Myers v. Shelby County Jail et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING 8 MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, DISMISSING CLAIMS AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/15/16. (Todd, James)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MARIO MYERS,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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No. 15-2839-JDT-tmp
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DFAULT JUDGMENT,
DISMISSING CLAIMS AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
On December 16, 2015, Plaintiff Mario Myers (“Myers”), who is currently a pre-trial
detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which included fellow inmates Johnny Ray
Rowland, Antwon Rainer, and William Spade as Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1.) On January 7, 2016,
this Court severed the claims of plaintiffs, leaving Myers as the sole Plaintiff in this matter. (ECF
No. 3.) On January 19, 2016, Myers filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 5.)
In an order issued February 2, 2016, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the defendants as Shelby County,1 Sheriff
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The Court construes claims against the Shelby County Jail as claims against Shelby
County. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove Shelby County Jail as a defendant and add Shelby
County.
Bill Oldham, and Grievance Coordinator L. Austin. Defendants are sued in their individual and
official capacity.
I. The Complaint
Myers alleges that on November 18, 2015 and November 23, 2015, he filled out an
inmate grievance due to black mold build up in the showers in the 4-M-Pod. (Compl. at 3, ECF
No. 1; Grievance Nos. 402228 and 402041, ECF No. 1-1.) Myers contends that he has been
getting sick from the bacteria and mildew in the showers. (Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1.) Myers
argues that this is a direct violation of his civil rights as he has been forced to breathe black mold
for four months. (Id.)
Myers seeks two million dollars in compensation. (Id. at 4.)
II. Analysis
A.
Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or
(2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the court applies standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the]
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complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin,
631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without
some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on
which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
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891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would
transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.
§ 1983 Claim
Myers filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
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District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
1.
Claims against Shelby County
The Court construes claims against Defendants Oldham and Austin in their official
capacity as claims against Shelby County, who is already a named defendant. The complaint
does not assert a valid claim against Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a
municipality, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was
caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that
violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Even if it were
assumed that the complaint alleged a violation of Myers’s constitutional rights, the second issue
would be dispositive of Myers’s claims against Shelby County.
A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38
F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A
municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.
1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was
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incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government
‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’
such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional
violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d
at 286 (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he
touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of
employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action
for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the
municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, Civil
Action No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Yeackering v.
Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2005); Oliver v.
City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub
v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008)
(denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom or
practice); Cleary v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v. City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL
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1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The complaint does not allege that Myers suffered
any injury arising from an unconstitutional policy or custom of Shelby County.
2.
Claims against Defendants Oldham and Austin (Twombly)
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendants Oldham and Austin.
When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim
for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
3.
Eighth Amendment Claims for Jail Conditions
Myers claims that the jail conditions violated his constitutional rights. For a convicted
prisoner, such a claim arises under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual
punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). For pretrial detainees, “the
‘cruel and unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does
not apply,” because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction
receives protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63,
69 (2d Cir. 2009); Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d Cir.1990). On June 22, 2015, the
Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), that excessive force
claims brought by pretrial detainees must be analyzed under a Fourteenth Amendment standard
of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s
state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what extent the holding in Kingsley
may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims concerning an inmate’s health or
safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. See
Morabito v. Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying, even after the decision
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in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims
and the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard to denial of medical care claim).
Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the deliberate indifference analysis to
claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Williams v. Curtin, 633 F.3d at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474,
479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently
serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has
been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“To succeed in an Eighth Amendment challenge, [a prisoner] must establish that . . . a single,
identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is being denied . . . .”). The Constitution
“does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for
their offenses against society.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement
claim.” Id. at 9.
In considering the types of conditions that constitute a substantial risk of serious harm,
the Court evaluates not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the
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harm will actually occur, but evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates contemporary
standards of decency, i.e., that society does not choose to tolerate the risk in its prisons. Helling
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that prisoners
can rarely establish an Eighth Amendment violation from a combination of conditions of
confinement that, in themselves, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation:
Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation
“in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some
prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all
prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing
as amorphous as “overall conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted); see also Thompson, 29 F.3d at 242 (“Eighth
Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of the circumstances, but rather must
identify a specific condition that violates” a particular right); Carver v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 887
F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner
must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297,
302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a
substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 303; Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir.
1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,
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[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach
comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual
“conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission
unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be
something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might
well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when
it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no
cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction
of punishment.
Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also Garretson v. City
of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of
an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant
individually. Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011); see also id. at 768 (“[W]e
must focus on whether each individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit
a finding of subjective knowledge.”).
There are no allegations that any named defendant was directly involved with the alleged
conditions or that they had a culpable state of mind; therefore, the subjective component to the
allegations is not met.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Myers’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
C.
Motion for Default Judgment
On April 20, 2016, Myers filed a motion for a default judgment. (ECF No. 8.) That
motion is DENIED. The Defendants are not in default because they have not been served with
process. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A and Local Rule 4.1(b)(3), all civil cases brought by
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prisoners acting pro se are screened, and no process will be served in the case unless the Court
orders such service. In this case, all claims are being dismissed sua sponte; therefore, the motion
for default judgment is rendered moot.
III.
LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
However, with the
exception of Myers’s § 1983 claims against Shelby County, the court cannot conclude that any
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amendment to Myers’s claims would be futile as a matter of law.
Therefore, Myers is
GRANTED leave to amend his complaint. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days
of the date of entry of this order. Myers is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the
original complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The
text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any
extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended
complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint
must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint or the first amended complaint. Myers
may add additional defendants provided that the claims against the new parties arise from the
acts and omissions set forth in the original or first amended complaints. Each claim for relief
must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Myers
fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.
Myers shall promptly notify the Clerk in writing of any change of address or extended
absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court, may result
in the dismissal of this case without further notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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