Brown et al v. AmSouth Bank et al

Filing 15

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO THE CHANCERY COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY. Signed by Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 4/7/2015. (McCalla, Jon)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
JOE W. BROWN, KIMERLY WILLIAMS
BROWN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AMSOUTH BANK, REGIONS
MORTGAGE,
Defendants.

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No. 2:15-cv-02202-JPM-tmp

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO THE CHANCERY COURT OF SHELBY COUNTY

For the reasons stated below, this case is REMANDED to the
Chancery Court of Shelby County.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Chancery Court of

Shelby County on May 6, 2011, requesting injunctive relief to
restrain Defendants from selling the property at 11851 Metz
Place, Eads, TN 38028.

(Brown v. AmSouth Bank, 2:11-cv-3022-

tmp, ECF No. 1-2 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).)

Defendants removed that

action to federal court on November 16, 2011.

(Id., ECF No. 1.)

On March 18, 2013, the Court ordered in part that:
if the Browns fail to pay said amount on or before August
3, 2012, Regions shall begin foreclosure proceedings
without objection from the Browns. The Browns agree they

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will not attempt to hinder the foreclosure process in any
way and waive all objections to the foreclosure.
(Id., ECF No. 29.)
On May 9, 2012, the Court administratively closed the case
without entering any judgment.

(Id., ECF No. 22.)

On April 2,

2013, Plaintiffs filed a Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment in
the other federal case (id., ECF No. 30), which the Court denied
on September 30, 2014 (id., ECF No. 43).

Because there had been

no judgment in the case, the Court instead interpreted the
motion as a request under Rule 54 for the Court to revise a
prior order.

(See id., ECF No. 43 at 5–9.)

Plaintiffs filed

another motion styled as a Rule 59 motion on October 31, 2014.
(Id., ECF No. 51.)
April 7, 2015.

The magistrate judge denied that motion on

(Id., ECF No. 54.)

On December 10, 2013, Defendants filed a motion in the
related case requesting that the Court issue an order stating
that a Forcible Entry and Detainer Warrant (“FED”) to obtain
immediate possession of the property at issue is not within the
jurisdiction retained by the federal court and that such relief
may be sought in any other court of competent jurisdiction.
(Id., ECF No. 37-1.)
September 30, 2014.

The Court granted the requested relief on
(Id., ECF No. 44.)

Judgment was entered in

the related case on April 7, 2015, and jurisdiction to enforce

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the settlement agreement was explicitly retained.

(Id., ECF No.

55.)
Defendants represent that they again sought an FED warrant
in General Sessions Court, which was set for March 25, 2015.
(ECF No. 7-1 at 4.)

In response, Plaintiffs’ filed with the

Shelby County Chancery Court a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the
General Sessions Court from issuing the FED warrant that
Defendants are seeking.

(ECF No. 7-2.)

According to

Defendants, Plaintiffs’ counsel “gave Defendants’ counsel
assurances that despite the petition filed the day before, he
would not seek a restraining order without first providing
Defendants with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
(ECF No. 7-1 at 5.)

Defendants represent that Plaintiffs

nevertheless proceeded to Chancery Court and obtained on March
25, 2015, a TRO without giving Defendants an opportunity to be
heard.

(Id.)

Defendants represent that they received service

of the TRO on March 27, 2015.
II.

(Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the

district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.”

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

If the plaintiffs in a suit

do not have standing, then the Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction.

Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
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Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007).

One necessary element

of standing is that “it must be likely that the plaintiff's
injury would be redressed by the requested relief.”

Slorp v.

Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, 587 F. App’x 249, 253 (6th Cir.
2014) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992)).
here.

As will be explained below, that element is missing

This case must therefore be remanded for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 1
This Court has no power to grant the injunctive relief
requested.

Plaintiffs pray that the Court issue “a Temporary

Restraining Order staying Respondent’s Forcible Entry and
Detainer (“FED”) action [in the] General Sessions Civil Court of
Shelby County, Tennessee, until such a time as the federal court
has ruled on the pending Rule 59 Motion, or entered its order
altering or amending the judgment.”

(ECF No. 1-1 at 7.)

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The Court notes that Defendants have also failed to establish that the
amount-in-controversy requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is met in this case.
See Mitchell v. Hudson, No. 1:13-CV-152, 2013 WL 610667, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Feb. 19, 2013) (“Where the complaint does not seek a specified amount of
damages, the party removing the action must ‘show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the allegations in the complaint at the time of removal satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement.’”) (quoting Northup Properties, Inc.
v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 567 F.3d 767, 769-70 (6th Cir. 2009)). As
Defendants acknowledged in open court, title for the property is not at
issue, and the value of the litigation is properly determined by the value of
the right of possession. See Battle v. Atkinson, 115 F. 384, 389 (C.C.E.D.
Ark. 1902) aff’d, 191 U.S. 559 (1903) (“The action being one to determine
merely the right of possession at the time of the institution of the suit,
regardless of the ownership or title, the value of the right of possession
alone must determine the amount involved, with such actual damages as the
complaint shows the plaintiff can recover under the statute in this
action.”). That value has not been established by a preponderance of the
evidence to meet the jurisdictional requirements of § 1332.

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“The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, recognized
that the Anti–Injunction Act creates an absolute prohibition
against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction
falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions.”
Martingale LLC v. City of Louisville, 361 F.3d 297, 302 (6th
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“These three

exceptions, embedded within the statute’s text, permit
injunctions against state court proceedings (1) where Congress
expressly authorizes, (2) where necessary in aid of the court’s
jurisdiction, and (3) where necessary to protect or effectuate
the court's judgments.”

Id.

None of the three exceptions applies here.

First, Congress

has not expressly authorized the injunctive relief that
Plaintiffs seek.

Second, the injunction that Plaintiffs seek is

not necessary in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction.

“Courts have

applied this second exception in only two scenarios: where the
case is removed from the state court, and where the federal
court acquires in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over a case
involving real property before the state court does.”

Id.

Because the case that Plaintiffs seek to enjoin is not the case
that was removed, the first scenario does not apply.

The second

scenario does not apply because this case is in personam and not
in rem or quasi in rem.

See id. at 303 & n.3.

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Third, there is

no federal court judgment that Plaintiffs seek to protect or
effectuate through the injunctive relief sought.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ injury is not
redressable in federal Court.

As a result, Plaintiffs do not

have standing and the Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
Because it “it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”
U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the

Chancery Court of Shelby County.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 7th day of April, 2015.

/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON P. McCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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