Denton v. Shelby County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS ORDER CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE. Signed by Chief Judge S. Thomas Anderson on 9/13/18. (mbm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
LEON DENTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE and
THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Defendants.

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No. 16-3010-STA-egb

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS
ORDER CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND
NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

On December 28, 2016, Plaintiff Leon Denton, who is currently incarcerated at the
Whiteville Correctional Facility in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed pro se a Complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 4.) On
January 18, 2017, the Court granted Denton leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the
civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 5.) The Clerk is instructed to record the Defendants as Shelby
County, Tennessee and the State of Tennessee. 1
BACKGROUND
On April 25, 2012, Denton was charged with five counts of aggravated rape, two counts
of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. (https://cjs.shelbycountytn.gov;

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The Court construes claims against the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office as claims against
Shelby County, Tennessee and claims against the Tennessee Judicial System as claims against
the State of Tennessee. The Clerk is DIRECTED to modify the docket accordingly.

case no. 12 02872-11142095). On May 31, 2012, Denton was charged with additional counts of
aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. (Id.) On September 3, 2015, a jury
convicted Denton of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated robbery. (Id.)
On April 25, 2012, Denton was charged in a separate proceeding with one count of aggravated
burglary and one count of theft of property. (https://cjs.shelbycountytn.gov; case no. 12 0193411142095). The state dismissed the second action nolle prosequi on December 8, 2016. (Id.)
In the Complaint before the Court, Denton alleges that he was wrongfully convicted of
aggravated rape and robbery, though Denton does not specify how the conviction was wrongful.2
(Attach. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-1.) Denton does allege that the transcript of his trial was
altered. According to Denton, the transcript includes testimony a victim did not actually give at
trial and omits the same witness’s exculpatory testimony, which would aid Denton’s case on
appeal. (Id.) Denton also complains about court dates being reset without notice and the trial
court’s refusal to provide him with a transcript of the preliminary hearing in his burglary case.
(Id.) Denton argues that he waited in detention for five years to have his first case proceed to
trial and that he is still awaiting trial on another case. (Id. at 2.) Denton claims that he has
brought these issues to the attention of his trial attorney as well as to the state court.
The Complaint goes on to raise a number of allegations about jail staff abusing other
inmates, the poor quality of food served at the jail, and threats of retaliation against inmates who
complain about these conditions. (Id.) Denton has filed a petition with his Complaint, listing
alleged violations at the jail and bearing the signatures of 107 inmates. (Petition at 1-7, ECF No.

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The Complaint also refers to Denton’s brother, Devan Denton. Because Devan Denton
is not a named party to this action, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider these allegations
further.
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1-2.) 3 In his prayer for relief, Denton seeks an order vacating his conviction in case no. 1202872, the dismissal of the charges against him in case no. 12-01934, and an award of $6 million
in compensatory damages. (Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1-1.)
SCREENING STANDARD
The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any
portion thereof, if the complaint—
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be
granted, the Court applies the pleadings standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Court accepts the Complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines
whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” Williams v. Curtin, 631
F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not
entitled to the assumption of truth,” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Ultimately, a complaint need only contain “a short and

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The Court will not review all of the allegations contained in the petition because Denton
lacks standing to pursue claims on behalf of other inmates. “To state a case or controversy under
Article III [of the United States Constitution], a plaintiff must establish standing.” Ariz.
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011). Denton can only seek relief for
injuries he himself has suffered. Percival v. McGinnis, 24 F. App’x 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2001); see
also Corn v. Sparkman, No. 95-5494, 1996 WL 185753, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (“A
prisoner cannot bring claims on behalf of other prisoners. A prisoner must allege a personal loss
and seek to vindicate a deprivation of his own constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)).
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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “showing, rather than a
blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Even so, pro se litigants and
prisoners are not exempt from the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). District courts are therefore not required “to
ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants.” Young Bok Song v. Gipson,
423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011). In the final analysis, a court “cannot create a claim
which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608,
612-13 (6th Cir. 2011).
ANALYSIS
I. Section 1983
Denton filed his pro se Complaint on the official form for actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured . . . .
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation
of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a
defendant acting under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150

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(1970). The Court holds that Denton has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against either
Defendant.
First, Denton has failed to state a plausible claim against Shelby County. When a § 1983
claim is made against a municipality or other local government, the Court must analyze two
distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2)
if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Here, the Complaint contains no facts to show that
Shelby County is responsible for any violation of Denton’s constitutional rights.

