Henderson V. Colvin

Filing 22

ORDER Affirming Decision of Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton on 4/8/2016. (Claxton, Charmiane)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case 2:15-cv-02113-cgc

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social
Security,
Defendant.

ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION OF COMMISSIONER

Plaintiff filed this action to obtain judicial review of his application for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, 1381-1385. By consent of the parties, this case has
been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry
of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB and SSI on April 29, 2009. His claims were denied
initially on March 12, 2010 and upon reconsideration on October 19, 2010. A hearing was held on
September 27, 2011 before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On April 19, 2012, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. The Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s
request for review. This decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff then filed this

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action requesting reversal of the Commissioner’s decision. For the reasons set forth below, the
decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial review of any final decision
made by the Commissioner after a hearing to which he was a party. “The court shall have the power
to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause
for a rehearing.” Id. The court's review is limited to determining whether or not there is substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner's decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wyatt v. Secretary of Health
& Human Services, 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir.1992); Cohen v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir.1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied,
Landsaw v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir.1986).
The Commissioner, not the court, is charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make
credibility determinations and resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to decide the case
accordingly. See Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d
383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). When substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's determination,
it is conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen,
800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff was born on April 23, 1963 and was forty-four years old on the alleged disability
onset date. (R. at 32). He has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in
English. (Id.) His only past relevant work experience is that of a “laborer, medium and unskilled
work” and a “garbage collector very heavy and unskilled work.” (R. at 31-32). He alleges a
disability onset date of June 11, 2007. (R. at 24).
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The ALJ determined as follows: (1) Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act
through December 31, 2012; (2) Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June
11, 2007, the alleged onset date; (3) Plaintiff has severe impairments of a “back
disorder”—specifically, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine— and obesity; (4) Plaintiff
does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of
the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (5) Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and
§ 416.967(a) except secondary to pain and that he is limited to carrying out simple instructions at
the unskilled level; (6) Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work; (7) transferability of job
skills is not an issue because Plaintiff’s past relevant work is unskilled; (8) considering Plaintiff’s
age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform; and, (9) Plaintiff has not been under a disability as defined in the Act from
June 11, 2007 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 26-32).
The Social Security Act defines disability as the inability to engage in substantial gainful
activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing an
entitlement to benefits. Born v. Secretary of Health & Human Services., 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th
Cir.1990). The initial burden of going forward is on the claimant to show that she is disabled from
engaging in her former employment; the burden of going forward then shifts to the Commissioner
to demonstrate the existence of available employment compatible with the claimant's disability and
background. Id.
The Commissioner conducts the following, five-step analysis to determine if an individual
is disabled within the meaning of the Act:
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1. An individual who is engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found to
be disabled regardless of medical findings.
2. An individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found to be
disabled.
3. A finding of disability will be made without consideration of vocational factors,
if an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which
meets the duration requirement and which meets or equals a listed impairment in
Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations.1
4. An individual who can perform work that he has done in the past will not be found
to be disabled.
5. If an individual cannot perform his or her past work, other factors including age,
education, past work experience and residual functional capacity must be considered
to determine if other work can be performed.
Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1988). Further review
is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is not disabled at any point in this sequential
analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 & 416.920.
Here, the sequential analysis proceeded to the fifth step. At step five of the inquiry, “the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that
accommodate the claimant’s RFC . . . and vocational profile.” Jones v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of
making an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, and,
therefore, was not disabled within the meaning of the Act.

