United States of America v. Three Hundred Seventy (370) Units of Hardware Bearing the Registered Trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc. et al
Filing
39
ORDER granting 31 Motion to Strike; vacating the Court's Orders Denying the Claimant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and denying Claimant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Jon Phipps McCalla on 3/16/2016. (McCalla, Jon)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
370 UNITS OF HARDWARE BEARING
THE REGISTERED TRADEMARK OF
CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendants,
ORDER GRANTING
COURT’S ORDERS
FOR JUDGMENT ON
DISMISS
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No. 2:15-cv-02360-JPM-tmp
MOTION TO STRIKE CLAIM AND ANSWER; VACATING THE
DENYING CLAIMANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION
THE PLEADINGS; AND DENYING CLAIMANT’S MOTION TO
AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Before the Court is the Government’s Motion to Strike Claim
and Answer, filed December 17, 2015.
(ECF No. 31.)
Claimant
Core 3 Technologies (“C3T”) responded in opposition on December
31, 2015.
(ECF No. 32.)
January 14, 2016.
The Government filed a reply brief on
(ECF No. 33.)
With leave of Court, on
February 10, 2016, C3T filed a sur-reply.
(ECF No. 37.)
The
Court held a hearing on the instant motion on February 24, 2016.
(Min. Entry, ECF No. 38.)
For the following reasons, the Government’s Motion to
Strike Claim and Answer is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns three hundred seventy (370) units of
hardware imported into the United States through the FedEx World
Hub in Memphis, Tennessee, between November 28, 2012, and
December 13, 2012.
(Compl., Ex. A. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, ECF No. 1-1;
Answer to Ex. A. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, ECF No. 24.)
The Government alleges
that the labels on these units “contained a ‘Cisco’ word mark
with a ‘bridge’ design that is identical to or substantially
indistinguishable from the registered and recorded Cisco
trademark.”
(Compl., Ex. A ¶ 5; Answer to Ex. A ¶ 5.)
The
Government alleges that it sent samples to the Customs and
Border Protection (“CBP”) Laboratory, which reported
inconsistencies between the seized goods and genuine Cisco
trademarked goods.
(Compl., Ex. A ¶¶ 6-7.)
Ultimately, the
Government determined that “the suspect ‘Cisco’ mark on the
modules constituted a counterfeit mark such that the modules
were subject to seizure.”
(Compl., Ex. A ¶ 17.)
On January 28,
2013, the Government seized the defendant property.
(Compl.
¶ 2; Answer ¶ 2.)
The United States brought this civil forfeiture proceeding
on May 27, 2015.
(Compl., ECF No. 1.)
On May 29, 2015, the
Court entered an Order for CBP to seize the defendant property
and hold it subject to further orders of the Court.
4.)
(ECF No.
On June 30, 2015, Core 3 Technologies (“C3T”) filed a
Verified Claim to the seized property.
(ECF No. 14.)
filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 14, 2015.
(ECF No. 15.)
Court denied the motion on September 3, 2015.
2
C3T then
(ECF No. 23.)
The
On September 22, 2015, C3T filed an Answer.
(ECF No. 24.)
C3T then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on
September 25, 2015.
on November 25, 2015.
(ECF No. 25.)
The Court denied the motion
(ECF No. 29.)
On December 17, 2015, C3T
filed a petition for writ of mandamus to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
(ECF No. 30.)
On December 17, 2015, the Government filed a Motion to
Strike Claim and Answer, arguing that C3T does not have a valid
claim to the seized property.
(ECF No. 31.)
opposition on December 31, 2015.
C3T responded in
(ECF No. 32.)
filed a reply brief on January 14, 2016.
The Government
(ECF No. 33.)
With
leave of Court, C3T filed a sur-reply on February 10, 2016.
(ECF No. 37.)
The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Strike
Claim and Answer on February 24, 2016.
(Min. Entry, ECF No.
38.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(i) provides that “[a]t any time
before trial, the government may move to strike a claim or
answer: (A) for failing to comply with Rule G(5) or (6), or (B)
because the claimant lacks standing.”
Supplemental Rule
G(8)(c)(ii) further instructs that such a motion “must be
decided before any motion by claimant to dismiss the action.”
The Advisory Committee Notes to this section explains that this
structure is in place because “[a] claimant who lacks standing
3
is not entitled to challenge the forfeiture on the merits.”
Supp. Admiralty & Maritime Claims R. G, Advisory Committee
Notes.
A. Standing
“In order to contest a governmental forfeiture action,
claimants must have statutory standing through compliance with
Supp. Admiralty and Maritime Claims R. C(6),[ 1] as well as the
Article III standing required for any action brought in federal
court.”
