Robles v. Comtrak Logistics, Inc.

Filing 125

ORDER denying 113 Motion for Modification; finding as moot 117 Motion for More Definite Statement. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 07-02-2018. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

SALVADOR ROBLES, JORGE AVALOS,
and JOSE MARQUEZ, individually
and on behalf of others
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMTRAK LOGISTICS, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:15-cv-02228-SHM-tmp

ORDER

Before the Court are two motions.

The first is Plaintiffs

Salvador Robles, Jorge Avalos, and Jose Marquez’s Motion for
Clarification and Modification of Court’s July 19, 2016 Order,
or in the Alternative, Motion for Revision and Reconsideration
of

Court’s

July

19,

2016

filed on August 11, 2016.
on August 25, 2016.
September 8, 2016.
The

second

Order

(“Motion

(ECF No. 113.)

(ECF No. 116.)

for

Modification”),

Defendants responded
Plaintiffs replied on

(ECF No. 121.)
is

Defendants’

Motion

for

More

Definite

Statement or, in the Alternative, Motion To Strike (“Motion for
More Definite Statement”), filed on August 26, 2016.
117.)

(ECF No.

For

the

reasons

below,

the

Motion

for

Modification

is

DENIED, and the Motion for More Definite Statement is DENIED AS
MOOT.
I.

Background
The

facts

are

stated

entered on July 19, 2016.
On

January

25,

more

fully

in

the

Court’s

Order

Salvador

Robles,

Jorge

(ECF No. 110.)

2013,

Plaintiffs

Avalos, and Jose Marquez filed a Complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of California.
1.)

(ECF No.

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of current and former

truck drivers.
On

May

6,

(ECF No. 24.)
4, 2015.

(Id. at 2.)
2013,

Plaintiffs

filed

an

Amended

Complaint.

The case was transferred to this Court on April

(ECF No. 66.)

Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on May 15,
2015.

(ECF

No.

86.)

The

Second

Amended

Complaint

alleges

twenty-four causes of action.
The Settlement Release Subclass brings a cause of action
for Declaratory Relief.

(Id. at 1295-96.)

Plaintiffs and the Putative Class bring causes of action
for:

(1)

Declaratory

Relief;

(2)

Reimbursement

of

Business

Expenses; (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage for all Hours Worked;
(4) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage For Time Spent Driving Actual
2

Miles; (5) Payment of Wage Below Designated Rate for all Hours
Worked; (6) Payment of Wage Below Designated Rate for Time Spent
Driving Actual Miles; (7) Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment; (8)
Failure to Provide Meal Periods; (9) Failure to Provide Rest
Stops; (10) Failure to Timely Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage
Statements;

and

(11)

Violation

of

California

Business

and

Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (Id. at 1296-1309.)
The Former Drivers Subclass brings a cause of action for
Waiting Time Penalties.

(Id. at 1306.)

Plaintiff Salvador Robles brings causes of action for: (1)
Reimbursement of Business Expenses; (2) Failure to Pay Minimum
Wage for all Hours Worked; (3) Failure to Pay Minimum Wage for
Time

Spent

Driving

Actual

Miles;

(4)

Payment

of

Wage

Below

Designated Rate for all Hours Worked; (5) Payment of Wage Below
the Designated Rate for Time Spent Driving Actual Miles; (6)
Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment; (7) Failure to Provide Meal
Periods; (8) Failure to Provide Rest Periods; (9) Failure to
Timely Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (10) Waiting
Time Penalties; and (11) Violation of California Business and
Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.

(Id. at 1309-20.)

On June 8, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 91.)
95.)

Plaintiffs responded on June 29, 2015.

Defendants replied on July 13, 2015.
3

(ECF No.

(ECF No. 97.)

On July 19, 2016, the Court entered an Order granting in
part and denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
No. 110.)

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims on behalf of

purported

class

members

who

signed

settlement

Plaintiffs’ claims based on quantum meruit.
Plaintiffs’ other claims survived.
II.

(ECF

agreements

and

(Id. at 1692-93.)

(Id.)

Analysis
A. Motion for Modification
1. Whether

Dismissal

of

Claims

was

With

or

Without

Prejudice
Plaintiffs contend that “[w]hat is unclear from the Court’s
Order is whether these claims were dismissed with, or without,
prejudice.”

(ECF No. 113 at 1700.)

“A ‘dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a judgment on the merits,’
and is therefore done with prejudice.”

Pratt v. Yentas, Inc.,

365 F.3d 514, 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted);
see also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,
399 n.3 (1981).

There was no need to “specify whether [the]

claims were being dismissed with or without prejudice.”

(ECF

No.

with

113

at

1700.)

Plaintiffs’

prejudice.

