Tyler v. Taco Bell of America, Inc. et al

Filing 81

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 41 Motion to Certify Class. Signed by Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 5/3/2016. (McCalla, Jon)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DORIS TYLER, individually and
on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
TACO BELL CORP., and TACO BELL
OF AMERICA, LLC,
Defendants.

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No. 2:15-cv-02084-JPM-cgc
Jury Demanded

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Notice and
Conditional Certification, filed September 18, 2015.
41.)

(ECF No.

Defendants responded in opposition on October 19, 2015.

(ECF No. 52.)

Plaintiff, as well as opt-in plaintiff Sara

Smith, filed a reply on November 2, 2015.

(ECF No. 57.)

The

Court held a hearing on, inter alia, the Motion for Notice and
Conditional Certification on December 23, 2015.
ECF No. 69.)

(Min. Entry,

On December 28, 2015, Defendants filed a Notice of

Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion.
(ECF No. 70.)

On March 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Supplemental Authority in Support of her Motion.

1

(ECF No. 73.) 1

Plaintiff originally filed her Notice of Supplemental Authority on
March 4, 2016. (ECF No. 71.) This filing, however, was found to be deficient
because it lacked an electronic signature. (ECF No. 72.) Plaintiff
corrected the deficiency in the March 7, 2016 filing. (ECF No. 73.)

Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority on March 8, 2016.

(ECF No. 75.)

With

leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendants’ Response
on March 11, 2016.

(ECF No. 78.)

Plaintiff filed a second

Notice of Supplemental Authority on April 5, 2016.
79.)

Defendants filed a Response on April 7, 2016.

(ECF No.
(ECF No.

80.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for Notice and Conditional
Certification.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

This case involves allegations that Defendants
misclassified Assistant General Managers as “exempt” under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and did not pay them overtime
compensation.

(See Am. Compl., ECF No. 25.)

Taco Bell 2 employed

Plaintiff Doris Tyler as an Assistant General Manager (“AGM”) at
its restaurant in West Memphis, Arkansas, and then at its
restaurant on Elvis Presley Boulevard in Memphis, Tennessee
during the period between September 18, 2012, and December 24,

2

Defendants assert that Taco Bell of America, LLC, employed Tyler (SUF
¶ 1), but Plaintiff denies “that Taco Bell of America, LLC and Taco Bell
Corp. were not joint employers.” (Resp. to SUF ¶ 1.) Because this issue
does not affect the Court’s determination on summary judgment, the Court
refers to both entities together as “Taco Bell” for the sake of simplicity.

2

2014. 3

(Tyler Dep. 21:5-24:22, ECF No. 42-10; 4 Statement of

Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 50-2; Resp. to SUF ¶ 2,
ECF No. 59-1.)
According to Tyler, despite her classification as an exempt
employee, her primary duties were manual tasks, such as
cleaning, cashiering, and taking out the trash.
273:3-274:4; Resp. to SUF ¶¶ 7, 8.)

(Tyler Dep.

She asserts that she

regularly “performed hourly work because she was told to, and
because there were not enough hourly workers to get the work
done.”

(Resp. to SUF ¶ 13 (citing Tyler Dep. 286-87).)

She

contends that she was a member of the management team in name
only and did not have any actual authority to make material
decisions.

(Tyler Dep. 125:21-26:20, 220:7-13, 221:19-222:1,

276:11-18; Resp. to SUF ¶¶ 8, 11, 28, 66-68.)

Tyler maintains

that she needed “verification” from the RGM to make any
decisions about the restaurant.

(Resp. to SUF ¶ 138 (citing

Tyler Dep. 276, 288).)
Taco Bell, however, disputes Tyler’s perception of her role
as AGM and asserts that “Tyler’s primary duties included
coaching, developing, and training employees to perform their
3

Tyler has released her FLSA claims that arose prior to November 13,
2013 (see Am. Compl. ¶ 10 n.2, ECF No. 25), but requests conditional
certification of a class beginning September 18, 2012, three years prior to
the filing of the Motion for Conditional Certification (see ECF No. 42 at 23).
4
Defendants and Tyler each submit excerpts of Tyler’s deposition
transcript in connection with their summary judgment memorandum. (See ECF
Nos. 50-3, 59-2 to 59-4.) For convenience, the Court refers to the complete
transcript of Tyler’s deposition, submitted at ECF No. 42-10.

3

duties well and provide excellent customer service.”

(SUF ¶ 8;

see also Foust Dep. 166:1-169:10, ECF No. 50-5; Jackson Decl.
¶ 3, ECF No. 50-4.)

