refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly
suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences
12
of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Id. at 843
n.8, 114 S. Ct. 1970.
Id.
The failure to approve a consultation with a specialist or to
perform a biopsy does not establish deliberate indifference. “A
medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not
represent cruel or unusual punishment. At most it is medical
malpractice, and as such the proper forum is the state court.”
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S. Ct. at 293. Therefore, the
subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim has not been
satisfied.
The
Complaint
also
asserts,
without
elaboration,
that
Plaintiff’s right to due process has been violated. Although the
Complaint does not state whether Plaintiff is asserting a violation
of his right to procedural or substantive due process, the facts
presented by Plaintiff do not fit within any recognized procedural
due process claim. Plaintiff also cannot bring a challenge to his
conditions of confinement as a substantive due process claim
because that claim arises under the Eighth Amendment. Smith v.
Mich., 256 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) & (2).
The Sixth Circuit recently held that a district court may
allow a prisoner to amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte
dismissals under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, ___ F.3d ___, ___,
13
2013 WL 2221569, at *5 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No.
12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per
curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim
is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the
deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend
is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL
646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37
(1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua
sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff
automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the
plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be
futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma
pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284
(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte
dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right
of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment
would be futile as a matter of law. Therefore, leave to amend is
GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the
date of entry of this order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended
14
complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of June, 2013.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
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