United States v. $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3d
491, 497 (6th Cir. 1998).
Constitutional standing under Article
III consists of three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact, an invasion of a legally protected interest that
is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical.
Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the challenged action of the defendant.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury would be redressed by a
favorable decision.
United States v. Funds in the Amount of $239,400, 795 F.3d 639,
643 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
The Sixth Circuit has found that “[a] property interest
less than ownership may . . . be sufficient to create standing.
Possessory interests may be sufficient to bestow standing on a
1
Prior to Supplemental Rule G’s adoption in 2006, Supplemental Rule C
governed claim procedure in civil forfeiture actions. See United States v.
One Men’s Rolex Pearl Master Watch, 357 F. App’x 624, 628 n.2 (6th Cir.
2009).
4
claimant to contest a forfeiture.”
$515,060.42 in U.S.
Currency, 152 F.3d at 498 (citation omitted).
The inquiry into
whether a lesser interest is sufficient focuses on whether
“[t]he economic harm to a party with a possessory interest in
seized property, imposed by virtue of its liability to the owner
of such property, . . . constitute[s] a palpable injury
sufficient to confer standing under Article III.”
Via Mat Int’l
S. Am. Ltd. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.
2006) (finding that the transporter of seized currency had a
possessory interest in the currency); see also United States v.
Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1999) (“While
ownership or possession of property may provide evidence of
standing, and in some circumstances act as, in effect, a
surrogate for an inquiry into whether there is injury direct
enough and sufficient enough to sustain standing, it is injury
that is at the heart of the standing question.”).
“[T]he
fundamental requirement is that claimants have at least a
facially colorable property interest in the proceedings
sufficient to satisfy Article III’s ‘case-or-controversy’
requirement.”
$515,060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3d at 498.
The purpose of this inquiry is to ensure that the claimant
has “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
5
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Torres
v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1157 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
“[D]ue to
concerns about ‘straw man’ transfers, . . . [w]hen confronted
with mere physical possession of property as a basis for
standing, we require some explanation or contextual information
regarding the claimant’s relationship to the seized property.”
$515,060.42 in U.S. Currency, 152 F.3d at 498.
“Similarly, bare
legal title, in the absence of assertions of dominion, control
or some other indicia of ownership of or interest in the seized
property, is insufficient to confer standing to challenge a
forfeiture.”
Id. at 498 n.6.
B. Supplemental Rule G(6)
Supplemental Rule G(6) permits the government to serve
special interrogatories in forfeiture actions to determine
whether a claimant has standing.
Specifically, it provides that
“[t]he government may serve special interrogatories limited to
the claimant’s identity and relationship to the defendant
property . . . .
Answers or objections to these interrogatories
must be served within 21 days after the interrogatories are
served.”
Supp. Admiralty & Maritime Claims R. G(6)(a)-(b); see
also United States v. Funds in the Amount of $547,840, 719 F.3d
648, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The purpose of such interrogatories
6
is to smoke out fraudulent claims—claims by persons who have no
colorable claims.”)
If a claimant fails to respond to the special
interrogatories, the Government may move to strike a claim or
answer for failing to comply with Supplemental Rule G(6).
Admiralty & Maritime Claims R. G(8)(c)(i)(A).
Supp.
The Advisory
Committee Notes to this Rule clarify that:
the court should strike a claim or answer only if
satisfied that an opportunity should not be afforded
to cure the defects under Rule 15. Not every failure
to respond to subdivision (6) interrogatories warrants
an order striking the claim.
But the special role
that
subdivision
(6)
plays
in
the
scheme
for
determining claim standing may justify a somewhat more
demanding approach than the general approach to
discovery sanctions under Rule 37.
Supp. Admiralty & Maritime Claims R. G, Advisory Committee
Notes.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Timeliness
C3T argues that the Government has “waived” the ability to
challenge standing by failing to raise the issue prior to the
Court’s decision on the Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 37 at 1-2.)
At the hearing, the Government argued that Supplemental Rule
G(8)(c)(i) permits it to challenge standing at any time before
trial and, regardless, that standing is a jurisdictional
requirement such that the Court cannot consider challenges by a
Claimant who lacks standing.
7
The Court agrees with the Government.
threshold question in every federal case.’”
“Standing is ‘the
Coyne v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(i)
sets a procedural deadline for the Government to challenge
standing.
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii), on the other hand,
sets a procedural requirement for the Court to consider
challenges to standing before a motion to dismiss.
A challenge
to standing should be resolved before a motion to dismiss
because a claimant who lacks standing cannot challenge the
forfeiture actions on the merits.