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Before then proceeding to step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must
determine the claimant’s RFC pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e). An
individual’s residual functional capacity is his ability to do physical and mental work activities
on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments. In making this finding, the
undersigned must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, including impairments that are not
severe pursuant to 20 C.F.R 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e) & 416.945.
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On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made multiple errors of both fact and
law in determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff raises the following issues: (1) whether
the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians on the issue of whether
he could perform a full day of sedentary work; (2) whether the ALJ made various erroneous findings
of fact in consideration of the medical source opinion evidence; (3) whether the ALJ properly
considered Plaintiff’s credibility as to his reports of pain; and (4) whether the ALJ properly
considered the combined effects of Plaintiff’s impairments when he considered Plaintiff’s various
diagnoses and the opinions of his treating physicians separately.
I. Medical Source Opinions
As to the first issue, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical source
opinion evidence in the record in crafting Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ’s assessment of medical source
opinions must follow 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and § 416.927(c), which contain six factors. First,
the ALJ must examine the relationship between the patient and medical professional, as more weight
is accorded to an examining source. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1) & 416.927(c)(1). Second, the ALJ
must consider whether the medical professional actually treated the patient, as “these sources are
likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [his]
medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such
as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.”

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) &

416.927(c)(2). If a treating source’s opinion on the nature and severity of the impairment(s) is “well
supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [a claimant’s] case record, [the ALJ] will give it
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controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2). If a treating source’s opinion
is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the length of the treatment relationship and
the frequency of examination along with the nature and extent of the treatment relationship to
determine if his or her opinion should be given more weight than a nontreating source. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(2), (c)(2)(I)-(ii), 416.927(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2)(I)-(ii). The ALJ must “always give
good reasons” in the notice of determination or decision for the weight given to a treating source’s
opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) & 416.927(c)(2).
Third, the ALJ must consider the amount of relevant evidence the medical source provides
to support the opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, to determine the amount
of weight to be given to the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3) & 416.927(c)(3). As to
nontreating sources, the weight accorded to their opinions will “depend on the degree to which they
provide supporting explanations for their opinions.” Id. The ALJ must also “evaluate the degree
to which these opinions consider all of the pertinent evidence in [the] claim, including opinions of
treating and other examining sources.” Id.
Fourth, the ALJ must consider the consistency of the opinion, as the more consistent an
opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight it will be given. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4)
& 416.927(c)(4). Fifth, the ALJ generally gives more weight to the opinion of a specialist about
medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to an opinion of a source who is not a
specialist. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(5) & 416.927(c)(5). Sixth, the ALJ will consider any factors
the claimant or others bring to his or her attention, or of which he or she is aware, which tend to
support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(6) & 416.927(c)(6).
The ALJ considered the opinions of multiple medical sources in the specialties of orthopedics
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and anesthesia, who all both examined and treated Plaintiff: Dr. Fereidoon Parsioon, Dr. David
Dowling, Dr. Owen Tabor, Dr. Philip Green, and Dr. T. E. Rizk. (R. at 27-31). Overall, the ALJ
concluded that the “objective medical evidence is fully consistent with the above residual functional
capacity and inconsistent with disabling levels of pain” as complained of by Plaintiff, which the ALJ
found to be exaggerated. (R. at 27-31). While the ALJ did not explicitly state that he accorded the
majority of the treating physicians’ opinions with controlling weight, it appears to this Court that he
did so with the exception of Dr. Rizk, the weight of whose opinion he expressly reduced. (R. at 3031). In so doing, he considered that Dr. Rizk was only “marginally a treating source with only 2
treatment visits” on November 19, 2010 and June 20, 2011. (R. at 31). Further, he concluded that
the “nature and frequency of Dr. Rizk’s treatment and evaluation can reasonably be seen as not based
on the claimant’s medical need for treatment or evaluation, but on the need for the claimant to obtain
a report in support of his claim for disability.” (Id.)
Upon review, the ALJ’s consideration of the medical source opinions properly followed 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and § 416.927(c). Accordingly, the Court concludes that he did not err in the
weight he accorded to these opinions and that his decision was supported by substantial evidence.
II. Accuracy of Findings of Fact
Next, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ made several inaccurate findings of fact in his decision:
(1) that Plaintiff demonstrated negative straight leg raising tests when he actually exhibited positive
straight leg raising tests upon examination by both Dr. Green and Dr. Rizk; (2) that Dr. Green did
