Henry v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority et al
Filing
46
ORDER granting 32 Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint; denying as moot [27,38] Motions to Dismiss First Amended Complaint; and Order Declining to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction and Remanding Case to State Court. Signed by Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 3/28/16. (Anderson, S.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
DONYAEL HENRY,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
No. 15-2641-STA-tmp
)
MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY AIRPORT
)
AUTHORITY, MEMPHIS INTERNATIONAL )
AIRPORT POLICE DEPARTMENT,
)
and LT. KENDRICK JONES,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED
COMPLAINT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AS MOOT
ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND
REMANDING CASE TO STATE COURT
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Plaintiff Donyael Henry’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
(ECF No. 32) filed on January 21, 2016. Defendants Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
and Memphis International Airport Police Department (“the airport Defendants”) and Defendant
Lt. Kendrick Jones have filed separate responses in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF Nos.
34, 36). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED.
The filing of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint renders Defendants’ separate Motions to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27, 38) moot. As a result, the Motions to
Dismiss are DENIED. Based on Plaintiff’s amendment to drop his claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims under
Tennessee law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Therefore, the Court hereby remands this matter
to state court.
1
BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against Defendants in the
Circuit Court for Shelby County, Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis. The
Complaint asserted causes of action under Tennessee law for false imprisonment, abuse of
process, malicious prosecution, and the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff demanded an award of damages in the amount of $250,000.00.
Plaintiff’s opening
pleadings alleged for jurisdictional purposes that he was a resident of Mississippi and that
Defendants were residents of Tennessee. Defendants were served with the initial complaint and
on April 10, 2015, filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative
a motion for summary judgment. Among other things, Defendants argued that they were cloaked
with immunity from Plaintiff’s claims sounding in tort pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental
Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”).
Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss TGTLA immunity
arguments by filing his First Amended Complaint on August 27, 2015.
Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint added alternative claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the First
Amended Complaint alleged that if Defendants were deemed state actors for purposes of the
TGTLA, then Defendants had acted under color of law to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Based on Plaintiff’s new claims for relief under federal
law, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal on September 28, 2015. Upon removal, Plaintiff
requested a remand of the case for Defendants’ failure to follow the procedural requirements of
the removal statute.
The Court disagreed holding that Plaintiff’s initial pleading was not
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) and that Defendants’ removal of the First Amended
Complaint was timely.
2
On December 28, 2015, the airport Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
the First Amended Complaint, including Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
Plaintiff responded in
opposition to Defendants’ Motion and renewed his motion to remand the case to state court. In
conjunction with his opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave
to Amend his Complaint and proposed what would be his Second Amended Complaint.1
Plaintiff’s proposed amended pleading would eliminate his § 1983 claims and leave only his tort
claims under Tennessee law. Plaintiff argues that the Court should freely grant leave to amend,
permit him to “non-suit or dismiss” his § 1983 claims, and then remand the original state law tort
claims to state court.2
Defendants have responded in partial opposition to the Motion for Leave to Amend.
Neither the airport Defendants nor Lt. Jones opposes the filing of an amended complaint. All
Defendants, however, request that the Court grant the motion to amend with prejudice as to the §
1983 claims so as to preclude Plaintiff from refiling the § 1983 claims at a later time.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff amended his complaint once already to add the § 1983 claims and
that allowing him to amend again and drop the § 1983 claims is simply Plaintiff’s attempt to get
his case back to state court. The dismissal of the § 1983 claims without prejudice leaves open
the possibility that Plaintiff will reassert the claims, perhaps resulting in the removal of his suit to
federal court for a second time. Defendants argue that as a matter of fairness and judicial
economy, the Court should only permit Plaintiff to dismiss his § 1983 claims with prejudice.
1
On January 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the scheduling order deadline for
amending the pleadings, in part because Plaintiff wanted additional time to evaluate the airport
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and extended the
deadline for amending the pleadings to January 21, 2016.
2
Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n & Renewed Mot. to Remand 5, ECF No. 35.
