Williams v. Shelby County Board of Education

Filing 207

ORDER Granting 185 Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying As Moot 186 Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Thomas L. Parker on 04/10/2020. (kah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

SONYA P. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.

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No. 2:17-cv-02050-TLP-jay

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S PARTIAL MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant, Shelby County Board of Education, moves for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Title VII failure to hire claim. (ECF No. 185.) And Plaintiff, Dr. Sonya P. Williams,
moves affirmatively for summary judgment on her claim for failure to rehire. 1 (ECF No. 186.)
Both parties timely responded in opposition to the respective motions (ECF Nos. 188 & 189),
and filed the appropriate replies (ECF Nos. 190 & 191). For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Title VII failure to rehire

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Defendant frames Plaintiff’s claim as one for retaliatory failure to hire, and Plaintiff
distinguishes that she is claiming that Defendant improperly failed to rehire her after the
termination of the program in which she worked. The parties argue about the same events:
Plaintiff’s attempts to regain employment with the school system after March 2016. Because the
Court takes all facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court will refer to the
claim specifically as a retaliatory “failure to rehire” claim. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606,
614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).

claim. And because the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, it DENIES AS
MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
This case is about Plaintiff’s dismissal from the Shelby County School System (“SCS”)
and her unsuccessful attempts later to acquire another position with SCS. (See ECF No. 1.) So
Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging: (1) retaliation in violation of the First
Amendment; 2 (2) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3)
violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act; (4) retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; and (5) violation of the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act, Tennessee Code
Annotated § 49-5-511(b). (Id.) The Court later dismissed almost all of Plaintiff’s claims, except
for the claims under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and Title VII claims related to
harassment, referrals to Labor Relations, the written reprimand, and the negative job evaluation.
(ECF No. 88 at PageID 2647.)
The Court takes these facts from Defendant’s statements of undisputed facts (ECF No.
185-2), and Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts and statement of
additional undisputed facts (ECF No. 188-1).
Plaintiff began working for Defendant in August 2015 as an Adult Education Advisor at
Shelby County Schools (“SCS”) Messick Adult Learning Center. (ECF Nos. 185-2 at PageID
4983; 188-1 at PageID 5167.) Later that same year, Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge claiming

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Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her First Amendment prior restraint claim. (ECF No. 40.)
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retaliation. 3 (ECF Nos. 188-1 at PageID 5167; 59-1 at PageID 1697.) More specifically, she
alleged, in full:
On or about August 17, 2015, I was promoted to Adult Education Advisor
position as part of my Negotiated Settlement Agreement.
On my first day of employment, Mrs. Miller, Interim Career Technical Adult
Education Director, in the presence of Ms. Griffin, Interim Principal, made
comments and references to me having filed a previous EEOC charge.
On or about September 9, 2015, Ms. Griffin gave me verbal counseling at which
time she made reference that I was acting like the “HNIC.” On or about
September 11, 2015, I received an email outlining my verbal counseling/coaching
from Ms. Griffin. On or about September 22, 2015 Ms. Griffin threatened me
with a write-up due to insubordination and she referred me to Labor relations.
During the periods (Sept. 10, Sept. 23, Sept. 30, 2015), I complained to Ms.
Cecelia Barnes, Legal and Ramon Lloyd, Labor Relations, as well as Ms. Griffin
herself, regarding the continuous harassment and intimidation from Ms. Griffin.
I believe I have been discriminated against and retaliated against for filing my
previous charge . . . in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
(ECF No. 59-1 at PageID 1697.)
In February 2016, the State of Tennessee terminated the grant which funded SCS’s Adult
Education Program. (ECF Nos. 185-2 at PageID 4893–94; 188-1 at PageID 5168.) As a result,
SCS discontinued the Adult Education Program and terminated its employees assigned there,
including Plaintiff. The parties dispute the reason for Plaintiff’s termination. Defendant argues
that when the state terminated the grant, it had no choice but to discontinue the Adult Education
Program and lay off its employees (ECF No. 185-2 at PageID 4984), and Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant chose to discontinue the program, and chose not to substitute any additional funding

