Means v. Hayles et al

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 12/15/14. (Todd, James)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
COURTNEY MEANS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MATTHEW HAYLES, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 14-2606-JDT-dkv

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE
AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On August 4, 2014, Plaintiff Courtney Means, Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”) prisoner number 375663, who is currently an inmate at the Turney Center
Industrial Complex in Only, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 addressing his previous confinement at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary
(“WTSP”) in Henning, Tennessee, accompanied by a motion seeking leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order issued on August 5, 2014, the Court granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Security Threat Group (“STG”) Coordinator Matthew Hayles, Unit Manager
William Bryant, Officer First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Jackson, TDOC Director of
Classification Brandon Maloney, former WTSP Warden Jerry Lester, former Acting WTSP

Warden Dwight Barbee, Captain FNU Sweat, Captain FNU Munford, Assistant Warden
FNU Dickerson, and TDOC Commissioner Derrick Schofield, who was erroneously sued as
“Derrick Scholfield.”1 Each of the individual Defendants is sued in his or her individual and
official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.)
The complaint alleges that, on February 12, 2013, Plaintiff was sent to the STG
Program at the Bledsoe County Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) in Pikeville, Tennessee,
because of the murder of his cousin at the Northwest Correctional Complex in Tiponville,
Tennessee. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff renounced all gang memberships and participated fully in the
STG Program. (Id. ¶ 2.) In July 2013, TDOC revised its STG policy (TDOC Policy
#506.26) into the Security Management Unit (“SMU”) policy. The STG program at BCCX
was terminated and all inmates housed there were shipped to the WTSP. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff
alleges that he “disagreed with my placement into the SMU Program, because not all inmates
in the Bledsoe Program were shipped to the new Program.” (Id. ¶ 4.) He also claims that,
“[a]lthough I had renounced any and all affiliation with gangs, the transfer to West Tennessee
State Prison put me in danger from existing gangs.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff “exhausted all prison
remedies to obtain transfer to a safe environment, but was refused and/or ignored.” (Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff continued in the SMU Program and graduated on January 7, 2014. (Id. ¶ 9.)
In anticipation of his completion of the SMU Program, Plaintiff contacted Defendants
Maloney, Lester, Hayles, and Bryant in order to obtain a transfer away from the WTSP. (Id.

1

The Clerk is directed to modify the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant
Schofield’s last name.
2

¶¶ 10 & 12, at PageID 5-6.) Plaintiff “asked to be sent to a prison where I could do my time
peacefully and be safe from all violence.” (Id. ¶ 11, at PageID 6.) Plaintiff also presented
these issues to the SMU Review Board and the Unit Team. (Id. ¶ 13.)
TDOC policy provides that inmates who successfully complete the SMU Program will
be scheduled for a reclassification hearing. (Id. ¶ 14.) The SMU Review Board is
responsible for providing security recommendations to the Classification Panel for
consideration. (Id. ¶ 15.) Upon completion of the SMU Program, Plaintiff made Defendants
aware of the danger he was in. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants refused to reclassify Plaintiff and
totally ignored his concerns. (Id. ¶¶ 17-18.) Plaintiff’s concerns for his safety were not
documented, as required by TDOC policy. (Id. ¶ 21.)
Instead of transferring Plaintiff to another prison, he was “sent to the compound of
West Tennessee State Prison and placed in Unit 12.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant Bryant, who had
been the Unit Manager of the SMU Program, was reassigned as Unit Manager of Units 11
and 12. (Id. ¶ 23.) Defendant Bryant was aware of Plaintiff’s concerns for his personal
safety but did nothing to protect him. (Id. ¶ 24, at PageID 7.) During the next two weeks,
Plaintiff frequently visited the WTSP Classification Coordinator, Ms. Humphries, who is not
a party to this action, “trying to get shipped from the danger.” (Id. ¶ 25.) No action was
taken. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also discussed his concerns with Defendants Lester, Dickerson,
Sweat, and Mumford during morning inspections. (Id. ¶ 27.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he
tension increased daily, and I knew I was in real danger.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was

