Caffey v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 13

ORDER REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER AND REMANDING CASE PURSUANT TO SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 9/12/2017. (Pham, Tu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
CHARLES EDWARD CAFFEY,

)
)
)
)
) No. 14-cv-02640-TMP
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

ORDER REMANDING CASE PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

Before
appeal

from

the
a

court
final

is

plaintiff

decision

of

the

Charles

Edward

Commissioner

Caffey’s
of

Social

Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act
(“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.

On May 25, 2017, the parties

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

(ECF No. 12.)

For the

reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is
reversed and the action is remanded pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.
On

December

16,

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2010,

Caffey

applied

insurance benefits under Title II of the Act.

for

disability

(R. at 102.)

Caffey alleged disability beginning on August 10, 2003, due to

residual back problems from a herniated disk.
183.)

Caffey’s

application

was

denied

(R. at 102, 179,

initially

and

upon

reconsideration by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).
(R. at 22.)

At Caffey’s request, a hearing was held before an

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 1, 2012.

(Id.)

On May

23, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying Caffey’s request for
benefits after finding that Caffey was not under a disability
because he retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy.
Council

(R. at 22–30.)
denied

Caffey’s

On July 20, 2014, the SSA’s Appeals
request

for

review.

(R.

at

1.)

Therefore, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision for the
Commissioner.

(Id.)

Subsequently, on August 18, 2014, Caffey

filed the instant action.

(ECF No. 1.)

Caffey argues that (1)

the ALJ erred by improperly weighing the opinion of Caffey’s
treating

physician,

Dr.

Forest

Robinson;

and

(2)

the

ALJ’s

finding that Caffey has the RFC to perform a significant number
of jobs in the national and local economy is not supported by
substantial evidence.

(ECF No. 8 at 6–8.)
II.

A.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial

review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which he or she was a party.

2

“The court shall have

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing.”
review
there

of

the

is

whether

Commissioner’s

substantial

the

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
decision

evidence

Commissioner

is

limited

to

the

the

used

support
proper

legal

Judicial
to

whether

decision

and

criteria

in

making the decision. Id.; Burton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 164190, 2017 WL 2781570, at *2 (6th Cir. June 27, 2017); Cole v.
Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011); Rogers v. Comm’r of
Soc.

Sec.,

486

F.3d

234,

241

(6th

Cir.

2007).

Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance, and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Kirk v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir.
1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
In

determining

whether

substantial

evidence

exists,

the

reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a
whole and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight.’”

Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918,

923 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383,
388

(6th

support
affirm

Cir.
the

that

1984)).

If

Commissioner’s
decision

and

substantial
decision,

“may

3

not

evidence

however,
even

the

inquire

is

found

to

court

must

whether

the

record

could

support

a

decision

the

other

way.”

Barker

v.

Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir.
1989)).
resolve

Similarly, the court may “not try the case de novo,
conflicts

credibility.”

in

the

evidence

or

decide

questions

of

Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th
Cir. 2007)).

The Commissioner, not the court, is charged with

the duty to weigh the evidence and to resolve material conflicts
in the testimony.

Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525,

528 (6th Cir. 1997); Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th
Cir. 1990); Prater v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 114CV01221STATMP,
2017 WL 2929479, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. July 10, 2017).
B.

The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in

any

substantial

gainful

activity

by

reason

of

any

medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last

for

a

continuous

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).

period

of

not

less

than

12

months.”

Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the

Act states that:
An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience,

4

engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
For purposes of the preceding
sentence (with respect to any individual), “work which
exists in the national economy” means work which
exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of
the country.
Under

the

Act,

the

claimant

bears

the

establishing an entitlement to benefits.

ultimate

burden

of

Oliver v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).

The initial

burden is on the claimant to prove she has a disability as
defined by the Act.

Siebert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F.

App’x 744, 746 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at
529); see also Born v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d
1168, 1173 (6th Cir. 1990).

If the claimant is able to do so,

the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the
existence of available employment compatible with the claimant’s
disability and background.

Born, 923 F.2d at 1173; see also

Griffith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir.
2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

First, the

claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

5

Second, a finding

must be made that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment.
20

C.F.R.

§§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii),

416.920(a)(5)(ii).

In

the

third step, the ALJ determines whether the impairment meets or
equals

the

severity

criteria

set

forth

in

the

Listing

Impairments contained in the Social Security Regulations.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

of
See

If the impairment

satisfies the criteria for a listed impairment, the claimant is
considered to be disabled.

On the other hand, if the claimant’s

impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ
must undertake the fourth step in the analysis and determine
whether the claimant has the RFC to return to any past relevant
work.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(e).

