Batts v. Huff et al

Filing 7

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DENYING 5 MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL, DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/17/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_____________________________________________________________________________
BENJAMIN BATTS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICER HUFF, et.al.,

Defendants.

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No. 2:15-cv-2785-JDT-tmp

ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL,
DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On December 4, 2015, Plaintiff Benjamin Batts (“Batts”), who is confined as an inmate
of the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion asking leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). In an order issued December 7, 2015, the Court granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the
defendants as Officer First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Huff, Deputy Anthony White, Lieutenant
(“Lt.”) FNU Moor, Sergeant (“Sgt.”) T. Simmons, K-9 Officer FNU Crook, City of Memphis,1
and Shelby County.2

1

The Court construes allegations against the K-9 Unit K31 and the Memphis Police
Department as allegations against the City of Memphis. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove the
aforementioned parties and add the City of Memphis.
2
The Court construes allegations against the Shelby County Sheriff’s Department as
allegations against Shelby County. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove Shelby County Sheriff’s
Department as a Defendant and add Shelby County.

I. THE COMPLAINT
Batts alleges that on April 7, 2015, he was assaulted and attacked by an “‘unwarranted’
police canine.” (Affidavit of Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-2.) Batts was involved in a high-speed
chase with various law enforcement agencies in Shelby County, Tennessee, which ended when
the vehicle he was driving ran out of gas and coasted to a stop at the Summer and I-240 exit on
White Station.

(Id.)

When the vehicle came to a stop, various law enforcement officers

swarmed the vehicle. (Id.) While several of the officers were shouting out surrender commands,
a few officers, with side-arms drawn, removed the passengers out of the vehicle and forced them
to the ground. (Id.) Simultaneously, the “Law Enforcement Team” demanded that Batts get out
of the vehicle; however, Batts was “stuck behind the seatbelt behind the steering wheel of the
vehicle.” (Id.) Batts raised his arms into a surrender position, but did not unlock his seatbelt
because, “[he] knew from recent media coverage that any sudden movements could cost [him]
his life.” (Id.) Batts yelled, “’I have my seat belt on. I have my seat belt on.’”
A member of the law enforcement team opened the driver side door “exposing” Batts to
lights, guns, and a “huge” canine. (Id.) Even though his seat belt was still on, the dog was
allowed to attack him. (Id.) The dog was biting into Batts’s bicep and tricep when one of the
officers released the seat belt. (Id. at 2,) With the law enforcement team shouting for Batts to
get out of the car, Batts turned to his left resulting in the dog changing positions and biting Batts
on his leg. (Id.) An officer removed Batts from the vehicle while holding the dog; however, the
dog began to gnaw on Batts’s calf and inside thigh. (Id.) Batts was “tossed” to the ground while
the dog continued to bite and crawl on him. (Id.)

Plaintiff has also named the police dog, K-9 Dog Cesar, as a defendant; however, a dog is
not a suable entity and is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to remove K-9 Dog Cesar as a defendant.

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Batts was put into the police car, allegedly bleeding and in excruciating pain; however,
his requests for medical attention were ignored for two and half hours. (Id.) Batts was then
transferred to the Trauma Center where he had emergency surgery on his left arm. (Id.) Batts
was in the hospital for two days. (Id.) Batts alleges the injuries caused permanent nerve damage
in his left arm and hand. (Id.)
Batts seeks monetary compensation for violation of his constitutional rights, for pain and
suffering, for disfigurement and nerve damage in left arm, shoulder, and hand, and for mental
anguish and disorder. (Relief Sought at 1, ECF No. 1-1.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

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conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still
requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some
factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement
of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the
claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges
not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge
must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge
does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in
prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

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518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Batts filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).

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1.

Twombly Standard

The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendants Huff, White, Moore,
Simmons, or Crook. When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily
fails to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
2.

Municipality Claims

Plaintiff has sued the City of Memphis and Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made
against a municipality, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm
was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for
that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second
issue is dispositive of plaintiff’s claim against City of Memphis and Shelby County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy
v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345
(6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless
there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889
(6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a
government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330

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F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving
force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body
under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation
omitted)).

