Rushing v. Shelby County Schools
ORDER striking (40) motion for leave to file amended complaint; granting (48) motion to consolidate cases; denying as moot (9) motion to dismiss; denying as moot (25) motion to reset/extend deadlines; and adopting (42) Report and Recommendations re m otion for TRO and denying (27) motion for TRO in case 2:16-cv-02662-SHM-cgc; denying as moot (7) motion to dismiss in case 2:17-cv-02331-SHM-cgc and administratively closing case 2:17-cv-02331-SHM-cgc. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 08/07/2017. Associated Cases: 2:16-cv-02662-SHM-cgc, 2:17-cv-02331-SHM-cgc(Mays, Samuel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
SHELBY COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Before the Court are five motions.
First, on September 8,
2016, Defendant Shelby County School System1 (“SCSS”) filed a motion to dismiss in part the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Tammy
Rushing (the “Partial Motion to Dismiss”).
(Mot. to Dismiss
Pl.’s Title VII Claim and Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s Partial
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.)
On December 9, 2016, Rushing filed
a response to the Partial Motion to Dismiss (the “Response to
Partial Motion to Dismiss”).
(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss Pl.’s Title VII Claim, ECF No. 24.)
SCSS has not filed
a reply in support of the Partial Motion to Dismiss, and the
time to do so has passed.
SCSS has represented that Rushing has incorrectly identified
the proper defendant in this action, and that the proper defendant is the Shelby County Board of Education.
(See, e.g., Mot.
to Dismiss 1 n.1.) Following the caption in the Complaint, the
Court will refer to the defendant as SCSS.
Second, on April 4, 2017, Rushing filed a motion seeking to
reset or extend all existing case deadlines (the “Deadline-Reset
(Pl.’s Mot. to Reset/Extend All Deadlines, Mem. in
Supp., and Certificate of Consultation, ECF No. 25.)
a response to the Deadline-Reset Motion (the “Deadline-Reset Response”) on April 17, 2017.
(Def. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ.’s
Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot to Reset/Extend All Deadlines, ECF
Rushing filed a reply in support of the Deadline-Reset
Motion (the “Deadline-Reset Reply”) on May 1, 2017.
ply to Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Reset/Extend All
Deadlines, ECF No. 39.)
Third, on April 13, 2017, Rushing filed a motion requesting
a temporary restraining order (the “TRO Motion”).
for TRO, Mem. in Supp., and Cert. of Consultation, ECF No. 27.)
The Court referred the TRO Motion to Magistrate Judge Charmiane
Claxton on April 14, 2017.
(Order of Reference, ECF No. 28
(“TRO Order of Reference”).)
SCSS filed a response to the TRO
Motion (the “TRO Response”) on April 18, 2017.
Cty. Bd. of Educ.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for TRO, ECF
Magistrate Judge Claxton held a hearing on the TRO Mo-
tion on April 18, 2017.
(“TRO Hr’g Minutes”).)
(See, e.g., Minute Entry, ECF No. 34
On May 12, 2017, Magistrate Judge Clax-
ton issued a report and recommendation addressing the TRO Motion
(R. & R., ECF No. 42.)
Neither party has filed
objections to the Report, and the time to do so has passed.
(See, e.g., id. at 7 (setting deadline for objections).)
Fourth, on May 11, 2017, Rushing filed a motion for leave
to file an amended complaint.
(Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File
Proposed Am. Compl., ECF No. 40 (“Mot. for Leave”); see also
On May 17, 2017, Rushing filed a notice that she was
striking the Motion for Leave.
(Notice Striking Mot. for Leave
to Amend, ECF No. 43 (“Amendment-Mot. Notice”).)
SCSS has not
filed a response to the Motion to Leave, and the time to do so
Fifth, on June 9, 2017, Rushing filed a motion (the “Consolidation Motion”) to consolidate this action with a second action filed in this Court, Case No. 2:17-cv-02331.
for Consolidation, Mem. in Supp., and Certificate of Consultation, ECF No. 48.)
SCSS filed a response to the Consolidation
Motion (the “Consolidation Response”) on June 23, 2017.
