Chandler v. WFM-WO, Inc et al

Filing 18

ORDER granting 3 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 04/24/2014.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

Paul Chandler,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
WFM-WO, Inc., Whole Foods
Market Group, Inc. and
Manitoba Harvest Hemp Food
& Oils,
Defendants.

No. 13-2450

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion”)
filed by Defendants WFM-WO, Inc. (“WFM-WO”), Whole Foods Market
Group, Inc. (“Whole Foods”), and Manitoba Harvest Hemp Food &
Oils (“Manitoba”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on July 18, 2013.
(Mot.,

ECF

No.

3.)

On

July

26,

2013,

Defendants

filed

an

unopposed motion to stay the case pending the Court’s ruling on
the Motion and a motion to remand.

(ECF No. 11.)

granted the motion to stay on July 29, 2013.

The Court

(ECF No. 12.)

On

August 14, 2013, Plaintiff Paul Chandler (“Chandler”) responded
to the Motion.

(Resp., ECF No. 14.)

the Motion is GRANTED.
I.

Background

For the following reasons,

The case is DISMISSED.

Chandler filed this action on June 4, 2012, in the Circuit
Court

for

the

Thirtieth

Judicial

Tennessee (the “Complaint”).

District

in

Shelby

(Compl., ECF No. 1-2.)

day, Chandler had process issued for Whole Foods.

County,
The same

(See Shelby

County Circuit Court Docket Sheet, ECF No. 4-1 at 4.)

However,

Chandler never served process on Whole Foods, nor did he ever
cause process to issue for WFM-WO or Manitoba.
at 2-3.)

(Mot., ECF No. 4

On June 4, 2013, Chandler filed a Motion to Continue

Period to Effect Service of Process as to all Defendants, citing
the expense of serving a party in Canada and the need for time
to

collect

funds

to

retain

experts

(“Chandler’s

(Plaint. Cir. Ct. Mot., ECF No. 4-2 ¶¶ 4, 8.)

Motion”).

On June 24, 2013,

before Chandler’s Motion had been decided, Whole Foods filed a
Notice of Removal, removing the case to this Court.

(Not. of

Rem., ECF No. 1.)
Chandler alleges Defendants sold him a defective product
that caused him to lose his job.
16.)

(Compl., ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 10,

On or about June 2, 2011, Chandler purchased from Whole

Foods a bottle of hemp seed oil manufactured by Manitoba.
¶ 10.)

He began to use the oil on a daily basis.

(Id.

(Id. ¶ 14.)

On or about June 30, 2011, Chandler was randomly selected for a
drug

test

by

his

employer,

Butler-Tillman

Express

Tracking.

(Id. ¶ 15.)

He tested positive for THC in his system and was

terminated.

(Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)

Chandler alleges that he never
2

used marijuana and that Defendants’ product was the source of
the THC.

(Id. ¶ 18.)

He seeks $180,636 in damages for products

liability, gross negligence, and negligence.
II.

(Id. ¶ 24.)

Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

Under

28

U.S.C.

§

1332(a),

this

Court

has

original

jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of different
states “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of

$75,000,

exclusive

of

interest

Chandler

is

a

1332(a)(1).
Defendant

WFM-WO

is

a

is

also

a

Delaware

business in Texas.

Tennessee

Delaware

place of business in Texas.

and

costs”.
resident.

corporation

(Id. ¶ 2.)

corporation

(Id. ¶ 3.)

with

with

28

U.S.C.

(Id.
a

¶

§

1.)

principal

Defendant Whole Foods
a

principal

place

of

Defendant Manitoba is a company

organized under the laws of Canada with a principal place of
business in Canada.
damages.

(Id. ¶ 4.)

(Id. ¶ 24.)

Chandler seeks $180,636 in

The parties are completely diverse, and

the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied.
In a diversity action, state substantive law governs.

See

Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir.
1997)

(citing

(1938)).

Erie

R.R.

Co.

v.

Tompkins,

304

U.S.

64,

78

Where, as here, there is no dispute that a certain

state’s substantive law applies, the court will not conduct a
“choice of law” analysis sua sponte.

3

See GBJ Corp. v. Eastern

Ohio Paving Co., 139 F.3d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir. 1998).

Tennessee

substantive law applies.
III.

Standard of Review

In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527

(6th

Cir.