not prescribe a spinal cord stimulator trial when Dr. Green only sought to attempt medical
management first and ultimately recommended the spinal cord stimulator; (3) that Dr. Green only
prescribed Percocet one time when he was also prescribed and continues to take Oxycodone and
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Hydrocodone; and, (4) that Plaintiff could have had his medication adjusted to prevent the side
effects of drowsiness. Plaintiff further states that the ALJ failed to address evidence that Plaintiff’s
pain was not resolved despite his use of increasingly serious medications. The Court will consider
each of these in turn.
As to Plaintiff’s straight leg raising test results, the ALJ correctly noted that Plaintiff had a
“positive left straight leg raise” when examined by Dr. Green (R. at 29, 519, 522). With respect to
Dr. Rizk, the record states that his “straight leg rest test was 60E on the left side and 70E on the right
side,” (R. at 524), which the ALJ did not mention. However, as already stated, the ALJ did accord
lessened weight to Dr. Rizk’s medical source opinion due to his limited treatment history with
Plaintiff. (R. at 30-31). Further, the ALJ did correctly note that Plaintiff had a negative straight leg
raise on various occasions when examined by Dr. Tabor (R. at 28, 379, 470), Dr. Dowling (R. at 28,
409), and Dr. Katz (R. at 28, 459, 517). This is consistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that
examination results have shown a negative straight leg raise on multiple occasions. (R. at 30).
While the ALJ describes the record as having “consistently” shown a negative straight leg raise, and
while there were positive straight leg tests on certain examinations, the Court does not find that the
ALJ erred in his overall recitation and consideration of the medical source opinion evidence on this
finding.
As to the spinal cord stimulator, Dr. Green examined Plaintiff on March 8, 2011. (R. at 520,
542). Plaintiff had questions about a spinal cord stimulator, which Dr. Green reports were addressed.
(Id.) Dr. Green stated that he still felt that Plaintiff “could have further attempts at medical
management pain control.” (Id.) On July 14, 2011, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Green “stating that he
would like a stimulator trial.” (R. at 522 & 538). Dr. Green discussed “differential diagnosis and
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treatment options” with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff stated that he was fearful that he would not be
approved by insurance. (Id.) Ultimately, Dr. Green scheduled Plaintiff for a “TENS trial,” noted
that he is “considering a spinal cord stimulator and would like to proceed with that” and “is willing
to submit for a psychological evaluation prior to the trial.” (Id.) Dr. Green stated that Plaintiff
would follow him “at the trial if approved, or otherwise as needed” and “will follow with others as
scheduled.” (Id.) Ultimately, workers’ compensation insurance denied the spinal stimulator. (R.
at 523). Upon review, while Plaintiff would assert that Dr. Green “ultimately recommended and
continued to recommend that Plaintiff be given the opportunity to undergo this procedure,” that is
not reflected in the record. Instead, it appears that Plaintiff initiated both discussions of this
procedure and, on the latter date, Dr. Green scheduled Plaintiff for a TENS trial and only noted that
Plaintiff wanted to pursue a spinal cord stimulator and would follow certain procedures if approved.
Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s summarization that “Dr. Green did not prescribe a
stimulator” is correct and supported by substantial evidence in the record.
As to Plaintiff’s pain medications, the ALJ summarized that Dr. Green issued him a “onetime prescription for Percocet 5 mg #30” and referred him “for evaluation of ongoing medical
management of pain control.” (R. at 29). While this one reference is only to Dr. Green’s
prescription of pain medicine to Plaintiff, the ALJ references Plaintiff’s reliance on medication,
including Ultram ER 100mg, Ultram ER 200mg, Aleve, multiple times in his consideration of his
RFC. (R. at 29, 30). While Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not appropriately consider that Plaintiff
was also prescribed Oxycodone and Hydrocodone, Plaintiff provides no citation to the records
evidencing these additional prescriptions. However, it is clear that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s
use of pain medication, including the side effects of drowsiness that it might cause, in determining
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the RFC. Further, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the ALJ is “not required to discuss all the
evidence, as long as [his] factual findings as a whole show that [he] implicitly considered the record
as a whole.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 730 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Kornecky
v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 507-08 (6th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, the Court finds
that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of Plaintiff’s reliance upon pain medication in
determining his RFC.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by stating as follows: “[T]he claimant has alleged
significant adverse side-effects (sleepiness from medications), but the record fails to show that he
has reported such side effects to treating physicians. This casts doubt on its existence and, moreover,
even if it does exist, fails to show that it would be functionally limiting if reported and medications
were adjusted.” (R. at 30). Upon review, Plaintiff correctly notes that the record does reflect that
he advised Dr. Green on March 8, 2011 that Ultram ER “might be a little too strong as he slept a
little bit too much when taking it.” (R. at 519). It appears that he had been on the 200 mg dosage
of Ultram ER from his January 27, 2011 appointment with Dr. Green. (R. at 544). On the March
8, 2011 visit, Dr. Green lowered his dosage to 100mg of Ultram ER and also advised that Plaintiff
could take Aleve along with Ultram ER. (R. at 519). Thus, while the ALJ was incorrect that
Plaintiff never reported any side effects of drowsiness to a treating physician, it appears to be a moot
point as Plaintiff’s medication was adjusted and there are no further complaints of drowsiness with
that level of medication or others that Plaintiff relies upon in the record. Accordingly, the Court
finds that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of the adverse side-effects of Plaintiff’s
medication.