Shelby Cty. Sch. Sys.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Consolidation,
ECF No. 54.)
STRICKEN, the Consolidation Motion is GRANTED, the Motion to
Dismiss is DENIED as moot, the Deadline-Reset Motion is DENIED
as moot, the Report is ADOPTED, and the TRO Motion is DENIED.
Rushing filed the Complaint on August 12, 2016.
with SCSS during the 2015–16 school year, when Rushing worked at
Treadwell Middle School in Memphis.
(See generally Compl. ¶¶ 9–
The Complaint asserts three causes of action.
(Id. ¶¶ 42–
Count One alleges that SCSS “intentionally[,] willfully
and knowingly discriminated against [Rushing] . . . based upon
unlawful disability discrimination in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 [(“ADA”)] . . . and in violation
of Title VII . . . .”
(Id. ¶ 43.)
Count Two asserts that Rush-
ing has a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on
a deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights.
(Id. ¶ 47.)
Count Three asserts that SCSS is liable “for retal-
iatory discharge and intentional employment discrimination” pursuant to section 50-1-304 of the Tennessee Code.
(Id. ¶ 49.)
SCSS filed the Partial Motion to Dismiss on September 8,
SCSS filed its answer to the Complaint the same day.
(Answer and Affirmative Defenses, ECF No. 8.)
On December 7, 2016, the Court held a scheduling conference
and entered a scheduling order after consulting with the parties.
(See, e.g., Scheduling Order, ECF No. 23 (“December
In relevant part, the scheduling order set
a deadline of January 31, 2017, for the parties to amend their
pleadings and join parties; a deadline of April 1, 2017, for
Rushing to disclose her expert witnesses; a deadline of June 14,
2017, to complete discovery; a deadline of August 17, 2017, to
file any dispositive motions; and a trial date of January 16,
(Id. at 1–2.)
On December 9, 2016, Rushing filed the Re-
sponse to Partial Motion to Dismiss.
Rushing filed the Deadline-Reset Motion on April 4, 2017.
In relevant part, Rushing says that she has “just received a
right to sue on [a] second EEOC charge,” that she needs to amend
the Complaint, and that amendment would “require a new Scheduling Order” altering the remaining case deadlines.
Reset Mot. ¶¶ 7–8.)
On April 13, 2017, Rushing filed the TRO Motion.
Motion makes various allegations about SCSS conduct.
¶¶ 6–29; see also Rep. 2–4 (summarizing allegations).)
Motion seeks “a temporary restraining order, restraining and enjoining [SCSS] and any of [SCSS’s] employees from contacting
way . .
until . . .
provider finds she has sufficiently recovered to return from
FMLA leave to her place of employment.”
(TRO Mot. 9.)
Court referred the TRO Motion to Magistrate Judge Claxton on
April 14, 2017.
(TRO Order of Reference.)
On April 17, 2017, SCSS filed the Deadline-Reset Response.
On April 18, 2017, SCSS filed the TRO Response.
The same day,
Magistrate Judge Claxton held a hearing on the TRO Motion.
On May 1, 2017, Rushing filed the Deadline-Reset
On May 11, 2017, Rushing filed the Motion for Leave.
Motion for Leave represents that Rushing filed a (second) EEOC
charge on December 14, 2016, and that she received a right-tosue letter addressing that charge on February 13, 2017.
for Leave ¶ 2.)
The Motion states that Rushing “desires to
amend her original Complaint to include the second charge and
other related causes of action.”
(Id. ¶ 3.)
Rushing’s Proposed Amended Complaint is attached to the Motion for Leave.
Paragraphs 12 through 78 of the Proposed Amend-
ed Complaint contain allegations about the 2015–16 school year.
(Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12–78.)
Those paragraphs repeat many of
the factual allegations made in the Complaint, but they include
additional allegations about the 2015–16 school year.
id. with Compl. ¶¶ 9–41.)
The Proposed Amended Complaint also
contains more than three hundred paragraphs of allegations about
the 2016–17 school year (Proposed Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79–419), during
which Rushing worked at the A.B. Hill Elementary School in Memphis (id. ¶ 79).
