Parks v. Lebo et al
Filing
101
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 83 MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Chief Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 8/12/19. (mbm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
BRUCE PARKS, JR.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
No. 2:16-cv-2862-STA-jay
)
MATTHEW COCHRAN and
)
JEFF MIDDLETON,
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Jeff Middleton’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 83) filed on
May 3, 2019. The Court held a motion hearing on July 12, 2019. At that time Plaintiff Bruce
Parks, Jr. had not responded to the Motion and stated to the Court that he was unaware of the
filing of the Motion until the Court had set the hearing. The Court granted Parks additional time
to prepare and file his response. Parks has now responded in opposition, and Middleton has filed
a reply. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Parks filed his initial Complaint on October 31, 2016. Parks alleges that on August 12,
2016, while Parks was an inmate at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”), three staff
members identified in the Complaint as “Cpt. Middleton, Lt. Miller, and Sgt. Cochran” came to
Parks’ cell and woke him. (Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1.) The staff members first removed Parks
and his property from the cell.
(Id.) When Parks inquired why staff were moving him,
Middleton told Parks that a female correctional officer had accused Parks of putting semen on
1
her. (Id.) According to Parks, the officer never actually reported this allegation or produced any
evidence to support it.
(Id.)
When the staff members returned Parks to his cell, still in
handcuffs, he was told to put his knees on the bunk. (Id.) Cochran then began to hit Parks,
verbally and mentally abused him, and then threatened to apply a taser to Parks’ head. (Id.) The
initial Complaint alleges that Sgt. Cochran and the other two staff members who participated in
the assault left the cell and that Parks did not receive medical treatment until the next day. (Id.)
Parks alleges in the initial Complaint that he filed a grievance over the assault but could not
verify that the grievance was filed because Parks is in lockdown and in the SMU program. (Id.)
The initial Complaint named only two Defendants, Warden Jonathan Lebo and Matthew
Cochran, the correctional officer who allegedly used excessive force against Parks.
In a
screening order dated June 30, 2017 (ECF No. 9), the Court dismissed the claim against the
warden but concluded that the Complaint stated a plausible claim against Cochran for the
violation of Parks’ Eighth Amendment rights. Cochran subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Parks had failed to exhaust his claim properly through the Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”) grievance process. The Court held a hearing on Cochran’s
motion and later denied the motion in a written order, holding that genuine issues of fact
remained on the exhaustion issue. The Court also directed TDOC to produce the following
information to Parks: (1) the form 2592 report prepared at WTSP, documenting Plaintiff’s
August 12, 2016, injuries; (2) all photographs taken of Plaintiff’s injuries on August 12, 2016, or
at any time thereafter; (3) the medical records for the treatment of Plaintiff’s August 12, 2016,
injuries, both at WTSP and outside medical facility(ies), including follow-up care (if any); and
(4) all other reports, documents, or information in the possession of the Department of
Correction related to Plaintiff’s injuries or claims arising out of or related to the incident on or
2
about August 12, 2016.
Following the entry of a protective order, TDOC submitted the
information for in camera review and produced a copy to Parks.
Based on the contents of TDOC’s disclosures, Parks filed a motion to amend his
complaint to add Middleton as a defendant, which the Court granted on November 28, 2018. In
his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 56), Parks alleges that Middleton was the chief of security at
WTSP in August 2016 and that Middleton ordered Cochran and another correctional officer
identified as “Mr. Braden” to assault Parks. The Amended Complaint alleges that Parks learned
for the first time from TDOC internal reports that Middleton was cited for violations of TDOC
policy over the incident. Parks also alleges that Middleton failed a polygraph test, presumably
when questioned about the alleged assault. Otherwise, the Amended Complaint incorporates by
reference the fact pleadings in the original Complaint.
In his Motion to Dismiss, Middleton argues that the Amended Complaint fails to state a
plausible claim against him. Middleton first raises two claims processing arguments for the
dismissal of the Amended Complaint.
Middleton contends that the one-year statute of
limitations has run on any claim Parks has against him and in the alternative that Parks failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies through the TDOC grievance process.
On the merits,
Middleton argues that the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Middleton was in a position to
intervene or prevent the alleged use of excessive force against Parks.
For these reasons,
Middleton argues that the Court should dismiss the claims against him.
