Namer v. United States of America
Filing
6
ORDER Denying Petition; Order Certifying Appeal Not Taken in Good Faith; and Notice of Appellate Filing Fee. Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 11/18/13. (Anderson, S.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DAVID NAMER,
Petitioner,
vs.
WARDEN ANTHONY HAYNES,
Respondent.
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No. 13-2049-STA/cgc
ORDER DENYING PETITION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND
NOTICE OF APPELLATE FILING FEE
On January 25, 2013, Petitioner David Namer, Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) inmate registration number 15869-034, an inmate at
the Federal Correctional Complex (“FCC”) in Forrest City, Arkansas,
filed a pro se petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and paid the
filing fee. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.)
The Clerk is directed to record the
respondent as Warden Anthony Haynes.1
On September 28, 2000, a federal grand jury returned a
ninety-five count indictment, charging Namer with multiple counts
of securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and
tax evasion, and one count of criminal forfeiture.
(United States
v. Namer, No. 00-20176, Criminal “Cr.” ECF No. 1.) From July 1-
1
Although the petition names the United States as the respondent, the
only proper respondent to a habeas petition is the petitioner’s custodian.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2717-18, 159 L. Ed.
2d 513 (2004). The Clerk is directed to terminate the United States as a party
to this case.
August 20, 2002, then United States District Court Judge Bernice B.
Donald2 presided at a jury trial, at which the jury found Defendant
guilty as charged. (Cr. ECF No. 469-508.) On May 6, 2003, Judge
Donald held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Namer to three
hundred fifty (350) months of imprisonment, to be followed by a
five-year period of supervised release. (Cr. ECF No. 559, Cr. ECF
No. 562.) He was also ordered to pay restitution of $32.7 million
and to forfeit $34.65 million. (Id.)
Defendant appealed. (Cr. ECF
No. 557.)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed Namer’s conviction, but remanded the case for resentencing
because he had been sentenced under a mandatory-Guidelines scheme,
in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 200,
122 S. Ct.
738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). (Cr. ECF No. 654; United States v.
Namer, 149 Fed. App’x 385 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2005).)
On remand,
the Judge Donald conducted a resentencing hearing on July 6, 2007,
and imposed a sentence of imprisonment for two hundred forty (240)
months,
to
be
followed
by
a
three-year
period
of
supervised
release. (Cr. ECF No. 679.) An amended judgment was entered on July
31, 2007. (Cr. ECF No. 681.) Defendant did not appeal after
resentencing.
2
Judge Donald is now an appellate judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
2
The facts underlying Defendant’s conviction were summarized by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as
follows:
BACKGROUND
A. The Issuance of Private Placement Corporate Notes
After his release from prison following a 1980
conviction for wire fraud, Namer moved to Memphis,
Tennessee, where he began a scheme to raise funds for
cash-strapped companies with no credit. The scheme
involved issuing unregistered corporate notes, known as
private placements. These private placements, which would
be marketed and sold across the country by licensed
security dealers, are not rated by any quality-control
organization and are thus high risk.
Namer hired attorney Larry Baresel to prepare the Private
Placement Memoranda (“PPM's”) and to serve as bond
counsel during closings. On most of the note issuances
Namer planned he was the primary control person, but
since Baresel told him that listing himself as control
person would require Namer to disclose his prior fraud
conviction, Namer never disclosed himself as primary
control person in any of the PPM's.
In 1993, Namer recruited Craig Colwell, a licensed broker
at Sutter Securities (“Sutter”), to sell Namer's private
placement notes. Colwell informed Namer that no one would
purchase his notes without some form of insurance (a
“financial guarantee”). This presented a problem for
Namer because any potential insurer would want to conduct
due diligence, which Namer's corporations would not
withstand.
B. Namer's Bribery of Richard Quackenbush
To solve his due diligence problem, Namer entered into a
relationship with Richard Quackenbush, a vice-president
for Universal Bonding Company (“Universal”) in New
Jersey. Universal's business was issuing performance
bonds, which essentially acted as financial guarantee
(insurance) bonds, and Quackenbush was in a position to
influence whether such bonds were issued. In January
1994, Quackenbush issued a series of performance bonds
for Namer's companies. These guarantees would normally
3
have required collateral equal to the full coverage
amount of the bonds, but Namer did not have the
collateral, so Universal issued the bonds anyway at a
$50,000 premium.
In February 1994, Namer asked Quackenbush for additional
bonds without collateral, which Quackenbush approved.