The Proposed Amended Complaint names an addi-
tional defendant: Dr. Angela Brown, the principal at A.B. Hill
Elementary School during the 2016–17 school year.
(Id. ¶ 3.)
The Proposed Amended Complaint asserts twelve causes of action.
(See generally id. ¶¶ 429–64.)
Counts One, Two, and
Three in the Proposed Amended Complaint restate Counts One, Two,
and Three in the Complaint.
(Compare id. ¶¶ 429–39 with Compl.
Count Four alleges a claim under Title VII based on
a second charge of discrimination that Rushing filed with the
Rushing alleges that SCSS “has intentionally interfered”
with her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),
“has intentionally discriminated against [her] . . . based on
disability discrimination,” has retaliated against her for engaging in protected activities, and has “subjected [her] to a
hostile environment on a daily basis.”
(Proposed Am. Compl.
Count Five asserts that Rushing has a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on SCSS’s allegedly depriving
her of “constitutionally guaranteed rights to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.”2
(Id. ¶ 445.)
Count Six asserts that
The relationship between this § 1983 claim and the § 1983 claim
in Count Two is unclear.
Count Two asserts that Rushing “has
lost her job” and that she “had property rights to her job.”
(Proposed Am. Compl. ¶ 434.) Count Five appears to be more expansive. It states that SCSS denied Rushing
(Id. ¶ 447.)
Count Seven asserts that SCSS violated
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1983.
(Id. ¶ 448.)
Count Eight asserts that SCSS violated the FMLA.
(Id. ¶¶ 451–
Counts Nine and Ten assert that SCSS is liable to Rushing
under sections 49-2-301(b)(1)(H) and 49-2-301(b)(1)(BB) of the
(Id. ¶¶ 455, 457.)
Count Eleven asserts that
SCSS violated section 50-1-304 of the Tennessee Code, a part of
the Tennessee Public Protection Act.
(Id. ¶¶ 459–60.)
Twelve asserts a claim against SCSS and Brown for intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
(Id. ¶¶ 462–
On May 12, 2017, Magistrate Judge Claxton entered the Report addressing the TRO Motion.
Motion be denied.
She recommended that the TRO
her right to due process including but not
limited to: termination of her tenure without notice and opportunity to be heard, conducting
adequate notice . . . , and allowing said
“hearings” to exceed the initial scope of
said “hearings,” and allowing the hearing
officer to investigate further, including
interviewing witnesses after the conclusion
of said “hearings,” without notice and opportunity for Plaintiff to be present and to
cross examine said witnesses.
(Id. ¶ 445.)
The same day, Rushing commenced a new action.
No. 1 in 17-02331 (“Compl. in 17-02331”).)3
The complaint in
Case No. 17-02331 is similar to the Proposed Amended Complaint,
with two major differences.
First, Paragraphs 19 through 57 of
the Proposed Amended Complaint, alleging various facts about the
2015–16 school year, do not appear in the complaint in Case No.
Second, Counts One through Three of the Proposed
Amended Complaint do not appear in the complaint in Case No. 1702331.
For all practical purposes, the complaint in Case No.
17-02331 is an attempt to assert in a new complaint the claims
On May 17, 2017, Rushing filed a Notice Striking Motion for
Leave to Amend.
The notice states
that Rushing’s Proposed Amended Complaint in this action is unnecessary because Rushing “has filed a second and separate Complaint” in Case No. 17-02331.
June 9, 2017, SCSS and Brown filed a motion seeking
partial dismissal of the complaint in Case No. 17-02331 and additional time to answer the rest of that complaint.
Mem. of Facts and Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s
Title VII and IDEA Claims Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
References to “17-02331” are to filings in Rushing v. Shelby
County School System, Case No. 2:17-cv-02331 (W.D. Tenn.).
Compl., ECF No. 7 in 17-02331 (“Partial Mot. to Dismiss 17-02331
The same day, Rushing filed the Consolidation Mo-
Invoking Rule 42(a),4 that motion seeks consolidation of
this case and Case No. 17-02331 “for all purposes.”
tion Mot. ¶ 7.)
Rushing asks the Court “to merge the cases,
such that briefings and rulings may apply to both cases, and
there will be one trial, not two.”