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Plaintiff alleges retaliation resulting from a 2013 EEOC charge alleging age and race
discrimination after she did not receive a promotion for which she applied. (See ECF No. 59-1 at
PageID 1697.) The EEOC-negotiated settlement led to Plaintiff receiving a position as an Adult
Education Advisor in the Adult Education Program. (See ECF No. 88 at PageID 2615.)
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for it after the state terminated the grant (ECF No. 188-1 at PageID 5168). Plaintiff’s last day of
employment with SCS was in March 2016. (ECF Nos. 185-2 at PageID 4984; 188-1 at PageID
5169–70.)
So Plaintiff amended her EEOC charge against Defendant in April 2016, adding that she
faced:
Threats on or about October 21, 2015, referred to Labor Relations October 22,
2015, employees no longer reported to me as of October 28, 2015, a written
reprimand on December 22, 2015, referred to Labor Relations January 11, 2016, a
negative performance evaluation on February 5, 2016.
In addition, management did not take heed to my counsel and my program lost its
grant, I lost job responsibilities, and I was denied two professional development
opportunities, and I made several written and verbal complaints to management of
retaliation.
I believe I have been retaliated against for making a protected protest and filing a
previous EEOC charge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended.
(ECF Nos. 185-2 at PageID 4984; 188-1 at PageID 5170; 185-3 at PageID 4988.) In short order,
Plaintiff again amended the EEOC charge by adding:
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black), my age
(46), and retaliated against for making a protected protest and filing a previous
EEOC charge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
(ECF Nos. 185-2 at PageID 4894; 188-1 at PageID 5170–71; 185-4 at PageID 4990.) Plaintiff
does not dispute the contents of any of her EEOC charges but contends that “[t]he summary of
the . . . charge as typed by the EEOC representative was not all-inclusive.” (ECF No. 188-1 at
PageID 5170–71.)
In October 2016, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue—issued on
request—reflecting that it was ceasing to process the charge and closing her case. (ECF No.
185-5 at PageID 4991.) Plaintiff then sued Defendant. (ECF No. 1.)
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Plaintiff did not originally list failure to rehire as a cause of action but asserted that
Defendant did not hire her in positions for which she was qualified in retaliation for engaging in
protected activity. (ECF No. 185-2 at PageID 4985; See ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff now alleges, on
the other hand, that she did in fact state a claim for failure to rehire, because the complaint
provides—“Defendant did not place Plaintiff on any type of list that would make her available
for any future job opportunities . . . Defendant has not offered Plaintiff any future job
opportunities.” (ECF Nos. 188-1 at PageID 5172; 1 at PageID 6–7.)
Plaintiff later asserted Title VII failure to hire in response to Defendant’s motion in
limine to exclude evidence of her job applications. (See ECF No. 118.) Because Plaintiff
attempted to raise this claim so late in the process, the Court allowed Defendant to move again
for summary judgment if it wished. (ECF No. 174.) This claim now undergirds the parties’
current cross-motions for summary judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court begins its analysis of this motion by consulting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. The court will grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir.
2012). “A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would
establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v. Louisville
Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A dispute
over material facts is ‘genuine’ ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986)). “When the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential

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element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper.” Chapman, 670 F.3d at 680
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S 317, 323 (1986)); accord Kalich v. AT&T Mobility,
LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2012).
“The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact.” Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “Once a moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing a triable issue of material fact.” Mosholder, 679
F.3d at 448–49 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
To show that a fact is, or is not, genuinely disputed, both parties need to either “cite[] to
particular parts of materials in the record” or “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 776 (alterations in original) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)); see also Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 (“To support its motion, the moving
party may show ‘that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’”
(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in
the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); see also Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 F. App’x
733, 736 (6th Cir. 2011) (“‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles’ that might be buried in
the record.”); Chi. Title Ins. Corp. v. Magnuson, 487 F.3d 985, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A district
court is not required to ‘search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of
material fact.’”).

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“In considering a motion for summary judgment, [a court] must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Phelps v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 680 F.3d
725, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). “The central issue is ‘whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251–52). “[A] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is
insufficient to defeat summary judgment; rather, the non-moving party must present evidence
upon which a reasonable jury could find in her favor.” Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d
523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); accord Bell v. Ohio State Univ.,
351 F.3d 240, 253 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Mere conclusory and unsupported allegations, rooted in
speculation, do not meet [the] burden.”).
Now, the Court will apply the law to the undisputed facts.
ANALYSIS
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to rehire claim, arguing
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Plaintiff did not exhaust her
administrative remedies; (2) Plaintiff failed to plead properly the claim, and (3) Plaintiff cannot
establish a causal connection between a protected activity and the alleged failure to rehire. (See
ECF No. 185-1.) Plaintiff opposes that motion, claiming that she properly exhausted her
administrative remedies and pleaded a failure to rehire claim. (ECF No. 188.) She also moves
for summary judgment, alleging that there is no dispute that Defendant failed to rehire her as a
result of illegal retaliation for her protected activities. (See ECF No. 186.)
The Court first addresses Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies before suing for failure to rehire. Title VII provides that, before suing