Later that month, Quackenbush asked Namer for a $50,000
loan to use in a personal investment. Namer gave him the
$50,000 in two checks, making no provision for repayment.
A few days later Namer also gave Quackenbush $400 in cash
that the latter implied he would accept as a bribe.
Quackenbush continued to approve millions of dollars of
performance
bonds
in
violation
of
Universal's
underwriting requirements and without requiring any
collateral. The bribes continued as well. Namer helped
Quackenbush create an offshore company (“RJJJ”) to which
Namer sent $34,959.46 in checks. In October 1994,
Quackenbush sent Namer a fax asking him to pay
Quackenbush's home mortgage, and over a two-year period
thereafter, Namer funneled $36,154.91 from one of his
companies to pay Quackenbush's mortgage.
This scheme resulted in Quackenbush's issuing $17 million
in performance bonds for Namer's companies. Namer never
pledged any collateral for these bonds, which ultimately
cost Universal and its re-insurer $7.75 million. Namer
also never informed any of his investors that their notes
were backed up by fraudulently obtained bonds.
C. Namer's Bribery of Craig Colwell
Once Namer had obtained the performance bonds, Colwell
could market Namer's notes. Over the course of a year and
a half, Namer made $90,000 in under-the-table payments to
Colwell, who sold over $22 million of Namer's notes to
investors. None of the payments to Colwell was ever
disclosed to Colwell's employer (Sutter) or its clients,
or in the PPM's prepared by Namer and Baresel for
prospective investors. The payments to Colwell for
selling notes began in January 1994, which coincided with
the beginning of Namer's bribery of Quackenbush in return
for his issuing bonds as insurance. The whole scheme
ended up costing Sutter $1.2 million, because when the
notes went into default Universal refused to pay under
some of the performance bonds.
D. Namer's Bribery of Bruce Barbers
4
Namer engaged in a similar bribery arrangement with Bruce
Barbers of the New York-based brokerage firm Meyers,
Pollock, Robbins (“MPR”). As an MPR broker, Barbers sold
over $1.5 million in notes for Namer; in return, Namer
made $141,155 in corporate check and wire payments to an
account held by Barbers under another name. These
payments were never disclosed to any purchasers of the
notes.
E. Namer's Falsely Representing That Notes Were Insured
Meanwhile, an audit at Universal revealed problems with
performance bonds issued to Namer, causing Quackenbush to
resign in March 1995. This development left Namer without
a source of performance bonds for his note issues.
Namer's Ponzi scheme required issuing additional notes to
pay off prior note obligations. Without new note issues,
Namer would default on principal and interest payments on
old ones, and his scheme would be discovered.
After leaving Universal, Quackenbush joined another firm,
National Surety Specialists. In mid 1995, Namer contacted
Quackenbush and succeeded in getting National Surety to
issue “consents of surety” for some of his companies.
“Consents of surety” are not actual performance bonds
insuring the notes, but merely commitment letters from
insurance companies to issue insurance if they receive
the appropriate collateral. No insurance was ever issued,
however, because Namer never provided the requisite
collateral; his intent all along was to use the consents
of surety to trick investors into believing his notes
were insured when they were not.
Namer needed more consents of surety than he could get
from National Surety, which led Quackenbush to introduce
Namer to Fred Smith, who owned Associated Insurance
Agency, an insurance brokerage firm in Boston. Smith
issued several consents of surety from Ranger Insurance
Company, which Ranger never knew of or approved.
Smith gave Namer consents for $18 million in insurance,
but both men realized Namer could never provide the $18
million in collateral necessary actually to obtain the
insurance and only wanted documents to make it look as if
he had failsafe insurance commitments. Therefore, Namer
indicated in his PPM's that he had irrevocable and
unconditional insurance commitments. When brokers or
potential investors asked to see the consents of surety,
5
Namer simply whited out the collateral condition from the
letters, and then faxed the apparently unconditional
consents to the relevant inquirers.
Namer sent such forged documents to various brokers
trying to verify his insurance, the trust company
overseeing the bond offerings, and any investors
attempting to verify the insurance. Meanwhile, Smith
agreed to vouch for the forged consents of surety when
inquiries were made to him, which led brokers and
investors to believe mistakenly that Namer's notes were
insured. On the occasions when interested parties wanted
to see actual copies of the performance bonds, Namer
forged them. When they wanted to contact Ranger to verify
insurance, Namer told them they were not allowed do so
and that he would verify it for them.