On June 14, 2017, after a request by Rushing, the Court
held a status conference.
(Minutes, ECF No. 51; see also Pl.’s
Mot. for Extension of Discovery and All Other Deadlines 2, ECF
No. 49 (requesting status conference).)
After that conference,
the Court entered an Amended Scheduling Order.
(“June 2017 Scheduling Order”).)
(ECF No. 53
That Order, inter alia, set a
written-discovery deadline of August 31, 2017; a dispositivemotion deadline of September 29, 2017; and a trial date of February 20, 2018.
(Id. at 1.)
On June 23, 2017, SCSS filed the Consolidation Response.
On July 21, 2017, Rushing filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss 17-02331 Complaint.
(Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss Pl.’s Title VII and IDEA Claims, ECF No. 12 in 1702331.)
References to “Rule __” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court has jurisdiction over the Complaint’s federal-law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, U.S. district courts have orig-
inal jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
Complaint asserts that SCSS (1) discriminated against Rushing in
violation of the ADA, (2) discriminated against Rushing in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), and
(3) denied Rushing her Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights.
(Compl. ¶¶ 42–47.)
Those claims arise under the Constitution or
laws of the United States.5
state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Those claims derive
from a “common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal-law
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966); Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 588
(6th Cir. 2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Motion for Leave
Less than a week after filing the Motion for Leave, Rushing
filed the Amendment-Motion Notice.
The Notice contends that,
Because the Court has jurisdiction over Rushing’s federal-law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, it need not address Rushing’s
statement that the Court also has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
because Rushing has filed a second complaint in the new Case No.
17-2331, “[a]mendment of [the complaint in this action] is . . .
(Amendment-Mot. Notice 1.)
SCSS has not re-
sponded to the Motion for Leave, and Rushing seeks to strike it.
The Motion for Leave is STRICKEN.
Motion to Consolidate
The Motion to Consolidate asks the Court to consolidate
this case and Case No. 17-02331.
Rushing cites Rule 42(a).
(See generally Consolidation
(Id. ¶ 8.)
Under Rule 42(a),
“[i]f actions before the court involve a common question of law
or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all
matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or
(3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”
“‘The party moving for consolidation bears the burden of demonstrating the commonality of law, facts or both in cases sought
to be combined[.]’”
Blasingame v. Church Joint Venture, L.P.,
No. 15-1038, 2015 WL 3952793, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 29, 2015)
FSB, 276 F.R.D. 567, 571 (E.D. Mich. 2011)).
The parties disagree about whether this action and Case No.
17-02331 involve common questions of law or fact.
gues that both cases seek relief against SCSS, that “[b]oth cases involve claims under federal employment law,” and that Case
No. 17-02331 “alleges retaliation and other actions, based upon
(Consolidation Mot. ¶ 5.)
SCSS argues that “the only thing the
two lawsuits share is one common Defendant” and that Rushing has
“fail[ed] to carry her burden of demonstrating the common question of fact and law.”
(Consolidation Resp. 4.)
The two actions involve at least one common question of law
SCSS’s filings –– specifically, its partial motions to
dismiss in the two cases –– support this conclusion.
Complaint in this action and the complaint in Case No. 17-02331
allege that SCSS violated Title VII by discriminating against
Rushing on the basis of disability.
02331 ¶ 375.)
(Compl. ¶ 43; Compl. in 17-
In both cases, SCSS has argued in a partial mo-
tion to dismiss that Title VII cannot ground claims of disability discrimination.
(See Partial Mot. to Dismiss 2–3; Partial
Mot. to Dismiss 17-02331 Compl. 3–4.)
Whether Title VII can
ground disability-discrimination claims is a legal question common to both actions.
Under Rule 42(a), the Court has discretion
to consolidate the actions.
In deciding whether to consolidate cases under Rule 42(a),
a district court should consider the factors listed in Hendrix
v. Raybestos–Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).
