Rowan v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING 2 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE $400 CIVIL FILING FEE, ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS ( 4 and 5 ), DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 3/25/16. (Todd, James)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
BRENT A. ROWAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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No. 15-2324-JDT-dkv
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO PAY THE $400 CIVIL FILING FEE,
ADDRESSING PENDING MOTIONS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND
DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
On May 14, 2015, Plaintiff Brent A. Rowan (“Rowan”), booking number 15102052, an
inmate at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court; former U.S. Bankruptcy Clerk Jed Weintraub; the U.S. Tax Court; and the Shelby County
Criminal Justice Complex.1
Under the PLRA, a prisoner bringing a civil action must pay the full filing fee required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The statute merely provides the prisoner the opportunity to make a
1
Plaintiff has listed various other entities as defendants, several of which are not fully
identified. The list includes “US Trustees, Property Division, Human Resources, Civil Division,
Court Costs Division and Fines Section, General Sessions Criminal Court and Release Division,
Jail Housing, Inmates, Jail Staff and Mental Health Staff.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
“downpayment” of a partial filing fee and pay the remainder in installments. See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[w]hen an inmate seeks pauper status, the
only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the proceeding or over a
period of time under an installment plan. Prisoners are no longer entitled to a waiver of fees and
costs.”), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th
Cir. 2013).
However, not all indigent prisoners are entitled to take advantage of the installment
payment provisions of § 1915(b). Section 1915(g) provides as follows:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a
civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Thus, “[s]uch a litigant cannot use the period payment benefits of § 1915(b). Instead, he must
make full payment of the filing fee.” In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 2002). The Sixth
Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of this provision. Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 60206 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff has filed three previous civil rights lawsuits in this district while he was
incarcerated that were dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous.2 Therefore, Plaintiff
may not file any action in this district while he is still incarcerated in which he proceeds in forma
pauperis unless he demonstrates that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
The assessment of whether a prisoner is in imminent danger is made at the time of the filing of
2
Plaintiff previously filed Rowan v. Pizza Hut, No. 2-10-cv-02658-JDT-dkv (W.D. Tenn.
Sept. 2, 2011) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); Rowan v. Major Currie, No. 2:12-cv02264-JST-dkv (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 26, 2012) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); and Rowan
v. City of Memphis, No. 2:12-cv-02707-JDT-cgc (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2013) (dismissed for
failure to state a claim).
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the complaint. See, e.g., Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. App’x 560, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2011);
Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x 796, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2008); Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559,
562-63 (2d Cir. 2002); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312-16 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
Rowan alleges that the LSAC sent a prospectus to him at the Shelby County Criminal
Justice Complex (“Jail”) “for employment and legal services before May 6, 2015.” He asked for
relief from the Defendants, who represent him in his current case in General Sessions Court.
After his release from jail, Rowan states he requires the Defendants to allow him to question a
violation of the U.S. Constitution that occurred in U.S. District Court. He claims that the U.S.
Departments of Defense, Education, and Justice have received the facts of his case, including the
persons involved during his stay at the Jail. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
Rowan requests that the Court review the LSAC prospectus and order the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court and the U.S. Tax Court to pay damages. He states that he needs to file a
Chapter 11 case to reorganize and consolidate his finances and currencies. He asks “[s]houd the
court order a release to a law school or business school?” (Id. at 3.)
Rowan has “failed to plead facts supporting a finding of imminent danger on the date that
he filed his complaint.” Taylor v. First Medical Mgmt, 508 F. App’x 488, 492-93 (6th Cir.
2012). Therefore, the application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff is ORDERED to remit the entire $400 civil filing fee within thirty
(30) days after the date of this order. 3
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Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1914(a) requires a civil filing fee of $350. However, pursuant to
§ 1914(b), “[t]he clerk shall collect from the parties such additional fees . . . as are prescribed by
the Judicial Conference of the United States.” The Judicial Conference has prescribed an
additional administrative fee of $50 for filing any civil case, except for cases seeking habeas
corpus and cases in which the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915. Because the Court is denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case,
Plaintiff is liable for the entire $400 fee.
3
On July 10, 2015, Rowan filed a Motion for Judge to File and Review Inmate Programs
(ECF No. 4) and a Motion That Credits Plaintiff’s Inmate Trust Fund Account from Revenue and
Net Income (ECF No. 5). These motions are without merit and are DENIED.
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
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“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
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510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
Rowan filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
The complaint does not assert any valid claims because, even though Rowan requests
monetary damages, there is no allegation of actual wrongdoing by any of the named Defendants.
When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Therefore, the complaint is
subject to dismissal in its entirety for failure to state a claim.
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The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, leave to amend is not warranted.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Rowan in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in
good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It
would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior
to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.
See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that
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lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith.
The Court DISMISSES Rowan’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b(1). Leave to amend is
DENIED. It is also CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this
matter by Rowan would not be taken in good faith. Because Rowan is a 3-strike filer under 28
U.S.C. §1915(g), leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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