According to Taco Bell, Tyler managed and

directed the work of two to seven employees each day.

(SUF ¶ 96

(citing Tyler Dep. 189:2-20).)
Additionally, Taco Bell asserts, and Tyler agrees, that
Tyler interviewed applicants and recommended whether they should
be hired.

(SUF ¶ 108 (citing Tyler Dep. 191:4-24, 267:4-18,

268:1-25); Resp. to SUF ¶ 108.)

The parties disagree, however,

as to the weight given to Tyler’s feedback on applicants.
¶¶ 109, 110; Resp. to SUF ¶¶ 109, 110.)

The parties also

disagree as to whether Tyler hired any employees.
14; Resp. to SUF ¶¶ 111-14.)

(SUF

(SUF ¶¶ 111-

Taco Bell also asserts that Tyler

recommended employees for termination and that Taco Bell
terminated those employees.
¶ 16).)

(SUF ¶ 117 (citing Jackson Decl.

Tyler’s employment evaluations reflect that Tyler was

often rated “below target” in many management areas (see Tyler
Dep. Ex. 24; SUF ¶ 88), but Tyler asserts that these evaluations
demonstrate her inability to perform various functions “given
her manual task load” (Resp. to SUF ¶ 87; see also Tyler Dep.
288).
According to Taco Bell’s corporate representative, Virginia
Foust, “[f]or purposes of determining whether an AGM is exempt
or non-exempt, in all significant respects the AGM’s duties are
4

the same no matter what Taco Bell restaurant they work in.”
(Foust Dep. 147:20-24, ECF No. 42-4.)

She further explained

that “[t]he responsibilities and accountabilities are pretty
[much] the same across the stores but the actual execution of
duties could vary” and that expectations for AGMs are consistent
across Taco Bell.

(Foust Dep. 170:4-7, 173:21-24.)

Tyler, on

the other hand, does not know what duties any other AGM actually
performed.

(Tyler Dep. 20:25-21:4.)

Opt-In Plaintiff Sara

Smith asserts that, as an AGM, she also “performed many of the
activities performed by hourly employees who did receive
overtime.”
B.

(Smith Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 42-11.)
Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 4, 2015.
No. 1.)
Dismiss.

(ECF

On March 31, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to
(ECF No. 14.)

The Court held a hearing on the Motion

to Dismiss on May 4, 2015, and granted Plaintiff leave to amend
her Complaint.

(Min. Entry, ECF No. 22.)

Amended Complaint on May 15, 2015.

Plaintiff filed an

(ECF No. 25.)

The Court

denied as moot the Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 2015.
26.)

(ECF No.

Defendants filed separate Answers to the Amended Complaint

on May 29, 2015.

(ECF Nos. 27, 28.)

On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff moved for conditional
class certification.

(ECF No. 41.)

opposition on October 19, 2015.

Defendants responded in

(ECF No. 52.)
5

Plaintiff filed

a reply brief on November 2, 2015.

(ECF No. 57.)

Defendants

filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on December 28, 2015.
(ECF No. 70.) Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority
on March 7, 2016.

(ECF No. 73; see supra p. 1 n.1.)

On March

8, 2016, Defendants filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority.

(ECF No. 75.)

With leave of Court, on

March 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendants’ Response.
(ECF No. 78.)

Plaintiff filed a second Notice of Supplemental

Authority on April 5, 2016.
Response on April 7, 2016.

(ECF No. 79.)

Defendants filed a

(ECF No. 80.)

On October 19, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(ECF No. 50.)

November 16, 2015.

Plaintiff responded in opposition on

(ECF No. 59.)

brief on November 30, 2015.

Defendants filed a reply

(ECF No. 61.)

On December 15,

2015, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority.

(ECF

No. 67.)
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Discovery Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) on November 16, 2015,
seeking a denial of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment to
permit Plaintiff to obtain additional discovery.

(ECF No. 60.)

On November 30, 2015, Defendants filed a Response in Opposition.
(ECF No. 62.)
2015.

Plaintiff filed a reply brief on December 14,

(ECF No. 66.)

The Court held a hearing on the pending

motions on December 23, 2015.

(Min. Entry, ECF No. 69.)
6

On

March 8, 2016, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d).
74.)

(ECF No.

The pending Motion for Notice and Conditional

Certification is the subject of the instant Order.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that employees may

recover unpaid overtime compensation by collectively suing an
employer under certain circumstances.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

Specifically, § 216(b) states:
Any
employer
who
violates
[the
maximum
hours
provisions] of this title shall be liable to the
employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid
minimum
wages,
or
their
unpaid
overtime
compensation, as the case may be . . . . An action to
recover [such liability] may be maintained . . . by
any one or more employees for an in behalf of himself
or themselves and other employees similarly situated.
Id.