F. Namer's $6 Million Sales of Unauthorized Ray and Ross
Notes
Namer also sought to generate legitimate revenue by
entering into a contingent agreement to purchase Ray and
Ross Transport, Inc. (“Ray and Ross”), a Las Vegas bus
line, from Sammie Armstrong, who had owned and operated
Ray and Ross for over twenty years. Since Namer's
operating the bus line required approval of the Nevada
Public Service Commission (“PSC”) (based on a check of
the bus line's finances), the sale was expressly
conditioned on his obtaining such approval. Therefore,
Ray and Ross's stock was placed in escrow and Armstrong
maintained control of the company's Board of Directors
pending Namer's obtaining PSC approval. As it turned out,
Namer never obtained this approval, and thus never gained
legal control of Ray and Ross.
Nonetheless, in February 1996, Namer caused $6 million in
notes to issue on behalf of Ray and Ross, without the
knowledge of the company's Board, which wrecked the
already struggling company's financial reputation and
assured that Namer would never get the PSC approval
necessary to effectuate the purchase. Namer and Baresel
created a bogus PPM to market the Ray and Ross notes.
Namer had the necessary documents signed by a Steven
Slade, who represented himself as president of Ray and
Ross, but who actually held no position at the company.
Thus, Namer essentially sold worthless pieces of paper to
investors. Moreover, he falsely represented in the PPM
that these non-existent notes were insured, and when
6
investors and brokers requested copies of performance
bonds, Namer sent them counterfeit bonds. Baresel
informed Namer at the time that the Ray and Ross scheme
was criminal fraud.
G. Namer's Fraudulent Northstar Notes
Namer also obtained control of a failing Las Vegas
commuter airline, Tri-Star Airlines, and sold Tri-Star
notes to investors. He engaged in negotiations with
Northwest Airlines to make Tri-Star a commuter airline
for Northwest, and eventually changed Tri-Star's name to
Northstar Airlines in hopes of reaching such a deal. In
May 1996, Namer caused Northstar to issue $6.2 million in
notes, ostensibly for Northstar's startup costs. Namer
falsely represented in the PPM's and other communications
that the Northstar notes were fully insured and that
Northstar had a tentative contract with Northwest. No
such contract ever existed with Northwest, which broke
off negotiations with Namer by sending him a “drop dead”
letter upon learning of his 1980 federal felony
conviction.
Although Namer had sold millions of dollars worth of
Northstar notes prior to receiving this letter, he never
informed purchasers that there would be no revenue from
which to make interest and principal payments on the
notes. Even worse, weeks after receiving the “drop dead”
letter, Namer sold $1.5 million in notes to the Seventh
Day Adventist Church. He falsely represented that the
deal with Northstar was still alive, and the church lost
its entire investment.
H. Namer's Fleecing of Gabriel Elias
In late 1995, Namer solicited an investment in Tri-Star
notes from Gabriel Elias, an elderly investor in
Pennsylvania who was attracted to the investment because
of its high rate of return and insured notes. Namer gave
Elias a PPM and fake performance bonds that convinced him
the notes were insured. Namer also had Fred Smith (or his
son, Tim) falsely verify to Elias that the Gulf Insurance
Company was prepared to issue performance bonds on order.
Later, after the notes were defaulted, Elias contacted
Smith again and the latter admitted he was not affiliated
with Gulf Insurance. Elias lost just under $2 million of
his $2,150,000 investment in Tri-Star.
7
I. Namer's Diverting Ray and Ross and Northstar Note
Proceeds to Buy MPR
Since Namer constantly needed brokers to market his
notes, he purchased an interest in the brokerage firm
Meyers, Pollack, Robbins. Namer purchased a fifty percent
interest in the firm for $2 million, which required him
to divert revenue from the sale of Ray and Ross and
Northstar notes to buy MPR. This diversion was not
disclosed to Ray and Ross and Northstar noteholders, who
had been led to believe their investment would be used to
benefit those companies, not for one of Namer's personal
investments.
J. Namer's Tax Evasion
Namer evaded approximately $209,568.50 in federal income
taxes from 1994 through 1996. He did this in part through
corporate diversion-paying personal expenses from the
accounts of his companies. Namer also concocted an
elaborate scheme to make his home mortgage payments with
unreported income, which involved representing his mother
in Panama as the home's owner, issuing corporate checks
to his step-father Nissim Russo, forging Russo's
signature, and depositing the forged checks in the
account of the mortgage holder (one deposit even occurred
after Russo's death).
