Jiles v. The State of Tennessee

Filing 51

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 47 . Signed by Judge Thomas L. Parker on 7/20/2020. (bab)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL L. JILES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONTINA JOHNSON,
Defendant.

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No. 2:16-cv-02057-TLP-tmp
JURY DEMAND

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, an inmate at South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, sued pro
se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant showed deliberate indifference to his
medical needs. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff’s complaint concerns his previous
incarceration as a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex (“Jail”) in
Memphis, Tennessee. (Id.)
Defendant now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff has not responded to
Defendant’s motion. 1
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim.

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Plaintiff failed to respond timely to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment under Local Rule
56.1(b). So the Court issued an order to show cause ordering Plaintiff to set forth the reasons for his
failure to respond timely, and to address why the Court should not grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff never responded to the Court’s order to show cause. So the Court held a status
conference to gauge Plaintiff’s intention to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (See
ECF No. 50.) During the conference, Plaintiff informed the Court and Defendant that he no longer
desired to pursue this action. (Id.) The Court will thus proceed with analyzing Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment as if it were unopposed.

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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex at the
time of his alleged injury. (ECF No. 47-5 at PageID 215.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs while he was at the Jail. (Id. at
PageID 216.)
Defendant now moves for summary judgment. (ECF No. 40.) She argues that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing suit as required by the Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
Courts are to grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “establish[es] or refute[s] an essential element of the
cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not all disputes are genuine. A dispute is genuine “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The reviewing court
“must evaluate each party’s motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Taft
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991).

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ANALYSIS
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PRLA”) “seeks to alleviate the burden of this
litigation by requiring prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before they can file suit
in federal court.” Napier v. Laurel Cty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1997a). “The ‘dominant concern’ of the PLRA is ‘to promote administrative redress,
filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court.’” Id.
(quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (making the exhaustion requirement
mandatory)).
“Specifically, the law provides that ‘[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available
are exhausted.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)).
“This requirement is a strong one. To further the purposes behind the PLRA, exhaustion
is required even if the prisoner subjectively believes the remedy is not available, Brock v.
Kenton County, 93 Fed. App’x. 793, 798 (6th Cir.2004); even when the state cannot grant the
particular relief requested, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); and ‘even where [the
prisoners] believe the procedure to be ineffectual or futile . . ..’” Id. (quoting Pack v. Martin,
174 Fed. App’x. 256, 262 (6th Cir.2006)).
Here, Defendant claims that Plaintiff filed to exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing suit. This contention is unopposed. So the undisputed fact is that “Plaintiff did not fully
exhaust his available grievance remedies regarding the” allegations he has put forth in his
complaint. (ECF No. 47-5 at PageID 219.) The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has failed to
meet the requirements necessary under 42 U.S.C. § 1997a to file suit in federal court.

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The Court therefore finds no material issue of fact and that Defendant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The Court thus GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant.
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of July, 2020.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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