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her employer, an aggrieved employee must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2011). The
purpose of exhaustion of administrative remedies is to give the employer notice of its potential
liability. Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 F. App’x 466, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2008). It is “not
meant to be overly rigid, nor should it result in the restriction of subsequent complaints based on
procedural technicalities or the failure of the charges to contain the exact wording which might
be required in a judicial pleading.” Id. at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Courts should liberally construe a plaintiff’s EEOC charge to encompass all claims
“reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. When facts related to the
charged claim would prompt the EEOC to investigate a different, uncharged claim, a plaintiff
can still sue on that claim. Davis v. Sodexho, Cumberland Coll. Cafeteria, 157 F.3d 460, 463
(6th Cir. 1998). Likewise, “[w]hen the EEOC investigation of one charge in fact reveals
evidence of a different type of discrimination against the plaintiff, a lawsuit based on the newly
understood claim will not be barred.” Id.
“Courts are apt to find that the complaint relates to the EEOC charge where the plaintiff
had merely failed to recognize a procedural technicality, distinguish between seemingly identical
legal theories, or articulate the exact wording required in a judicial pleading. Blackburn v.
Shelby County, 770 F. Supp. 2d 896, 917 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing to Haithcock v. Frank, 958
F.2d 671, 675 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Courts distinguish, however, between failure to allege specific legal claims and failure to
allege specific factual predicates. McFagdon v. Fresh Market, Inc., No. 05-2151-D/V, 2005 WL
2768996, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 21, 2005) (“[G]enerally . . . [c]ourts can expect the EEOC to
identify and investigate legal issues that flow from the plaintiff’s factual allegations. However,

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this should not be misinterpreted to automatically mean that claims sharing the same subject
matter . . . but different factual predicates, are ‘reasonably related.’”) (citing E.E.O.C. v. McCall,
633 F.2d 1232, 1236 (6th Cir. 1980)). A complainant is expected to specify each event in her
EEOC charge which she feels stemmed from unlawful discrimination. Vinson v. Ford Motor
Co., 806 F.2d 686, 688 (6th Cir. 1986). Courts have therefore found that a plaintiff’s failure to
allege discriminatory conduct specifically in the EEOC charge barred plaintiff from bringing that
claim. See, e.g., Moore v. Boeing Co., No. 4:02CV80 CFP, 2004 WL 3202777, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
March 31, 2004) (dismissing the plaintiff’s argument that alleging compensation discrimination
in the EEOC charge was reasonably related to her claim of discrimination in denial of overtime
because nothing in the EEOC charge would put the defendant on notice that she was
complaining that she received fewer overtime assignments than male coworkers).
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge and then amended it twice over six months. Nowhere in
the two amended charges 4 did Plaintiff specifically allege that Defendant failed to rehire her.
(See ECF Nos. 59 at PageID 1697; 185-2 at PageID4984; 188-1at PageID 5170–71; 185-3 at
PageID 4988; 185-4 at PageID 4990.) Plaintiff can therefore only maintain her failure to hire
claim if it was “reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Scott, 275 F.
App’x at 471.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim of failure to hire would not be reasonably
expected to grow out of her properly exhausted discrimination or retaliation claims. (ECF No.
185-1 at PageID 4978.) Plaintiff contends that she properly exhausted her “failure to rehire”

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Because Plaintiff’s employment ended on March 7, 2016, only the amended and secondamended EEOC charges—in April 2016 and June 2016—could satisfy her exhaustion
requirements. George v. Youngstown State Univ., No. 4:17-cv-2322, 2019 WL 118601, *6 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2019) (“[I]t is impossible for a claim accruing after the close of the EEOC
investigation to fall within the scope of the investigation.”).
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claim and that it qualifies as an adverse action sufficient to establish retaliation under Title VII.
(ECF No. 188 at PageID 5148–49.)
But the Court cannot say that Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim was reasonably expected to
grow out of her allegations in the EEOC charges. Her first EEOC charge alleged harassing
behavior, intimidation, and threats of reprimand in retaliation for her prior EEOC charge. (See
supra pp. 2–3.) The first amendment in April 2016 included allegations of improper written
reprimands and negative performance evaluations, loss of supervisory opportunities, loss of job
responsibilities, and denial of professional development opportunities. (See supra p. 3.) Plaintiff
also alleged that “management did not take heed to [her] counsel” causing the Adult Education
program to lose state funding. (Id.) Plaintiff claims in her final amended EEOC charge that she
believes Defendant discriminated against her because of race and age, that it retaliated against
her for filing previous EEOC charges, and that Defendant’s actions are violations of Title VII
and the ADEA. (See supra p. 4.) There is nothing in her filings with EEOC that says Defendant
failed to rehire her.
An uncharged claim is reasonably expected to grow out of an EEOC charge if the facts
alleged in the charge would prompt the EEOC to investigate it. Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. E. Tenn.,
302 F.3d 367, 379 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s allegations here largely consist of retaliatory
actions she alleges occurred during her employment.
She did not allege that she attempted to obtain new employment with SCS or that she
intended to keep working for SCS in another capacity. Although one might say that Plaintiff’s
retaliatory harassment and retaliatory failure to rehire claims share the same subject matter—
alleged improper retaliation for her prior protected activities—those claims are factually much
different. The Court therefore cannot find that the different factual predicates are close enough