4

claims

were

dismissed

2. Reconsideration
Plaintiffs argue that, if their “claims were dismissed with
prejudice,” the Court should “revise and reconsider its July 19
Order” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

(Id. at

1701.)
Under Rule 54(b), a court may revise an order before it
issues an entry of judgment adjudicating all of the claims and
all of the parties' rights and liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b); see also Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare
Fund, 89 F. App’x. 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004).

“Rule 54(b) does

not expressly provide for . . . motions by parties and does not
prescribe
decisions.”

any

standards

or

bases

for

revisions

of

prior

Lumpkin v. Farmers Grp., Inc., No. 05–2868 Ma/V,

2007 WL 6996777, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts generally revise interlocutory orders only “whe[re]
there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new
evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.”

Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro

Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rodriguez, 89 F. App’x. at 959).

Motions to revise

“may not be used to relitigate old matters.”

In re Regions

Morgan Keegan Secs., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., Nos. 07–2784,
5

MDL 2009, 2010 WL 5464792, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts in this district also rely on Local Rule 7.3(a).
“Before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all of the claims .
. . in a case, any party may move . . . for the revision of any
interlocutory order made by that Court.”

L.R. 7.3(a).

The

moving party must show:
(1) a material difference in fact or law from that
which was presented to the Court before entry of the
interlocutory order for which revision is sought, and
that in the exercise of reasonable diligence the party
applying for revision did not know such fact or law at
the time of the interlocutory order; or (2) the
occurrence of new material facts or a change of law
occurring after the time of such order; or (3) a
manifest failure by the Court to consider material
facts or dispositive legal arguments that were
presented to the Court before such interlocutory
order.
L.R. 7.3(b).

“Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders

are not otherwise permitted.”
Plaintiffs
controlling
7.3(b)(2).

do

law

not

after

L.R. 7.3(a).

allege
the

new

Court

facts

entered

or
its

a

change

Order.

in
L.R.

They do not allege that the Court “fail[ed] . . . to

consider material factors or dispositive legal arguments that
were presented to the Court” before its Order.

L.R. 7.3(b)(3).

Plaintiffs

Second

argue

that,

after

filing

their

Amended

Complaint and before the Court’s Order, “Plaintiffs [] uncovered
substantial

evidence

of

economic
6

duress,

undue

influence,

intentional
facts.”

misrepresentations,

and

(ECF No. 113 at 1703.)

concealments

of

material

Plaintiffs contend that “[i]t

would be manifestly unjust, and a striking departure from the
liberal pleading paradigm proscribed [sic] by the Federal Rules,
to

refuse

Plaintiffs

at

least

one

opportunity

to

cure

the

pleading deficiencies related to claims on behalf of Settlement
Class Members.”

(Id. at 1701 (emphasis in original).)

Plaintiffs’ argument is not well taken.

“Where parties

have fully argued the merits of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and
the district court has . . . issued an opinion resolving the
motion, it is a stretch to say justice requires granting leave
to

cure

the

complaint’s

deficiencies

as

identified

adversarial pleadings and the district court’s order.”

in

the

United

States ex rel. Ibanez v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 874 F.3d 905,
918 n.2 (6th Cir. 2017); accord Wysong Corporation v. APN, Inc.,
889 F.3d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 2018).
Plaintiffs admit they discovered the allegedly new evidence
before the Court entered its Order.

They fail to explain why

they did not move to amend their Second Amended Complaint in the
fourteen

months

between

the

filing

of

the

Second

Amended

Complaint on May 15, 2015, and the Court’s Order on July 19,
2016.

Plaintiffs failed to exercise the reasonable diligence

required by L.R. 7.3(b)(1).
7

“Although
liberally

leave

when

to

the

amend

motion

a

complaint

is

made

should

be

pretrial,

granted

different

considerations apply to motions filed after dismissal.”

Russell

v. GTE Government Systems Corp., 141 F. App’x 429, 436 (6th Cir.
2005)

(internal

quotations

omitted).

Plaintiffs

have

not

established that revision of the Court’s Order is warranted.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
B. Motion for More Definite Statement
On September 9, 2016, the parties filed a Stipulation to
Withdraw Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement (the
“Stipulation”).
“Defendants
statement

(ECF 122 at 1763.)

hereby
.

.

.

withdraw
.

The

their
parties

The Stipulation states that
motion
agree

for

more

that,

definite

under

this

Stipulation, Defendants are not otherwise required to answer or
plead in response to the Second Amended Complaint.”

(Id. at

1764.)
The Motion for More Definite Statement is DENIED AS MOOT.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Modification is
DENIED, and the Motion for More Definite Statement is DENIED AS
MOOT.

8

It is SO ORDERED this 2nd day of July, 2018.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. ___
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9