Watkins v. Tennessee Department of Human Services, et al.

Filing 12

ORDER granting 7 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 4/17/15. (Anderson, S.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
MYRA WATKINS,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
No. 14-2751-STA-dkv
)
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
)
HUMAN SERVICES,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Tennessee Department of Human Services’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 7) filed on February 25, 2015. Plaintiff Myra Watkins has responded in
opposition to the Motion. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
In the alternative, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to serve within 120 days under
Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2014, Plaintiff Myra Watkins filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) against
Defendant Tennessee Department of Human Services. 1 On the same day Plaintiff caused
summons to issue. No further docket activity occurred after that date. On January 26, 2015,
when more than 120 days passed from the filing of the Complaint, the Court ordered Plaintiff to
show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss her Complaint for failure to effect service

1

The Complaint included in the caption of the case “Raquel Hatter, Commissioner.” On
March 27, 2015, the Court granted Defendant’s unopposed motion to remove Hatter as an ECF
1

within 120 days under Rule 4(m) or in the alternative for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).
On February 10, 2015, Plaintiff responded to the Court’s show cause order. Plaintiff
stated that she served the summons and Complaint on the Attorney General for the state of
Tennessee on February 4, 2015.

Plaintiff requested that the Court accept the service as

“effective” and argued that Defendant had not suffered any prejudice as a result of Plaintiff’s
failure to effect service within the time allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff also requested that the Court enter a scheduling order, which would require Defendant to
file the administrative record and set deadlines for the parties to brief the issues raised in
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Defendant responded by filing the instant Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction now before the Court. Defendant argues that Plaintiff seeks judicial review of
Defendant’s decision to deny her Medicaid benefits. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs has also
filed a petition with the Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tennessee. Plaintiff has alleged
no other claim against Defendant. Defendant argues that under the circumstance this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review the state agency’s decision.

None of the statutes cited in the

Complaint actually confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear Plaintiff’s appeal. Tennessee’s
Uniform Administrative Procedures Act requires that any appeal of a state agency decision must
be taken to the Chancery Court for Davidson County, Tennessee. In the alternative, the Court
should hold that it lacks jurisdiction because Defendant is an agency of the state of Tennessee
and therefore is entitled to sovereign immunity and cannot be sued under the Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution.

participate in this action.
2

Plaintiff has responded in opposition. 2 Plaintiff begins by requesting that the Court
direct Defendant to file the administrative record. Plaintiffs argues that pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §
706, an agency must file the administrative record before a reviewing court can makes it
determination of the agency decision. Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement its response
upon filing of the administrative record. Plaintiff contends that federal question jurisdiction
exists in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For support Plaintiffs cites 42 U.S.C. § 1396a,
which governs state plans for medical assistance. Plaintiff argues that other federal courts have
held that subject matter jurisdiction exists “to address alleged wrongs engaged in the bye [sic]
states when interpreting and applying the federal Medicaid statutes.” Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n 3.
Plaintiff does concede that she filed a “precautionary petition” in Davidson County Chancery
Court but that federal question jurisdiction exists over her claims.

Plaintiff concludes by

proposing deadlines for a case management scheduling order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss a claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law
presumes that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”3 As such, “federal courts have a
duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in every case and may raise the issue sua

2

When Plaintiff failed to respond to the Motion to Dismiss within the time permitted
under the Local Rules of Court, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why the Motion
should not be granted. See Order to Show Cause Apr. 1, 2015 (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed a
response as directed on April 8, 2015.
3

Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3

sponte.”4 A party moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “may either attack
the claim of jurisdiction on its face or it can attack the factual basis of jurisdiction.”5 “A facial
attack goes to the question of whether the plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, and the court takes the allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of Rule
12(b)(1) analysis.”6 By contrast, “[a] factual attack challenges the factual existence of subject
matter jurisdiction” in which case the court may receive evidence to determine “whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists, including evidence outside of the pleadings.”7 In the final analysis,
the plaintiff has the burden to prove that the federal court has jurisdiction to hear the claim.8
ANALYSIS
I. Lack of Jurisdiction
The Court holds that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking in this case. Based on the
well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the Tennessee Department of
Human Services’s determination that she is not entitled to benefits under the state’s Medicaid
program.9 The Sixth Circuit has summarized the nature and purposes of the Medicaid program
as follows:
4

New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Home Sav. & Loan Co. of Youngstown, Ohio, 581 F.3d 420,
423 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
5

Crugher v. Prelesnik, 761 F.3d 610, 613 (6th Cir. 2014).