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to render them ‘reasonably related’ to the allegations in Plaintiff’s EEOC charges. See
McFagdon v. Fresh Market, Inc., No. 05-2151-D/V, 2005 WL 2768996, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Oct.
21, 2005) (citing E.E.O.C. v. McCall, 633 F.2d 1232, 1236 (6th Cir. 1980)). And the Court finds
that Plaintiff’s factual allegations before the EEOC would not prompt the EEOC to investigate a
retaliatory failure to rehire claim under Title VII. Plaintiff’s failure to rehire claim is, therefore,
not reasonably expected to grow out of her EEOC charges.
Likewise, Plaintiff cannot claim that she did not know to specify the alleged retaliatory
acts; she specified many other events she claims to result from retaliation. For example, Plaintiff
complained that employees of Defendant threatened her with write-ups, referred her to Labor
Relations, and gave her verbal counseling in retaliation for her earlier EEOC charge. (ECF No.
59-1 at PageID 1697.) Plaintiff is expected to specify each event in her charge which she claims
stems from unlawful retaliation—she cannot rely on a conclusory “retaliation” designation as the
catch-all for all possible claims she wishes to make. See Vinson v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.2d
686, 688 (6th Cir. 1986) (“It does not constitute an unjustifiable burden on claimants to require
them to specify each . . . event” or “identif[y] that conduct which [he or she] felt was the result of
discrimination.”).
Plaintiff is, in effect, asking the Court to find that her barebones statement that she
believes Defendant “retaliated against [her] for making a protected protest and filing a previous
EEOC charge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . .” puts Defendant on
notice of all possible retaliatory misconduct claims which could have arisen both during and after
her employment at SCS. The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot encompass all possible retaliation
claims by broadly alleging “retaliation in violation of Title VII.” To do so would significantly

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expand the scope of the EEOC charges and undermine the purpose of the charge—to give notice
to Defendant of the facts underlying the suit. Scott, 275 F. App’x at 470–71.
Plaintiff also alleges that she had in fact applied for open positions and tried to include
those allegations in her EEOC charge. (ECF Nos. 188 & 188-7.) But her only support for that
allegation is her own affidavit swearing that the EEOC agent improperly left those allegations off
of the charge. (Id.) As a result, she argues that “the face of the EEOC charge was not all
encompassing” and she should be able to proceed with the claim. (ECF No. 188 at PageID
5149.) But self-serving affidavits, standing alone and without support in the record, will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Freeman v. Trombley, 483 F. App’x 51, 58 (6th Cir.
2012) (“[A] self-serving affidavit must be reviewed with great skepticism.”); Capital Telecom
Holdings II, LLC v. Grove City, Ohio, 403 F. Supp. 3d 643, 649 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (“[S]elfserving affidavits alone are not enough to create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary
judgment.”).
The evidentiary record contains all three of Plaintiff’s EEOC charges—the original
charge and two amendments. (ECF Nos. 59-1 at PageID 1697; 185-2 at PageID4984; 188-1 at
PageID 5170–71; 185-3 at PageID 4988; 185-4 at PageID 4990.) Nowhere in these charges does
Plaintiff claim retaliatory failure to rehire or place her in another position after her department
was closed. Plaintiff’s self-serving affidavit, by itself, does not create an issue of material fact to
overcome Defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the record contains evidence to the
contrary. See Whitley v. Spencer Cty. Police Dep’t, 178 F.3d 1298, 1999 WL 196499, at *3 (6th
Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment
for the defendant where the evidence at the close of discovery contradicted plaintiff’s selfserving affidavits and conclusory allegations).

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For these reasons, Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. And
because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit, the Court
finds it unnecessary to delve into the merits of that claim.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court therefore
GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim. (ECF No. 185.) And the
Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the same claim. (ECF
No. 186.)
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of April, 2020.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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