“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal
liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986)) (emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the
municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, No.
3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Yeackering v. Ankrom,
No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2005); Oliver v. City of
Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v.
Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15,
2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom
or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No. 06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v. City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL
1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an
official policy or custom which caused injury to plaintiff. Instead, it appears that plaintiff is suing

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City of Memphis and Shelby County because the City of Memphis and Shelby County employed
persons who allegedly violated his rights.
3.

Fourth Amendment Claim for Excessive Force

Batts’s claim for use of excessive force during his arrest is analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Not every use of force will state a
§ 1983 claim. “[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the
right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396 (citation
omitted). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citation
omitted); see also id. at 396-97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”). The “reasonableness” inquiry is an objective one: “the question is
whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations
omitted). The proper application of this standard
requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.
Id. at 396 (citation omitted); see also Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, 471 F.3d 601, 606 (6th
Cir. 2006). “These factors are not an exhaustive list, as the ultimate inquiry is whether the
totality of the circumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure.” Baker, 471 at 606-07 (internal
quotation marks omitted).

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Batts’s makes no claims that any of the individual Defendant’s actions caused the dog to
bite him. Rather, Batts’s statements are generalized allegations against unspecified officers;
therefore, Batts fails to sufficiently state a Fourth Amendment claim.
4.

Eighth Amendment Claim for Medical Indifference

Batts alleges that he was denied medical care for two and a half hours. Although Batts
was a pretrial detainee while he was at the Jail, for both pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners, the Sixth Circuit has analyzed claims for failure to provide adequate medical care
under the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard, even after the decision in
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).3 See Morabito v. Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353,
356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claims and deliberate indifference standard to claim for denial of medical care).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual
punishment. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim
consists of both objective and subjective components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin,
633 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective
component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’. . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not

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In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that excessive force claims brought by pretrial
detainees must be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective
reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of
mind. Id. at 2472-73.

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received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id., at 106.
Within the context of Estelle claims, the objective component requires that the medical
need be sufficiently serious. Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical
need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)).
To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead
facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in
the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue
suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as
the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id.
511 U.S. at 835-36. Plaintiff’s complaint neither provides a request for treatment or a denial for
treatment by a particular defendant.
Batts fails to allege that any specific defendant was indifferent to his medical needs;
therefore, even if Batts states a sufficient objective need, he does not meet the subjective
standard for an Eighth Amendment claim.

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For the foregoing reasons Batts’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C.

Motion to Appoint Counsel
On March 11, 2016, Batts filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 5.)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the “court may request an attorney to represent any such person
unable to employ counsel.” However, “[t]here is no constitutional or . . . statutory right to
counsel in federal civil cases.” Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 323 (7th Cir. 1993), and “§
1915(d) does not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of counsel” to
represent indigent civil litigants, Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989).
Generally, a court will only appoint counsel in exceptional circumstances. Willett v. Wells, 469
F. Supp. 748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). Although “no comprehensive definition of exceptional
circumstances is practical,” Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982), courts resolve
this issue through a fact-specific inquiry. Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.
1986). Examining the pleadings and documents in the file, the Court analyzes the merits of the
claims, the complexity of the case, the pro se litigant’s prior efforts to retain counsel, and his
ability to present the claims. Henry v. City of Detroit Manpower Dep’t, 763 F.2d 757, 760 (6th
Cir. 1985); Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 1985).
As a general rule, counsel should be appointed in civil cases only if a litigant has made “a
threshold showing of some likelihood of merit.” Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 174
(2d Cir. 1989). Because Batts has not met the threshold showing likelihood of success, the
motion is DENIED.
III.

LEAVE TO AMEND

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The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, the court cannot
conclude that any amendment to Batts’s claims would be futile as a matter of law; therefore,
Batts is GRANTED leave to amend his complaint. Any amendment must be filed within thirty
(30) days of the date of entry of this order. Batts is advised that an amended complaint
supersedes the original complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior
pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without

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reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of
the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended
complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint or the first amended
complaint. Batts may add additional defendants provided that the claims against the new parties
arise from the acts and omissions set forth in the original or first amended complaints. Each
claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that
count. If Batts fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess
a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
Batts shall promptly notify the Clerk in writing of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court, may result
in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_s/James D. Todd_____________
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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