Reed v. Shelby County Justice Center et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/23/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
ROGER REED,
Plaintiff,
VS.
SHELBY COUNTY, ET AL
Defendants.

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No. 16-2020-JDT-dkv

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On January 8, 2016, Plaintiff Roger Reed (“Reed”), a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby
County Criminal Justice Complex (“Jail”), in Memphis Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) After Reed filed the required documentation, the Court issued an order on
February 10, 2016, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 8.)
The Clerk shall record the Defendants as Shelby County1 and Sheriff Bill Oldham.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Reed alleges that he could not afford proper medical treatment due to his incarceration at
the Jail and that the treatment he received was ineffective and actually made his condition worse.
(ECF No. 1 at 2.) He seeks money damages for his pain and suffering. (Id. at 3.)

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The Court construes allegations against the Shelby County Justice Complex as
allegations against Shelby County.

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still
requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some
factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement
of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the
claim rests.”).

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“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief.
Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations
and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a
dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual
allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept
“fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are
reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wells v. Brown,

891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App=x 608, 612, 613
(6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with
Aunique pleading requirements@ and stating Aa court cannot >create a claim which [a plaintiff] has
not spelled out in his pleading=@ (quoting Clark v. Nat=l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167,
1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); Payne v. Sec=y of Treas., 73 F. App=x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, A[n]either this
court nor the district court is required to create Payne=s claim for her@); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542
U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (ADistrict judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se
litigants.@); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App=x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (A[W]e decline to

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affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se
litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from
neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly
charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.@).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Reed filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Plaintiff has sued Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality,
the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a
constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
dispositive of plaintiff’s claim against Shelby County.
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The second issue is

A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in
other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”
Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy
v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345
(6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless
there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889
(6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a
government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official
decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” Alkire, 330
F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving
force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body
under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation
omitted)).

“[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the

municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal
liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis
v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80
(1986)) (emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence &

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Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the
municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell, No.
3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); Yeackering v. Ankrom,
No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 2005); Oliver v. City of
Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v.
Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15,
2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom
or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No. 06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v. City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL
1421099, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an
official policy or custom which caused injury to plaintiff. Instead, it appears that plaintiff is suing
Shelby County because he was confined in a county institution.
The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendant Oldham. When a
complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Reed complains that he could not afford medical treatment and the treatment he received
worsened his condition.

For a convicted prisoner, such claims arise under the Eighth

Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294 (1991). However, in the case of a pre-trial detainee such as Reed, “the ‘cruel and
unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,”
because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives protection

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against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Liscio v. Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d
Cir.1990). Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Even though Reed was a
pre-trial detainee during the events at issue, the court will analyze his claims under Eighth
Amendment principles because the rights of pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of
convicted prisoners. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985).2
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992);
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d at 383; Mingus v.
Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010).

The objective component requires that the

deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8; Wilson,
501 U.S. at 298.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’. . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not
received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429

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The Supreme Court held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), that
excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be analyzed under a standard of
objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s
state of mind. Id. at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what extent the holding in Kingsley
may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims concerning an inmate’s health or
safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. See
Morabito v. Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying, even after the decision
in Kingsley, the objective reasonableness standard to pre-trial detainee’s excessive force claims
and the deliberate indifference standard to denial of medical care claim). Absent further
guidance, the Court will continue to apply the deliberate indifference analysis to claims
concerning a pre-trial detainee’s health and safety.
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U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such
indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id., at 106.
Reed’s allegations provide no actual details about his medical condition or the treatment
he received at the Jail, do not explain why he should have been given more or different
treatment, and do not set forth any facts or circumstances suggesting that any specific individual
was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Reed states merely that he received care,
but it worsened his condition. Such meager allegations are insufficient to state a claim for denial
of adequate medical care.
For the foregoing reasons, Reed’s complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State

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Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, the Court concludes that an amendment to the complaint is necessary.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to amend
is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this
order. Reed is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and must be
complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any
exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached
to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged
in the original complaint or the first amended complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in
a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Reed fails to file an
amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g) and enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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