A local

government “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v.
Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also Searcy v. City of
Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir.
1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is
a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92; Deaton v. Montgomery Cnty., Ohio, 989 F.2d 885, 889
(6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal
policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular
injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
The Court holds that Denton has failed to allege the existence of any county policy or
custom. Civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating municipal
liability with particularity. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993). Still, in order “[t]o avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a

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complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations with respect to all material
elements of the claim.” Wittstock v. Mark a Van Sile, Inc., 330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003).
At the very least, a complaint must satisfy Rule 8(a)’s notice pleading requirements and give a
municipality notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability. E.g., Oliver v. City of Memphis, No. 042074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004). Denton’s Complaint fails to
identify an official policy or custom which caused his alleged injury. Instead, it appears Denton
is suing Shelby County because he was confined in a county institution, and Shelby County
employed persons who allegedly violated his rights. These allegations fail to state a claim for
municipal liability against Shelby County. Therefore, Denton’s claim against Shelby County is
DISMISSED.
Likewise, the Court holds that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief
against the State of Tennessee. It is well-settled that Denton cannot sue the State of Tennessee
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, a state is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). More fundamentally, Tennessee is immune from suit.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The Supreme Court has construed the
Eleventh Amendment to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal court. Welch v.
Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973). Furthermore, the State of

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Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). While a
state is free to “waive its sovereign immunity” and Congress has authority to abrogate a state’s
sovereign immunity, “absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a
private person’s suit against a State.” Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S.
247, 253-54 (2011). For all of these reasons, Denton’s claims against the State of Tennessee are
DISMISSED.
In the alternative, any claims arising from Denton’s conviction are barred by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's
action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding
criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed,
in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086
(6th Cir. 1995) (same). In this case Denton has essentially attacked the validity of his conviction
in state court but without showing that the conviction has been reversed, vacated, invalidated,
expunged, or called into doubt. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481-82; see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (whenever the relief sought is release from prison, the only remedy is
through a habeas petition, not a § 1983 complaint); Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its

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duration are the province of habeas corpus.”). As a result, Heck bars all of Denton’s claims
related to the validity of his conviction.
Having determined that the Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief, Denton’s
Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
II. Leave to Amend
The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his
complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,
951 (6th Cir. 2013). But in this case, the Court concludes that leave to amend is not warranted
because Denton cannot cure the defects identified by the Court. Therefore, Denton will not be
granted an opportunity to file an amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court DISMISSES Denton’s Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Leave to amend is
DENIED because Denton cannot cure the deficiencies in his Complaint.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether Denton has a
good faith basis for an appeal of the Court’s decision. The good faith standard is an objective
one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is
taken in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not
frivolous. Id. It would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should
be dismissed prior to service on a defendant but has sufficient merit to support an appeal in
forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same
considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the
conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, it is CERTIFIED,

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Denton would not be taken
in good faith.
The Court must also address the assessment of the $505 appellate filing fee if Denton
nevertheless appeals the dismissal of the case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good
faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff’s ability to take advantage of the installment
procedures contained in § 1915(b). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other grounds by LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951. McGore sets
out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b).

Denton is

instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the
appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(a)(2) by
filing an updated in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust
account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.
For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), this is the first dismissal of one of Denton’s cases
as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This “strike” shall take effect when judgment is
entered. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763-64 (2015).
The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ S. Thomas Anderson
S. THOMAS ANDERSON
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Date: September 13, 2018.

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