See Supp. Admiralty &
Maritime Claims R. G, Advisory Committee Notes.
To comply with the procedure set forth in Supplemental Rule
G, the Court hereby VACATES its orders denying C3T’s Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The Court
next considers the challenge to C3T’s standing.
B.
Standing
The Government argues that C3T’s Claim and Answer should be
stricken for lack of standing because C3T has failed to show
that it has suffered an injury-in-fact, that its alleged injury
is causally related to the seizure of defendant property, or
that its alleged injury would be redressed by the return of the
property.
(ECF No. 31 at 4-6.)
Specifically, the Government
argues that because C3T had not yet paid for the property, C3T
8
suffered no injury aside from “the inconvenience of not
receiving the items it ordered in timely fashion.”
(Id. at 6.)
Additionally, the Government argues that “the government’s
seizure of the property was not the cause of claimant’s injury,
if any”; instead, it was the independent acts of two other
companies, Verification Systems Technology (“VST”) and London
Network Systems (“LNS”), that interfered with C3T’s attempt to
acquire genuine Cisco hardware.
(ECF No. 33 at 3.)
The
Government also asserts that it is not clear that C3T “would be
entitled to ownership or possession of the defendant property if
it were released from government custody by the Court” and,
accordingly, fails to demonstrate redressability.
(Id. at 3-4.)
C3T argues that it has standing because it has “an obvious
possessory interest” in the defendant property.
(ECF No. 32 at
PageID 246.)
The Court is not persuaded that C3T has suffered “an
invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete
and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent.”
Amount of $239,400, 795 F.3d at 643.
Funds in the
It is undisputed that C3T
did not pay for the seized property and, therefore, lacks an
ownership interest in the property.
127.)
(See ECF No. 18 at PageID
It is further undisputed that C3T did not have actual or
constructive possession of the property at the time of the
seizure.
(See id.)
C3T’s argument, then, is that its future
9
right to possess the not-yet-paid-for property is sufficient to
establish a possessory interest and, as a result, an injury-infact.
Despite C3T’s contention of some future possessory
interest, however, it does not allege and cannot demonstrate
that it is subject to actual or imminent harm as a result of the
seizure.
Because C3T has not paid for the defendant property,
it has not experienced any financial loss as a result of the
seizure. 2
Moreover, because C3T apparently has no obligation to
pay for the defendant property if the Cisco marks on the
property are determined to be counterfeit, and no obligation to
pay if the Cisco marks are determined to be genuine yet the
products are untimely delivered, neither is there a risk of
imminent financial loss.
In other words, C3T has no risk of
loss in litigating this action.
If the property is determined
to be counterfeit, and the forfeiture upheld, C3T’s only loss
will be its legal expenditures.
If the property is determined
to be genuine, and the goods are returned, C3T seemingly may
decide whether to enforce the contract, which stipulates that
“ALL PRODUCT MUST ARRIVE NO LATER THAN 11/28/12,” but which
2
In a letter from Chris Bergen, the Managing Partner of C3T, to LaDon
Tucker, John Carpenter, and Marcelo Mancheno, employees of CBP, dated
December 13, 2012, Bergen notes that “[t]he client has also canceled the
remaining shipments for the order due to the product being held up.” (ECF
No. 18-6 at PageID 152.) C3T fails to allege, however, that it suffered any
financial or goodwill loss from the client’s cancellation of the order.
Without an allegation to this effect, the Court cannot speculate that C3T
incurred such a loss.
10
C3T’s counsel represented was still in effect.
(See ECF No. 18-
3 at PageID 145.)
The purpose of the “case or controversy” requirement is to
avoid this precise scenario.
The claimant must have “such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.”
$36,256.80 U.S.
Currency, 25 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).
Because C3T will sustain no real loss regardless of the outcome
of this forfeiture action, C3T cannot establish that it has a
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of this case.
well established that “[a]bstract injury is not enough.
It is
It must
be alleged that the plaintiff ‘has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the
challenged statute or official conduct.”
Id. at 493 (quoting
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
Although C3T makes a conclusory allegation that it has a
possessory interest in the defendant property, it fails to
specifically allege what, if any, harm it has endured or will
endure.
See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (A “mixture of speculation and conclusory assertion[s] . .
. does not satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement for
‘specific, concrete facts’ demonstrating injury, and
11
‘particularized allegations of fact.’” (quoting Warth, 422 U.S.
at 508, 501)).
Notably, C3T does not assert that it has
suffered or will imminently suffer a financial loss, loss of
client goodwill, or any other concrete or tangible loss related
to the seizure of defendant property.
