Gilchrist v. Colvin
Filing
26
ORDER affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 03/25/2019. (jmd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
KORTAVIUS LE’UNDRE GILCHRIST,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
No. 2:17-CV-02027-TMP
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social
)
Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
_________________________________________________________________
ORDER AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
_________________________________________________________________
Before the court is plaintiff Kortavius Gilchrist’s appeal
from a final decision of the Commissioner 1 of Social Security
(“Commissioner”) denying his application for supplemental security
income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”),
42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.
(ECF No. 1.)
After the parties consented
to the jurisdiction of the United States magistrate judge, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this case was referred to the undersigned.
(ECF
No.
16.)
For
the
reasons
below,
the
decision
of
the
Commissioner is affirmed.
I.
1Carolyn
FINDINGS OF FACT
W. Colvin was the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
at the time this action was filed. Therefore, she is named in the
in the caption to this case. As of the date of this order, the
Acting Commissioner of Social Security is Nancy A. Berryhill.
On May 31, 2012, Lisa Gilchrist applied for SSI on Kortavius
Gilchrist’s behalf under Title XVI of the Act, with an alleged
onset
date
of
November
19,
2007. 2
(R.
54.)
The
claimant
(“Gilchrist”), who was born on September 1, 1998, was thirteen
years old when his initial application for benefits was filed.
(Id.)
The
Social
Security
Administration
(“SSA”)
denied
Gilchrist's application initially and upon reconsideration.
83, 90.)
At Gilchrist’s request, a hearing was held before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on October 22, 2013.
106.)
(R.
(R. at 95,
On December 2, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision denying
Gilchrist's request for SSI.
(R. 21-33.)
On January 27, 2015, the
Appeals Council denied Gilchrist’s request for review, making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
(R. 1.)
Gilchrist then appealed the ALJ’s December 2 decision to this
court.
Subsequently, the Commissioner moved to remand the case to
the ALJ for further consideration and the court granted the motion.
(R. 407-410.)
Following remand, the ALJ issued a final decision on November
9, 2016, and again found that Gilchrist is not entitled to any
benefits.
(R. 368-382.)
Gilchrist turned eighteen years old
before the ALJ issued this decision.
2When
As a result, the ALJ analyzed
the initial application was filed, Gilchrist was under
eighteen years old; however, he turned eighteen before the ALJ
rendered a final decision. Therefore, Gilchrist himself (not his
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whether Gilchrist was disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(C) of the
Act from Gilchrist’s alleged onset date until August 31, 2016,
which was the day before his eighteenth birthday.
The ALJ then
analyzed whether Gilchrist was disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A)
of
the
Act
for
the
period
following
Gilchrist’s
eighteenth
birthday.
Under the Section 1614(a)(3)(C) analysis, the ALJ initially
found
that
Gilchrist
has
not
engaged
in
substantial
activity since he filed his application for SSI.
gainful
(R. 373.)
At
step two, the ALJ found that, prior to Gilchrist’s eighteenth
birthday,
Gilchrist
had
the
following
severe
impairments:
“attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant
disorder,
and
borderline
intellectual
functioning.”
(Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ’s analysis proceeded to step three where he
concluded that:
Before attaining age 18, the claimant did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A or B [(the
“listings”)].
. . . [And] [b]efore attaining age 18 the claimant did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
functionally equaled the listings.
(Id.)
In making this determination, the ALJ made the following
findings as it relates to the six domains of function: before
mother) brings the instant action.
-3-
attaining age eighteen the claimant had 1) less than a marked
limitation in acquiring and using information (R. 376); 2) less
than a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks (R.
377); 3) a marked limitation in interacting and relating with
others (R. 378); 4) no limitation in moving about and manipulating
objects (R. 379); 5) less than a marked limitation in the ability
to care for himself (Id.); and 6) no limitation in health and
physical well-being (R. 380).
The ALJ therefore concluded that
“[b]ecause the claimant did not have an impairment or combination
of
impairments
that
met,
medically
equaled
any
listing
or
functionally equaled the listing, the claimant was not disabled
prior to attaining age eighteen.”
(Id.)
As for Gilchrist’s Section 1614(a)(3)(A) claim, the ALJ found
that Gilchrist continued to have the same severe impairments that
he had prior to turning eighteen years old.
(Id.)
However, the
ALJ found that Gilchrist did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments listed in or medically equal to one of the listed
impairments contained within the listings.
(Id.)