“To proceed collectively, named plaintiffs must therefore

demonstrate that they are ‘similarly situated’ to the opt-in
plaintiffs—the employees they seek to notify and represent.”
Lindberg v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, 761 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757 (W.D.
Tenn. 2011).
Courts generally employ a two-phase inquiry to determine
whether plaintiffs are similarly situated.

O’Brien v. Ed

Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 583 (6th Cir. 2009), abrogated
on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663

7

(2016).

“The first stage occurs early in the discovery process,

when the Court determines whether to ‘conditionally’ certify the
proposed class.

Lindberg, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (citing Comer

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2006));
see also Shabazz v. Asurion Ins. Serv., No. 3:07-0653, 2008 WL
1730318, at *2-3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2008) (“The first step . .
. consists of a preliminary inquiry into whether the plaintiff’s
proposed class consists of similarly situated employees who were
collectively ‘the victims of a single decision, policy, or
plan[.]’” (alteration in original) (quoting Lugo v. Farmer’s
Pride Inc., Civil Action No. 07-cv-00749, 2008 WL 638237, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2008))).
The purpose of conditional certification is “to provide
notice to potential plaintiffs and to present them with an
opportunity to opt in.”

Lindberg, 761 F. Supp. at 757-58.

“Because the determination at this stage is made using a fairly
lenient standard, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that it
‘typically results in conditional certification of a
representative class.’”

Id. at 758.

“Although collective

actions under the FLSA are generally favored, the named
plaintiff(s) must present some factual support for the existence
of a class-wide policy or practice” that violates the FLSA.
Caballero v. Kelly Servs., Civil Action No. H-14-1828, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 137475, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2015).
8

“At the

notice stage, district courts within the Sixth Circuit typically
do not consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, resolve
factual disputes, make credibility determinations, or decide
substantive issues.”

Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, 276 F.R.D.

210, 214 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
The second stage only occurs after “all of the opt-in forms
have been received and discovery has concluded.”

Comer, 454

F.3d at 546.

At that point, a second determination, using a

more

standard,

rigorous

is

made

as

to

whether

the

plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated.

named
Id. at

547.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Conditional Certification

Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to conditional
certification because all AGMs employed by Defendants are
similarly situated.

(ECF No. 42 at 3-7.)

Specifically, she

“seeks to prosecute her FLSA claims as a collective action on
behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by
Defendants as an exempt AGM at any time from February 4, 2012 to
December 24, 2014.”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 25.)

Tyler asserts that the testimony of Virginia Foust, Taco
Bell’s designated corporate representative, demonstrates that
the same job duties apply to all AGMs at corporate-owned Taco
Bell restaurants across the United States.
9

(Id. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff also contends that the declaration of Opt-In Plaintiff
Sara Smith corroborates her assertion that the duties of AGMs
are the same.

(Id. at 4.)

Additionally, Plaintiff relies on

Taco Bell’s training materials, corporate policies, compensation
method, and job description to support her argument that all
AGMs employed by Taco Bell are similarly situated.
7.)

(Id. at 4-

Plaintiff asserts that she spent approximately ninety to

ninety-five percent of her time performing non-exempt tasks.
(Tyler Dep. 265:10-24.)

She contends that, therefore, her

actual duties varied from those described in Taco Bell’s written
policies and job description.

(ECF No. 42 at 3-4.)

Plaintiff

argues that her burden at the conditional certification stage is
minimal and that, based on the uniform treatment of AGMs, the
class should be conditionally certified.

(Id. at 9-12.)

Defendants argue that the class should not be conditionally
certified because (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a
collective action, (2) Tyler was properly classified as an
exempt employee, and (3) Tyler is not similarly situated to
other Assistant General Managers.

(ECF No. 52 at 2-20.)

Specifically, Defendants assert that Tyler’s responsibilities
consisted of primarily “executive” duties, that a national Taco
Bell policy enumerated primarily executive duties for all
assistant general managers, and that Tyler does not know about
and has not submitted evidence as to the actual duties performed
10

by other assistant general managers.

(Id. at 6-20.)

Defendants

submit the declarations of ten assistant general managers at
Taco Bells around the country to refute Plaintiff’s contentions
that all AGMs primarily perform manual tasks.

(ECF No. 52-4.)