C3T merely asserts that
it has a possessory interest and argues that such a possessory
interest alone is sufficient to establish standing.
At the hearing on the instant motion, C3T’s counsel
repeatedly stated that, if the seized property were returned,
“the contract would kick in.”
As written, however, the contract
may now be voided at C3T’s whim, based on London Network
System’s failure to deliver the 370 units by the stated
deadline.
Thus, C3T is not obligated to pay for or receive the
370 units, even if they are returned at the conclusion of this
action.
Accordingly, C3T’s bare assertion of a possessory
interest is insufficient to establish that C3T suffered, or is
in imminent danger of suffering, a concrete, particularized
injury.
See Morrison v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd Cnty., 521 F.3d
602, 608 (6th Cir. 2008) (“To avoid conferring standing by way
of guesswork, we require that a litigant demonstrate either a
concrete harm or the threat of such harm.” (citing Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13 (1972))); $515,060.42 in U.S. Currency,
152 F.3d at 498.
C3T therefore lacks standing to assert a claim
12
to the seized property, and the Motion to Strike its Claim and
Answer is GRANTED.
C.
Compliance with Supplemental Rule G(6)
Alternatively, the Government asserts that C3T’s Claim and
Answer should be stricken because C3T failed to comply with
Supplemental Rule G(6).
Specifically, the Government argues
that C3T improperly objected to and failed to answer Special
Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 7, which the Government maintains
were designed to determine “the true identity of the claimant in
this case; in particular, whether it is actually C3T, or whether
VST . . . is actually prosecuting the claim on its behalf.”
(ECF No. 31 at 8-9.)
Additionally, the Government argues that
C3T improperly objected to and failed to answer Special
Interrogatory No. 3, which it asserts was designed to discover
the identity of the claimant.
(Id. at 10.)
Finally, the
Government argues that C3T improperly objected to and failed to
answer Special Interrogatory No. 6, which the Government asserts
“seeks details about the purchase-and-sale agreement between the
claimant and London Network Systems for the defendant property”
and “goes to the heart of the issue of whether the relationship
between the claimant and the defendant property is such that the
claimant has Article III standing to pursue its claim.”
11.)
13
(Id. at
C3T argues that it has provided sufficient information
under Supplemental Rule G(6), including “its articles of
incorporation, purchase orders for the defendant property, and
the invoice pertaining to the commercial transaction.”
(ECF No.
32 at PageID 250.)
1.
Special Interrogatories Nos. 2 and 7
In Special Interrogatory No. 2, the Government asked C3T
to:
Identify the individual verifying the claim of
Core 3 Technologies on behalf of claimant, including
name, address, occupation and title(s), and describe
in detail the nature and extent of that individual’s
current and any former relationship to claimant, as
well as his current and any former relationship to
Verification Systems Technology (VNS) and London
Network Systems, Ltd. (LNS).
Please identify each
witness (by name, address and telephone number) and
each document (and the name, address and telephone
number of the custodian of the document) that supports
your answer.
(ECF No. 18 at PageID 125.)
In Special Interrogatory No. 7, the Government asked C3T
to:
State the relationship, if any, between claimant
and Verification Systems Technology (“VST”), including
whether they affiliated in any way, whether VST has
ever acknowledged any liability to claimant, to LNS,
or to any other party in connection with the seizure
of the defendant property, whether VST has ever
reimbursed claimant, LNS, or any other party, either
in whole or in part, based on the seizure of the
defendant property, and whether VST is prosecuting the
instant claim on claimant’s behalf, or on behalf of
any other party, under a subrogation agreement or any
other legal contract.
Please identify each witness
14
(by name, address and telephone number) and each
document (and the name, address and telephone number
of the custodian of the document) that supports your
answer.
(Id. at PageID 129.)
C3T objected to both Special Interrogatory
Nos. 2 and 7 in their entirety, as “having nothing to do with
either the identity of this claimant or its relationship to the
defendant property.”
(Id. at PageID 129; id. at PageID 125-26.)
C3T is correct that these special interrogatories are
beyond the scope of Supplemental Rule G(6).
These
interrogatories seek more information about the relationship
between C3T and VST.
Despite the Government’s contention that
it is concerned that VST is prosecuting the claim on C3T’s
behalf, these questions are not limited to C3T’s identity and
its relationship with the defendant property.
For purposes of
determining standing, C3T’s relationship with VST is irrelevant.
If C3T satisfied the constitutional and statutory standing
requirements, 3 it would be permitted to prosecute its claim for
the defendant property, regardless of its motivation in doing so
or its relationship with another corporate entity.