3
The airport Defendants add that the Court should dismiss the § 1983 claim against them
for the reasons stated in their Motion to Dismiss. On February 12, 2016, Defendant Jones filed
his own Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint, seeking qualified immunity as to the §
1983 claim against him.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion for Leave to Amend
The threshold issue presented is whether Plaintiff should be allowed to file a Second
Amended Complaint, removing his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but without
prejudice to refile the claims at a later time. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides
that a party may amend his pleadings only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave and “that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.”3
In the absence of any apparent or declared reason such as undue delay, bad faith
or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc. the leave
sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”4
While Defendants argue that the Motion to Amend is in its essence a motion for voluntary
dismissal under Rule 41(a), Rule 15(a) provides “the preferred method” for a plaintiff who seeks
to abandon fewer than all of his claims against a defendant.5
Under Rule 15(a)’s liberal standard for amending the pleadings, the Court finds good
cause to grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend and permit him to abandon his claims for
3
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
4
Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
5
Baker v. City of Detroit, 217 F. App’x 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Mgmt.
Investors v. United Mine Workers of Am., 610 F.2d 384, 394-95 (6th Cir. 1979)); Raeth v. Nat'l
City Bank, 755 F. Supp. 2d 899, 901 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2362 (3d ed. 2008)).
4
relief under § 1983. Plaintiff’s proposed amendment will streamline the ultimate issues for trial,
simplify the scope of discovery, and essentially return the case to its original posture, a case
about common law torts under Tennessee law and Defendants’ possible immunity under the
TGTLA. While all of Plaintiffs’ claims share a common nucleus of facts, the elements of
Plaintiff’s tort claims have little in common with the elements of his § 1983 claims.
Furthermore, the § 1983 claims against the airport Defendants have distinct elements and are
governed by wholly separate legal standards from the § 1983 claims against Lt. Jones. Should
Plaintiff be denied leave to amend, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims will remain, Defendants will incur
the expense of defending against the claims, and the Court will ultimately have to decide the
claims on the merits. Plaintiff’s decision to drop the § 1983 claims at this juncture, early enough
in the discovery phase and before the Court has decided the Motions to Dismiss, will clearly
conserve the resources of the Court and the parties. All of these considerations suggest that the
Court should freely grant Plaintiff leave to amend. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend is GRANTED.
Defendants argue that the elimination of the § 1983 claims without prejudice to
Plaintiff’s right to re-file the claims at a later time poses a risk of prejudice to Defendants and
suggests a possibility of forum shopping. According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s decision to
amend his pleadings yet again is a tactic to get his case back to the Shelby County Circuit Court.6
Just as Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint led to the removal of his claims to federal court, his
Second Amended Complaint will result in the remand of his claims to state court. Be that as it
may, the Court finds nothing inherently improper about Plaintiff’s attempt to get his claims back
6
Plaintiff has gone further and requested that if the Court denies his renewed motion to
remand, the Court certify the question of Defendants’ immunity under the TGTLA to the
Tennessee Supreme Court. The Court finds it unnecessary to consider this request for relief.
5
before the courts of the state of Tennessee. “It is well established that the plaintiff is master of
his complaint and can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction . . . subject to a good faith requirement .
. . .”7 And the Court finds no evidence of bad faith in this instance. Plaintiff raised § 1983 in his
First Amended Complaint as an alternative theory of relief and in response to Defendants’
argument that as state actors they were entitled to immunity from Plaintiff’s tort claims under the
TGTLA. Under all of the circumstances, the Court finds no grounds to support Defendants’
request that the Court grant Plaintiff leave to amend but with prejudice as to the § 1983 claims.
II. Motions to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint
It is well-settled that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and
renders the initial pleading a nullity.8 Courts in this Circuit routinely deny as moot motions to
dismiss a pleading after a plaintiff subsequently files an amended pleading.9
In this case
Defendants’ separate Motions to Dismiss are directed at Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. In
light of the fact that Plaintiff is being granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, the
First Amended Complaint is, strictly speaking, a nullity. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss the First Amended Complaint are DENIED as moot.
III. Remand
Having granted Plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings and drop his § 1983 claims, only
Plaintiff’s claims for false imprisonment, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and the
7
Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
punctuation omitted).
8
Heyward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 617 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted).