Despite the low standard for conditional certification,
Plaintiff fails to show that she is similarly situated to all of
the current and former AGMs who are the asserted potential
plaintiffs.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Taco Bell’s corporate

documents and the testimony of Taco Bell’s corporate
representative is misplaced.

Taco Bell’s job description,

training materials, corporate policies, and compensation method
for AGMs do not support conditional certification because these
policies facially comply with the FLSA.

See Caballero, 2015

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137475, at *12-13 (“Similar job descriptions
are insufficient to support allegations of a defendant
employer’s unwritten national policy regarding overtime
timekeeping practices.”)

Similarly, Foust’s testimony that all

AGMs at corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants completed the same
training (Foust Dep. 74:5-13), were subject to the same
guidelines (see, e.g., id. at 100:2-25), received the same
benefits (id. at 158:20-160:1), and had “pretty [much] the same”
responsibilities and accountabilities (id. at 169:11-170:7),
does not demonstrate a “class-wide policy” that violates the
FLSA or otherwise support conditional certification.
11

But see

Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 814329, at *8 (6th
Cir. Mar. 2, 2016) (finding that “the record contained ample
evidence of a company-wide policy of requiring technicians to
underreport hours that originated with FTS executives” in
reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to decertify
class). 5

Foust’s testimony instead suggests that Taco Bell’s

other AGMs were properly classified as exempt employees under
the FLSA and that Plaintiff’s misclassification, assuming her
allegations are true, was an anomaly.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s own testimony does not
demonstrate that other AGMs were also misclassified.

In her

deposition, Plaintiff repeatedly stated that she had no personal
knowledge about the duties performed by any other AGM between
2012 and 2014.

(Tyler Dep. 19:4-8, 23:2-13, 295:22-296:1.)

5

In Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, she cited Monroe v.
FTS USA, LLC, -- F.3d --, 2016 WL 814329 (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2016). While
Monroe rearticulates general principles for FLSA certification, it is not
particularly relevant in the instant matter. Monroe involves the denial of a
motion for decertification following a jury verdict, which involves the
application of a different standard than conditional certification.
Additionally, in Monroe, the collective plaintiffs presented evidence of a
company-wide policy that violated the FLSA. Id. at *8.
The Court also clarifies that it does not consider whether
individualized inquiries would be necessary in the instant case. Said
rationale for denying certification in an FLSA action was rejected in Monroe,
2016 WL 814329, at *7, and O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 584-85. See also Kampfer v.
Fifth Third Bank, Case No. 3:14 cv 2849, at 10-11 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2016)
(declining to consider the “unique defenses” by putative class members in
granting a motion for conditional certification). As Plaintiff correctly
states, the need to perform individualized inquiries is not relevant to
whether conditional certification is appropriate. The Court grants limited
conditional certification due to the lack of any evidence that AGMs who
worked in corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants, other than those who worked
in store number 17477 in West Memphis, Arkansas, and store number 1618 on
Elvis Presley Boulevard in Memphis, Tennessee, were similarly situated to
Tyler.

12

She acknowledged, in fact, that other AGMs might do things
differently than she did.

(Id. at 36:17-22.)

Thus, while

Plaintiff’s testimony that she spent a significant portion of
her time performing non-exempt tasks supports her claim that
she, individually, may have been misclassified, it has no
bearing on her claim that other AGMs were also misclassified
and, accordingly, were similarly situated.
The Court also notes the paucity of affidavits from other
AGMs supporting Plaintiff’s claim for conditional certification.
Plaintiff submits only the declaration of Opt-In Plaintiff Sara
Smith, in which Smith states that, as AGM, she “was not
permitted to depart from Taco Bell’s corporate policies” and
“performed many of the activities performed by hourly
employees.”

(Smith Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5, ECF No. 42-11.)

Smith also

states that she lacked authority to determine which menu items
to sell, the layout of the store, the prices for the menu items,
the store hours, the payroll budget, the employee pay rate, the
dress code, and the vendors from whom to order supplies.
¶¶ 7-14.)

(Id.

Smith does not, however, assert that her primary duty

consisted of non-exempt tasks, that she did not regularly direct
the work of two or more employees, or that she lacked authority
to hire or fire personnel.

(See id.)

Thus, Smith fails to

allege a similar violation of the FLSA due to misclassification.

13

Lacking such allegations, Smith’s declaration does not support
Plaintiff’s claim that other AGMs were similarly situated.
The Court also notes that Taco Bell has produced affidavits
from ten other AGMs at corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurants
across the country (ECF No. 52-4), including one affidavit from
Sharon Miles, an AGM at the West Memphis, Arkansas, location
where Tyler worked (id. at PageID 1974-80).