See, e.g., Carpenter v. GAF Corp., Nos. 90-3460, 90-3461, 1994
WL 47781, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1994) (quoting Hendrix);
Under Hendrix, a court should consider
whether the specific risks of prejudice and
possible confusion [are] overborne by the
risk of inconsistent adjudications of common
factual and legal issues, the burden on parties, witnesses and available judicial resources posed by multiple lawsuits, the
length of time required to conclude multiple
suits as against a single one, and the relative expense to all concerned of the singletrial, multiple-trial alternatives.
776 F.2d at 1495 (internal quotation omitted).
risks of prejudice and possible confusion that could result from
consolidation are minimal.
The only “specific risk” that SCSS
asserts is “a great potential for confusion and prejudice if
these matters are tried together, as a jury would infer, absent
proof, that Plaintiff’s employment was continuous with [SCSS]
somehow related to what Plaintiff contends took place at Treadwell Middle School during the 2015-16 school year.”
continuous is something SCSS can present to the jury at trial.
If the point is material and there is no reasonable factual dispute about it, the parties can offer a stipulation or SCSS can
seek an appropriate jury instruction.
The complaint in Case No.
17-02331 alleges that the events at Treadwell Middle School and
the events at A.B. Hill Elementary School were related.
e.g., Compl. in 17-02331 ¶¶ 71–75 (alleging that Brown, principal at A.B. Hill Elementary, was aware of events that had taken
place at Treadwell).)
rectly at issue.
Whether the events were related is di-
It is not confusing or prejudicial to adjudi-
cate in one action claims against one employer arising from both
To the extent the Court will handle both cases if they proceed separately, the risk of inconsistent legal decisions is
The Court can decide the legal issues in both cases con-
Consolidation will not resolve Rushing’s suits more
Rushing does not contemplate a consolidation under
which her second action will proceed on the timeline for the
She contemplates that the first action will pro-
ceed on an extended timeline with the second action.
The potential for jury trials in these cases raises the
prospect of inconsistent adjudications.
At present, the Court
cannot say that the events of the 2016–17 school year are unrelated to the events of the 2015–16 school year.
juries decide the two cases could lead to outcomes based on different views of factual questions common to both cases.
proceed as one consolidated matter will reduce the burden on the
parties, witnesses, and available judicial resources.
Rushing “seeks consolidation for all purposes” and asks the
Court to “merge the cases, such that briefings and rulings may
apply to both cases.”
(Consolidation Mot. ¶ 7.)
“‘Cases consolidated under Rule 42(a) . . . retain
their separate identity’”; consolidation does not merge suits
into a single action.
Tri-Med Fin. Co. v. Nat’l Century Fin.
Enters., Inc., Nos. 98-3617, 99-3062, 2000 WL 282445, at *8 (6th
Cir. Mar. 6, 2000) (quoting Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135
F.3d 389, 412–13 (6th Cir. 1998)); see also Twaddle v. Diem, 200
F. App’x 435, 438 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1933)); Lewis, 135 F.3d at
412–13 (quoting Johnson, 289 U.S. at 496).
quire the entry of a separate judgment.
Each case will re-
9A Charles Alan Wright
et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2382 (3d ed. 2008 & 2017
Supp.) (citing cases).
Courts have interpreted Rule 42(a) to authorize “the filing
of a unified or master complaint . . . in cases consolidated
both for pretrial discovery and for trial.”
Id. (citing cases).
This action and Case No. 17-02331 are proceeding on two separate
Consolidation will best be achieved if the parties
and the Court proceed based on a unified complaint containing
all of Rushing’s allegations and claims.
The Motion to Consolidate is GRANTED.
This case and Case
No. 17-02331 are consolidated for discovery and trial as one ac-
tion under Case No. 16-02662.
Case No. 17-02331 is closed ad-
ministratively; when the Court enters judgment in this case, it
will enter judgment in Case No. 17-02331.
Rushing is ORDERED to
file, within 7 days of the entry of this order, a Unified Complaint combining the allegations and causes of action in the
complaint in Case No. 16-02662 and the complaint in Case No. 1702331.
She may not add allegations beyond those in the two com-
Motion to Dismiss
Rushing will be filing a Unified Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot.
See, e.g., Henry v. Memphis-Shelby Cty.