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III. Plaintiff’s Credibility
Next, Plaintiff claims the ALJ did not properly consider his own complaints of his pain and
limitations. The ALJ is required to follow 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and § 416.929 to evaluate a
claimant’s symptoms, including pain. He must consider all of a claimant’s symptoms, including
pain, and the extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) & § 416.929(a). A
claimant’s own statements about his level of pain will not alone establish disability; instead, there
must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that the claimant has a medical
impairment or combination of impairments which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain
or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all the other evidence, would lead to
a conclusion that the claimant is disabled. Id. However, the finding that a claimant’s impairments
could reasonably be expected to produce his pain does not involve a determination as to the intensity,
persistence, or functional limiting effects of his symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b) & § 416.929(b).
In evaluating the intensity and persistence of a claimant’s symptoms, including pain, the ALJ
must consider all of the available evidence, including his medical history, the medical signs and
laboratory findings, and the claimant’s own statements about how the symptoms affect him. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c) & § 416.929(a), (c). The ALJ will then determine the extent to which the
alleged functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably accepted
as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings and other evidence to decide how a
claimant’s symptoms affect his ability to work. Id. The ALJ further considers the following: the
claimant’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of his pain or other
symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of
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any medication he takes or has taken to alleviate his pain or other symptoms; any measures he uses
or has used to relieve his pain or other symptoms; and, other factors concerning his functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. Id. § 404.1529(c) & § 416.929(c).
In the instant case, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (R. at 27). However, the ALJ
continued to conclude that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects
of these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent” with the eventual RFC
determination. (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ found the Plaintiff to be “credible to the extent he would
experience back and leg pain with heavy lifting,” and the RFC was “reduced to accommodate such
limitation.” (Id.) The ALJ found, though, that Plaintiff’s “allegations that he is incapable of all work
activity” was not credible because of “significant inconsistencies in the record as a whole.” (Id.)
As already discussed in some detail, the ALJ then considered Plaintiff’s medical history, the
medical signs and laboratory findings, and the claimant’s own statements about how the symptoms
affect him as required by the applicable regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a), (c) & §
416.929(a), (c). With respect to Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ found as follows:
In regard to activities of daily living, the claimant stated in testimony at the hearing
that he cannot lift objects and is limited to standing and sitting for short periods of
time. He added that he has to take naps during the day. Such testimony indicates a
marked curtailment of even simple daily activities, but the evidence as a whole does
not substantiate any good cause for such inactivity, apart from the claimant’s own
preference. For example, the claimant’s own treating physicians have assessed the
claimant as having the ability to return to work, after a short post surgery recovery
period. Severe pain will often result in certain observable manifestations such as loss
of weight due to loss of appetite from incessant pain, muscular atrophy due to muscle
guarding, prolonged bed rest or adverse neurological signs. In the present case, no
such signs exist in the objective medical evidence of record. The undersigned must
conclude, based upon a consideration of subjective allegations weighed against
objective medical evidence and other relevant information bearing on the issue of
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credibility, that the claimant exaggerates his physical complications and so such
subjective allegations must be rejected as lacking credibility.
(R. at 30).
The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s work history and concluded that he had “a steady work history
for many years prior to the alleged onset date, indicating motivation to work,” which the ALJ found
to Plaintiff’s credit. (Id.) The ALJ also considered the credibility of Plaintiff’s reports of any
limitations of drowsiness due to sleep medication but, as already considered, the ALJ properly
determined that Plaintiff’s medication dosage had been lowered since the last date upon which he
complained of side effects and that there was no more recent support in the record for limitations on
this basis. (Id.) The ALJ then continued to consider additional evidence as to Plaintiff’s credibility
as follows:
His pain and allegations of being disabled are not supported. Two treating
physicians, Dr. Tabor and Dr. Green, chose not to assign any restrictions.
Examination reports have consistently shown normal gait, normal strength, good
range of motion, and negative straight leg raise.2 Based on the medical evidence of
record, the symptoms are partially credible, and disabling symptomology is not
supported. The functional restrictions alleged are disproportionate to the clinical
findings. Pain, weakness, fatigue, and obesity have been considered singly, and in
combination, and are reflected in the sedentary/unskilled residual functional capacity
as outlined above.
(Id.)
Based upon the ALJ’s extensive discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility on the intensity,
persistence, or functional limiting effects of his symptoms as compared with his including his
medical history and the objective medical signs and laboratory findings, the Court concludes that the
ALJ complied with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and § 416.929 and that his decision was supported by
2

