Lubinski v. Hub Group Trucking, Inc.

Filing 59

ORDER denying 53 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 7/30/2015. (McCalla, Jon)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
CHRISTIAN LUBINSKI,
individually and on behalf of
all other similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HUB GROUP TRUCKING, INC.,
F/K/A COMTRAK LOGISTICS, INC.,
Defendant.

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No. 2:14-cv-02843-JPM-dkv

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY FURTHER DISCOVERY
PENDING DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Stay Further
Discovery Pending Decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, filed July 15, 2015.

(ECF No. 53.)

In

the Motion, Defendant Hub Group Trucking, Inc. (“HGT”), requests
the Court to “stay further discovery pending a final decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Costello v. Beavex, Inc., Case No. 15-1110.”

(ECF No. 53 at 1.)

Plaintiff Christian Lubinski responded in opposition to the
motion on July 28, 2015.

(ECF No. 57.)

“A stay of discovery for any reason is a matter ordinarily
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”

Sentell

v. Tenn., No 3:12-CV-593, 2013 WL 3297124, at *1 (E.D. Tenn.

June 28, 2013) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d
1229 (6th Cir. 1981)). Trial courts have both broad discretion
and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions
that may dispose of the case are determined.

Bangas v. Potter,

145 F. App’x 139, 141 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hahn v. Star Bank,
190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Courts may therefore stay

discovery for “good cause” to protect a party from “undue burden
or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
When considering a motion for stay, courts must “weigh the
burden of proceeding with discovery upon the party from whom
discovery is sought against the hardship which would be worked
by a denial of discovery.”

Bolletino v. Celluar Sales of

Knowxville, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-138, 2012 WL 3263941, at *2 (E.D.
Tenn. Aug. 9, 2012).

Stays are favored where a case can be

resolved “based on legal determinations that could not be
altered by any further discovery.” Muzquiz v. W.A. Foot Mem’l
Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1995).

“Only in rare

circumstances[, however,] will a litigant in one cause be
compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the
rule of law that will define the rights of both.”

Landis v. N.

Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936); see also Ohio Envtl. Council
v. U.S. Dist. Court, S. Dist. of Ohio, E. Div., 565 F.2d 393,
396 (6th Cir. 1977).

“The suppliant for a stay must make out a

clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go
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forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for
which he prays will work damage to someone else.”

Id. at 166.

“[T]he burden is on the party seeking the stay to show that
there is pressing need for delay, and that neither the other
party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of the order.”
Ohio Entl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396.

“Furthermore, even if the

reasons for the stay are proper, the stay itself ‘is immoderate
and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception that its
force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as
they are susceptible of prevision and description.’”

Id.

(quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 257).
HGT argues that good cause exists to stay the instant case
“because the Seventh Circuit will decide FAAA Act preemption in
the context of the Illinois statute that is the sole basis for
Plaintiff’s Complaint — the IWPCA.”

(ECF No. 54 at 4.)

HGT

avers that “FAAA Act preemption is a dispositive ground for
dismissing Plaintiff’s entire Complaint.”

(Id.)

HGT contends

that even though Costello is not binding on the Court, “Costello
has many parallels to this case, and the Seventh Circuit’s
ruling likely will provide a roadmap for both the parties and
the Court for how the preemption issue should be analyzed.”
(Id. at 5.)

HGT further asserts that relevant to the issues

raised in the present case, Costello will resolve issues

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regarding “class certification under the IWPCA for a putative
class of independent contractor couriers.”

(Id.)

HGT also argues that it would experience hardship should
the Court decide not to enter a stay of proceedings because
Plaintiff likely will move to certify such a class,
resulting in broad and burdensome discovery, numerous
depositions, and requiring HGT unnecessarily to expend
large amounts of money and other resources defending a
claim when the Seventh Circuit’s ruling may confirm
that the claim is preempted by the FAAA Act or, if not
preempted, is inappropriate for class treatment.
(Id. at 6.)

HGT avers that Lubinski and other putative class

members will not suffer prejudice as a result of the stay
because they will also be able to “avoid making a large
investment of time and money in a case that the Seventh Circuit
ruling may render very weak.”

(Id.)

For these reasons, HGT

concludes that the balance of the interests supports a stay in
the instant case.

(Id. at 6-7.)

Lubinski contends that a stay of proceedings pending the
Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Costello would indefinitely delay
the instant case.

(ECF No. 57 at 4-5.)

Lubinski asserts that

because oral argument is set for September 18, 2015 and the
losing party may appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, “it
could be several years before the issues in Costello are
decided.”

(Id. at 5 (citing Patent Compliance Grp., Inc. v.

Hunter Fan Co., No. 10-2442, 2010 WL 3503818 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
1, 2010)).)

Lubinski further argues that “a stay of proceedings
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in the instant case is improper because Costello would not in
any event be binding upon this Court.”

(Id.)

Lubinski avers

that “there is simply no precedent for the proposition that the
Court should order a stay of proceedings pending the non-binding
outcome of a case involving wholly separate litigants and
facts.”

(Id. at 6.)

Finally, Lubinski argues that a stay of proceedings would
prejudice him and the putative class.

Lubinski asserts that he

and the putative class members “have a right to a determination
of their rights and liabilities ‘without undue delay.’”
(quoting Ohio Entl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396).)

(Id.

Lubinski

further asserts that he would suffer prejudice from a stay
because the passing of “time inevitably erodes witness
recollection and increases the likelihood that evidence may be
disposed of, lost, or otherwise compromised.”

(Id.)

Lubinski

also asserts “that each day of delay translates as another day
of lost income” for him and the putative class members.

(Id. at

6-7.)
The Court agrees with Lubinski.

Because the Seventh

Circuit’s decision in Costello will not be binding on the Court,
it will not conclusively resolve any of the legal issues raised
in the instant case.

Moreover, there is no assurance that the

Seventh Circuit will issue an opinion within a reasonable time.
Consequently, HGT has not satisfied its burden “to show that
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there is pressing need for delay.”

See Ohio Entl. Council, 565

F.2d at 396.
The balance of the hardships also favors denial of a stay
of these proceedings.

Lubinski has a right to adjudication of

his claims without undue delay, and the interest in preserving
evidence for claims that go back as far as ten years prior to
the filing of the instant case is substantial.

In contrast, the

hardship that HGT would suffer by going forward in the instant
case without the benefit of a non-binding appellate decision is
minimal.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Stay
Further Discovery Pending Decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (ECF No. 53) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of July, 2015.

/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON P. McCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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