Walker v. Lauderdale County et al

Filing 9

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ENFORCE, PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS. Signed by Judge James D. Todd on 3/23/17. (Todd, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
QUENTIN WALKER
a/k/a QUINTIN WALKER,
Plaintiff,

VS.

LAUDERDALE COUNTY, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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No. 16-2362-JDT-cgc

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO ENFORCE, PARTIALLY DISMISSING
COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED
ON THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS

On May 26, 2016, Plaintiff Quentin Walker, a/k/a Quintin Walker, (“Walker”),
who is currently confined at the Pemiscot County Jail in Caruthersville, Missouri, filed a
pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint addresses Walker’s previous confinement
while he was a pre-trial detainee at the Lauderdale County Jail (“Jail”) in Ripley,
Tennessee. On June 2, 2016, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).

(ECF No. 4.)

The Clerk shall record the Defendants as

Lauderdale County, Officers First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Glass, Dixie Duncan, FNU

Neal, FNU Geary, FNU Reed, FNU Parker, FNU Lenderman, FNU Johnson and Christy
Norton. Defendants are sued in their official and individual capacities.
I. The Complaint
Walker alleges that on July 23, 2015, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Defendants
Glass, Duncan, Neal, Geary, Reed, Parker, Lenderman, Johnson, and Norton “rushed”
into Unit 1, where Walker was housed. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Several of the Officers,
including Defendants Johnson, Reed, and Norton, began conducting a “pat search” of
another inmate, Judson Ouzts. (Id.) Before the search of Ouzts began, Defendant Glass,
who was holding a taser throughout the encounter, motioned for Walker to come out of
his area and to stay by him, and Walker obeyed. (Id. at 6-7.) Defendant Reed lost his
balance after slamming Ouzts to the floor and began falling backwards into the area
where Walker and Defendant Glass were standing. (Id. at 7.) Walker moved out of the
way so Defendant Reed would not slam into him, but that resulted in Defendant Reed
slamming into Defendant Glass and “sandwiching” Defendant Glass between Defendant
Reed and the wall. (Id.)
Defendant Reed got up and went back toward inmate Ouzts, who was on the floor
with several other officers on him. (Id.) Defendant Glass, without first giving Walker
any verbal orders or directives, allegedly began tasing Walker in his back and ribs on the
right side. (Id.) Defendant Parker then allegedly grabbed Walker around the neck,
putting Walker into a headlock and punching him in the face four or five times. (Id.)
While Parker had Walker in the headlock, Defendant Glass allegedly continued to tase
Walker. (Id.) Walker alleges that Defendant Johnson grabbed him around his legs,
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Defendant Neal also tased Walker, and Defendant Duncan sprayed Walker with mace.
(Id.at 7-8.) After Walker was sprayed with mace, the Defendants stopped applying force
because they also were coughing and choking from the spray; however, Defendant Parker
allegedly continued to hold Walker in the headlock until Defendant Glass said, “thats
[sic] enough.” (Id. at 8.)
Walker states he does not know whether Defendants Geary, Reed, Lenderman, or
Norton actually participated in the force; however, he does allege they had the
opportunity to intervene and stop the incident but failed to do so. (Id.) Further, Walker
alleges he was not resisting in any way during this incident, did not provoke the use of
force, and was not given any verbal orders that he refused to obey. (Id.) He states the
Defendants were not trying to place him in handcuffs during the incident and did not
handcuff him after the incident. (Id.)
Immediately after the incident, Walker, inmate Ouzts and a third inmate were
removed and placed in the court holding area of the Jail, in separate cells.

(Id.)