Airport Auth., No. 15-2641-STA-TMP, 2016 WL 1249617, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 29, 2016) (“Courts in this Circuit routinely deny as
moot motions to dismiss a pleading after a plaintiff subsequently files an amended pleading.”) (citing cases).
Complaint within 21 days after its filing.
Any named dethe
Fed. R. Civ. P.
If the defendants file a motion to dismiss,
that motion may include any arguments asserted in the Partial
Motion to Dismiss in this action or in the Partial Motion to
Dismiss in Case No. 17-02331.
The Court will set a status conference to establish a new
scheduling order based on the Unified Complaint.
The Deadline-Reset Motion asks the Court to extend various
deadlines from the December 2016 Scheduling Order.
states that “[a]ll remaining deadlines” in the case will “need
to be reset, once [Rushing] either (a) amends her Complaint; or
(b) files a separate action . . . .”
(Deadline-Reset Mot. ¶ 8.)
The Court will enter a new scheduling order establishing deadlines for the Unified Complaint.
The Deadline-Reset Motion is
DENIED as moot.
The TRO Motion asks the Court to “issue a temporary restraining order, restraining and enjoining [SCSS] and any of
[SCSS]’s employees from contacting [Rushing] in any way, including
until . . .
provider finds she has sufficiently recovered to return from
FMLA leave to her place of employment.”
(TRO Mot. 9.)
tion also asks that “[a]ny further communications from [SCSS]
regarding [Rushing’s] FMLA leave should be submitted to [Rushing’s] attorney by mail.
(Id. at 9–10.)
threshold matter, the TRO Motion “be treated as one requesting a
preliminary injunction” because “a motion is properly treated as
one for a preliminary injunction when the adverse party has been
given notice, as is the case here.”
cites four factors a court must consider before issuing a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant is likely to prevail
irreparable injury if the court does not grant a preliminary injunction; (3) whether a preliminary injunction would cause substantial
injunction would be in the public interest.”
(Id. at 5 (citing
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566,
573 (6th Cir. 2002); Leary v. Daeshner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th
The Report recommends denying the TRO Motion.
The Report states that the allegations in the TRO Motion
are temporally distinct from the allegations in the Complaint
and address matters not pled in the Complaint.
against Plaintiff . . . as to prevent the issuance of a preliminary injunction.”
The Report also makes certain recommendations about interaction between SCSS and Rushing:
Although it is recommended that no preliminary injunction shall issue, the Court advises Defendants to make all reasonable
efforts to assist Plaintiff with the treatment plan that her psychiatrist has provided[,] and Plaintiff to understand that
certain communications may be necessary as a
current employee of Defendant and as a
Plaintiff pursuing a case against Defendant.
It appears to the Court that, to the extent
that [any] necessary or important communica-
tions may be relayed through Plaintiff’s
counsel or by representatives of [SCSS] not
involved in the allegations in this litigation, it would allow for Plaintiff to follow
her medical treatment plan while [SCSS] also
[complies] with [its] obligations as her employer during the course of this litigation.
(Id. at 6.)
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on
the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of districtcourt duties to magistrate judges.
See United States v. Curtis,
States, 490 U.S. 858, 869–70 (1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003).
judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s
disposition that has been properly objected to.”
P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ.
the evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district court is not required to re-
view –– under a de novo or any other standard –– those aspects
of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
which no specific objection is filed.
The district court
Id. at 151–52.
The Report requires that any objections be filed within
fourteen (14) days after service.
(Report 8; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) (“Within fourteen days after being served with a
copy [of the magistrate judge’s report], any party may serve and
file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.”).)
Because no party has
objected, Arn counsels the Court to adopt the Report in its entirety.
474 U.S. at 151–52.
Adopting the Report is consistent
§ 636 ––
economy and protecting against the “functions of the district
court [being] effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and
the district court perform identical tasks.”
Howard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
For the foregoing reasons, the Report is ADOPTED.
Motion is DENIED.
The Motion for Leave is STRICKEN.
Rushing is ORDERED to file a Unified Complaint as
Case No. 17-02331 is closed administratively.
The Consolidation Motion
ADOPTED, and the TRO Motion is DENIED.
So ordered this 7th day of August, 2017.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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