Parks v. Lebo et al
Filing
53
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 24 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Chief Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 11/27/18. (mbm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
BRUCE PARKS, JR.,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
No. 2:16-cv-2862-STA-egb
)
SGT. MATTHEW COCHRAN,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
Before the Court is Defendant Sgt. Matthew Cochran’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 24, 25, 26) filed on March 12, 2018. 1 Defendant seeks judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiff Bruce Parks, Jr.’s claim that Defendant, a correctional officer at the West Tennessee
State Penitentiary, violated Parks’ constitutional rights by assaulting him during his incarceration
at the prison. The Court held a hearing September 14, 2018, and received additional testimony
from several witnesses, including Parks. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Parks filed his initial Complaint on October 31, 2016. Parks alleged that on August 12,
2016, he was awakened by three staff members, one of whom was Sgt. Cochran. The staff
members told Parks to place handcuffs on and then moved him from his cell while his property
1
The Clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant’s
name as “Sgt. Matthew Cochran.” The Complaint had spelled Defendant’s last name as
“Cocarhan.”
1
was removed from the cell. (Compl. at 5, ECF No. 1.) When Parks inquired why this was
happening, one of the staff members told Parks that another correctional officer claimed that
Parks had gotten semen on her. (Id.) Parks alleges that this allegation was never reported, and
there was no evidence of such conduct. (Id.) When Parks came back to his cell, still in
handcuffs, he was told to put his knees on the bunk. (Id.) Sgt. Cochran then began to hit Parks,
verbally and mentally abused him, and then threatened to apply a taser to Parks’ head. (Id.) The
Complaint alleges that Sgt. Cochran and the other two staff members who participated in the
assault left the cell and that Parks did not receive medical treatment until the next day. (Id.) The
Complaint further alleges that upon his return from medical treatment at an outside emergency
room, Parks filed a grievance over the assault. (Id.) Parks alleges that because he is in lockdown
and in the SMU program, he was not able to verify that the grievance was filed. (Id.)
In a screening order dated June 30, 2017 (ECF No. 9), the Court concluded that the
Complaint stated a plausible claim against Cochran for the violation of Parks’ Eighth
Amendment rights. Cochran now seeks judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Parks failed to
exhaust his claim properly through the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”)
grievance process. In support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Cochran has asserted that
the following facts are undisputed for purposes of Rule 56. 2 From March 22, 2016 to February
9, 2017, Parks was housed at WTSP in Henning, Tennessee. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed
Fact ¶ 1.) Any grievance filed by Parks during that time would have originated from WTSP.
2
Local Rule 56.1(a) requires a party seeking summary judgment to prepare a statement
of facts “to assist the Court in ascertaining whether there are any material facts in dispute.”
Local R. 56.1(a). A fact is material if the fact “might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the
governing substantive law.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Wiley
v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
2
(Id. ¶ 2.) At the time of the alleged August 12, 2016 incident, Parks was housed in a cell in Unit
1 of WTSP. (Id. ¶ 4.) During his deposition, Parks testified that he filed a grievance related to
the August 12, 2016, incident involving Sgt. Cochran, on August 14, 2016. (Id. ¶ 5.) According
to Parks, he wrote out his grievance on a grievance form and gave the grievance to Corporal
Jones to place in the grievance box. (Id. ¶ 6.)
After Parks gave Corporal Jones the grievance, Parks asked Jones numerous times to
confirm that he had put Parks’ grievance in the grievance box. (Id. ¶ 7.) Jones confirmed to
Parks that he had put the grievance in the grievance box. (Id. ¶ 8.) The grievance box was
located in the center core of Unit 1. (Id. ¶ 9.) Parks testified that the normal process for filing a
grievance in Unit 1 was to give the grievance to Corporal Jones, who would then place the
grievance in the grievance box. (Id. ¶ 10.) Parks later inquired with the warden about the
grievance and was told by the warden that his grievance “was taken care of.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Parks
has never received a response to the grievance. (Id. ¶ 12.) Parks does not have a copy of the
grievance he filed on August 14, 2016, (id. ¶ 13.) and Parks did not file a second grievance
related to the August 12, 2016, incident. (Id. ¶ 14.)