K. Proceedings Below
On September 28, 2000, Namer was indicted for ninety-four
counts of securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, and tax evasion, and a separate count for
criminal forfeiture. Because of the complexity of the
case and the large volume of documents involved, Namer
and his defense team were provided the use of a suite of
offices in the courthouse for preparation, electronic
copies of all of the government’s documents and exhibits,
access to make paper copies of these documents, two
court-appointed attorneys at trial, two experts, a
paralegal,
six
document
examiners,
and
private
investigators.
Namer
was
detained
during
the
twenty-one-month period prior to his trial because the
district court found that he posed a flight risk;
nonetheless, he was transported three times a week by
federal marshals to his defense team's offices in the
courthouse to allow him to work with his counsel to
prepare his defense.
8
During a seven-week trial, the
sixty-six witnesses and introduced
August 20, 2002, the jury returned
ninety-four counts, and found for
criminal forfeiture count.
government presented
over 1400 exhibits. On
guilty verdicts on all
the government on the
United States v. Namer, 149 Fed. App’x at 388-93.
On June 30, 2008, Namer filed a motion to vacate his
conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
United States v. Namer,
No. 08-2437-BBD-cgc (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2011). Namer alleged that
counsel provided ineffective assistance:
(1)
because
of
Defendant
Namer’s
conflict with Attorney Harviel;
irreconcilable
(2)
by failing to call a Fed. R. Evid. 615 securities
expert at trial;
(3)
by failing to prepare for trial;
(4)
by failing to provide reliable advice;
(5)
by failing to obtain and use essential documents;
(6)
by
failing
to
obtain
documents
for
cross
examination and failing to object to the improper
use of documents by the government;
(7)
by failing to prepare witnesses for trial;
(8)
by failing to call the Court’s attention to an
extra-marital affair between Assistant United
States Attorney Parker and Internal Revenue Service
Special Agent Rankin;
(9)
by failing to anticipate the United States Supreme
Court’s holding in United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 170 L. Ed.2d 912 (2008);
and
(10) by failing to anticipate the Supreme Court’s
holding in United States v. Cuellar, U.S. ,128 S.
Ct. 1994, 170 L. Ed.2d 942 (2008).
9
(Id. at ECF No. 1.)
On August 23, 2011, Judge Donald entered an
order denying and dismissing the motion to vacate.
39.)
Namer appealed.
(Id. at ECF No. 41.)
(Id. at ECF No.
On July 20, 2012, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Namer’s
application for a certificate of appealability.
(Id. at ECF No.
43.)
Namer alleges in this petition that he is actually
innocent of all money laundering charges under the holding of
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 170 L. Ed.
2d 912 (2008).
Federal
prisoners
may
obtain
habeas
corpus
relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 only under limited circumstances. The
“savings clause” in § 2255 provides as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained
if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for
relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or
that such court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
“Construing this language, courts have uniformly held
that claims asserted by federal prisoners that seek to challenge
their convictions or imposition of their sentences shall be filed
in the sentencing court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and that claims
seeking to challenge the execution or manner in which the sentence
is served shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the
10
prisoner’s custodian under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Charles v. Chandler,
180 F.3d 753, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citations
omitted). In this case, Petitioner is attacking the imposition of
his sentence and, therefore, habeas relief is not available to him
unless
relief
under
§
2255
is
inadequate
or
ineffective.
Petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating that the savings
clause applies. Id. at 756.
The
Sixth
Circuit
has
construed
the
savings
clause
narrowly: “Significantly, the § 2255 remedy is not considered
inadequate or ineffective simply because § 2255 relief has already
been denied, or because the petitioner is procedurally barred from
pursuing relief under § 2255, or because the petitioner has been
denied permission to file a second or successive motion to vacate.”
Id. (citations omitted). After its decision in Charles, the Sixth
Circuit reemphasized the narrow scope of the savings clause:
The circumstances in which § 2255 is inadequate and
ineffective are narrow, for to construe § 2241 relief
much more liberally than § 2255 relief would defeat the
purpose of the restrictions Congress placed on the filing
of successive petitions for collateral relief. As we
explained in Charles, “[t]he remedy afforded under § 2241
is not an additional, alternative or supplemental remedy
to that prescribed under § 2255.”
United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Charles, 180 F.3d at 758) (additional citation omitted).
The § 2255 remedy might be inadequate or ineffective when
the Supreme Court announces a new statutory interpretation.
Even
in that circumstance, a prisoner can obtain relief under § 2241
11
only if he is “actually innocent” of the crime of which he has been
convicted.
Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2003);
Charles, 180 F.3d at 757 (“No circuit court has to date permitted
a post-AEDPA petitioner who was not effectively making a claim of
‘actual
innocence’
to
utilize
§
2241
(via
§
2255’s
‘savings
clause’) as a way of circumventing § 2255’s restrictions on the
filing of second or successive habeas petitions.”); see also
Peterman, 249 F.3d at 462 (“Without determining the exact scope of
the savings clause, we conclude that defendants’ claims do not fall
within any arguable construction of it because defendants have not
shown an intervening change in the law that establishes their
actual innocence.”).
The Sixth Circuit has derived its understanding of the
definition of “actual innocence” from Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998). Martin, 319
F.3d at 804. Bousley held that “[t]o establish actual innocence,
petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him ... [and] that ‘actual innocence’ means factual
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” 523 U.S. at 623–24, 118
S. Ct. 1604 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). One
way to establish factual innocence is to show an “intervening
change in the law that establishes [the petitioner’s] actual
innocence.” Peterman, 249 F.3d at 462. This may be achieved by
12
demonstrating
(1)
the
existence
of
a
new
interpretation
of
statutory law, (2) which was issued after the petitioner had a
meaningful time to incorporate the new interpretation into his
direct appeals or subsequent motions, (3) is retroactive, and (4)
applies to the merits of the petition to make it more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
The Supreme Court issued the decision in Santos on June
2,
2008,
after
Namer
was
resentenced.
Santos
changed
the
definition of the term “proceeds” in 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and overruled
Sixth Circuit precedent defining “proceeds” as “gross receipts.”
See United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2009).
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not
address the retroactivity of Santos until April 12, 2012.
See
Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2012)(holding the new
definition of a key phrase in the money laundering statute is a
substantive change of law increasing the United States’ burden of
proof and is retroactive).
Petitioner contends that his money laundering convictions
were
based
on
paying
the
essential
expenses
underlying acts creating a merger problem.
of
the
charged
Unfortunately for
Petitioner Namer, Santos applies only when the underlying predicate
offense for the money laundering conviction has a statutory maximum
that is less than the twenty (20) year maximum of § 1956. Namer was
convicted of the predicate offenses that carried a higher statutory
13
maximum of thirty (30) years, instead of the twenty (20) year
maximum of § 1956. Thus, there is no merger problem under Santos.
See Kratt, 579 F.3d at 562 (“‘[P]roceeds’” does not always mean
profits, as Justice Scalia concluded; it means profits only when
the § 1956 predicate offense creates a merger problem that leads to
a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
such an increase. Whenever a predicate offense satisfies this
narrow rule, the Justices in the plurality would hold ‘proceeds’
means profits as well, because they would define ‘proceeds’ as
profits for every predicate offense.”). Petitioner is unable to
demonstrate his actual innocence through Santos and does not fall
within the savings clause of § 2255.
The Court does not have
jurisdiction to grant him relief under § 2241.
Because Namer is not entitled to invoke § 2241, “it
appears from the application that the applicant or person detained
is not entitled” to any relief.
DENIED and DISMISSED.
28 U.S.C. § 2243.
The petition is
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for
Defendant.
Federal prisoners who file petitions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging their federal custody need not obtain
certificates of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Durham
v. United States Parole Comm’n, 306 F.3d 225, 229 (6th Cir. 2009);
Melton v. Hemingway, 40 F. App’x 44, 45 (6th Cir. 2002) (“a federal
14
prisoner seeking relief under § 2241 is not required to get a
certificate of appealability as a condition to obtaining review of
the denial of his petition”); see also Witham v. United States, 355
F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 2004) (28 U.S.C. § 2253 “does not require
a certificate of appealability for appeals from denials of relief
in cases properly brought under § 2241, where detention is pursuant
to federal process”).
A habeas petitioner seeking to appeal must pay the $455
filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913 and 1917. To appeal in
forma pauperis in a habeas case under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the
petitioner must obtain pauper status pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a). Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952
(6th Cir. 1997). Rule 24(a) provides that a party seeking pauper
status on appeal must first file a motion in the district court,
along with a supporting affidavit. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1).
However, Rule 24(a) also provides that if the district court
certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, or
otherwise denies leave to appeal in forma pauperis, the petitioner
must file his motion to proceed in forma pauperis in the appellate
court.
See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)-(5).
In this case, because Petitioner is clearly not entitled
to relief, the Court determines that any appeal would not be taken
in good faith.
It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to Fed. R. App.
P. 24(a), that any appeal in this matter would not be taken in good
15
faith. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.
If Petitioner
files a notice of appeal, he must also pay the full $455 appellate
filing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
supporting affidavit in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit within thirty (30) days.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 18th day of November, 2013.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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