Approximately thirty minutes later, Defendants Glass, Duncan and Neal returned to the
court holding area and asked Walker if he was hurt anywhere. (Id. at 8-9.) Walker
alleges he replied that he could not breathe, his face was burning, his neck was hurting,
and he wanted to get washed up, but Defendant Glass told him they would be back in a
“little bit.” (Id. at 9.) After they left, Walker alleges he yelled for help because he was
having trouble breathing and his face, eyes, and nose felt like they were on fire. (Id.)
Walker began to vomit, allegedly due to the effects of the mace. (Id.) Other inmates also
yelled for the officers to return and help Walker. (Id.) Roughly two hours after Walker
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was placed in the holding cell, Defendant Neal returned to put Walker’s mattress and
property in the cell. (Id.) Despite Walker allegedly informing Defendant Neal that his
face was still burning and he was having trouble breathing, and despite that Defendant
Neal noticed Walker had thrown up, Defendant Neal gave Walker the mattress and left.
(Id.) Walker further alleges that he continued to tell Defendants Neal and Geary that he
needed medical attention each time they walked by, but they continued to ignore him.
(Id. at 9-10.) At approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 24, 2015, Defendant Geary saw Walker
on the floor and that Walker had vomited and radioed for another officer to come to the
cell; Defendant Geary also called an ambulance. (Id. at 10.) When the paramedics
arrived, Defendant Neal told them that Walker was fine and had only been in the cell for
an hour. (Id.)
Defendant Lenderman and Mr. Duncan, the husband of Defendant Duncan,
accompanied Walker to the hospital. (Id.) Walker alleges that Mr. Duncan, who is not
named as a defendant, told the nurses and the doctor that Walker was fighting at the jail
and that his injuries stemmed from the fight. (Id.) Walker’s injuries were examined and
treated, and he received a cat-scan of his skull, neck and back. (Id.) He was released
from the hospital about 6:00 a.m. on July 24, 2015, and returned to the Jail. (Id.) Walker
alleges that his injuries included a swollen and bruised right eye; taser burns on his ribs
and back; pain in his neck, throat and lower back from the physical force; and extreme
and severe burning of his face, eyes, nose and mouth from the chemical agent. (Id. at
10-11.) Walker contends that Defendants’ refusal to alleviate his pain by allowing him a
shower or prompt medical attention made his pain more severe. (Id. at 11.)
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Walker states that Lieutenant (“Lt.”) Elizabeth Kiestler, who is not named as a
defendant, took pictures of Walker’s injuries but said that she could not see taser burns on
Walker’s left rib area. (Id.) On July 24, 2015, Defendant Norton took pictures of the
taser burn on Walker’s left rib area and sent them Lt. Kiestler. (Id.) On July 28, 2015,
Walker was seen by Dr. Crown, who also is not named as a defendant, at the Jail and was
prescribed Ibuprofen and Tylenol. (Id.)
Walker seeks compensatory and punitive damages for his physical and emotional
injuries. (Id. at 15-16.)
On May 26, 2016, Walker filed a motion to enforce in which he seeks to enforce
an injunction issued on April 1, 1998. (ECF No. 3.) A search of the Court’s records
indicates that Walker likely is referring to Davis, et al. v. Sutton, et al., No. 93-2004-JPM
(W.D. Tenn.), a class action suit that was filed to remedy certain constitutional
deficiences at the Lauderdale County Jail. Any attempt to enforce the relief granted in
the Davis matter should be filed in that case. Therefore, the motion to enforce is
DENIED.
II. Analysis
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint,
or any portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1)
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2)
such relief.

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
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In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may
be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the
Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more
than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule
8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.
Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could
satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is
legally frivolous would ipso facto fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for
relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827
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(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional”
factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for
frivolousness. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.
Id. at 471.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Rawlings, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Rawlings v. Matauszak,
No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a
court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”)
(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))
(alteration in original); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and
stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for
her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to
act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x
506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the
strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly
burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into
advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the
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rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants
as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).
Walker filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a
deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Walker’s claims against the Defendants in their official capacity are claims against
their employer, Lauderdale County, which is already a named Defendant. When a § 1983
claim is made against a municipality, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1)
whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether
the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex.,
503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of Walker’s claims against
Lauderdale County.
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A local government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in
original); see also Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v.
City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Co., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To
demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or
custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury
was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th
Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
“Where a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s
official decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983
suit.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or
custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish
the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Searcy, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting Polk
Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 326 (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’
is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the
municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