If the

ALJ determines that the claimant can return to past relevant
work, then a finding of not disabled must be entered.

Id.

But

if the ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past relevant
work, then at the fifth step the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant can perform other work existing in significant numbers
in the national economy.
404.1520(g)(1),

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.960(c)(1)-(2).

Further

review

is

not

necessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled
at

any

point

in

this

sequential

analysis.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
C.

The ALJ’s Assessment of the Treating Physician’s Opinion
Caffey argues that the ALJ erred by giving no weight to the

6

opinion of his treating source,1 Dr. Forrest Robinson.
8 at 7.)

Dr. Robinson treated Caffey from October 7, 2008

through January 5, 2009.
ALJ

that

(ECF No.

Caffey

(R. at 25, 269.)

suffered

from

He reported to the

“compression

neuropathies”

resulting from his disk injury as well as from chronic pain that
medication did little to ease.
of

these

conditions,

Dr.

(R. at 269, 275.)
Robinson

said

As a result

that

Caffey

is

“consistently subject to ice packs, pain killers and bed rest up
to twenty-four hours” after engaging in light activity like yard
work.

(R. at 275.)

disabled”

and

While initially declaring Caffey “totally

incapable

of

gainful

employment,

Dr.

Robinson

later acknowledged that his “professional opinion regarding this
patient is based primarily on subjective statements made by the
patient”

and

explained

that

prevented further evaluation.
The

ALJ

gave

no

Caffey’s

financial

limitations

(R. at 269, 275.)

weight

to

Dr.

Robinson’s

opinion,

explaining that “Dr. Robinson’s conclusion cannot be accepted
because it is inconsistent with the Claimant’s activities of
daily

living,”

and

“the

final

responsibility

[disability] is reserved to the Commissioner.”
Caffey

contends

the

ALJ

violated

procedural

for

deciding

(R. at 29.)

requirements

by

neglecting to apply mandatory criteria when deciding what weight

1

The parties both describe Dr. Forrest Robinson as a treating
source. (ECF Nos. 8, 9.)
7

to give Dr. Robinson’s opinion.

(ECF No. 8 at 7–8.)

Treating sources are medical sources who have treated a
claimant

and

have,

or

have

had,

an

“ongoing

treatment

relationship” with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). If
an ALJ finds that a treating source’s diagnostic techniques are
medically acceptable and that the substantial evidence of the
claimant’s
opinion,

record

than

weight.”

the

accords
ALJ

with

will

the

give

treating
that

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2).

source’s

opinion
In

the

medical

“controlling
event

the

treating source’s opinion does not meet these requirements and,
therefore, does not merit controlling weight, the ALJ must apply
a set of regulatory factors to determine what weight to give the
opinion.

Id.

Those factors include the length and nature of

the treatment relationship, the frequency of exams, the evidence
upon which the physician bases her or his opinion, the opinion’s
consistency with the record as a whole, whether the physician is
practicing in an area where she or he has specialized, and any
other relevant factor, like the physician’s familiarity with the
claimant’s

full

medical

record.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-

(6).
Though the Sixth Circuit emphasizes that ALJs must apply
all of these factors, it has recognized three instances where it
amounts to harmless error even though an ALJ failed to apply the
factors to the treating source’s opinion.

8

See Wilson v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2004).

The first

is if the treating source’s opinion is “so patiently deficient
that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it.”
second

is

if

the

“Commissioner

adopts

the

Id.

opinion

of

The
the

treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion.”
Id.

The third is if the ALJ met the “goal of § 1527(d)(2)” by

fully

assessing

the

value

of

the

treating

without explicitly applying all of the factors.

source’s

opinion

Id.

In addition to specifying how to evaluate medical opinions,
the Code of Federal Regulations draws an important distinction
between

medical

opinions

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

The

and
ALJ

conclusory

should

opinions.

always

apply

the

procedural factors to determine what weight to give a medical
opinion.

Id.

But, when a physician opines on issues reserved

to the Commissioner by, for example, announcing that a person is
disabled,

the

Commissioner

“will

not

give

any

special

significance” to the physician’s opinion on that issue.

Id.;

see also Curler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 561 F. App'x 464, 472
(6th

Cir.

2014).

However,

just

because

the

physician

impermissibly opines about a claimant’s ability to work does not
mean that the ALJ can cast aside the entirety of the physician’s
opinion. See Hall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 148 F. App'x 456, 461–
67 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding a case because the ALJ failed to
give good reasons for dismissing the treating physician’s entire

9

opinion even though the doctor had improperly opined that the
claimant was “totally disabled”).
The Commissioner argues that because Dr. Robinson’s opinion
was conclusory it was not entitled to any weight and, thus, the
ALJ did not need to apply the multi-factor analysis.
at 11.)