3

transferred to Unit 11, which is next door to Unit 12, but he contends that “[t]his . . . was no
real transfer at all, I was still in danger.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
On March 20, 2014, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Plaintiff was returning to Unit 11.
(Id. ¶ 31.) The doors to Units 11A and 11B should have been secured at that time. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Once Plaintiff stepped into the core area, Defendant Jackson “opened the doors to 11B and
allowed five inmates out of door without a pass.” (Id. ¶ 33.) “These men by post orders and
Policy #506.17 should not have been out of the Unit.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Plaintiff was immediately
attacked and stabbed six times. (Id. ¶ 35.) Although Defendant Jackson should have seen
the attack, “no Code was called.” (Id. ¶ 36.) Counselor Carswell and CCO Agnew, who are
not parties to this action, saw the incident and called for assistance once it was over. (Id.
¶ 37.) “However, no Code was called.” (Id. ¶ 38.)2 Plaintiff was taken to Lauderdale
Community Hospital and, upon his discharge, was placed in the prison infirmary. (Id.
¶¶ 39-40.)
Plaintiff was served with a disciplinary write-up for STG activity because he had been
attacked by gang members. (Id. ¶ 41, at PageID 8.) Although Plaintiff had previously
renounced his gang memberships, he was convicted and sent to the “hole” only because his
attackers were gang members. (Id. ¶ 42.) TDOC records still list Plaintiff as STG even
though he had renounced his gang memberships and completed the SMU Program. (Id.
¶ 43.) TDOC refuses to remove the STG designation from Plaintiff’s file. (Id. ¶ 44.)

2

The complaint does not explain the distinction, if any, between calling for assistance
and calling a Code.
4

Plaintiff contends that this refusal “violates the purspose and the policies and state laws
governing the programs.” (Id. ¶ 45.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at PageID 8-9.) He also
seeks an order directing the TDOC to change Plaintiff’s records to reflect that he is no longer
STG. (Id. at PageID 9.)
Plaintiff also alleges that he previously filed a lawsuit about his assignment to the
SMU Program at the WTSP (id. ¶ 7, at PageID 5), but that, “[w]ithout legal aid and without
knowledge of law and proper legal form, I soon became lost in the legal battle and unable to
afford an attorney, I dropped the suit” (id. ¶ 8). By way of background, on October 24, 2013,
Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the TDOC, Defendants
Lester, Bryant, and Maloney, and other parties, addressing his transfer to the SMU Program
at the WTSP after the closure of the STG unit at the BCCX. Means v. Lester, No. 2:13-cv02836-JDT-cgc (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2014) (dismissed for failure to state a claim).3
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or
any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or

3

In an order issued on January 15, 2014, the Court dismissed the complaint in case
number 13-2836 sua sponte for failure to state a claim but delayed the entry of judgment for
thirty days to permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the defendants in their
individual capacities that cured the deficiencies identified in that order. (No. 13-2836, ECF No.
6.) After Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint, the Court issued an order on February 26,
2014, directing the entry of judgment. (Id., ECF No. 7.) Judgment was entered on February 27,
2014. (Id., ECF No. 8.)
5

(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are
applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “[P]leadings that
. . . are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’
on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470
(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. (citing
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328-29).

6

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give judges
not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge
must accept all factual allegations as true, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that
are reviewed for frivolousness.
Id. at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however,
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608,
612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim
which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836,
837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no
obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423
F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out

7

the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly
burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates
for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who
come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,4 a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1)
a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Alleged violations of TDOC policy are not actionable under § 1983.
See Storm v. Swiger, No. 4:07 CV 2387, 2007 WL 3171491, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2007)
(citing Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993), overruled in part on other
grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995)).5

4

Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
5

In Levine, 986 F.2d at 1515, a habeas case, the Court of Appeals stated that “[a] state
cannot be said to have a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures; such a
system would result in the constitutionalizing of every state rule, and would not be
administrable.”
8

Defendants are employed by the TDOC. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s
office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted). Any claims against Defendants in
their official capacities is asserted against the State of Tennessee.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The
Eleventh Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in
federal court. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Employees of Dep’t
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973);
see also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A
State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress
may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal
courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.” (citations omitted)). By its
terms, the Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 100-01. Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2013-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will, 491 U.S.
9

at 71. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official
capacities pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Lester, Bryant, and Maloney arising from his
assignment to the SMU Program at the WTSP are barred by claim preclusion or res judicata.
“A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and
directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a
subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts apply the
doctrine of res judicata to promote the finality of judgments, which in turn increases
certainty, discourages multiple litigation and conserves judicial resources.”

Sanders

Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 1992). “Under
the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that
action.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998) (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (same).
Claim preclusion applies when (1) there is a final decision on the merits in the
first action by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves
the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) the second action raises an

10

issue actually litigated or which should have been litigated in the first action;
and (4) there is an identity of claims between the first and second actions.
Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App’x 476, 480 (6th Cir. 2014).
Each of these requirements has been satisfied. The Court issued a judgment on the
merits in case number 13-2836 dismissing the action for failure to state a claim.6 Defendants
6