While housed as an inmate at WTSP, Parks filed a total of five (5) grievances. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Parks’ other grievances concern misplaced property, denial of a shower, removal of Parks from
the Ramadan list, and alleged unprofessionalism by a correctional officer toward Parks. (Id. ¶
16.) All grievances filed at WTSP during that period were logged into the Tennessee Offender
Management Information System (“TOMIS”) for processing. (Id. ¶ 17.) Parks was housed in
Unit 1 of WTSP for the grievances he filed on the following dates: March 28, 2016; June 30,
242, 247–48 (1986)). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
3
2016; July 16, 2016; and January 13, 2017. (Id. ¶ 18.) Parks testified during his deposition that
his understanding of the process for filing a grievance on August 14, 2016, was no different than
his understanding of the process for filing grievances on the other dates on which he filed
grievances. (Id. ¶ 19.) Parks understood that he had seven days to file a grievance related to an
incident. (Id. ¶ 20.)
In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Sgt. Cochran argues that Parks failed to exhaust
the administrative grievance process before filing his Complaint based on the alleged assault. It
is undisputed that there is no record of a grievance pertaining to the events of August 12, 2016.
Cochran points out that Parks filed a number of grievances during his incarceration at WTSP and
was obviously familiar with grievance policies and procedures. Even if the Court accepts that
Parks prepared a grievance and requested staff to deposit it in the grievance box on his housing
block, Parks had a responsibility under TDOC policy to advance his grievance to the second
stage of the administrative review process. Assuming the grievance was filed and never acted
upon, Parks should have moved his grievance to the second stage of the process. There is no
evidence that Parks ever exhausted this next step of the TDOC grievance procedure before filing
suit. Therefore, the Court should dismiss the Complaint for failure to exhaust the administrative
procedures.
Cochran filed his Rule 56 Motion on March 12, 2018, making Parks’ response due no
later than April 9, 2018. When Parks failed to respond by that deadline, the Court directed Parks
to respond in an order dated April 20, 2018. The Court advised Parks that his response must
comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56 and cautioned Parks that his failure to respond
to the Motion for Summary Judgment would result in the Court taking up Cochran’s Motion for
Summary Judgment without the benefit of hearing Parks’ position on the Motion. On May 11,
4
2018, the Clerk docketed a letter from Parks addressed to the Court. Parks stated that he
opposed the dismissal of his case but that he did not have access to certain discovery materials.
Plaintiff’s letter specifically referred to photographs of his bruises from the alleged assault as
well as evidence related to the grievance process. Parks also stated that his facility had been on
lockdown for an unspecified period of time. Based on the posture of the case and Parks’ letter to
the Court, the Court set a hearing for September 14, 2018. 3
At the hearing the Court first received testimony from Parks, testimony that largely
tracked the version of events Parks alleged in his Complaint. Parks stated that he had been
summoned from his cell around midnight on August 12, 2016. Officers, including Sergeant
Cochran and Captain Middleton, advised Parks that a female officer had made an assault
complaint against Parks. Before leaving Parks in his cell, Cochran struck Parks with a closed fist
on the right side of his face. Cochran then threatened to put a “butcher” in the cell with Parks,
called Parks a sex offender, and put a taser to Parks’ temple and threatened to use it. Parks
testified that Cochran kicked him in the head, back, and kidneys and left him bleeding on the
floor of the cell. Parks remained lying on the floor until the next morning when Officer Miller
discovered him. Parks received medical attention for his injuries and complaints, while thenLieutenant Barlow and others questioned Parks about what had happened. According to Parks,
Barlow photographed Parks’ injuries.
3
Parks’ letter in response to the Court’s order referred to several correctional officers
who might have information relevant to Parks’ claims. When the Court decided to set this matter
for a hearing, the Court directed TDOC to make these witnesses available to testify. TDOC filed
a response, stating that several of the witnesses no longer worked for the department:
Christopher Jones, Latora DeBerry, Valisa Bankhead, and Keundra Miller. So the Court ordered
TDOC to produce the last known addresses for the former correctional employees and then
ordered summons to issue for each of them. The United States Marshal eventually served Miller
but was unable to serve Jones, DeBerry, or Bankhead.