(ECF No. 9

This is true for the portion of Dr. Robinson’s opinion

that invaded the ALJ’s purview.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

The

ALJ did not have to give any weight to Dr. Robinson’s statements
that Caffey was “totally disabled” and could not be “gainfully
employed.”

(R. at 269.)

However, Dr. Robinson’s opinion also

contained medical opinions.
“compression

Dr. Robinson diagnosed Caffey with

neuropathies;”

detailed

the

nature,

unpredictability, and severity of Caffey’s symptoms; and stated
that

Caffey’s

activities.

pain

impacts

(R. at 269, 275.)

his

ability

to

perform

daily

Thus, the ALJ had to comply with

the regulatory requirements and determine what weight to assign
to these medical opinions.
Here, the ALJ correctly chose not to give Dr. Robinson’s
opinion controlling weight but erred by not applying the multifactor analysis to Dr. Robinson’s medical opinions.
Robinson

based

all

of

his

opinions

primarily

Because Dr.
on

Caffey’s

subjective complaints, the ALJ provided good reason for deciding
not to give Dr. Robinson’s opinion controlling weight.

Payne v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F. App'x 109, 113 (6th Cir. 2010)

10

(“[T]he ALJ is not bound by conclusory statements of doctors,
particularly where they are unsupported by detailed objective
criteria and documentation.” (quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d
762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001))).

However, after determining that the

Dr. Robinson’s opinion did not merit controlling weight, the ALJ
did not apply the multi-factor test to the opinion.

The court

will therefore consider whether the ALJ’s decision falls into
one

of

the

three

Wilson

exceptions

and

amounts

to

harmless

error.
Applying the first of the Wilson exceptions, this is not a
situation where the treating source’s opinion was “so patently
deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it.”
Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547.

Dr. Robinson’s opinion is confirmed by

his own medical notes and corresponds with the evidence from
Caffey’s MRI. (R. at 212, 269–275.); cf. Pasco v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., 137 F. App'x 828, 837–38 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding an
ALJ’s decision to give no weight to a medical opinion where the
claimant’s record contained no “office notes or other treatment
records” from the doctor and the doctor’s opinion lacked any
objective basis whatsoever to support it).
The ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Robinson’s opinion also does not
fall

into

Wilson,

378

the

second

F.3d

at

Wilson

547.

exception:

The

Robinson’s opinion. (R. at 29.)

11

ALJ

implicit

explicitly

adoption.

rejected

Dr.

The

only

remaining

exception

is

the

third:

the

ALJ

comported with the goal of the regulatory requirements if not
the letter of them.
contends

that

this

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547.
is

the

case

and

that

the

The Commissioner
ALJ

implicitly

applied two of the factors when he noted that Dr. Robinson’s
opinion

was

inconsistent

with

Caffey’s

daily

activities

identified the subjective basis of the opinion.
12.)

When

applying

the

third

Wilson

and

(ECF No. 9 at

exception,

the

Sixth

Circuit has permitted ALJ decisions to stand even though the ALJ
applied less than the full set of factors.

Kepke v. Comm'r of

Soc. Sec., 636 F. App'x 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ALJ
gave good reasons for discounting Dr. Chapman's opinion, and
satisfied the mandates of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 by considering
some of the listed factors . . . .”); Pasco, 137 F. App'x at
837–38.

Nevertheless, the ALJ still had to apply those factors

in a reasoned fashion spelled out in the opinion.

Morr v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 616 F. App'x 210, 211 (6th Cir. 2015) (“If
an ALJ decides to give a treating source's opinion less than
controlling weight, she must give ‘good reasons’ for doing so
that are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent
reviewers the weight given to the treating source’s opinion and
the

reasons

544)).
apply

for

that

weight.”

(quoting

Wilson,

378

F.3d

at

Here, the ALJ’s treatment of the two factors that he did
falls

short

of

the

goal

12

of

the

procedural

regulation

because the ALJ did not provide a fully reasoned analysis.
The ALJ’s finding of inconsistency between Dr. Robinson’s
opinion and Caffey’s daily activities is an insufficient basis
for

disregarding

the

opinion.

The

Sixth

Circuit

has

held

several times that an “ALJ's focus on the claimant's ability to
do

certain

activities

in

discounting

the

treating

source's

opinion does not constitute ‘good reasons’ for doing so when the
claimant's testimony and other record evidence contradict the
ALJ's finding.”