The ALJ’s finding of “consistent[]” negative straight leg raise tests has already been
addressed above.
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substantial evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff states that the ALJ failed to address the evidence that Plaintiff’s pain was
not resolved despite use of increasingly serious medications. Plaintiff did not cite to any evidence
in the record to support this conclusion, and the ALJ properly considered all of the evidence.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that his decision was supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Plaintiff’s Cumulative Impairments
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of Plaintiff’s
impairments but, instead, only considered Plaintiff’s various diagnoses and the opinions of his
treating physicians separately. The record reflects that the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s symptoms of
“[p]ain, weakness, fatigue, and obesity have been considered singly, and in combination, and are
reflected in the sedentary/unskilled residual functional capacity . . . .” (R. at 30). Further, Plaintiff
only has two severe impairments—degenerative disc disease and obesity—and does not assert that
he has any other non-severe impairments that should be addressed in combination. The ALJ’s
decision extensively focuses upon the effects of his degenerative disc disease, including Plaintiff’s
own claims and the medical source opinions. While portions of the opinion discuss certain evidence
separately, the opinion as a whole considers all appropriate evidence of the effects of Plaintiff’s
impairments cumulatively.
The ALJ’s decision also expressly “notes that the claimant has a body mass index of 35.9 and
in addition to [a] back disorder, obesity has been diagnosed.” (R. at 30). The ALJ found that, as
Social Security Ruling 02-1p provides, in pertinent part, that “obesity can cause limitations of
function in an individual’s ability to sit, stand, walk, lift, carry, or push/pill, and may affect the
ability to climb, balance, stoop, and crouch,” that the “combined effects of obesity with the other
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impairment may be greater than what might be expected without obesity.” (R. at 30). Accordingly,
the Court concludes that the ALJ properly considered the combined effects of Plaintiff’s impairments
and that his decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, upon a finding that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and
applied the correct legal standards, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of April, 2016.
s/ Charmiane G. Claxton
CHARMIANE G. CLAXTON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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