Hughlett v. Chumley et al
Filing
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ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 12/16/15. (Todd, James)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
CEDRIC LEEMOND HUGHLETT,
Plaintiff,
VS.
J.T. “PANCHO” CHUMLEY, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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No. 14-2845-JDT-dkv
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On October 24, 2014, Plaintiff Cedric Leemond Hughlett (“Hughlett”), an inmate at the
Tipton County Correctional Facility (“Jail”) in Covington, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order issued October 28, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as
Tipton County Sheriff J.T. “Pancho” Chumley; Chief Billy Doughtery;1 and Lieutenant John
Weatherly.
I. The Complaint
Hughlett alleges that he has been discriminated against and received cruel and usual
punishment while incarcerated at the Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 4.) He contends that he has been
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The Court cannot ascertain from Plaintiff’s handwriting whether this Defendant’s name
is Doughtery or Daughtery.
denied medical treatment, housed in a cell with mold and water leaking, and condemned to
segregation merely because Defendant Weatherly dislikes him. (Id.) Hughlett alleges he has
filed grievances to Defendant Weatherly’s supervisor, Defendant Doughtery, but Defendant
Doughtery has concurred with Defendant Weatherly’s actions.
(Id.)
He seeks monetary
damages and asks that the Defendants be fired or ordered to resign.
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations
in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in
original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
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relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
Hughlett filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
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The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendant Chumley. When a
complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Hughlett complains about being denied medical treatment and also about the conditions
at the Jail, including exposure to mold and leaking water. For a convicted prisoner, such claims
arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments.
See
generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In the case of a pretrial detainee, “the ‘cruel and
unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,”
because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives protection
against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d
Cir.1990). Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Even if Hughlett was a pretrial
detainee during the events at issue, the court will analyze his claims under Eighth Amendment
principles because the rights of pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of convicted prisoners.
Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 f.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Roberts v. City of Troy,
773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985).2
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On June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 133 S. Ct. 2466
(2015), that excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be analyzed under a
standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a
defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what extent the holding in
Kingsley may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims concerning an inmate’s health
or safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. See
Morabito v. Holmes, --- F. App’x ---, 2015 WL 5920204, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying,
even after the decision in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claims and the deliberate indifference standard to denial of medical care claim).
Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the deliberate indifference analysis to
claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.
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An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).
The objective component requires that the
deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’. . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not
received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id., at 106.
Within the context of Estelle claims, the objective component requires that the medical
need be sufficiently serious. Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical
need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)).
To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead
facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in
the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue
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suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as
the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id.
511 U.S. at 835-36.
Hughlett does not allege what his serious medical needs are, that he ever requested
medical treatment from any named Defendant, or that any named Defendant denied his request
for medical treatment. He states only that he was refused medical attention. Such a conclusory
allegation is insufficient to establish either the objective or subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment violation.
With regard to Hughlett’s claims regarding mold and leaking water, in order to satisfy the
objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he “is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has been deprived of the
“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004) (“To succeed in an
Eighth Amendment challenge, [a prisoner] must establish that . . . a single, identifiable necessity
of civilized human existence is being denied . . . .”). The Constitution “does not mandate
comfortable prisons.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “extreme
deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9.
In considering the types of conditions that constitute a substantial risk of serious harm,
the Court evaluates not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the
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harm will actually occur, but evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates contemporary
standards of decency, i.e., that society does not choose to tolerate the risk in its prisons. Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that prisoners
can rarely establish an Eighth Amendment violation from a combination of conditions of
confinement that, in themselves, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation
“in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some
prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all
prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing
as amorphous as “overall conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted); see also Thompson, 29 F.3d at 242 (“Eighth
Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of the circumstances, but rather must
identify a specific condition that violates” a particular right); Carver v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 887
F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297,
302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir.
1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
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[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach
comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be
something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might
well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when
it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction
of punishment.
Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City
of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of
an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant
individually. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011); see also id. at 768 (“[W]e
must focus on whether each individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit
a finding of subjective knowledge.”).
Hughlett does not allege that any named Defendant was personally responsible for
exposing him to mold or leaking water. Furthermore, Hughlett fails to allege that he suffered
any harm as a result of such exposure. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”
The allegations in Hughlett’s complaint concerning his placement in segregation are too
vague to state a due process claim and do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Hughlett
does not state whether he was charged with or convicted of any disciplinary violation, what
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specific role any named Defendant may have played in his placement in segregation, or how long
he has been in segregation. Hughlett also does not complain about any procedures employed
during a disciplinary hearing.
In general, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in a
particular security classification or in freedom from administrative segregation.
Olim v.
Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976);
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976);
Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th
Cir. 1986). The complaint does not allege that the conditions experienced by Hughlett in
segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to violate due process. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995).
Although Hughlett alleges that he has been discriminated against, he does not have a
valid equal protection claim against any Defendant. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in
pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Most Equal Protection claims “allege
that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a
protected class.” Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff is a member
of a protected class.3 That Plaintiff may have been treated differently than other prisoners is
insufficient to state a claim because prisoners are not a protected class for equal protection
purposes.
See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2005); Berry v.
Traughber, 48 F. App’x 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2002); Garrison v. Walters, No. 00-1662, 2001 WL
1006271, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2001); Heddleston v. Mack, No. 00-1310, 2000 WL 1800576,
3
Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege that the challenged action unduly burdens the
exercise of a fundamental right. This case does not involve the exercise of a fundamental right.
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at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (“prisoners incarcerated at the same institution as Heddleston who
wished to mail items weighing more than one pound on January 9, 1999, do not constitute a
protected class”); Aldred v. Marshcke, No. 98-2169, 1999 WL 1336105, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 20,
1999); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1999); Preston v. Hughes, No. 97-6507,
1999 WL 107970, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir.
1998) (“neither indigents nor prisoners are a suspect class”); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281,
1286 (6th Cir. 1997).
This also is not an appropriate case for a “class of one” Equal Protection claim.
The purpose of [the Equal Protection Clause] is to secure every person within the
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents. . . . Equal protection challenges are “typically . . .
concerned with governmental classifications that affect some groups of citizens
differently than others.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601, 128
S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that a “class-of-one” may
bring an equal protection claim where the plaintiff alleges that: (1) he or “she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated”; and (2)
“there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000).
United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 657, 650-51 (6th Cir. 2011) (additional internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1056 (2012); see also Davis v. Prison
Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing “class of one” claims from other
equal protection claims evaluated under the rational basis standard).
The complaint does not allege that Hughlett was arbitrarily treated differently than
similarly situated prisoners at the jail or that he has a valid claim for a “class of one.”
Hughlett appears to claim that Defendant Doughtery failed to properly redress his
grievance against Defendant Weatherly.
However, Defendant Doughtery’s participation in
investigating, processing, or denying Hughlett’s grievances cannot in itself constitute sufficient
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personal involvement to state a claim of constitutional dimension. Simpson v. Overton, 79 F.
App’x 117, 120 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Martin v. Harvey, 14 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“The denial of the grievance is not the same as the denial of a request to receive medical
care.”). Section 1983 liability may not be imposed against a defendant for “a mere failure to act”
based upon information contained in the grievance. See Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300; Lillard v.
Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1996).
For all of the foregoing reasons, Hughlett’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
III. Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
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amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to Hughlett’s claims would be futile
as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Hughlett’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to
amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days after the
date of this order. Hughlett is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original
pleadings and and must be complete in itself without reference to those prior pleadings. The text
of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint
must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint.
Hughlett may add additional
defendants provided that the claims against the new parties arise from the acts and omissions set
forth in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must
identify each defendant sued in that count. If Hughlett fails to file an amended complaint within
the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter
judgment.
Hughlett is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or
extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court,
may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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