Johnson v. Lane

Filing 9

ORDER DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 4/29/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
BRANDON MICHAEL JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
C/O LANE, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-2260-JDT-tmp

ORDER DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED

On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff Brandon Michael Johnson (“Johnson”), who is
confined at the Morgan County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which was opened as case number 152260-JDT-tmp. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint concerned an incident that occurred during
Johnson’s previous confinement at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary and named
only one defendant. (Id.) After Plaintiff filed the necessary documentation (ECF No. 5),
the Court issued an order on May 20, 2015, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.)
Johnson filed a second pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 21,
2015, which was opened as case number 15-2345-JDT-tmp. That complaint addressed
the same incident as the prior complaint, but named two additional defendants. (ECF No.

8.) After Johnson filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (No. 15-2345, ECF No. 6),
the Court granted the motion and assessed the filing fee in that case as well (id., ECF No.
7).
On March 15, 2016, the Court issued an order noting that Johnson should have
filed the second complaint as an amended complaint in case number 15-2260. (ECF No.
7.) Therefore, the Court directed the Clerk to docket the complaint from case number 152345 as an amended complaint in case number 15-2260 and close case number 15-2345.
(Id.) The Court also set aside the fee assessment in case number 15-2345. (Id.) The
Clerk shall record the Defendants as Correctional Officer (“C/O”) First Name Unknown
(“FNU”) Lane; C/O FNU Jones; and Corporal (“Cpl.”) FNU Ivy.
I. The Complaint and Amended Complaint
Johnson alleges that on May 11, 2014, while he was confined at the WTSP,
Defendants Lane, Jones and Ivy, along with other unknown officers, came to his cell to
remove his property. Prior to doing so, they took Johnson from his cell, in retraints and
on camera, and placed him in the “U-2-D” passive room.

After his property was

removed, the three Defendants walked Johnson back to his cell, in restraints and off
camera, during which time he and the Defendants engaged in a brief, heated argument.
They all entered Johnson’s cell, and Defendant Ivy was holding Johnson’s restraint.
Defendant Lane asked Johnson, “what’s all that shit you was talking,” and then hit
Johnson in the eye, causing it to bruise and swell instantly. (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 8
at 2.) Defendants Jones and Ivy did nothing to help and refused to let Johnson see the
nurse afterward. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Additionally, after the handcuffs were removed,
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Johnson’s wrists were also bruised and swollen. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Johnson seeks
monetary compensation for the alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id.;
ECF No. 8 at 3.)
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
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Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Johnson, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Johnson v. Matauszak, No.
09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting
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Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in
original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua
sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either
this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. Pliler v.
Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or
paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th
Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a
particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who
come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal
theories they should pursue.”).
Johnson filed both his complaint and amended complaint on the court-supplied
forms for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Johnson complains that he was assaulted, while handcuffed, by Defendant Lane
while Defendants Jones and Ivy stood by and did not intervene. For a convicted prisoner
such as Plaintiff, such claims arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). Where
an inmate challenges a use of force by prison guards, “the question whether the measure
taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
37 (2010) (per curiam) (“The ‘core judicial inquiry’ [for an excessive force claim] was
not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause
harm.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A significant physical injury is not required
to establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilkins, 559 U.S.
at 1178-79 (“An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to
pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good fortune to escape
without serious injury.”); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1992) (same).

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For purposes of screening, the Court concludes that Johnson has alleged a
plausible claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against
Defendants Lane, Jones and Ivy.
“The right to adequate medical care is guaranteed to convicted federal prisoners by
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, and is made
applicable to convicted state prisoners . . . by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). “A prisoner’s right
to adequate medical care ‘is violated when prison doctors or officials are deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs.’” Id. at 874 (quoting Comstock v.
McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585,
590 (6th Cir. 2013) (same). Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the prison officials
acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer
serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303;
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222
(6th Cir. 1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor
v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference
describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Although Johnson alleges that his eye and both wrists were bruised and swollen
after the incident and that Defendants refused to let him see a nurse, he does not allege
the Defendants were aware of, and disregarded, any excessive risk to Johnson’s health if
medical care was not provided. Therefore, Johnson has not stated a claim under the
Eighth Amendment for denial of adequate medical care.
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III. Conclusion
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for the Defendants, WTSP C/O
Lane, WTSP C/O Jones, and WTSP Cpl. Ivy and deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal
for service. Service shall be made on Defendants Lane, Jones and Ivy pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1) and
(10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of service shall
by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Johnson shall serve a copy of every subsequent
document he files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendants or on any unrepresented
Defendant. Johnson shall make a certificate of service on every document filed. Johnson
shall familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local
Rules.1
Johnson shall promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court may
result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
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