2007).

A

plaintiff

can

support

a

claim

“by

showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563

(2007).
This standard requires more than bare assertions of legal
conclusions.

Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356,

361 (6th Cir. 2001).

“[A] formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do.”
To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss,

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
a

complaint

must

contain

sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

“The plausibility standard

is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
4

statements, do not suffice.”
plaintiff

with

no

facts

Id. at 1949 (citation omitted).

and

“armed

with

nothing

more

conclusions” cannot “unlock the doors of discovery.”

A

than

Id. at

1950.
IV.

Analysis

Defendants argue that the one-year statute of limitations
for products liability claims has run because it was not tolled
by

Chandler’s

incomplete

service

of

process.

Chandler

disagrees.
In diversity cases, state law and procedural rules govern
statutes

of

limitations

and

the

process in tolling those statutes.

effectiveness

of

service

of

Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y.

v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (holding that federal courts
sitting in diversity must honor state statutes of limitations);
West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 n.4 (1987) (“Respect for the
State's substantive decision that actual service is a component
of the policies underlying the statute of limitations requires
that the service rule in a diversity suit be considered part and
parcel

of

the

statute

of

limitations.”);

4A

Charles

Allen

Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1082 (3d ed. 1998) (“In determining the validity
of service in the state court prior to removal, a federal court
must apply the law of the state under which the service was
made.”).
5

Chandler’s claims are governed by Tennessee’s statute of
limitations for products liability claims.

See Alexander v.

Third Nat’l Bank, 915 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tenn. 1996) (holding that
the gravamen of an action rather than its designation determines
its legal nature).

A products liability action includes:

all actions brought for or on account of personal
injury . . . caused by or resulting from the
manufacture,
construction,
design,
formula,
preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning,
instruction, marketing, packaging or labeling of any
product.
[It also] includes . . . all actions based
upon . . . negligence . . . or any other substantive
legal theory in tort or contract . . . .
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(6).
liability,

gross

negligence,

Chandler’s claims of products
and

negligence

arise

from

Defendants’ alleged faulty preparation and testing of the hemp
oil Chandler used.

All are within the scope of a products

liability action.
Subject

to

exceptions

not

applicable

here,

a

products

liability action against a manufacturer or seller of a defective
product

must

be

action accrues.

brought

within

one

year

after

the

cause

of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a); § 29-28-104.

“[T]he cause of action for injury to the person shall accrue on
the date of the

personal injury . . . .”

§ 29-28-104(b).

Chandler’s alleged injury occurred on June 30, 2011, when he
tested positive for THC in his system because of Defendants’

6

defective hemp oil.

The deadline to file this action was June

30, 2012.
Although Chandler filed the Complaint on June 4, 2012, the
Complaint

was

inadequate

to

toll

the

statute

of

limitations

because Chandler never served process on Defendants.
v.

Mitchell,

205

S.W.3d

469,

473

(Tenn.

Ct.

See Slone

App.

2005).

Under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure:
If process remains unissued for 90 days or is not
served within 90 days from issuance, regardless of the
reason, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the original
commencement to toll the running of a statute of
limitations unless the plaintiff continues the action
by obtaining issuance of new process within one year
from issuance of the previous process or, if no
process is issued, within one year of the filing of
the complaint.
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3.
complaint

effective.

Justification for delay does not make a
See

Slone,

205

S.W.3d

at

473

(“[T]he

reason for process not being issued is not a consideration.”)
Withholding service for one year, even “for a very reasonable
purpose,”
statute

renders

of

a

complaint

limitations.

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).
opinion

from

application.
2010).

an

expert

Jones

ineffective
v.

Cox,

for

316

tolling

S.W.3d

616,

the
622

A plaintiff’s difficulty obtaining an
does

not

affect

the

rule’s

strict

Jones v. Vasu, 326 S.W.3d 578 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Because more than one year has passed since Chandler

filed the Complaint and he has not obtained issuance of process
or new process within the meaning of Rule 3 or served process on
7

Defendants,

the

Complaint

did

not

toll

the

statute

of

limitations applicable to this cause of action.
The limitations period on Chandler’s claims has run.

This

action is time barred.
V.

Conclusion

For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

Motion

to

Dismiss

is

GRANTED.
So ordered this 24th day of April, 2014.
s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.____ _
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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