9
E.g., Pinks v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., 83 F. App’x 90 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Nat’l
Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Stutte, 298 F.R.D. 376, 380 (E.D. Tenn. 2014); Okolo v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 948 (M.D. Tenn. 2012); Ellis v. Kaye-Kibbey, 581 F. Supp. 2d
861 (W.D. Mich. 2008).
6
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law remain. The final
issue presented for the Court then is whether the Court should continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims or remand them to state court. For the reasons that follow, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims.
As an initial matter, the Court has jurisdiction over these claims only by virtue of 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), which grants district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”10 Plaintiff’s
Tennessee tort claims only came before this Court once Defendants removed Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint with Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Defendants’ Notice of Removal stated that
Defendants removed the action from state court on the basis of the § 1983 claims, a cause of
action arising under the laws of the United States and providing this Court with federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.11 Defendants’ Notice of Removal did not specifically refer
to § 1367(a) as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over the state law claims.
But the
supplemental jurisdiction statute at § 1367(a) provided the exclusive means for Defendants to
bring Plaintiff’s Tennessee tort claims before this Court. Plaintiff’s original complaint stating
the Tennessee tort claims was not removable to federal court, even though the complaint alleged
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000 and district courts have original jurisdiction over such civil actions pursuant to 28
10
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
11
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (“Any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.”).
7
U.S.C. § 1332(a).12 As more fully explained in the Court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion to
remand, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) barred the removal of Plaintiff’s original complaint and its
Tennessee tort claims because Plaintiff initially filed the action in Tennessee and Defendants are
citizens of Tennessee.13 In sum, the entire record of the case confirms that Plaintiffs’ Tennessee
tort claims are before this Court pursuant only to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Having established that the Court obtained jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Tennessee tort
claims by virtue of § 1367(a), the Court must next determine whether it should continue to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims. “With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in
particular, a federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it
may (or may not) choose to exercise.”14 “[I]f there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the
default assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related
claims.”15 Still, district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a related
claim if any of the following apply:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction,
12
§ 1332(a) (vesting district courts with original jurisdiction over all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds § $75,000 and is between citizens of different states).
13
§ 1441(b)(2) (prohibiting the removal of an action based on diversity jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) where any defendant “is a citizen of the State in which such action is
brought”). Defendants’ opposition to the motion to remand not only emphasized that Defendants
removed the case because of the First Amended Complaint’s § 1983 claims but denied that they
could have removed the Tennessee tort claims sooner based on the apparent diversity of
citizenship and the amount in controversy. Defs.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Remand 4 (ECF
No. 18). The Court agreed in denying Plaintiff’s motion to remand the case for failure to comply
with the procedural requirements of the removal statute.
14
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).
15
Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2012)
(Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 1998)).
8
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.16
Even when one of these statutory conditions applies, the district court may nevertheless exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “if recommended by a careful consideration of
factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”17 The district court enjoys
“broad discretion” in this regard.18
Because Plaintiff has been granted leave to file his Second Amended Complaint and
eliminate his § 1983 claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining claims under Tennessee law. The claim that provided grounds for the
removal of this action from state court, Plaintiff’s civil rights claim under § 1983, no longer
remains as an issue between the parties and therefore is no longer before the Court. And the fact
that Plaintiff only asserts Tennessee tort claims and Defendants have asserted the TGTLA as a
defense to the claims also suggests that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit has concluded that “the Tennessee legislature expressed a clear
preference that TGTLA claims be handled by its own state courts” and “[t]his unequivocal
preference of the Tennessee legislature is an exceptional circumstance for declining jurisdiction”
under § 1367(c)(4).19 Therefore, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and the Second Amended Complaint
is remanded to state court.
16
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
17
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
18
Phaneuf v. Collins, 509 F. App’x 427, 434 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Musson Theatrical,
Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996)).
19
Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000).
9
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend his pleadings and file a Second Amended
Complaint is GRANTED.
The filing of Plaintiff’s amended pleadings renders Defendants’
separate Motions to Dismiss to the First Amended Complaint moot. Therefore, the Motions to
Dismiss are DENIED. Having disposed of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining tort claims under Tennessee law.
The Second Amended Complaint is hereby remanded to the Circuit Court for Shelby County,
Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis, for all further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: March 28, 2016.
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?