5
Parks testified under oath that he prepared and submitted a written grievance against
Cochran about the incident. Parks requested a grievance form from a Corporal Jones and
returned the completed grievance to Jones on August 14, 2016. Parks slid the form through the
door flap and asked Jones to put it in the grievance box. Parks claimed, however, that he never
received a response to his grievance. When Parks subsequently questioned Jones about the
grievance, Jones assured him he had placed the grievance in the grievance box. Parks also asked
Warden Lebo about the grievance and was told it was “taken care of.” Parks did not re-file the
grievance.
The Court next received testimony from then-Lieutenant Terry Barlow. 4 At the time of
the alleged assault, Barlow was the first-shift commander at WTSP and received the initial report
about Parks’ need for medical attention. Parks reported to Barlow that Sergeant Cochran and
Captain Middleton had used force against him. Barlow testified that a form described as a 2592
or an AIT (accident-injury-trauma) report was completed. Although Barlow did not recall the
specific injuries Parks complained of, Barlow did remember that Parks walked with a limp and
reported that he was having trouble breathing. Barlow further testified that Parks was housed in
a high-security unit at WTSP at that time and that because of his security classification, Parks
would have needed to hand a grievance to a correctional officer or request a meeting with the
unit manager or counselor and submit a grievance directly to them. Barlow explained that in the
event an inmate claims he submitted a grievance and never received a response, Barlow’s
practice was to verify when the inmate turned in the grievance, review security video footage
from that date and time, and question the correctional officer who had received the grievance.
4
Barlow testified that he is currently the warden at the Tennessee Prison for Women.
6
Barlow received a promotion a short time after the alleged assault and did not investigate Parks’
grievance. Barlow testified that any video from August 2016 would no longer exist unless a
prison official had archived it.
The Court next received testimony from two correctional officers at WTSP, Sergeant
Christy Parker and Officer Keundra Miller. Parker is the current grievance chairperson at
WTSP, though Parker was not the grievance chair in 2016. Parker testified to her personal
practice about handling and processing inmate grievances but could not testify to the practice of
her predecessor who would have handled grievances in August 2016. Miller, who is no longer
employed as a corrections officer, was the officer who found Parks on the morning after the
alleged assault. According to Miller, Parks was lying in the floor of his cell during a morning
security check. Miller observed that Parks’ mouth was bleeding and that he was barely able to
speak. Miller also saw what appeared to be bruises on Parks’ ribs. 5
After the Court had received testimony from the witnesses, the Court heard from counsel
for Cochran. According to counsel, any official report or other record of the incident would be
in Parks’ official TDOC file. Cochran did not produce the file to Parks in the course of the
normal discovery period because Parks never made a request for it. Parks answered that he did
not know that he had to make a formal request for the file or any other discovery. Parks
confirmed that he had never received a copy of the AIT report or the photos taken to document
his injuries in August 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court directed TDOC to
produce the following information: (1) the form 2592 report prepared at WTSP, documenting
5
Parks’ mother, Leslie Jackson, addressed the Court at the conclusion of the hearing,
though Ms. Jackson was not placed under oath to testify. Ms. Jackson stated that she received a
call about her son being taken to the hospital for treatment after the alleged assault and only
7
Plaintiff’s August 12, 2016, injuries; (2) all photographs taken of Plaintiff’s injuries on August
12, 2016, or at any time thereafter; (3) the medical records for the treatment of Plaintiff’s August
12, 2016, injuries, both at WTSP and outside medical facility(ies), including follow-up care (if
any); and (4) all other reports, documents, or information in the possession of the Department of
Correction related to Plaintiff’s injuries or claims arising out of or related to the incident on or
about August 12, 2016.
Following the entry of a protective order, TDOC submitted the
information for in camera review and produced a copy to Parks.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a party is entitled to summary
judgment if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]hough determining
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment is a question of law, it is a
legal question that sits near the law-fact divide.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 674 (2009). In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986), and the “judge may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 379 (6th Cir. 1994).
When the motion is supported by
documentary proof such as depositions and affidavits, the nonmoving party may not rest on his
pleadings but, rather, must present some “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. It is not sufficient “simply [to] show that there is some
talked to her son three days later. Ms. Jackson also stated that she had attempted to find an
attorney who would take her son’s case.