The ALJ then
concluded the Gilchrist maintains the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional level but
with the following nonexertional limitations: limited to
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and occasional
contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general
public.
-4-
(R. 381.)
After discussing the basis for this RFC, the ALJ
proceeded to step four and concluded that Gilchrist had no past
relevant work.
(Id.)
As a result, the ALJ’s analysis advanced to
step five where he stated that:
considering
the
claimant’s
age,
education,
work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.
(Id.)
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Gilchrist was not
disabled and was therefore not entitled to benefits.
Gilchrist did
not file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision with the Appeals Council;
and, as a result, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner on the sixty-first day following the day that the
ALJ rendered his decision.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484.
Gilchrist filed the instant action on January 13, 2017,
seeking review of the ALJ’s decision.
Gilchrist raises two arguments.
(ECF No. 1.)
In his appeal,
Gilchrist initially argues that
the “ALJ erred by failing to find Plaintiff had marked limitations
in the domains of acquiring and using information and attending and
completing tasks.”
(ECF No. 20 at 8.)
This first argument applies
to Gilchrist’s claim under Section 1614(a)(3)(C) of the Act.
Gilchrist’s next argument relates to his Section 1614(a)(3)(A)
claim.
In this regard, Gilchrist argues that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence “because there
-5-
is no evidence in the record assessing Plaintiff’s ability to
work.”
(Id. at 16.)
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant may obtain judicial
review of any final decision made by the Commissioner after a
hearing to which he or she was a party.
“The court shall have
power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.”
the
Commissioner’s
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
decision
is
limited
to
Judicial review of
whether
there
is
substantial evidence to support the decision and whether the
Commissioner used the proper legal criteria in making the decision.
Id.; Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir.
2015); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011); Rogers v.
Comm’r
of
Soc.
Sec.,
486
F.3d
234,
241
(6th
Cir.
2007).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less
than preponderance, and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Kirk v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
-6-
In
determining
whether
substantial
evidence
exists,
the
reviewing court must examine the evidence in the record as a whole
and “must ‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from its weight.’”
Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir.
1990) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984)).
If
Commissioner’s
substantial
decision,
evidence
however,
is
the
found
court
to
support
the
must
affirm
that
decision and “may not even inquire whether the record could support
a decision the other way.”
Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794
(6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Similarly, the court may not
try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide
questions of credibility.
Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d
709, 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509
(6th Cir. 2007)).
Rather, the Commissioner, not the court, is
charged with the duty to weigh the evidence, to make credibility
determinations, and to resolve material conflicts in the testimony.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997);
Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990); Kiner v.
Colvin, No. 12-2254-JDT, 2015 WL 1295675, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
23, 2015).
B.
The Three-Step Analysis
Section 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) of the Act states that:
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An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered
disabled for the purposes of this title if that
individual has a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment, which results in marked and severe
functional limitations, and which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months . . . .
Under
the
Act,
the
claimant
bears
the
establishing an entitlement to benefits.
ultimate
burden
of
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(a);
Lowery v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 55 F. App'x 333, 341 (6th Cir.
2003).
A
child’s
entitlement
to
social
security
benefits
is
determined by a three-step sequential analysis set out in the
Social Security Regulations.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.
First, the
child must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
C.F.R. § 416.924(b).
Second, a finding must be made that the child
suffers from a medically determinable severe impairment.
C.F.R. § 416.924(c).
See 20
See 20
In the third step, the ALJ determines whether
the impairment or combination of impairments meets, medically
equals, or functionally equals the severity of any impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1.
See Peck o/b/o
A.M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 114-CV-01252-STA-DKV, 2017 WL
4074613, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2017).
If the impairment
satisfies the criteria for a listed impairment, the claimant is
considered to be disabled.
On the other hand, if the claimant’s
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impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ must
find that the child is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d).
C.
The Five-Step Analysis
The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any
substantial
gainful
activity
by
reason
of
any
medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 3
423(d)(1).
42 U.S.C. §
Additionally, section 423(d)(2) of the Act states that:
An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering
his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any
individual), “work which exists in the national economy”
means work which exists in significant numbers either in
the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
Under
the
Act,
the
claimant
bears
establishing an entitlement to benefits.
the
burden
of
Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 415 F. App’x 681, 682 (6th Cir. 2011).
3The
ultimate
The initial burden is
five-step analysis is applicable to social security claims
brought by claimants who are eighteen and older. Because Gilchrist
turned eighteen before the ALJ issued his decision, the ALJ also
considered whether Gilchrist was disabled (since his eighteenth
birthday) under the five-step analysis.