Cole, 661 F.3d at 939 (citing Johnson v. Comm'r

Soc.

F.3d

Sec.,

652

646,

652

(6th

Cir.

testimony contradicts the ALJ’s finding.

2011)).

Caffey’s

The ALJ noted that

Caffey can engage in “activities of daily living, which include
yard

work,

shopping.”

housework,
(R. at 28.)

daily

exercise,

driving,

ironing

and

This commentary mischaracterizes the

many limitations that Caffey laid out both in his testimony and
in his questionnaire responses.

Caffey conceded

that he

is

capable of doing yard work but clarified that it causes him pain
in his back and right hip to do it.

(R. at 165.)

With regard

to the household chores, Caffey acknowledged he was responsible
for them but explained “it doesn’t get done, my house is a
mess.”

(R. at 47.)

He also explained that when he does wash

dishes he has to rest or lie on his back afterwards and that he
can cook on a good day but, even then, can only stand long
enough to make simple meals like a frozen dinner.

13

(R. at 151,

160, 192, 202.)
the

exercise

When discussing exercise, Caffey specified that

consisted

of

ice

packs,

stretching,

different size balls,” hardly a rigorous workout.

and

“two

(R. at 44.)

With regard to shopping, Caffey consistently reported that he
could

only

do

it

on

a

good

day.

(R.

at

44,

151,

160.).

Furthermore, he stated that he could only shop at night when
there were no lines and that he had trouble with heavy grocery
bags.

(Id.)

All of Caffey’s explanations correspond with Dr.

Robinson’s medical opinion that Caffey’s “daily activities are
only

accomplished

Robinson’s

through

opinion

was

pain.”

(R.

consistent

at

with

275.)

evidence

Thus,
of

Dr.

Caffey’s

activities.
Dr. Robinson’s opinion of Caffey’s physical condition does
conflict with the opinions of the state consultants who noted
that Caffey could do everything from stand for six hours to
climb, balance, stoop, and crawl.

(R. at 219–220.)

However, it

does not appear that the ALJ assessed the weight of the state
consultant

opinions,

thus

calling

into

question

the

ALJ’s

reliance on the state consultants’ opinions over Dr. Robinson’s
opinion.
(6th

Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 379–80

Cir.

2013)

(“His

failure

to

apply

the

same

level

of

scrutiny to the opinions of the consultative doctors upon which
he relied, let alone the greater scrutiny of such sources called
for

by

20

C.F.R.

§

404.1527,

14

further

demonstrates

that

his

assessment of [the treating source’s] opinions failed to abide
by

the

Commissioner's

question

the

ALJ's

regulations

and

analysis.”).

therefore

For

calls

into

of

these

assessment

opinions, the ALJ mentioned only that the state agency medical
consultant opinions were supported by the record.

(R. at 28.)

The ALJ’s failure to apply the multi-factor analysis to the
state consultants’ opinions lessens the probative value of any
inconsistencies between the state consultants’ opinions and Dr.
Robinson’s opinion.
With

the

inconsistency

factor

an

unsound

reason

to

disregard Dr. Robinson’s opinion, the primarily subjective basis
of Dr. Robinson’s medical opinions remains as the single factor
from the multi-factor test supporting the ALJ’s decision to give
Dr. Robinson’s opinion no weight.

In McGlothin v. Commissioenr

of Social Security, the Sixth Circuit upheld an ALJ decision to
disregard treating sources’ medical opinions solely because of
the subjective basis of the opinions.
(6th

Cir.

2008).

However,

in

299 F. App'x 516, 523

McGlothin,

the

Sixth

Circuit

pointed out that the ALJ had found the claimant’s complaints to
be “incredible.”
while

“at

statements

times”
were

Consequently,

Id.

In the present case, the ALJ found that,

Caffey’s
also

because

claims

“generally
the

ALJ

were

exaggerated,

credible.”

(R.

found

the

that

at

Caffey’s
27–28.)

subjective

complaints upon which Dr. Robinson based his medical opinion

15

were

exaggerated

sufficient
opinions.

but

basis

for

credible,

the

ALJ
Dr.

discounting

did

not

provide

Robinson’s

a

medical

While there may be additional factors in the record

upon which the ALJ could have relied when deciding to give Dr.
Robinson’s medical opinions no weight, “the requisite evidence
and analysis must appear in the ALJ's decision, not simply be
present in the rest of the record.”