6

Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014).

7

Id.

8

Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2014).

9

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s suit is brought on her behalf by Robert Watkins, her
agent holding power of attorney.
4

Medicaid is a federal “grant-in-aid” program that helps states pay for health
services for the needy. Grant-in-aid programs are contractual in nature—that is,
states that accept federal Medicaid funding must develop a state Medicaid plan
that complies with the terms and conditions upon which the federal funds were
offered. State plans must include certain services, and may include others if the
state chooses, but the services offered must meet the requirements of the
Medicaid Act unless a waiver of certain requirements is approved by the Federal
Center for Medicaid Services in the Department of Health and Human Services
(CMS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n.10
The Complaint alleges that the Court has jurisdiction over her petition for judicial review
pursuant to several statutory sources. However, none of the statutes actually confers jurisdiction
on this Court to hear Plaintiff’s claims.
For example, the Complaint cites Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322, Tennessee’s Uniform
Administrative Procedures Act. The code section provides for judicial review of a final state
agency decision by filing a petition in “the chancery court for Davidson County.”11 Plaintiff’s
other statutory citations, likewise, fail to confer jurisdiction on this Court to hear Plaintiff’s
appeal from the Tennessee Department of Human Services’s decision. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1316
provides for judicial review of a determination by the Secretary of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services that a state’s Medicaid plan does not meet federal requirements.12
Notably, this code section requires that the state file its petition for judicial review in the United

10

Brown v. Tennessee Dept. of Finance and Admin., 561 F.3d 542, 544 n.1 (6th Cir.

2009).
11

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-5-322(b)(1)(A); see also § 4-5-322(b)(1)(B) (providing for
judicial review of a final decision of the Tennessee Department of Human Services by filing a
petition in the chancery court located either in the county of the official residence of the
appropriate commissioner or in the county in which one (1) or more of the petitioners reside).
12

42 U.S.C. § 1316.
5

States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the state is located. 13 The Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., “governs the conduct of federal administrative agencies”
and provides for judicial review of an act or decision of an “agency” of the United States.14 The
other statutes cited by the Complaint in support of the Court’s jurisdiction do not provide for
judicial review at all. 15

The Court concludes from these allegations that subject matter

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim does not exist from the face of the Complaint. Therefore,
the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In her response in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff relies on the statutes
mentioned in her pleadings as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. Section 1396a largely defines the
requirements for state Medicaid plans. Plaintiff has not shown how this code section grants the
Court jurisdiction to hear her appeal of the Tennessee Department of Human Services’ decision
to deny Medicaid benefits. The cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable because the plaintiffs
in those cases alleged that state Medicaid programs failed to provide all of the services required
by federal law or denied them due process under the United States Constitution. For example,
the plaintiffs in Beal v. Doe alleged that Pennsylvania’s Medicaid program was required under 42
U.S.C. § 1396a to provide coverage for “all abortions permissible under state law.” 16 The
Supreme Court in Beal never actually addressed the scope of federal jurisdiction. The nursing

13

42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3).

14

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Security Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 677-78 (6th Cir.

2007).
15

Compl. ¶ 3; 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (defining the eligibility criteria for aged, blind, and
disabled persons to receive Supplemental Security Income benefits but never addressing judicial
review); § 1396 (creating the Medicaid and CHIP Payment Access Commission).
16

Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1977).
6

home plaintiff in Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal alleged that Pennsylvania violated the
nursing home’s due process rights by discontinuing Medicaid payments to the nursing home
without first granting the nursing home an evidentiary hearing and judicial review of the decision
to terminate the payments. The Third Circuit held that the constitutional claim raised a federal
question and satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 1331.17 And the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York concluded in Hempstead General Hospital v. Whalen that the federal courts
had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Secretary of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (“TDHS”)’s determination that a state’s Medicaid regulations complied
with 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.18
Each of these cases is clearly distinguishable from Plaintiff’s complaint for judicial
review of the Tennessee Department of Human Services’ determination that she was not eligible
for Medicaid benefits. Plaintiff raises three assignments of error in her Complaint: (1) TDHS
incorrectly calculated her countable resources and failed to take into account her outstanding
debts; (2) TDHS incorrectly applied the undue hardship exception provided in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(c)(2)(D); and (3) TDHS incorrectly required Plaintiff to raise her undue hardship claim
prior to her hearing. Each of the issues implicates a final decision from an agency of the state of
Tennessee, not a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”19

17

Town Court Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266, 279 (3d Cir. 1978).

18

Hempstead Gen. Hosp. v. Whalen, 474 F.Supp. 398, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The Court
would add that in 1984, five years after Whalen, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1316 and created
a right to judicial review of such determinations but only for the state itself. And as previously
noted, a petition for judicial review under this section is filed with the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which the state sits. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3).
19

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
7

It is true that Plaintiff has challenged the state’s application of the hardship exception
created under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D). Federal courts have reached differing conclusions
about whether specific portions of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., create a private
right of action a plaintiff can vindicate by filing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20 Section 1983
creates a cause of action under federal law for the deprivation of rights secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, though only under certain circumstances. “Section
1983 provides a cause of action against State officials for ‘the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ but does not provide a
mechanism through which citizens can enforce federal law generally.”21 For example, the Sixth
Circuit has concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) does not “provide Medicaid recipients or
providers with a right enforceable under § 1983.”22 The Sixth Circuit has not decided whether §
1396p(c)(2)(D) creates a private right of action to enforce Medicaid’s undue hardship exception.
The Court need not decide this specific issue because Plaintiff has not alleged any claim
for relief under § 1983 in this case.

Neither the Complaint nor Plaintiff’s response brief

mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such, Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the issues listed in the
Complaint implicate her rights under the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

20

E.g. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) did not create a private right of action under § 1983
“because it does not unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the State”); Sabree ex rel.
Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10),
1396d(a)(15) & 1396a(a)(8) did create a private right of action under § 1983). It bears emphasis
that the Third Circuit reached its conclusion after a full analysis of the all of the factors
enumerated by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
21

Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 541 (6th Cir. 2006).

22

Id. at 542.
8

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to show that this Court has jurisdiction
over her claims.23 Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction must be
GRANTED.
II. Failure to Serve Defendant Under Rule 4(m)
In the alternative, even if Plaintiff had properly alleged subject matter jurisdiction, the
Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for her failure to serve Defendant within
the 120-day time limit under Rule 4(m). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides in
relevant part that
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120
days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own
initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as
to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time;
provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall
extend the time for service for an appropriate period.24

In this case, Plaintiff filed her Complaint on September 24, 2014, making the deadline for service
of process January 23, 2015. The record shows that Plaintiff failed to serve Defendant by that
deadline and waited until February 4, 2015 to serve Defendant, after the Court had ordered
Plaintiff to show cause as to why she did not serve Defendant within 120 days of filing her
Complaint. It is undisputed then that Plaintiff failed to effect timely service on Defendant as
required by Rule 4(m).
Under the circumstances dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is mandatory unless Plaintiff

23

The Court need not reach Defendant’s argument that it is entitled to sovereign
immunity in order to decide the jurisdictional issue.
24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
9

can establish good cause for her failure to serve Defendant. 25 As the party requesting an
extension of the 120-day service period, Plaintiff has the burden to show good cause and
demonstrate “why service was not made within the time constraints” of Rule 4(m).26 Plaintiff
offers no explanation in her response to the Court’s January 26, 2015 show cause order to
demonstrate why she was unable to serve Defendant within the time permitted under Rule 4(m).
Plaintiff only asserts that the delay in service has not prejudiced Defendant, and she requests that
the Court extend the deadline for service. Plaintiff’s failure to offer any explanation for the lack
of timely service fails to meet the good cause standard. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for the
extension is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed but without prejudice for Plaintiff to pursue judicial
review in the proper forum.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: April 17, 2015.

25

Nafziger v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., 467 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2006).

26

Id.
10