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metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. These facts must be
more than a scintilla of evidence and must meet the standard of whether a reasonable juror could
find by a preponderance of the evidence that the nonmoving party is entitled to a verdict.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In this Circuit, “this requires the
nonmoving party to ‘put up or shut up’ [on] the critical issues of [his] asserted causes of action.”
Lord v. Saratoga Cap., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 840, 847 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (citing Street v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir. 1989)).
When determining if summary judgment is appropriate, the Court should ask “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-side that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
Summary judgment must be entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
ANALYSIS
Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State” subjects another to “the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to
prevail on such a claim, a section 1983 plaintiff must establish “(1) that there was the deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting
under color of state law.” Wittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
“Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right,” Humes v. Gilless, 154 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1357 (W.D. Tenn. 2001), but creates a “species of tort liability” for the violation of rights
guaranteed in the Constitution itself. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 916 (2017)
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(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
The issue presented is whether Parks has properly exhausted his § 1983 claim against
Sgt. Cochran through the TDOC grievance procedure.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires a prisoner to exhaust all available administrative
remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 action. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); HarbinBey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005).
“No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is mandatory, and “unexhausted
claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). “When the
defendants in prisoner civil rights litigation move for summary judgment on administrative
exhaustion grounds, they must prove that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies.” Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017)
(citing Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2012)).
The prison, in this case TDOC, defines the process and “the boundaries of proper
exhaustion,” not the PLRA. Jones, 549 U.S. at 218. TDOC has established a three-step review
process for inmate grievances with specific time limits for each stage of the process. An inmate
initiates the process by filing a completed grievance form. TDOC Policy 501.01 § VI. (C)(1),
ex. A to Parker Aff. (ECF No. 26-1). At the first step of the process (Level I), the grievance
chairperson, who is assigned by the warden to administer the grievance process, receives the
properly completed grievance form and must notify the inmate of a response to the grievance
within 7 working days. Id. At the second step of the process (Level II), the inmate has 5
working days to appeal the chairperson’s Level I decision to a grievance committee and the
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warden. Id. at § VI. (C)(2). The grievance committee must hold a hearing within 5 working
days of the filing of the appeal and must issue a written decision to the warden within 5 working
days thereafter. Id. The warden then has 7 working days from receipt of the committee’s
decision in which to make and forward a final decision to the grievance chairperson. Id. The
chairperson then makes the warden’s Level II decision available to the inmate. Id. At the third
step of the process (Level III), the inmate may appeal the warden’s Level II decision to the
TDOC deputy commissioner of operations or a designee of the deputy commissioner, who has
final say on the grievance. Id. at § VI(C)(3). Each of the time limits at all the steps of the
grievance process is significant. “If a time limit expires at any stage of the process without the
required response, the grievant may move the grievance to the next stage of the process, unless
the inmate agrees in writing to a fixed extension of the time limit for response.” Id. at § VI(D).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Parks, a reasonable juror could find that
Parks did all that TDOC policy required to file a timely grievance. The Sixth Circuit has held
that “administrative remedies are exhausted when prison officials fail to timely respond to a
properly filed grievance.” Boyd v. Corr. Corp. Am., 380 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 2004). Parks
testified at his deposition and at the hearing before the Court that he completed a written
grievance and delivered it to a correctional officer for submission on August 14, 2016. Barlow,
who was at the time a lieutenant and shift commander at WTSP, testified that Parks’ submission
of the grievance to a correctional officer was the correct procedure for an inmate in Parks’
security classification. It is obviously undisputed that Parks never received a formal response to
his grievance. At the very least, there is a genuine dispute over whether Parks filed a grievance
and initiated Level I of the TDOC process, a dispute that cannot be resolved at summary
judgment. Parks also testified that although the correctional officer subsequently confirmed to
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Parks that the officer had submitted the grievance, Parks now believes that the officer never
submitted the grievance. Parks Dep. 81:7-21, Dec. 12, 2017 (ECF No. 26-2). Accepting Parks’
testimony as true, Parks filed his grievance properly, and the facility failed to respond to it. This
proof suffices to show that Parks exhausted his claim.