Because
Special Interrogatories No. 2 and 7 were beyond the scope of
Supplemental Rule G(6), C3T is not subject to sanctions for
failing to respond.
3
As discussed above, however, C3T does not satisfy the constitutional
standing requirements. See supra Part III.B.
15
2.
Special Interrogatory No. 3
In Special Interrogatory No. 3, the Government asked C3T to
“[s]tate the names and addresses of all officers, members,
agents, authorized representatives and employees of Core 3
Technologies (“C3T”) during the last five (5) years, and
indicate the position each such individual held.”
at PageID 126.)
(ECF No. 18
The Government asserts that “the identities of
[C3T’s] principals go to the very core of its corporate
identity.”
(ECF No. 31 at 10.)
C3T objected to this special
interrogatory in its entirety as being beyond the scope of
Supplemental Rule G(6).
(ECF No. 18 at PageID 126.)
To some extent, the Government is correct that because C3T
is a limited liability company, the identities of its members
and officers are relevant to its corporate identity.
The
special interrogatory is overly broad, however, as to its
request that C3T identify all individuals who were agents,
authorized representatives, or employees of the company during
the last five years.
For this reason, striking C3T’s Claim and
Answer would be an extreme remedy for its failure to answer this
special interrogatory.
Because the Court has found that C3T
lacks standing, and therefore strikes C3T’s Claim and Answer, it
declines to determine what would be the appropriate remedy.
16
3.
Special Interrogatory No. 6
In Special Interrogatory No. 6, the Government asked C3T
to:
State, in detail, the purchase arrangement for
the defendant property between the claimant and London
Network Systems, LTD. (“LNS”), including the purchase
price, the date of any purchase/sale agreement, the
payment terms, whether and when claimant has ever
tendered payment to LNS, in whole or in part, in
exchange for the defendant property, and if so,
whether LNS has ever refunded that payment to
claimant, in whole or in part, based on the seizure of
the defendant property or for any other reason.
Please identify each witness (by name, address and
telephone number) and each document (and the name,
address and telephone number of the custodian of the
document) that supports your answer.
(ECF No. 18 at PageID 128.)
In response, C3T referred to its
answer to Special Interrogatory No. 4 and the attached exhibits,
but objected to Special Interrogatory No. 6 “[b]eyond this.”
(Id. at PageID 129.)
Between its answer to Special Interrogatory No. 4 and the
attached exhibits, C3T largely answered Special Interrogatory
No. 6.
Specifically, C3T provided the original and revised
purchase agreements for the defendant property, which reflect
that the purchase price was to be $122.00 per unit for 650
units, totaling $79,300.00.
(See ECF No. 18-3 at PageID 145.)
Additionally, C3T specifically stated in its answer to Special
Interrogatory No. 4 that it paid only for the units that it
17
received, which is supported by the attached Exhibits E and F.
(See ECF No. 18 at PageID 127; ECF Nos. 18-5, 18-6.)
Although C3T did not state whether London Network Systems
ever refunded a portion of this payment, such request is outside
the scope of Supplemental Rule G(6) in this specific instance.
Because C3T did not pay for the defendant property, any refund
that London Network Systems provided to C3T would have related
to the received units, rather than the defendant property.
Accordingly, the request for information regarding a refund did
not concern C3T’s relationship with the defendant property.
Additionally, C3T did not explicitly provide identifying
information about witnesses or custodians of the attached
documents in response to this special interrogatory.
C3T did,
however, provide a list of names and addresses of “all persons
known or believed . . . to have knowledge or information
pertaining to [C3T’s] ownership of the defendant units of
hardware” in response to Special Interrogatory No. 8.
This
response sufficed to answer Special Interrogatory No. 6, to the
extent said interrogatory requested identifying information
about witnesses or document custodians.
Accordingly, C3T adequately answered Special Interrogatory
No. 6, and the Government is not entitled to strike C3T’s Claim
or Answer on the basis of noncompliance with Supplemental Rule
G(6).
18
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Government’s Motion to Strike Claim and Answer is
GRANTED based only on C3T’s lack of standing.
C3T’s Verified
Claim (ECF No. 14) and Answer (ECF No. 24) are hereby stricken
from the record.
Because C3T lacked standing to bring a Motion
to Dismiss or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, these
motions are DENIED for lack of standing.
See supra Part III.A
(vacating the Court’s earlier orders denying said motions to
comply with Supplemental Rule G’s requirement to determine
standing before a claimant’s motion to dismiss).
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 16th day of March, 2016.
/s/ Jon P. McCalla
JON P. McCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
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