Willis v. Weaver et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE 5 . Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 11/16/15. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DAVID L. WILLIS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
JUSTIN WEAVER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-2589-JDT-cgc

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff David L. Willis (“Willis”), an inmate at the Shelby County
Criminal Justice Complex (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). In an
order issued July 31, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed
the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 29, 2014, that
appears intended to supersede the original complaint. (ECF No. 4.)1 The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Detective Justin Weaver and Detective Justin Smith.2

1

The amended complaint was accompanied by a second motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF No. 5.) Weaver had already been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis;
therefore, that motion is DENIED as moot.
2

The amended complaint names only Weaver and Smith as defendants. (ECF No. 4 at
1.) Therefore, the Clerk is directed to MODIFY the docket to remove the Collier Police
Department as a defendant.

I. The Amended Complaint
Willis alleges that the Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal
search and seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment rights against the deprivation of life, liberty or
property. (ECF No. 4 at 2.) On September 11, 2013, Willis drove his vehicle with four
passengers to the Walgreens on the corner of Poplar Avenue and Byhalia Road in Collierville,
Tennessee. (Id. at 3.) An employee of the Walgreen’s pharmacy notified the Defendants that
two of Willis’s passengers were purchasing pseudoephedrine, subsequent to which, the
Defendants conducted surveillance of the purchase and the passengers. (Id. at 5.) After the two
passengers returned to his vehicle, Willis drove out of the Walgreens parking lot. (Id. at 3.) Two
unmarked police cars, driven by the Defendants, followed Willis out of the parking lot, activated
their lights, and pulled Willis over. (Id.) Although Willis contends it was light outside, the
Defendants stated that Willis was stopped because the headlights were on, but the registration
plate was not lit. (Id. at 4.) Willis contends this was an illegal, pretextual stop and that
Defendants lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. (Id. at 4-5.) Willis was charged with
being a party to the offense of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. (Id.)
Willis seeks punitive and compensatory damages for the pain and suffering he suffered as
a result of Defendants’ acts. (Id. at 7.)
By way of background, on February 20, 2014, Willis was indicted on one count of
promoting manufacture of methamphetamine, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. See
jssi.shelbycountytn.gov (Indictment #14 00918). He entered a guilty plea on November 19,
2014, and was sentenced to one year and eight months in prison. Id.

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II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

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“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,

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510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
Willis filed his amended complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Willis appears to allege that his arrest was unlawful because the traffic stop was without
probable cause. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) A Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest requires an arrest
without probable cause. See, e.g., Parsons v. City of Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2008);
Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Today it is well established
that an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”). Probable cause exists
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where a suspect is arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant or where “‘facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense.” Crockett, 316 F.3d at 580 (quoting
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)); see also Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 717 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“probable cause necessary to justify an arrest is defined as ‘whether at that moment
[of the arrest] the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (alterations in original)); Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir.
2000).
In this case, Willis stated that Defendants told him that he was stopped because his
headlights were on, but his license plate was not illuminated. (Id. at 4.) Tennessee law provides,
in pertinent part, “. . . for all motor vehicles that are factory-equipped to illuminate the
registration plate, the registration plate shall be illuminated at all times that headlights are
illuminated.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-10-110(c)(1) (2013). Although Willis argues that “a license
plate light is very hard to see . . . ,” he does not contend that the license plate actually was
illuminated. (Id. at 4.) Notwithstanding the allegation that the stop was pretextual, it is wellsettled that a traffic stop is proper “so long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred or was occurring.” United States v. Palomino, 100 F.3d 446, 448
(6th Cir. 1996). Willis’s lack of registration plate lighting was more than sufficient probable
cause for Defendants to initiate a traffic stop. See also United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340
(6th Cir. 2005).

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Willis also contends that his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure
was violated. (ECF No. 4 at 2.)
The “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement permits an officer
to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains contraband. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45
S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). The rationale for the automobile exception is
two-fold. Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 135
L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–93, 105 S.Ct.
2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). First, it is often impractical for officers to obtain
search warrants in light of the inherent mobility of automobiles. Carney, 471
U.S. at 393, 105 S.Ct. 2066. Second, individuals have a reduced expectation of
privacy in their automobiles. Id. If the officer has probable cause to believe that
the automobile contains contraband, the officer may either seize the automobile
and then obtain a warrant or search the automobile immediately. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). “Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.
State v. Saine, 297 S.W. 3d 199, 2077 (Tenn. 2009). Willis alleges that a Walgreens employee
notified Defendants that two of his passengers were making suspicious purchases of
pseudoephedrine and that Defendants subsequently observed Willis’s passengers purchase
pseudoephedrine and return to his vehicle. (ECF No. 4 at 5.) This observation and information
was sufficient to provide Defendants with probable cause that the automobile contained evidence
to be used in the commission of a crime. Willis provides no further details of the search
conducted by the officers.
Willis alleges that as a direct result of Defendants’ actions he has “sustained personal
injury in the form of extended incarceration. . . .” (ECF No. 4 at 5.) When a prisoner seeks to
challenge the validity or duration of his confinement, his sole remedy is a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to
particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.”). Willis cannot challenge

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the validity of his confinement under § 1983, and this Court cannot order his release even if his
claims were meritorious.
Any claim for money damages arising from Willis’s allegedly unlawful prosecution or
imprisonment is premature:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983
suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court
determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the
invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action
should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnotes omitted). Thus, a prisoner has no
cause of action under § 1983 if the claims in that action hinge on factual proof that would call
into question the validity of a state court order directing his confinement unless and until any
prosecution is terminated in his favor, his conviction is set aside, or the confinement is declared
illegal. Id. at 481-82; Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995). None of these
events has occurred in this case.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Willis’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
III. Standard for Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
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951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, because the deficiencies in Willis’s complaint cannot be cured, leave to amend is not
warranted.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Harper’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b(1). Leave to amend is
DENIED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Willis in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in
good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It

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would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior
to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.
See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that
lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Willis would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Willis
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment
procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets
out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, Willis
is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the
appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(a)(2) by
filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust
account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Willis, this is the first
dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This “strike” shall take
effect when judgment is entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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