-9-
on the claimant to prove she has a disability as defined by the
Act.
Siebert v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 744, 746 (6th
Cir. 2004) (citing Walters, 127 F.3d at 529); see also Born v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 1168, 1173 (6th Cir.
1990).
the
If the claimant is able to do so, the burden then shifts to
Commissioner
to
demonstrate
with
the
the
existence
claimant’s
of
available
employment
compatible
disability
and
background.
Born, 923 F.2d at 1173; see also Griffith v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 582 F. App’x 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2014).
Entitlement to social security benefits is determined by a
five-step sequential analysis set forth in the Social Security
Regulations.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920.
First, the
claimant must not be engaged in substantial gainful activity.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b).
See
Second, a finding must be
made that the claimant suffers from a severe impairment.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) & 416.920(a)(5)(ii).
20 C.F.R.
In the third step, the
ALJ determines whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
criteria set forth in the Listing of Impairments contained in the
Social
Security
Regulations.
404.1525, 404.1526.
See
20
C.F.R.
§§
404.1520(d),
If the impairment satisfies the criteria for a
listed impairment, the claimant is considered to be disabled.
On
the other hand, if the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal
a listed impairment, the ALJ must undertake the fourth step in the
-10-
analysis and determine whether the claimant has the RFC to return
to any past relevant work.
404.1520(e).
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) &
If the ALJ determines that the claimant can return to
past relevant work, then a finding of not disabled must be entered.
Id.
But if the ALJ finds the claimant unable to perform past
relevant work, then at the fifth step the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant can perform other work existing in significant
numbers
in
the
404.1520(a)(4)(v),
national
economy.
404.1520(g)(1),
See
20
C.F.R.
416.960(c)(1)-(2).
§§
Further
review is not necessary if it is determined that an individual is
not disabled at any point in this sequential analysis.
20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4).
D.
Whether Gilchrist’s Impairments are “Functionally Equal” to a
Listed Impairment
A child’s functional equivalency is assessed in terms of six
domains: “(1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and
completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4)
moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for oneself; and
(6) health and physical well-being.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
A child’s impairment is “functionally equal” to a listed impairment
“if the child has an extreme limitation in one area of functioning
or a marked limitation in two areas of functioning.”
See Millen v.
Astrue, No. 2:13-cv-02148-JPM-cgc, 2016 WL 2894927, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. May 18, 2016) (quoting Miller ex rel. Devine v. Comm'r of
-11-
Soc. Sec., 37 F. App’x. 146, 148 (6th Cir. 2002)); 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(a).
20 C.F.R. §416.926a(e)(2), in part, provides the
following definition of a marked limitation:
(i) We will find that you have a “marked” limitation in a
domain when your impairment(s) interferes seriously with
your ability to independently initiate, sustain, or
complete activities. Your day-to-day functioning may be
seriously limited when your impairment(s) limits only one
activity or when the interactive and cumulative effects
of your impairment(s) limit several activities. “Marked”
limitation also means a limitation that is “more than
moderate” but “less than extreme.” It is the equivalent
of the functioning we would expect to find on
standardized testing with scores that are at least two,
but less than three, standard deviations below the mean.
(ii) If you have not attained age 3, we will generally
find that you have a “marked” limitation if you are
functioning at a level that is more than one-half but not
more than two-thirds of your chronological age when there
are no standard scores from standardized tests in your
case record.
Gilchrist argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find that
Gilchrist had a marked limitation in the domains of 1) acquiring
and using information; and 2) attending and completing tasks.
While the ALJ did not find a marked limitation in either of those
domains, he did find that Gilchrist had a marked limitation in the
domain of interacting and relating with others.
16.)
(ECF No. 20 at 10-
Thus, reversal is required if either of Gilchrist’s arguments
has merit.
1.
Acquiring and Using Information
“The domain of acquiring and using information concerns a
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child's ability to acquire or learn information, and to use the
information she has learned.”
Trammell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:13-cv-794, 2015 WL 1020221, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2015).
“A
child must ‘be able to use language to think about the world and to
understand
others
and
express
[himself];
e.g.,
directions, ask for information, or explain something.’”
to
follow
Dodson ex
rel. S.L.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:11-cv-332, 2012 WL
1831844, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 2012) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(g)(1)(ii)).
“School age children should be able to learn
to read, write, do math, discuss history and science, and use
skills in daily living situations at home and in the community.”
Kelley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-1009, 2016 WL 7477567,
at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 29, 2016).