Cochran argues in his summary judgment brief that an inmate cannot simply abandon a
grievance but must proceed to the next step of the grievance process when a jail or prison official
fails to respond to a grievance. It is true that “proper exhaustion” requires a prisoner to “tak[e]
advantage of each step the prison holds out for resolving the claim internally and by following
the critical procedural rules of the prison’s grievance procedure to permit prison officials to
review and, if necessary, correct the grievance on the merits.” Reed–Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d
322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006)).
Cochran’s
arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, TDOC policy did not require Parks to move his
grievance to the next step of the process. The language of the policy is permissive (“the grievant
may move the grievance to the next stage of the process . . .”), not mandatory. Submitting the
grievance was all TDOC policy “specifically required” Parks to do. Risher v. Lappin, 639 F.3d
236, 240–41 (6th Cir. 2011) (“declin[ing] to impose requirements on [an inmate] for exhaustion
purposes that go beyond what was specifically required by the [jail]’s grievance procedure”). 6
6
The Court finds that one of the cases cited by Cochran, Whipple v. Rochelle, No. 1:150040, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161074 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2017) is arguably at odds with
Risher. The U.S. magistrate judge in Whipple recommended that the district court grant
summary judgment for the inmate’s failure to exhaust, reasoning that TDOC policy permitted the
inmate to advance a grievance to the next step of the process, when he did not receive a timely
response to his grievance. For the reasons the Court has already explained, this feature of the
TDOC policy is permissive, not mandatory. As the Court reads Risher, inmates like Parks are
not “specifically required” to move forward with a grievance when jail administration fails to
take timely action.
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The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 1999), which
Cochran cites for support, is distinguishable. Cochran relies on Hartsfield for the proposition
that an inmate cannot abandon the grievance process, simply because he does not receive a
response to a grievance. Def.’s Mem. in Support 4 (ECF No. 25). The inmate in Hartsfield was
told that there was no record of his grievance and was instructed to re-file it. What is more, the
policy at issue in Hartsfield, a directive of the Michigan Department of Correction, required an
inmate who did not receive a response to a grievance to continue on to the next stage of the
process. Hartsfield, 199 F.3d at 309 (“Even if plaintiff did file an initial grievance against
Mowatt and Vidor, he was required to continue to the next step in the grievance process within
the time frame set forth in the regulations if no response is received from prison officials or if the
prisoner is not satisfied with the response. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, Policy Directive
03.02.130, ¶ G.”). The Michigan policy in Hartsfield was perhaps similar to the Ohio policy the
Sixth Circuit considered in Troche v. Crabtree, 814 F.3d 795 (6th Cir. 2016), which treated a
facility’s failure to respond to an inmate grievance at the first step of the process as an
“automatic waiver” of the opportunity to respond and required the inmate to advance the
grievance to the next step of the process. Troche, 814 F.3d at 800. These cases only underscore
the fact that “all prison grievance procedures are not made alike, and what a prisoner is required
to do by one grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies is not necessarily
required by another.” Id. at 801. They do not show what Parks was required to do as a matter of
TDOC administrative policy.
And one final decision cited by Cochran is not inconsistent with the Court’s reasoning.
In Perkins v. Nashville Sheriff Department, no. 3:14-cv-02334, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105332
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2015), the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment for a
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failure to exhaust the grievance process. But the proof in Perkins showed that the inmate had
been told in response to his inquiry about a grievance that there was no record of it and was
advised to re-file it, just like the inmate in Hartsfield. Perkins, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105332,
at *20. The district court in Perkins concluded that these facts, taken with the fact that the
inmate had received proper responses to his other grievances, tended to show that the inmate had
abandoned his grievance. Id. at **21–22. Perkins is simply factually distinguishable. There is
no evidence in this case that any prison official ever informed Parks there was no record of his
grievance or advised him to re-file it. On the contrary, Parks testified that a correctional officer
and the warden himself had assured him that the grievance was being “taken care of.” This proof
is inconsistent with Cochran’s theory that Parks abandoned a properly filed grievance.
Having concluded that a reasonable juror could find that Parks properly exhausted his
grievance against Cochran, Cochran is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
exhaustion issue.
CONCLUSION
Genuine issues of material fact remain over whether Parks properly exhausted his
administrative remedies.
Therefore, Cochran’s Motion for Summary Judgment must be
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: November 27, 2018.
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