Myers v. Aramark Food Services et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING 9 10 MOTIONS TO ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DISMISSING CLAIMS, CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/15/16. (Todd, James)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MARIO MARQUETTE MYERS,
a/k/a MALEIK ALI BEY,
Plaintiff,
VS.
ARAMARK FOOD SERVICES, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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No. 15-2824-JDT-tmp
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO ENTER DEFAULT JUDGMENT,
DISMISSING CLAIMS,
CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE
On December 23, 2015, Plaintiff Mario Marquette Myers, a/k/a Maleik Ali Bey
(“Myers”), who at the time of filing was a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal
Justice Center (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 accompanied with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.)
After
receiving final documentation from Myers (ECF No. 5.), in an order issued January 4, 2016, the
Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk
shall record the defendants as Aramark Food Services and Kitchen Supervisor Ms. Shirley
Hayslett.
I. The Complaint
Myers alleges that on December 9, 2015 while breakfast was being served at the Jail, he
saw dirty trays being used to feed inmates. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1, See also Grievance 402702
at 1, ECF No. 1-1) Myers contends the he noticed his tray had old food from prior meals stuck
to it. (Id.) Myers notified Mr. Thebaud and Ms. Taylor, who are not parties to this complaint,
and they called for another tray; however, that tray was also dirty. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1.)
After being served a third time on a styrofoam tray that was also dirty, Myers notified Mr.
Thebaud and was told to throw the dirty tray in the garbage, but he did not get a new one. (Id.)
Myers alleges that bacteria are on the trays from prior meals and hair particles which caused him
to become sick. (Id.) Myers contends that Defendant Hayslett and Interpol were informed, but
Aramark staff continues to feed him on dirty trays. (Id.)
On December 21, 2015, Myers alleges that he was served a tray with defective ham.
(Grievance No. 401842 at 3, ECF No. 1-1.) After Myers informed Ms. Rice, who is not a party
to this complaint, that his food was bad, he was told that all the trays look the same. (Id.) When
Myers informed her that all the trays did not look the same, she said that she would try to find
him another tray, but could not promise to find him one and that he should just eat what he
received. (Id.)
Myers seeks twenty million dollars and for Aramark to implement a quality control
program. (Id. at 3.)
II. Analysis
A.
Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
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(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
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but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
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responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.
§ 1983 Claim
Myers filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
1.
Claims against Aramark
The complaint does not assert a valid claim against Aramark. “A private corporation that
performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts under color of state law for
purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748, 748 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Street v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Parsons v. Caruso, 491 F.
App’x 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (corporation that provides medical care to prisoners can be sued
under § 1983). The Sixth Circuit has applied the standards for assessing municipal liability to
claims against private corporations that operate prisons or provide medical care to prisoners.
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Thomas, 55 F. App’x at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18; Johnson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 26 F.
App’x 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2001). CCA “cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat
superior.” Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, to
prevail on a § 1983 claim against CCA, Plaintiff “must show that a policy or well-settled custom
of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights. Id. The
complaint does not allege that Myers suffered any injury because of an unconstitutional policy or
custom of Aramark.
2.
Eighth Amendment Claims against Defendant Hayslett
Myers claims that he was served food on dirty trays. For a convicted prisoner, such a
claim arises under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See
generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). For pretrial detainees, “the ‘cruel and unusual
punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,” because
“as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,
106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives protection against
mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if held in state custody. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009); Liscio
v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d Cir.1990). However, even if Myer was a pretrial detainee
during the events at issue, the court will analyze the claims regarding jail conditions under
Eighth Amendment principles because the rights of pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of
convicted prisoners. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985).1
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On June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466
(2015), that excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees must be analyzed under a
Fourteenth Amendment standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that
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An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently
serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has
been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“To succeed in an Eighth Amendment challenge, [a prisoner] must establish that . . . a single,
identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is being denied . . . .”). The Constitution
“does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement
claim.” Id. at 9.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide inmates with a diet that is
nutritionally adequate for the maintenance of normal health. Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d
takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what
extent the holding in Kingsley may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims
concerning an inmate’s health or safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pretrial detainees
and convicted prisoners. See Morabito v. Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015)
(applying, even after the decision in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial
detainee’s excessive force claims and the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard
to denial of medical care claim). Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the
deliberate indifference analysis to claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.
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653, 656 (6th Cir. 1977); see also Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 292 (6th Cir. 2006).
In this case, the complaint alleges that Myers continues to be fed on dirty trays that have bacteria
on them. That deprivation does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Moore v.
Curtis, 68 F. App’x 561, 562 (6th Cir. 2003) (isolated deprivations of food do not violate the
Eighth Amendment); Sims v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 23 F. App’x 214, 216 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The
fact that Sims may have been served one cup of fruit as part of a six-meal-per-day diet does not
establish a deprivation of nutrition necessary to sustain his physical well-being. Furthermore,
Sims did not allege that he was denied sufficient food on a daily basis or that he could not
maintain his health based on the diet provided him even though one of the six meals he received
per day may have consisted of one cup of fruit.”); Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th
Cir. 1982) (inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights were not violated when he was served one meal a
day for 15 consecutive days because that meal was sufficient to maintain normal health).
Further, Myers claims that Defendant Hayslett was “informed” of the Myer’s accusations, but
not that she understood that Myer’s health or safety was in danger.
Therefore, Myer’s
allegations do not satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
For the foregoing reasons, Myers’s complaint is dismissed in its entirety for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C.
Motion for Default Judgment
On February 22, 2016, Myers filed two Motions to Enter Default Judgment. (ECF Nos. 9
& 10.) Those motions are DENIED. The Defendants are not in default because they have not
been served with process. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A and Local Rule 4.1(b)(3), all civil
cases brought by prisoners acting pro se are screened, and no process will be served in the case
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unless the Court orders such service. In this case, all claims are being dismissed sua sponte;
therefore, the motion for default judgment is rendered moot.
III. Standard for Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
IV. Appeal Issues
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by
Plaintiff in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one.
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in
good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It
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would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior
to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis.
See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that
lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an
appeal would not be taken in good faith.
V. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES Myers’s complaint as to the Defendants for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A(b(1). Leave to Amend is DENIED because the deficiencies in Myers’s complaint cannot
be cured. It is also CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this
matter by Plaintiff would not be taken in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Plaintiff
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment
procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets
out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, the
Plaintiff is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying
the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(a)(2)
by filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust
account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
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For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Plaintiff, this is the
first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This “strike” shall
take effect when judgment is entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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