Brittain v. Dickerson et al

Filing 8

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING 5 MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/18/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
TITUS BRITTAIN,
Plaintiff,

VS.

STANLEY DICKERSON, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 15-2823-JDT-tmp

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On December 23, 2015, Plaintiff Titus Brittain (“Brittain”), who is currently an inmate at
the Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint concerns Brittain’s prior incarceration at the West Tennessee State
Penitentiary (“WTSP”) in Henning, Tennessee. In an order issued December 28, 2015, the Court
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4) The Clerk shall
record the defendants as Warden Stanley Dickerson; the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC’); and former TDOC Commissioner Derrick Schofield.1

1

The complaint also purports to sue “John and Jane Doe” defendants. However, service
of process cannot be made on an unidentified party. The filing of a complaint against such a
“John or Jane Doe” defendant does not toll the running of the statute of limitation against that

I. THE COMPLAINT
Brittain contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the Defendants’
failure to protect him from an attack by another inmate. He alleges that on April 11, 2015, he
was in the custody of two unidentified officers at the WTSP, being escorted from the showers in
handcuffs during a lockdown, when another inmate ran up and stabbed him in the head. (ECF
No. 1 at 5, 7.) Brittain alleges that both officers ran, leaving him alone while the inmate stabbed
him. (Id.) In a grievance he filed concerning the incident, Brittain questioned how the inmate
could have gotten out of his cell when they were supposed to be on lockdown. (ECF No. 1-1 at
4.) Brittain stated in the grievance that he never had a problem with the inmate who assaulted
him and did not even know him. (Id.)
The complaint further alleges that TDOC failed to properly train the officers regarding
the protocol for escorting a prisoner through the facility during hostile conditions, apparently
referring to the lockdown. (ECF No. 1 at 7.)2
While Brittain also complains of a lack of medical care, he does not appear to allege that
he was deprived of medical care in the immediate aftermath of the asault. Instead, Brittain
alleges that his requests to be “checked for later arising injuries regarding the stabbings to his
head” have been refused. (Id.) He states he complained about his head hurting behind his ear,
but the WTSP medical staff advised him there did not appear to be any serious damage and that

party. See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996); Bufalino v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968). The Clerk is directed to terminate the reference to the John
and Jane Doe defendants on the docket.
2

Brittain also states, “the failure to train claims upon TDOC is broad enough to address
to address [sic] under American with Disability Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101 et seq., where
the Defendants acted in their[.]” (Id.) The sentence is not finished, and there is no further
reference to the ADA in the complaint. The Court declines to construe this incomplete thought
as an ADA claim, as it is impossible to discern the nature of any claim Brittain might be
attempting to assert.
2

he did not need further medical treatment.

(Id. at 13.)

However, Brittain has repeatedly

requested an MRI to “discover whether or not, a potential blood cots [sic] nerve damages exist
which may arise at a later date in time.” (Id. at 7.) In fact, Brittain wants a full-body MRI in
order to allay his fears. (Id. at 11.) However, the requests for an MRI and to see a neurologist
for medical care and treatment for this “potential danger of existing nerve damages” were
denied. (Id. at 7-8.) Brittain states that he is “heavily burdened” by the mental suffering and
stress caused by the potential danger of an unknown condition “which may result in his demise at
any later date.” (Id. at 7.)
Brittain also alleges that Defendants’ actions deprived him of his right to equal protection
of the law. (Id. at 14.) He seeks $1 million in nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages
against defendants as well as injunctions ordering the defendants to protect him from “personal
denials and deprivation.” (Id. at 19.)
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

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544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383

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(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Brittain filed his complaint pursuant to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983

provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
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in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Although Brittain alleges that he has been discriminated against, he does not have a
viable equal protection claim. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Most Equal Protection claims “allege that a state actor intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class.” Henry v. Metro.
Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.3 That Plaintiff may
have been treated differently than other prisoners is insufficient to state a claim because prisoners
are not a protected class for equal protection purposes. See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d
571, 576 (6th Cir. 2005); Berry v. Traughber, 48 F. App’x 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2002); Garrison v.
Walters, No. 00-1662, 2001 WL 1006271, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2001); Heddleston v. Mack,
No. 00-1310, 2000 WL 1800576, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (“prisoners incarcerated at the
same institution as Heddleston who wished to mail items weighing more than one pound on
January 9, 1999, do not constitute a protected class”); Aldred v. Marshcke, No. 98-2169, 1999
3

Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege that the challenged action unduly burdens the
exercise of a fundamental right. This case does not involve the exercise of a fundamental right.
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WL 1336105, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir.
1999); Preston v. Hughes, No. 97-6507, 1999 WL 107970, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999); Wilson
v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998) (“neither indigents nor prisoners are a suspect
class”); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997).
This also is not an appropriate case for a “class of one” Equal Protection claim:
The purpose of [the Equal Protection Clause] is to secure every person within the
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents. . . . Equal protection challenges are “typically . . .
concerned with governmental classifications that affect some groups of citizens
differently than others.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601, 128
S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that a “class-of-one” may
bring an equal protection claim where the plaintiff alleges that: (1) he or “she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated”; and (2)
“there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000).
United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 657, 650-51 (6th Cir. 2011) (additional internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see also Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir.
2012) (distinguishing “class of one” claims from other equal protection claims evaluated under
the rational basis standard).
The complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that Brittain was arbitrarily treated
differently than similarly situated prisoners at the jail or that he has a valid claim for a “class of
one.”
The claims against the Defendants in their official capacities are treated as claims against
their employer, TDOC, a state agency. Claims against TDOC are, in effect, claims against the
State of Tennessee. However, Plaintiff cannot sue the State of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
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commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment
has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal court. Welch v. Tex.
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Mo.
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); see also Va. Office for Protection &
Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A State may waive its sovereign immunity
at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation.
But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit
against a State.” (citations omitted)). By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment bars all suits,
regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100-01. Tennessee has not waived its
sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S.
613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendants Dickerson and
Schofield. When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Furthermore, Defendants Dickerson and Schofield cannot be held liable merely because
of their positions as Warden and TDOC Commissioner, respectively. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Thus, “a plaintiff must plead that each

8

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own official actions, violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific instance of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly
authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of
the offending subordinates.
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421 (citation omitted).

A supervisory official who is aware of the

unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates, but fails to act, generally cannot be held
liable in his or her individual capacity. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008);
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir.
1996). The complaint contains no allegations demonstrating that Defendants Dickerson or
Schofield, through their own actions, violated Brittain’s constitutional rights.
Brittain’s claim that WTSP officers failed to protect him from the attack by another
inmate is not asserted against any identified individual. Such a claim arises under the Eighth
Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294 (1991). An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective
components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8
(1992); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 633 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d
474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the deprivation be
“sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he
“is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has been

9

deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d
513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). “The Supreme Court has held that ‘prison officials have a duty . . . to
protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757,
766 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297,
302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. at 32; Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222
(6th Cir. 1997); Street, 102 F.3d at 814; Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir.
1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach
comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be
something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might
well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when
it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction
of punishment.

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Id. at 837-38 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights,
407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of an obvious risk of
which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant individually.
Bishop, 636 F.3d at 767; see also id. at 768 (“[W]e must focus on whether each individual
Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit a finding of subjective knowledge.”).
The factual allegations in the complaint suggest the other inmate assaulted Brittain
suddenly and without provocation, and Brittain states that he had no previous issues with the
inmate. Brittain does not allege the unnamed officers knew there was a substantial risk that the
other inmate would attack Brittain, yet deliberately disregarded that risk. Allegations that the
officers may have failed to follow the procedure for escorting inmates during a lockdown are
insufficient to establish such knowledge.
The Eighth Amendment also applies to Brittain’s claims regarding his medical care.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’. . . proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received
adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference
that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at
106.
Within the context of Estelle claims, the objective component requires that the medical
need be sufficiently serious. Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical

11

need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)).
To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment Estelle violation, a prisoner must plead
facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in
the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue
suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th
Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in Farmer v. Brennan, as
the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. Id.
511 U.S. at 835-36.
Brittain’s claims about a lack of medical care also are not asserted against any identified
individuals. He does not allege that either Dickerson or Schofield had anything to do with his
medical care, and he has sued no medical personnel. Thus, Brittain has not sufficiently stated a
claim that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Even if Brittain’s medical claims were asserted against a named defendant, he has failed
to state a claim. His extensive allegations are all focused on the fact that he was not provided
with an MRI and treatment by a neurologist to determine whether there are any latent effects
from the assault that could arise at a later date and threaten his life or health. Specifically,
Brittain fears he will develop a blood clot in his brain (ECF No. 1 at 7-8) or “serious potential
brain nerve ending damages” (id. at 11). However, while he states that he told the WTSP
“medical staff” that his head hurt behind his ear, Brittain also states that he was examined at that
time and told there did not appear to be any serious damage and that he needed no further

12

treatment. (Id. at 13.) Brittain does not allege that he has actually experienced any of the
conditions that he fears could develop. He alleges only that he “has shown potential danger” (id.
at 8, emphasis added), stating that he “suffers mentally as whether deaths/life of a later arising
affect [sic] of a nerve damages in his brain may cots [sic], and or bodily disfunctions as a result
of the head stabbing” (id. at 17). However, Brittain’s speculative fears that latent complications
from the stabbing might arise in the future are insufficient to state a claim for deliberate
indifference to any present serious medical need.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Brittain’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
C.

Motion for Discovery
On January 26, 2016, Brittain filed a Motion to Compel Discovery. (ECF No. 5.)

However, this motion is premature. If the Court ultimately allows this case to go forward and
orders service of process, only then should discovery be conducted in accordance with Rules 26
through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the motion to compel discovery
is DENIED.4
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
4

Brittain has used a form motion with blanks to be filled in, much of which does not
apply in these circumstances. For example, the motion refers to Plaintiff having served a
discovery request, to which the Defendants failed to respond within 30 days. (ECF No. 5 at 4.)
There is no indication that Plaintiff has served any such request, and it would be premature even
if he did so. The motion also refers to Defendants having filed a video with the Court (id. at
4-5), which has not occurred because there has been no service of process.
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form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to Plaintiff’s complaint would be
futile as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to amend
is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days after the date of this order.
Brittain is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and must be
complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any
exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached
to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged
in the original complaint or the first amended complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in

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a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Brittain fails to file an
amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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