It has not been conclusively resolved whether a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
and 1915A(b) is “on the merits.” In Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992), the Supreme
Court, reviewing a previous version of those statutes, stated that,
[b]ecause a § 1915(d) dismissal is not a dismissal on the merits, but rather an
exercise of the court’s discretion under the in forma pauperis statute, the
dismissal does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same
allegations. It could, however, have a res judicata effect on frivolousness
determinations for future in forma pauperis petitions. See, e.g., Bryant v.
Civiletti, 214 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 110–111, 663 F.2d 286, 287–288, n. 1 (1981) (§
1915(d) dismissal for frivolousness is res judicata); Warren v. McCall, 709 F.2d
1183, 1186, and n. 7 (CA7 1983) (same); cf. Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853,
855 (CA8 1988) (noting that application of res judicata principles after § 1915(d)
dismissal can be “somewhat problematical”). Therefore, if it appears that
frivolous factual allegations could be remedied through more specific pleading, a
court of appeals reviewing a § 1915(d) disposition should consider whether the
district court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice or
without leave to amend. Because it is not properly before us, we express no
opinion on the Ninth Circuit rule, applied below, that a pro se litigant bringing
suit in forma pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend the
complaint to overcome any deficiency unless it is clear that no amendment can
cure the defect. E.g., Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (CA9 1970); Noll v.
Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446 (CA9 1987).
In case number 13-2836, the Court gave Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to cure the
deficiencies in his complaint prior to dismissing his claims with prejudice, as required by
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.2d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013). Even before LaFountain, several Sixth
Circuit decisions have affirmed the dismissal of subsequent suits under § 1915(e)(2) as barred by
claim preclusion. See,e.g., Murray v. Reed, 69 F. App’x 246 (6th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. United
States, 37 F. App’x 754 (6th Cir. 2001); Haddad v. Mich. Nat’l Corp., 34 F. App’x 217, 218 (6th
Cir. 2002); Taylor v. Reynolds, 22 F. App’x 537, 539 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Lierer v. Ohio
Bur. of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(approving dismissal of official-capacity claim as barred by res judicata, reversing dismissal of
(continued...)
11

Bryant, Lester, and Maloney were parties to this case and to case number 13-2836. Case
number 13-2836, like this case, involved claims that Plaintiff was erroneously assigned to
the SMU Program at the WTSP after the closure of the STG unit at the BCCX. Any
difference in the allegations and legal theories in this suit and case number 13-2846 does not
entitle Plaintiff to litigate his assignment to the SMU Program in a second lawsuit. “A
plaintiff should have litigated two claims in his or her first suit, and thus may not litigate the
second claim later, where, as here, the two claims arose from the same transaction or series
of transactions.” Heike, 573 F. 3d at 482 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, this
case, like case number 13-2836, includes claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although the remaining Defendants were not parties to case number 13-2836,
Plaintiff’s claims against them arising from his assignment to the SMU Program at the WTSP
are barred by collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
Four specific requirements must be met before collateral estoppel may be
applied to bar litigation of an issue: (1) the precise issue must have been raised
and actually litigated in the prior proceedings; (2) the determination of the
issue must have been necessary to the outcome of the prior proceedings; (3)
the prior proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and
(4) the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.

6

(...continued)
individual-capacity claim that was not alleged in first suit, and noting that district court did not
address whether individual-capacity claim was barred by issue preclusion). Although the
unpublished decision in Stephens v. Hayes, 374 F. App’x 620, 622 (6th Cir. 2010), appears to
reach a different result, that decision is inconsistent with the subsequent published decision in
LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951, which address the circumstances under which a case may be
dismissed with prejudice under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1).
12

Cobbins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Transp., 566 F.3d 582, 589-90 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Hamilton’s
Bogarts, Inc. v. Mich., 501 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2007) (same). These requirements also
have been satisfied. The legality of Plaintiff’s assignment to the WTSP SMU Program was
raised and actually litigated in case number 13-2836, a decision was necessary to the
outcome of the prior proceeding, a final judgment on the merits was entered, and Plaintiff
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against the
remaining defendants regarding his assignment to the WTSP SMU Program are barred by
collateral estoppel or claim preclusion.
The complaint fails to state a due process claim against any Defendant arising from
the failure to reclassify Plaintiff after his completion of the SMU Program or the failure to
remove the STG designation from Plaintiff’s records. An inmate’s right to due process arises
only if a restriction implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In general, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in
a particular security classification or in freedom from administrative segregation. Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9
(1976); Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874,
876 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, courts have rejected challenges to even the most restrictive
security classifications. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576-77 (6th Cir. 2005)
(designation as member of a STG and permanent restrictions imposed as a result of that
designation not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
13