Karger v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 414 F. App'x 739, 753 (6th Cir. 2011).
Because the ALJ has failed to provide good reasons for
giving Dr. Robinson’s opinion no weight, the ALJ’s decision does
not meet the procedural requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c),
leaving the decision unsupported by substantial evidence.

See

Cole, 661 F.3d at 940 (“Our finding that the ALJ's decision is
not supported by substantial evidence is based on the ALJ's
violation of the agency's procedural rules.”).

Accordingly, it

is ordered that the case be remanded so that the ALJ may comply
with

procedural

requirements

when

determining

what

weight

to

give Dr. Robinson’s opinion.
D.

The ALJ’s RFC Determination
Caffey asserts that the ALJ’s determination that he has the

RFC

to

perform

evidence.

light

work

(ECF No. 8 at 6.)

is

not

supported

by

A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the

claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations.”
404.1545(a)(1),

substantial

416.945(a)(1).

The

16

ALJ

must

20 C.F.R. §§
assess

the

claimant’s RFC based on all of the relevant evidence in the
record.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3); see also

SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *3 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“The RFC
assessment is a function-by-function assessment based upon all
of the relevant evidence of an individual's ability to do workrelated

activities.”).

responsibility

of

“[T]he

evaluating

the

ALJ

is

charged

medical

evidence

with

the

and

the

claimant’s testimony to form an ‘assessment of [her] residual
functional capacity.’”
629,

633

(6th

Cir.

Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d
2004)

(alteration

in

original)(quoting

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv)).
The ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Caffey
[H]ad the [RCF] to lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10
pounds frequently and stand, walk, and sit 6 hours in
an eight hour workday with frequent balancing,
stooping,
kneeling,
crouching,
crawling,
and
ramp/stair
climbing
and
occasional
ladder/rope/scaffold
climbing
while
avoiding
concentrated exposure to hazards, moving machinery and
work at heights.
(R. at 26.)

As a result of these findings, the ALJ determined

that Caffey still had the RFC to “perform the full range of
light work . . . .”2 (R. at 30.)

2

“Light work”
involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a
good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
17

Caffey
reasons.

argues

this

finding

is

unsubstantiated

for

two

First, his treating physician reported to the ALJ that

Caffey’s disability rendered him incapable of working. (ECF No.
8 at 6.)

Second, the ALJ neglected to consider the combined

effect of Caffey’s three impairments: lumbar spinal disorders,
hypertension, and prostate cancer.
As

discussed

above,

ALJs

(Id.)
are

not

obligated

to

give

controlling weight to opinions that state that a claimant is
disabled,

regardless

of

their

source.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.972(d)(1); see also Curler, 561
F. App'x at 472.

Therefore, the ALJ correctly disregarded Dr.

Robinson’s opinion that Caffey was disabled.
Furthermore, the ALJ did consider the combined effect of
Caffey’s three impairments.

When assessing whether a claimant

is disabled, the ALJ must consider the “combined effect” of all
of the claimant’s impairments.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.

This

consideration must be more than “lip service” that does little
more

than

acknowledge

the

presence

of

multiple

impairments.

Germany-Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App'x 771, 775–76

sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, you
must have the ability to do substantially all of these
activities.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); see also SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at
*5 (January 1, 1983).
18

(6th Cir. 2008) (citing Mowery v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 966, 970
(6th Cir. 1985)).

However, the ALJ may meet this requirement by

analyzing each condition individually.

See Bledsoe v. Barnhart,

165 F. App'x 408, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The ALJ described
evidence pertaining to all impairments, both severe and nonsevere . . . . The ALJ explicitly stated that he considered
the combination of all impairments . . . .”); Loy v. Sec'y of
Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir. 1990) (“An
ALJ's

individual

discussion

of

multiple

impairments

does

not

imply that he failed to consider the effect of the impairments
in

combination,

where

the

ALJ

specifically

refers

to

a

‘combination of impairments’ in finding that the plaintiff does
not meet the listings.”).

Here, the ALJ listed and described

all three of Caffey’s impairments and noted that Caffey did not
have a “combination of impairments” that rendered him disabled.
(R. at 24–26.)

Even if he had not considered the combined

effect of the impairments, it is unclear from the record how the
hypertension and prostate cancer might have impacted Caffey’s
ability to work.

Therefore, whether the ALJ had or had not

considered the combined effect of the impairments would not have
impacted the ALJ’s ultimate determination.
the

court

upholds

the

ALJ’s

disregard

For these reasons,
of

Dr.

Robinson’s

conclusory opinions and assessment of the combined effect of
Caffey’s impairments when determining Caffey’s RFC.

19

III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ’s decision is reversed,
and this case is remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
September 12, 2017
Date

20