Parks opposes the Motion to Dismiss. According to Parks, his claim is that Middleton
directed subordinate correctional officers to assault him, allegations which constitute direct
involvement in the violation of Parks’ constitutional rights. With respect to the exhaustion issue,
Parks reiterates arguments he first raised in response to Cochran’s motion for summary judgment
3
on the exhaustion issue. As for the statute of limitations, Parks argues that he only learned of the
extent of Middleton’s role in the alleged assault after the Court ordered TDOC in September
2018 to produce its full internal investigation into the matter. As a result, Parks requests that the
Court deny Middleton’s Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A defendant may move to dismiss a claim “for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the Court must treat all of the well-pleaded allegations of the pleadings as true
and construe all of the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Saylor v. Parker Seal Co., 975 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir.
1992). However, legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences need not be accepted as
true. Morgan v. Church’s Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). “To avoid dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect
to all material elements of the claim.” Wittstock v. Mark a Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th
Cir. 2003).
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Although this standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require
more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007). See also Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege
facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
4
and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
Middleton seeks the dismissal of the Amended Complaint’s claims against him based on
Parks’ failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, the running of the statute of limitations,
and defects in the pleadings. Of these issues, exhaustion continues to be a threshold question in
this case, though it remains a question the Court cannot decide as a matter of law. “The Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) mandates that an inmate exhaust ‘such administrative
remedies as are available before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions.” Ross v. Blake, 136
S.Ct. 1850, 1854–55 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Simply put, “unexhausted claims
cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). The Court has already
concluded that genuine issues of fact remain over whether Parks exhausted his administrative
remedies through the TDOC grievance process. See Order Denying Cochran’s Mot. for Summ.
J., Nov. 28, 2019 (ECF No. 53). For the reasons articulated in the Court’s order denying
Cochran’s Rule 56 motion, the Court declines to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) for Parks’ alleged failure to exhaust.
Middleton also argues that the Amended Complaint’s claims against him are time barred.
A statute of limitations is an affirmative defense under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), and
so it is typically inappropriate to dismiss a claim as untimely on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Cataldo
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012). But when the allegations on the face of
the complaint show that the claim is time barred, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper. Bock,
5
549 U.S. at 215. Parks’ claims for the violation of his constitutional rights arise under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State” subjects another to “the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
statute of limitations on a claim for the violation of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is
one year in Tennessee, meaning the limitations period on any claim Parks had against Middleton ran
on August 12, 2017. Jordan v. Blount Cnty., 885 F.3d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a), and Roberson v. Tenn., 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005)). Parks filed
his Amended Complaint on December 14, 2018, more than one year after the limitations period
had expired. Parks’ claim against Middleton will only be consider timely then, if the Amended
Complaint relates back to the filing date of his original Complaint.
Rule 15(c)(1) provides that amended pleadings “relate back to the date of the original
pleading” but only under specific circumstances. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
The amended
pleading relates back to the original pleading where the amendment changes the party or the
naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted and if the following conditions are met: (1)
“the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(B); and (2) “if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and
complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it
will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 656 (2005).
In this case, the Amended Complaint did not change a party or the naming of a party.
6
Parks simply added Middleton as a completely new party to the action. The Sixth Circuit has
held that the relation back doctrine does not apply where an amended pleading adds a completely
new party to the case. See Lester v. Wow Car Co., Ltd., 675 F. App’x 588, 592–93 (6th Cir.
2017) (“Since the New Defendants were added to the complaint and not even plausibly
substituted for an original named defendant, any claims against the New Defendants cannot meet
the requirements of Rule 15(c) which speaks only of an amendment changing the party or the
naming of a party.”). Parks does not actually dispute that the statute of limitations bars his claim
against Middleton or argue that he did not name Middleton in his initial Complaint due to a
mistake. Instead, Parks seems to argue that he did not learn of the findings of an internal
investigation into Middleton’s role in the alleged assault until he received discovery in 2018.
This does not constitute grounds for applying the relation back doctrine. The Court holds that
Parks’ Amended Complaint against Middleton was filed outside of the statute of limitations and
does not relate back to the date of his original Complaint. Therefore, Middleton’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED on the statute of limitations issue.
Having determined that Parks’ claims against Middleton were filed outside of the oneyear statute of limitations, the Court need not reach the issue of whether the Amended Complaint
plausibly alleges a section 1983 claim against Middleton.
CONCLUSION
Parks’ Amended Complaint adding Middleton as a party to this action is now time
barred. Therefore, Middleton’s Motion to Dismiss must be GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: August 12, 2019.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?