Jiles v. The State of Tennessee

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 8/25/16. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL L. JILES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 16-2057-JDT-cgc

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

On January 26, 2016, Plaintiff Michael L. Jiles (“Jiles”), an inmate at the Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex (“BCCX”), in Pikeville Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 &
2.) The complaint concerns Jiles’s previous incarceration as a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby
County Criminal Justice Complex (“Jail”) in Memphis, Tennessee. After Jiles submitted the
necessary documentation, the Court issued an order on February 18, 2016, granting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the
Defendant as the State of Tennessee.
I. THE COMPLAINT
Jiles alleges that between the months of May and June 2015, he woke up in pain and
started throwing up. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Hours later he was taken to the hospital at the Med1
where he found out that he had two holes burned in his stomach and was rushed into surgery.

1

“The Med” is common way of referring to the Regional Medical Center at Memphis.

(Id.) A week later he was taken back to the Jail. (Id.) On the day of the incident, he contends
that he asked the 10-6 Shift Officer, Ms. Johnson, who is not a party to this complaint, to call a
code white, but she did not, resulting in Jiles having to wait until the 6-2 shift before a code
white was called. (Id.)
Jiles seeks monetary compensation for the injury, pain and suffering, disfigurement, and
any future medical complications. (Id. at 3.)
Jiles provides more detailed allegations in narratives attached as exhibits to the
complaint. Jiles alleges that he was in third floor Delta Pod when he began having difficulty
fully inhaling because of his stomach and also experiencing chest pain. (ECF No. 1-1, Ex. A.)
When the pain got worse and a knot appeared under his arm, he alerted the staff and a code white
was called. (Id.) While in second floor medical, the doctor and nurses stated they did not know
what was causing the knot. (Id.) Jiles asked if he could go to the Med to get an x-ray and
identify what was causing the problem; however, he was told that it was probably not that
serious, given Tylenol for the pain, and sent back to his pod. (Id.) Jiles alleges that days later
another code white was called because of his chest and stomach pain, but he still was not given
anything that helped, only Tylenol, and still no outside medical treatment was requested for him.
(Id.)
After about a week passed, Jiles alleges that he awoke from his sleep with a burning
sensation and pain in his stomach and difficulty breathing.

(ECF No. 1-2, Ex. B.)

Jiles

attempted to get out of bed so an officer would call a code white, but pain shot through his whole
upper body causing him to roll out of bed and land on the floor. (Id.) Jiles’s cellmate asked
what was wrong with him, and Jiles told him to tell the staff to call a code white due to Jiles
having severe stomach pain and feeling like he was going to pass out. (Id.) While Jiles’s

2

cellmate was calling for staff, Jiles got out of bed and began throwing up red and yellow liquid,
which Jiles identified as blood and acid. (Id.) Jile’s cellmate again yelled for help from staff.
(Id.)
Jiles further alleges that minutes later, Officer Johnson arrived, and was asked by Jiles’s
cellmate to call a code white and given details of Jiles’s condition. (ECF No. 1-3, Ex. C.)
However, she replied that she could not call a code white just because Jiles was throwing up and
went back to the staff station at the back of the pod even though she saw Jiles lying on the floor.
(Id.) While Ms. Johnson was sitting at the staff station, Jiles’s cellmate asked her what time it
was. She replied “past five,” and Jiles’s cellmate asked if she would please call a code white.
(Id.) As Johnson walked out of the pod, she replied that she would see when she got back. (Id.)
While she was gone, Jiles continued to throw up and lie on the floor because it was hard for him
to get up without causing himself more stomach pain. (Id.) When Johnson came back, Jiles’s
cellmate asked her again to call a code white. (Id.) She apparently called medical and reported
the nurses told her they could not call a code white just for throwing up, then she left. (Id.)
Jiles’s cellmate told him that all Johnson did was pick up the phone. (Id.) His cellmate
attempted to help Jiles up, but it caused too much pain, so he gave Jiles his pillow. (Id.) Jiles lay
on the floor, but could not get into a fetal position because of the pain. (Id.)
Jiles contends that he remained on the floor until the 6-2 shift and that it was after 7:30
when an officer called a code white because Jiles would not get off the floor due to the pain.
(ECF No. 1-4, Ex. D.) Jiles alleges that hours passed before he was taken to the Med, where he
was given IV’s and x-rayed. (Id.) He was later told that there were two holes burnt inside his
stomach and had to be rushed into surgery. (Id.) He was returned to the Jail several days later.
(Id.)

3

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Screening and Standard
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any

portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in
the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to
determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380,
383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the complaint’s framework, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still
requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some
factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement
of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the
claim rests.”).

4

“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally
frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges
not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless
legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge
must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge
does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in
prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and prisoners
are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown,
891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL
285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to
comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F.
App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s
claim for her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation
to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506,
510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause
of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would

5

transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While
courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that
responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should
pursue.”).
B.

§ 1983 Claim
Jiles filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to
the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970).
Plaintiff has sued only the State of Tennessee. However, Plaintiff has no claim against
the State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The
Eleventh Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in

6

federal court. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Employees of Dep’t of
Pub. Health & Welfare v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); see
also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A State
may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may
abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may
not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.” (citations omitted)). By its terms, the
Eleventh Amendment bars all suits against a State, regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 100-01. Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2013-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v.
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
III. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. R.I., No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb.
22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some
form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”).
Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. Brown, 2013 WL 646489, at
*1; Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of
course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically
must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the
complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Grayson v. Mayview State

7

Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“in forma pauperis plaintiffs who file complaints
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would
be inequitable or futile”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with
the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by
amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”).
In this case, an amendment to the complaint would not necessarily be futile as a matter of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to amend
is GRANTED. Any amendment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this
order. Jiles is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and must be
complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings. The text of the amended complaint
must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document.
Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be
attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts
alleged in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and
must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Jiles fails to file an amended complaint
within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter
judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8