Rawlings v. Arnold et al

Filing 6

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/14/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DEREK RAWLINGS, JR.
Plaintiff,

VS.

G. ARNOLD, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-2169-JDT-cgc

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT
AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED

On March 9, 2015, Plaintiff Derek Rawlings, Jr. (“Rawlings”), Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner number 485790, who is currently confined
at the Whiteville Correctional Facility in Whiteville, Tennessee,1 filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint addresses Rawlings’s previous confinement while he was a
pre-trial detainee at the Jail. On March 11, 2015, the Court granted leave to proceed in

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When the complaint was filed, Rawlings was confined at the Shelby County Criminal
Justice Complex (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) He submitted a change of
address on March 18, 2015, advising that he had been transferred to the Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex. (ECF No. 5.) However, the TDOC Felony Offender Information
database shows that he is now at the WCF. See https://apps.tn.gov/foil-app/search.jsp. The
Clerk is directed to MODIFY the docket to reflect that Rawlings’s current address is the WCF
and to send a copy of this order to him at that new address.

forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Officers G. Arnold, K. Boykin, and K. Gray and Shelby County.2
I. The Complaint
Rawlings alleges that on October 30, 2014, he was standing in the hallway of the
fourth floor of the Jail, in front of F-pod, talking to Sergeant (“Sgt.”) Petterson, who is
not a party to the complaint, when a fight broke out between inmates and officers inside
F-pod. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Officer Walker, who also is not a party to this complaint,
walked Rawlings to J-pod. (Id.) Rawlings stayed in J-pod for approximately thirty
minutes, and Walker then walked Rawlings back to his cell. (Id.) After he had been in
his cell for ten to fifteen minutes, Defendants Arnold, Boykin, and Gray, who are
members of the Gang Intelligence Unit, pulled Rawlings from his cell and told him to
come with them. (Id. at 2-3.) Rawlings thought they just wanted to ask him questions
about the fight. (Id. at 3.) The Defendants walked Rawlings to a classroom and closed
the door, then Defendant Boykin hit Rawlings in the face. (Id.) Defendant Gray began
hitting Rawlings in the body, and Defendant Arnold grabbed Rawlings’s legs to take him
to the floor. (Id.) Once they had him on the floor, all three Defendants beat Rawlings,
hitting and kicking him in the face and body. (Id.) Rawlings did not attempt to break
free because he just wanted the Defendants to stop. (Id.) When Rawlings told the
Defendants he had not done anything and asked why they were beating him, the
2

The Court construes any claims brought against the Shelby County Justice Center as
claims against Shelby County. Any official capacity claims against Defendants Arnold, Boykin
and Gray are also considered claims against Shelby County.
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Defendants said it was because he was in the fight and should not mess with officers.
(Id.) Defendants kept beating and kicking Rawlings while he was balled up on the floor.
(Id.) After they had assaulted him for a few minutes, the Defendants put Rawlings in
handcuffs, then Defendant Boykin got up and kicked Rawlings in the eye.

(Id.)

Rawlings contends Defendants took him into the classroom to beat him because there are
no cameras in that room. (Id.) Rawlings further states that another inmate was also in
the classroom, in the corner; Rawlings saw Defendant Gray hitting the other inmate in the
face. (Id.)
Rawlings stayed in the classroom for about thirty minutes after the assault, asking
the Defendants to talk to Sgt. Petterson, but they refused. (Id.) He was then taken to
medical. (Id.) Rawlings states that he was never written up for the incident because the
Defendants knew they were in the wrong. (Id.) When Rawlings talked to Sgt. Petterson
a few days later, Petterson said he told the Defendants that Rawlings was not involved in
the fight and that he did not know why the Defendants jumped on Rawlings. (Id.)
Rawlings states that he wrote grievances, but nothing was done. (Id.)
Rawlings seeks monetary relief for his pain and suffering. (Id. at 4.)
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
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28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
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meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Rawlings, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Rawlings v. Matauszak,
No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a
court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”)
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))
(alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and
stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for
her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to
act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x
506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the
strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly
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burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into
advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the
rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants
as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).
Rawlings filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Rawlings has sued Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a
municipality, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was
caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible
for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The
second issue is dispositive of plaintiff’s claims against Shelby County.
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A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in
original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v.
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To
demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury
was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“Where a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s
official decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983
suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish
the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk
Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’
is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

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112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986))
(emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to
put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007);
Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL
160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint
contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No.
06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v.
City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007)
(same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official
policy or custom which caused injury to plaintiff. Instead, it appears that Rawlings is
suing Shelby County because he was confined in a County institution and the County
employed persons who allegedly violated his rights.
Rawlings’s complaint alleges that Defendants Arnold, Boykin and Gray subjected
him to excessive force. The Supreme Court has held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.
Ct. 2466 (2015), that excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be
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analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness,
rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at
2472-73. For purposes of screening, Rawlings has alleged a plausible claim for violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Arnold, Boykin, and Gray.
III. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Rawlings’s claims against Shelby County pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendants G. Arnold, K.
Boykin and K. Gray and deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service
shall be made on Defendants Arnold, Boykin and Gray pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1) and (10), either by mail
or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of service shall by advanced by the
United States.
It is further ORDERED that Rawlings shall serve a copy of every subsequent
document he files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendants Arnold, Boykin and Gray
or on any unrepresented Defendant. Rawlings shall make a certificate of service on every
document filed. Rawlings shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and this Court’s Local Rules.3

3

A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
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Rawlings shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court may
result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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