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112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986))
(emphasis in original).
Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating
municipal liability with particularity, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty Narcotics Intelligence
& Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to
put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, see, e.g., Fowler v.
Campbell, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007);
Yeackering v. Ankrom, No. 4:05-CV-00018-M, 2005 WL 1877964, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
5, 2005); Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); cf. Raub v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., No. 06-13942, 2008 WL
160611, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint
contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); Cleary v. Cnty of Macomb, No.
06-15505, 2007 WL 2669102, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007) (same); Morningstar v.
City of Detroit, No. 06-11073, 2007 WL 2669156, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2007)
(same); Chidester v. City of Memphis, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The allegations of the complaint fail to identify an official
policy or custom which caused injury to plaintiff. Instead, it appears that Walker is suing
Lauderdale County because he was confined in a County institution and the County
employed persons who allegedly violated his rights.
Walker’s complaint alleges that Defendants Glass, Duncan, Parker, Johnson, and
Neal subjected him to excessive force while Defendants Geary, Reed, Lenderman, and
Norton did not intervene. The Supreme Court has held, in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135
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S. Ct. 2466 (2015), that excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness,
rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. Id. at
2472-73. For purposes of screening, Walker has alleged a plausible claim for excessive
force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Glass, Duncan,
Parker, Johnson and Neal.
With regard to the claims for failure to protect claim and denial of medical care,
such claims if brought by convicted prisoners arise under the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. See generally Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294
(1991). However, in the case of pre-trial detainees such as Walker, “the ‘cruel and
unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not
apply,” because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000).

Instead, a person detained prior to

conviction receives protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. Liscio v.
Warren, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d Cir.1990). Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d
Cir. 2009).
Notwithstanding the decision in Kingsley holding that excessive force claims
brought by pre-trial detainess must be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard, the court will analyze Walker’s claims for failure to protect and
lack of medical care under the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard.
Even after Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit has applied the deliberate indifference standard to
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claims concerning an inmate’s health and safety to pre-trial detainees. See Morabito v.
Holmes, 628 F. App’x 353, 356-58 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying the objective reasonableness
standard to pre-trial detainee’s excessive force claims and the deliberate indifference
standard to denial of medical care claim).
An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective
components. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
at 383; Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component
requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Hudson,
503 U.S. at 8; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
To satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner
must show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812
(6th Cir. 2005), or that he has been deprived of the “‘minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,’” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981)); see also Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). “[E]xtreme
deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson, 503
U.S. at 9. “‘[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.’” Leary v. Livingston Cnty., 528 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833); see also Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508,
512 (6th Cir. 2001) (same).

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To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a
prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he
had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also Wilson,
501 U.S. at 297, 302-03. To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for a claim
based on failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, the plaintiff must show that the prison
officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would
suffer serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303; Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215,1222 (6th Cir.
1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a
state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
Because Walker alleges that Defendants Geary, Reed, Lenderman, and Norton had
the opportunity and ability to stop the excessive force against him but failed to do so, the
Court also finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim against these Defendants for
failure to protect.
Under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,’. . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a
prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate

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indifference to serious medical needs.

It is only such indifference that can offend

‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id., at 106.
Walker alleges that even after hearing Walker’s repeated requests for medical
attention and seeing that Walker had vomited, Defendants waited until 2:30 a.m. to call
for needed medical care, which was provided at the hospital. (ECF No. 1 at 8-11.) While
Walker does allege that the delay in receiving medical care caused the pain from his
injuries to be more severe, at least temporarily (id. at 11), he does not allege that the
delay exacerbated or caused complications with regard to the injuries themselves. The
initial altercation allegedly began at 10:30 p.m. on July 23, 2015, and at 2:30 a.m. on July
24, 2015, an ambulance was called. (Id.) In these particular circumstances, the Court
finds that the delay of a few hours in the provision of medical care does not state a
plausible claim that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
III. Conclusion
The Court DISMISSES all of Walker’s claims against Defendant Lauderdale
County and his claims against all of the Defendants for denial of medical care pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
It is ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue process for Defendants Glass, Duncan
Parker, Johnson and Neal on Walker’s claim of excessive force and for Defendants
Geary, Reed, Lenderman, and Norton on Walker’s claim for failure to protect and shall
deliver that process to the U.S. Marshal for service. Service shall be made on Defendants
Glass, Duncan, Parker, Johnson, Neal, Geary, Reed, Lenderman and Norton pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) and Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 4.04(1) and
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(10), either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective. All costs of service shall
by advanced by the United States.
It is further ORDERED that Walker shall serve a copy of every subsequent
document he files in this cause on the attorneys for Defendants Glass, Duncan, Parker,
Johnson, Neal, Geary, Reed, Lenderman and Norton or on any unrepresented Defendant.
Walker shall make a certificate of service on every document filed.

Walker shall

familiarize himself with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.1
Walker is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any
change of address or extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or
any other order of the Court may result in the dismissal of this case without further
notice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

A copy of the Local Rules may be obtained from the Clerk. The Local Rules are also
available on the Court’s website at www.tnwd.courts.gov/pdf/content/LocalRules.pdf.
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