Bowles v. Shelby County Jail et al

Filing 5

ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/22/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
TONDREON M. BOWLES a/k/a
TONDREON M. BOWLESMERRIWEATHER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-2233-cgc

ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT
PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS

On April 8, 2015, Plaintiff Tondreon M. Bowles a/k/a Tondreon M. BowlesMerriweather (“Bowles”), who is a pretrial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal
Justice Complex (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) On April
10, 2015, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil
filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendants as Shelby County;1 Chief Jailer R. Moore; Sergeant (“Sgt.”) First Name
Unknown (“FNU”) Johnson; Officer (“Ofc.”) FNU Isom; Ofc. FNU Roy; and Ofc. FNU
Buford.

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The Court construes any claims against the Jail as claims against Shelby County.

I. THE COMPLAINT
Bowles alleges that on January 12, 2015, he was being relocated from third floor
Romeo to first floor Echo when Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy pushed him down the
escalators, causing him to fall down several stairs and resulting in serious injuries to both
of his legs. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Bowles alleges that he could not walk after the fall and
made several attempts to let the officers know he could not move, but he was dragged to
the first floor, bypassing medical. (Id.) Bowles continued to tell the officers about his
injuries, but he was thrown to the floor and forced to lie on his injured legs. (Id.) When
Bowles tried to turn, Defendant Roy grabbed his injured leg, which was in a boot, and
twisted it, causing serious pain to the leg, in which he previously had been shot. (Id.)
Bowles informed Defendant Buford that he needed medical attention, but Defendant
Buford cursed at Bowles and said he was not getting any medical treatment. (Id.)
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,

or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
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factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 092259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either
this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who

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come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Bowles filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendant Moore. When a
complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Additionally, Defendant Moore cannot be held liable as a supervisor. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. at 676; see also Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus,
“a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own official actions, violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific
instance of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At
a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least
implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinates.
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citation omitted). A supervisory official who is aware of the
unconstitutional conduct of her subordinates, but fails to act, generally cannot be held
liable in her individual capacity. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008);
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199
F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28
(6th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Bowles cannot sue Defendant Moore even if a subordinate
violated his rights.
Bowles’s claims against the Jail are claims against Shelby County. When a
§ 1983 claim is made against a municipality or county, the court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation;
and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of
Bowles’s claims against Shelby County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also
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Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a
constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy
or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton
v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993).

To demonstrate

municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2)
connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where
a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.”
Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom
“must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the
liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty.
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official
policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be
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sufficient to put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g.,
Fowler v. Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30,
2007); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained
conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 022556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of
the complaint fail to identify an official policy or custom of Shelby County which caused
injury to Bowles.
Bowles’s complaint alleges that Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy subjected him
to excessive force. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), the Supreme
Court held that excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees must be analyzed
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a
subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 2472-73.
For purposes of screening, Bowles has alleged a plausible claim for excessive force in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy.
Bowles also alleges that the Defendants refused to provide him with needed
medical treatment following his injury.

For both pretrial detainees and convicted

prisoners, the Sixth Circuit has analyzed such claims under the Eighth Amendment’s
deliberate indifference standard, even after the decision in Kingsley. See Morabito v.
Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the objective reasonableness

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standard to pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims and deliberate indifference standard
to claim for denial of medical care).
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective
components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component
requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson,
503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. In the context of an Eighth Amendment claim
based on a lack of medical care, the objective component requires that a prisoner have a
serious medical need. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004);
Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1994). “[A] medical need is objectively
serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would readily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005). For purposes of screening,
the Court presumes that Bowles’s claim that he was unable to walk after the fall and that
Defendant Roy twisted his already-injured leg is a sufficient allegation of a serious
medical need.
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a
prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he
had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson,
501 U.S. at 302-03.

The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with
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“deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555
F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir. 1997).
“[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment unless he subjectively knows of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate’s
health or safety and also disregards that risk. Id. at 837. “[A]n official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” does not state a
claim for deliberate indifference. Id. at 838.
Bowles does not sufficiently state a claim against Defendant Buford for lack of
medical care. The only allegation is that Bowles “informed Ofc. Buford,” who then
denied treatment. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Bowles does not allege that Buford was present and
witnessed Bowles’s injury, state how much time had passed before he talked to Buford,
or state specifically what he told Buford and what Buford observed. Thus, there is no
allegation that Buford was aware of an excessive risk to Bowles’s health and disregarded
that risk.
However, for purposes of screening, Bowles has stated a plausible claim for denial
of medical care against Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Bowles’s claims against Defendants Shelby County,
Moore and Buford pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Process

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will be issued for Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy on Bowles’s claims of excessive
force and denial of medical care.
The Clerk is ORDERED to issue process for the remaining Defendants, Sgt. FNU
Johnson, Ofc. FNU Isom and Ofc. FNU Roy and deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal
for service. Service shall be made on Defendants Johnson, Isom and Roy pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1) and
(10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of service shall
by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Bowles shall serve a copy of every subsequent
document he files in this cause on the attorneys for the Defendants or on any
unrepresented Defendant. Bowles shall make a certificate of service on every document
filed. Bowles shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this
Court’s Local Rules.2
Bowles shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements or any other order of the Court may
result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
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