prison life); Ford v. Harvey, 106 F. App’x 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Ford’s designation as
a ‘Security Threat Group Member’ is nothing more than a security classification used by the
prison. Because Ford does not have a constitutional right to a particular security level or
classification, he fails to state a claim.”); Ford v. Martin, 49 F. App’x 584, 586 (6th Cir.
2002) (rejecting claim that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights to due process and equal
protection when they designated him an STG member without a hearing, explaining that,
“[t]o the extent that Ford has argued that the defendants improperly changed his security
classification, such reclassification does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship
on him because a prisoner has no right to a particular security level”); Cromer v. Braman,
No. 1:07-cv-009, 2009 WL 806919, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 25, 2009) (rejecting due process
challenge to designation as an STG member). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff’s
designation as an STG member presents a significant and atypical hardship. The complaint
also does not allege that WTSP officials failed to conduct a classification review; instead,
Plaintiff is unhappy with his initial housing assignment after completion of the SHU
Program.
The complaint does not state a valid claim against any Defendant for issuance of a
false disciplinary write-up. As a preliminary matter, the complaint does not identify the
officer who issued the write-up. An inmate ordinarily cannot sue for the issuance of a false
disciplinary charge where there is a fair hearing on that charge. Jackson v. Madery, 158 F.
App’x 656, 662-63 (6th Cir. 2005) (“False accusations of misconduct filed against an inmate
do not constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights where the charges are adjudicated in
14

a fair hearing. . . . Jackson was provided due process hearings for the misconduct charges;
as such, his due process rights were not violated and he may not maintain a § 1983 claim for
the allegedly false misconduct reports.” (citations omitted)); see also McMillan v. Fielding,
136 F. App’x 818, 820 (6th Cir. 2005) (“McMillan’s complaint with regard to the false
charges fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. . . . Even if McMillan had a liberty
interest in remaining free from lock up, loss of package privileges, and a fine, his due process
right was fulfilled by his disciplinary hearing.”); Cromer v. Dominguez, 103 F. App’x 570,
573 (6th Cir. 2004) (“False accusations of misconduct filed against an inmate do not
constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights where the charges are subsequently
adjudicated in a fair hearing.”); Person v. Campbell, No. 98-5638, 1999 WL 454819, at *1
(6th Cir. June 21, 1999) (“[T]he filing of false disciplinary charges against an inmate does
not constitution a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983.”); Jones v. McKinney,
No. 97-6424, 1998 WL 940242, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (“McKinney did not violate
Jones’s constitutional rights, even if the disciplinary report was false, because a prisoner has
no constitutionally protected immunity from being wrongly accused.”); Mujihad v. Harrison,
No. 97-6366, 1998 WL 940243, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (“[T]he filing of false
disciplinary charges against an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation
redressable pursuant to § 1983.”). Here, Plaintiff makes no complaint about the procedures
employed during his disciplinary hearing. It is unclear whether Plaintiff was convicted of
the charge. His only complaint appears to be that he was issued a write-up and sent to the
“hole” to await a disciplinary hearing. Those allegations do not state a viable claim.
15

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants failed to protect him from his fellow inmates arises
under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.

See

generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim consists of
both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 631
F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective
component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must
show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir.
2005), or that he has been deprived of the “‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’”
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also
Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). “The Supreme Court has held that
‘prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.’” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S.
at 297, 302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate
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indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Woods
v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,
814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995).
“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
This approach comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our
cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and
unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or
omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might
well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society
might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such
concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an
official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City of Madison
Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of an
obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant
individually. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767; see also id. at 768 (“[W]e must focus on whether each
individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit a finding of subjective
knowledge.”).
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Although a failure to protect an inmate from the risk of violence from other prisoners
might satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff’s complaint
does not sufficiently allege that he faced a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Greene v.
Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766 (“To establish a constitutional violation based on failure to protect,
a prison inmate must first show that the failure to protect from risk of harm is objectively
sufficiently serious.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff
believed he was at risk of harm at the WTSP and that he was subsequently assaulted. There
are no allegations explaining the basis for Plaintiff’s fear; therefore, it is not possible to
conclude that Defendants should have perceived that the risk of harm to Plaintiff was
substantial.
For similar reasons, the complaint does not adequately allege the subjective
component of an Eighth Amendment violation. The complaint does not identify the
Defendants to whom Plaintiff communicated his fears for his personal safety.

The

allegations about Plaintiff’s supposed entitlement to reclassification after completion of the
SMU Program are commingled with those addressing his safety concerns. It is necessary to
assess whether each of the ten Defendants actually perceived that a substantial risk to
Plaintiff’s personal safety existed and whether each Defendant was deliberately indifferent
to that risk.
The subjective component is not satisfied even as to Defendant Jackson, who opened
the doors to Unit 11B and let five inmates out without a pass. That Jackson might have been
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negligent or might have violated WTSP policies does not establish that he was aware of the
risk to Plaintiff’s safety and deliberately disregarded that risk.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d
944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st
Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is
ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint
must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured.
Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st
Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without
prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the
plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte
dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); Curley v.
Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua
sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports
with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).

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The Court cannot conclude that any amendment to Plaintiff’s complaint against
Defendants in their individual capacities would be futile as a matter of law. Therefore, leave
to amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight days
after the date of this order.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and
must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleading. The text of the complaint
must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous
document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint
and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must
arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated
in a separate count and must identify each Defendant sued in that count. If Plaintiff fails to
file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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