These affidavits

directly contradict Tyler’s testimony, and state that the
undersigned AGMs are responsible for hiring and firing,
overseeing employees, and generally managing the store.

(See

Arreguin Decl. at PageID 1918-21, Cuadrado Decl. ¶¶ 9, 35, 36,
Henry Decl. at PageID 1934-35, Hufstetler Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 8, Husk
Decl. at PageID 1949-51, Jarvis Decl. at PageID 1960, 1963,
1966, 1968, W. Miles Decl. at PageID 1982-83, Nanez Decl. at
PageID 1989-90, 1992, Teague Decl. at PageID 1999, 2001, 2003,
ECF No. 52-4.)

At this stage, however, the Court “do[es] not

consider the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, resolve factual
disputes, make credibility determinations, or decide substantive
issues.”

Swigart, 276 F.R.D. at 214.

The Court therefore

places minimal weight on the proffered affidavits, which are
from employees “hand-picked” by Taco Bell, noting only that
these affidavits highlight Plaintiff’s failure to submit more
than a single, inapposite affidavit.

Cf. Creely v. HCR

ManorCare, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 819, 840 (N.D. Ohio 2011)
14

(“[T]he Court’s function at this stage of conditional
certification is not to performed a detailed review of
individualized facts from employees hand-picked by [the
defendant].”).
“The prevailing practice is to require plaintiffs to
establish through evidence at least a ‘colorable basis for their
claim that the putative class of similarly situated plaintiffs
exist.’”

Thompson v. RGT Mgmt., Inc., No. 2:11-cv-02573-AJT-

dkv, 2012 WL 3261059, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2012) (quoting
Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int’l Corp., 210 F.R.D. 591, 596 (S.D.
Ohio 2002)).

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that any other

AGM at a corporate-owned Taco Bell restaurant was misclassified
as non-exempt under the FLSA.

While the burden for conditional

certification is low, it does require some showing that other
AGMs may have been similarly misclassified.

See Harrison v.

McDonald’s Corp., 411 F. Supp. 2d 862, 868 (S.D. Ohio 2005);
D’Anna v. M/A-COM, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 889, 893-94 (D. Md. 1995)
(“the better reasoned cases require the plaintiff to make a
preliminary factual showing that a similarly situated group of
potential plaintiffs exists” so as “to avoid the ‘stirring up’
of litigation through unwarranted solicitation” (quoting
Severtson v. Phillips Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D.
Minn. 1991))).

Because Tyler does not establish “a colorable

basis” for her claim that AGMs at other corporate-owned Taco
15

Bell restaurants were misclassified as non-exempt, conditional
certification of a nationwide class is denied.

Tyler’s own

testimony is sufficient, however, to assert a colorable claim
that other AGMs at the two restaurants where Tyler was employed
from 2012 to 2014 were misclassified as non-exempt.
Accordingly, the Court grants conditional certification as to
the two Taco Bell locations where Tyler worked during the
relevant time period: store number 17477 in West Memphis,
Arkansas, and store number 1618 on Elvis Presley Boulevard in
Memphis, Tennessee.

See O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 586 (“The option

of partial certification is important to consider . . . .”).
B.

Notice

Plaintiff submits a proposed notice in the event of
conditional certification (ECF No. 42-24) and argues that, if
the Court conditionally certifies this action, the Court should
order Taco Bell to produce contact information for every
individual who could join the collective action.
13.)

(ECF No. 42 at

Plaintiff further argues that this notice should be sent

to potential plaintiffs through first class mail and that
Plaintiff should be permitted to send a follow-up reminder
postcard and email notification.

(Id. at 13-14.)

Because Plaintiff’s proposed notice assumes conditional
certification of a national class, it must be revised to reflect
the limited conditional certification of a class of AGMs at only
16

the West Memphis, Arkansas (Store No. 17477), and Elvis Presley
Boulevard, Memphis, Tennessee (Store No. 1618), locations.
Accordingly, Plaintiff must submit a revised proposed notice for
Court approval in accordance with this Order.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Notice

and Conditional Certification is GRANTED IN PART as to the
conditional certification of a class of AGMs at Taco Bell store
numbers 17477 and 1618, and DENIED IN PART as to nationwide
certification.
by May 9, 2016.

Plaintiff shall submit a revised proposed notice
Defendants shall submit any objections to the

revised proposed notice by May 16, 2016.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 3rd day of May, 2016.

/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON P. McCALLA
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

17