Henry v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority et al
Filing
22
ORDER denying 15 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 11/17/15. (Anderson, S.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DONYAEL HENRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY
AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
MEMPHIS INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT,
and LT. KENDRICK JONES,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No.: 2:15-cv-02641-STA-tmp
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND
Before the Court is Plaintiff Donyael Henry’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 15) filed on
October 26, 2015. Defendants Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority, Memphis
International Airport Police Department, and Lt. Kendrick Jones have response in opposition.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against Defendants in the
Circuit Court for Shelby County, Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis.
Plaintiff alleged for jurisdictional purposes that he was a resident of Mississippi and that
Defendants were residents of Tennessee.
The Complaint asserted causes of action under
Tennessee law for false imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and the
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff demanded an award of
damages in the amount of $250,000.00. Defendants were served with the initial complaint, and
1
on April 10, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint or in the alternative
a motion for summary judgment. Among other things, Defendants argued that they were cloaked
with immunity from Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability
Act (“TGTLA”). Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendants’ motion and also filed an
Amended Complaint, both on August 27, 2015. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added
allegations that if the state court deemed the Airport Authority a state actor, Plaintiff alleged the
violation of his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants filed their
Notice of Removal as to the Amended Complaint on September 28, 2015.
In his Motion to Remand, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have improperly removed his
Amended Complaint. According to Plaintiff, Defendants had 30 days from the filing of his
initial pleading in which to remove the action. The initial pleading alleged that the citizenship of
the parties was diverse and that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
Instead of
removing the action, Defendants chose to file a dispositive motion, thereby acquiescing to the
jurisdiction of the Shelby County Circuit Court. Defendants simply waited too late to remove
the action by waiting until Plaintiff had filed his Amended Complaint more than seven months
after Plaintiff had initiated his suit. Therefore, the Court should remand the case to state court
and award Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees.
In their opposition to the Motion to Remand, Defendants argue that removal was
procedurally proper. Defendants could not have removed the initial complaint. Plaintiff’s
opening pleading did not allege any claim presenting a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Although the allegations of the initial complaint satisfied the requirements for jurisdiction based
on the amount in controversy and diversity of citizenship requirements under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)(2) does not permit removal of an action where “any of the parties
2
in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action
is brought.” For these reasons the initial complaint was not removable. Furthermore, the
Amended Complaint, which alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, presented a federal question on its face. Defendants properly
removed the Amended Complaint within 30 days of being served with the new pleading.
Therefore, removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3), and the Motion to Remand should
be denied.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When a plaintiff files a case in state court that could have been brought in a federal
district court, a defendant may invoke the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, to secure a federal
forum.”1 “Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be
removed to federal court by the defendant.”2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal question
jurisdiction exists over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.3 The removal statute, found at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), provides that “[a]ny civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising
under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to
the citizenship or residence of the parties.”4
Any civil action presenting a claim for the
1
Jarrett-Cooper v. United Airlines, Inc., 586 F. App’x 214, 215 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 83 (2005)).
2
Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
3
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
4
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
3
deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 presents a federal question.5 In the final
analysis, it is the removing party’s burden to establish the existence of federal jurisdiction.6
ANALYSIS
The issue presented is whether Defendants properly removed Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint in September 2015 and can therefore establish the existence of federal jurisdiction.
The Court holds that removal of the Amended Complaint was procedurally proper. Title 28
U.S.C. § 1446 sets forth the procedure for removal and states at § 1446(b)(1) that a defendant
must file a notice of removal “within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such
action or proceeding is based . . . .”7 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is premised on the contention
that Defendants filed their Notice of Removal outside of the 30-day time limit in § 1446(b)(1). It
is true that Plaintiff filed his initial complaint more than 30 days before Defendant’s filed their
Notice of Removal. It is also true that Plaintiff’s initial complaint appears to have alleged
diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000.00. However, as
Defendants correctly note, the initial complaint was not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2),
which provides that “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of [diversity
jurisdiction] may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the States in which such action is brought.” 8 The Court concludes then
5
Bartholomew v. Blevins, 679 F.3d 497, 499 (6th Cir. 2012).
6
Nowicki-Hockey v. Bank of Am., N.A., 593 F. App’x 420, 421 (6th Cir. 2014).
7
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).
8
§ 1441(b)(2); Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 507 F.3d 910, 914 (6th Cir.
2007) (“As a preliminary matter, the [defendants] were citizens of Ohio and thus barred from
invoking removal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity.”).
4
that Plaintiff’s initial complaint was not removable. Therefore, Defendants’ Notice of Removal
did not run afoul of § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day time limit for removal.
What is more, Defendants’ Notice of Removal as to the Amended Complaint was
procedurally proper. Under § 1446(b)(3), “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not
removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.”9
Here Plaintiff filed both his Amended Complaint and his response in opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss on August 27, 2015. In those filings, Plaintiff asserted for the first time his
claim that Defendants’ conduct also violated his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As such, it was proper for Defendants to remove the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(3).
On November 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a reply brief (ECF No.
21). Although the motion did not include a copy of the proposed reply, Plaintiff states that he
would argue in reply that the Airport Authority is not entitled to immunity under the TGTLA and
that the question of the Airport Authority’s immunity is better left to the Tennessee state court.
The Court notes Plaintiff’s motion for the record but finds that nothing in Plaintiff’s
memorandum would alter the Court’s conclusions about the propriety of Defendants’ removal of
the action.
At best, Plaintiff seems to argue that the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the TGTLA claim. However, Plaintiff has not squarely presented
that issue in his opening brief, and Defendants have not raised it in their response in opposition.
Therefore, the Court need not decide whether the Airport Authority is entitled to immunity under
9
§ 1446(b)(3).
5
the TGTLA in order to decide the Motion to Remand. For the reasons already explained,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states on its face a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and therefore
presents a federal question over which this Court has original jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ removal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was procedurally correct.
Plaintiffs’ initial complaint against Defendants was not removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, however, alleged a claim over which this Court has original
jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: November 17, 2015.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?