In making the determination that Gilchrist had less than a
marked limitation in the domain of acquiring and using information,
the ALJ stated:
Social Security regulation 20 C.F.R. 416.926a(g)(3) sets
forth some examples of limited functioning in this domain
that children of different ages might have. The examples
do not apply to a child of a particular age; rather, they
cover a range of ages and developmental periods. In
addition, the examples do not necessarily describe
“marked” or “extreme” limitation in the domain. Some
examples of difficulty children could have in acquiring
and using information are: (i) does not understand words
about space, size, or time . . . (ii) cannot rhyme words
or the sounds in words; (iii) has difficulty recalling
important things learned in school yesterday; (iv) has
difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing
arithmetic answers; or (v) talks only in short, simple
-13-
sentences, and has the difficulty explaining what he
means.
Before attaining age 18, the claimant had less than
marked limitation in acquiring and using information. No
limitation in this area was observed during the mental
status examinations of both consultative examinations.
However, the undersigned finds that a less than marked
limitation is warranted, given the claimant’s borderline
intellectual functioning and poor performance in school.
(R. 376-77) (emphasis in original).
Gilchrist argues that the ALJ
erred by failing to find that Gilchrist has a marked limitation in
the domain of acquiring and using information.
(ECF No. 20 at 10.)
Much of Gilchrist’s argument centers around his contention that the
ALJ erred in giving the opinion of Susan Mathis, APN, minimal
weight.
Mathis, who is an advanced nurse practitioner, is not an
acceptable medical source.
See Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 591
F. App’x 449 (Mem), 451 (6th Cir. 2015) (“A nurse practitioner is
not an acceptable medical source, but rather falls in the category
of
other
evaluating
sources.”).
the
“The
opinions
of
ALJ
enjoys
broad
non-acceptable
discretion
medical
in
sources.”
Davidson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-0102, 2018 WL 4690962,
at *5 (M.D. July 20, 2018).
Although Mathis found that Gilchrist
had a marked limitation in the domain of acquiring and using
information, the ALJ properly exercised his broad discretion in
assigning Mathis’s opinion little weight.
Specifically, the ALJ
offered the following discussion of Mathis’s opinions:
[T]he November 2012 opinion of treating therapist [sic]
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Susan Mathis is given little weight, as her opinion is
not supported by the treatment notes or other evidence of
record. Ex. B8F. Likewise, the April 2013 opinion of Ms.
Mathis is also given little weight because treatment
notes do not document marked limitation in acquiring and
using information or in attending and completing tasks.
Ex. B9F.
(R. 375.)
Accordingly, the court concludes that the ALJ did not
err when he discounted Mathis’s opinion.
Gilchrist also argues that because he performed poorly in
school and was placed in a special education program, the ALJ
should have found that Gilchrist has a marked limitation in the
domain of acquiring and using information.
The court rejects this argument.
(ECF No. 20 at 12-14.)
While the evidence cited by
Gilchrist could aid in establishing that he had a marked limitation
in that domain, there is no requirement that an ALJ must find a
marked limitation because of that evidence.
In addition, the ALJ
did not ignore evidence of Gilchrist’s school performance.
To the
contrary, the ALJ utilized this evidence to conclude that Gilchrist
has some limitation, but less than a marked limitation, in the
domain of acquiring and using information.
the
undersigned
finds
that
a
less
than
(See R. 377) (“However,
marked
limitation
is
warranted, given the claimant’s borderline intellectual functioning
and poor performance in school.”).
In sum, the court concludes
that the ALJ’s determination that Gilchrist has less than a marked
limitation in acquiring and using information was proper because it
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was supported by substantial evidence (including the reports of
Michael Guinle, Ph.D. and Dr. Hugh Moore).
2.
Attending and Completing Tasks
Next, Gilchrist argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find
that Gilchrist has a marked limitation in the domain of attending
and completing tasks. (ECF No. 20 at 14-16.)
Gilchrist essentially
repeats the identical arguments he made in relation to the domain
of acquiring and using information.
The court rejects those
arguments for the same reasons stated above.
Moreover, the ALJ
concluded that Gilchrist has less than a marked limitation in the
domain of attending and completing tasks based on Gilchrist’s
“mental status examinations [by] both consultative examin[ers].”
(R. 377.)
The ALJ ultimately found that a “less than marked
limitation
is
warranted,
given
the
claimant’s
borderline
intellectual functioning and poor performance in school.”
The
court
concludes
that
this
determination
is
(Id.)
supported
by
substantial evidence.
E.
Whether the ALJ Erred When Making the RFC Determination
RFC “is defined as ‘the maximum degree to which the individual
retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physicalmental requirements of jobs.’”
Mokbel-Aljahmi v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 732 F. App’x 395, 399 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(c)).
-16-
“‘In formulating [an RFC],
the ALJ evaluates all relevant medical and other evidence and
considers what weight to assign to treating, consultative, and
examining physicians’ opinions.’”
Id. (quoting Eslinger v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 476 F. App’x 618, 621 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
In making this determination, the ALJ may
consider both objective medical evidence of a severe medical
condition
and
complaints.
the
credibility
of
the
claimant’s
subjective
See Steagall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 596 F. App’x 377,
381 (6th Cir. 2015); Schmiedebusch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 536 F.
App’x 637, 649 (6th Cir. 2013).
The “Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ — not a
physician — ultimately determines a claimant’s RFC.”
Coldiron v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 291 F. App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010); see
also Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2013)
(“[T]o
require
the
ALJ
to
base
her
RFC
finding
on
a
physician's opinion, would, in effect, confer upon the treating
source the authority to make the determination or decision about
whether an individual is under a disability, and thus would be an
abdication
of
the
Commissioner's
statutory
responsibility
to
determine whether an individual is disabled.”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Nejat v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.
App'x 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Although physicians opine on a
claimant's
residual
functional
-17-
capacity
to
work,
ultimate
responsibility for capacity-to-work determinations belongs to the
Commissioner.”); Webb v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 633
(6th Cir. 2004) (stating that under the SSA regulations, “the ALJ
is charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical
evidence and the claimant's testimony to form an ‘assessment of
[her]
residual
functional
capacity’”
(quoting
20
C.F.R.
§
416.920(a)(4)(iv))).
Here, the ALJ found that Gilchrist maintains the RFC to:
perform a full range of work at all exertional level but
with the following nonexertional limitations: limited to
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks and occasional
contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general
public.
(R. 381.)
Gilchrist primarily argues that the ALJ erred because
this RFC determination was not based on any medical opinion.
However, the Sixth Circuit has recently rejected this argument.
Mokbel-Aljahmi, 732 F. App’x at 401, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Finally, Mokbel-Aljahmi notes that, in assessing his
residual functional capacity, the ALJ gave no weight to
nearly all the physicians’ opinions regarding MokbelAljahmi’s ability to stand, walk, or reach, finding them
inconsistent with the physicians’ own notes. MokbelAljahmi contends that once the ALJ decided to give no
weight to the physicians’ opinions regarding his ability
to work, the ALJ was required to get the opinion of
another physician before setting the residual functional
capacity. We disagree. We have previously rejected the
argument
that
a
residual
functional
capacity
determination cannot be supported by substantial evidence
unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that
of the ALJ. See Shepard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F.
App’x. 435, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the
argument that “the ALJ’s [residual functional capacity]
-18-
In
lacks substantial evidence because no physician opined
that [the claimant] was capable of light work”); Rudd v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x. 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2013) (rejecting the same argument because “the ALJ is
charged with the responsibility of determining the
[residual functional capacity] based on her evaluation of
the medical and non-medical evidence”). We similarly find
no error here. The ALJ undertook a laborious evaluation
of the medical record when determining the residual
functional capacity, and substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s conclusions.
(emphasis added); see also Hockey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17cv-796,
2018
WL
3737945,
at
*1
(W.D.
Mich.
Aug.
7,
2018)
(“Plaintiff also repeats her original argument that the RFC must be
based on at least one medical opinion unless the medical evidence
on
the
record
shows
relatively
little
physical
impairment.
Plaintiff asserts that a medical opinion should be required in this
case because two examining physicians determined that she was
disabled. However, as the Commissioner notes in response, the Sixth
Circuit
recently
rejected
this
argument
in
Mokbel-Aljahmi.”).
Therefore, the court rejects Gilchrist’s argument that the ALJ
erred by not basing the RFC determination on the opinion of a
medical expert. 4
III. CONCLUSION
4In
a related argument, Gilchrist argues that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is unsupported by substantial evidence because the
record lacked any medical evidence that would enable an ALJ to make
an RFC determination.
However, as the Commissioner correctly
emphasizes in his brief, “the claimant bears the burden of
producing sufficient evidence to show the existence of a
disability.” Watters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 530 F. App’x
-19-
For these reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
March 25, 2019
Date
419, 425 (6th Cir. 2013).
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