Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Holloway, et al.

Filing 13

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 7 Report and Recommendations.. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 09/06/2017. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY
AMERICAS F/K/A BANKERS TRUST
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MELODY V. HOLLOWAY, ANDREW L.
LAWSON, AND ALL OTHER
OCCUPANTS OF 7247 TIMBER
VALLEY COVE, MEMPHIS, TN,
38125,
Defendants.

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No. 2:17-CV-02150-SHM-dkv

ORDER
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, dated March 14, 2017 (the “Report”).
7.)

(ECF No.

The Report recommends that “this case be dismissed sua

sponte for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and be remanded
to the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Tennessee pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447.”

(Id. at 10.)1

On March 23, 2017, Defendants

filed their objection to the Report.2

(ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11;

ECF No. 12.)

1

Unless otherwise noted, all in-cite page numbers refer to the PageID
number.
2
Defendant filed three documents on March 23, 2017. They are titled:
(1) Notice; (2) Notice In Response to Debt Collectors; (3) Summary of

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Report of
the Magistrate Judge.

The case is remanded to the Circuit

Court of Shelby County, Tennessee.
I.

Background
On June 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a detainer action against

Defendants in the Shelby County Court of General Sessions.
(ECF No. 1-2 at 19.)

The detainer action sought possession of

the property located at 7247 Timber Valley Cove, Memphis,
Tennessee, 38125.

(Id.)

Plaintiff received a judgment for

possession of the property on July 3, 2013.

(Id.)

Defendants

filed an appeal in the Circuit Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee, on July 11, 2013.

(Id.; ECF No. 1-2 at 25-26.)

It

is not known what transpired in the case for the next three
years.

(ECF No. 7 at 43 n.1.)

On March 6, 2017, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to
this Court.

(ECF No. 1.)

Defendants stated that removal was

based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), and 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(d).

(Id. at 1.)

Although the signature line of the

Notice of Removal printed the names of Defendants Melody
Holloway and Andrew Lawson, only Melody Holloway signed the
Notice of Removal.

(Id. at 2.)

Claims and Judgment. (ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.) The Court
construes these three filings as Defendants’ objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report. See United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)) (noting
that documents filed pro se are “to be liberally construed”).

2

On March 9, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss.
(ECF No. 6 at 40.)

The Motion to Dismiss argues that “the

actions of the Clerk and the remaining debt collectors are void
and without merit” and should be dismissed.

(Id.)

The Motion

to Dismiss also states that the state court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, the state
court was an improper venue, the process was insufficient, and
Plaintiff failed to state a claim.

(Id.)

On March 14, 2017, the Magistrate Judge entered the
Report, recommending the case be remanded to the Circuit Court
of Shelby County.

(ECF No. 7.)

The Magistrate Judge found

that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
because Plaintiff’s claim does not involve a federal question.
(Id. at 46-47.)

The Magistrate Judge also noted that removal

was procedurally improper because it was untimely and because
all Defendants did not join in the removal.

(Id. at 50-51.)

Defendants filed a timely, although improperly labelled,
objection on March 23, 2017.

(ECF No. 10; ECF No. 11; ECF No.

12.)
II.

Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the
federal

judiciary

by

permitting

duties to magistrate judges.

the

assignment

of

district-court

See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d

598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.

3

858,

869-70

“designate

(1989)).
a

A

magistrate

district
judge

court

to

has

conduct

the

authority

hearings,

to

including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge
of the court, of any motion.”
“A

district

judge

must

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
determine

de

novo

any

part

of

a

Magistrate Judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

After reviewing

the evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify the
proposed findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

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The district court is not required to review

-- under a de novo or any other standard -- “any issue that is not
the subject of an objection.”
(1985).

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150

The district court should adopt the findings and rulings of

the Magistrate Judge to which no specific objection is filed.

Id.;

United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981.)
Objections to any part of a Magistrate Judge’s disposition
“must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those
issues that are dispositive and contentious.”

Miller v. Currie, 50

F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Arn, 474 U.S. at 147
(stating that the purpose of the rule is to “focus attention on
those issues . . . that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.”).
“‘[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the magistrate's
recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed
[to be] in error’ are too general.”

Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d

721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).
4

A

general, frivolous, or conclusive objection will be treated as if no
objection had been made.

Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs.,

932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Mira v. Marshall, 806
F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he district court need not
provide de novo review where the objections are ‘[f]rivolous,
conclusive or general.’” (internal quotations omitted)).
III. Analysis

Defendants’ only reference to the Report is their objection
to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.

Defendants argue that the Court has

jurisdiction because “the Detainer action does involve a
federal question.”
123.)

(ECF No. 11 at 115; see also ECF No. 12 at

Defendants argue that the federal question is raised on

the back of Plaintiff’s “Detainer Warrant,” which contains a
“FAIR DEBT COLLECTION NOTICE” and thus violates the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).

(ECF No. 11 at 115-17; see

also ECF No. 12 at 125.)
As discussed by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff’s
“detainer action arose under state law.”

(ECF No. 7 at 47.)

Plaintiff does not assert any federal cause of action against
Defendants.

(Id.)

Defendants argue that there is a federal

question because Plaintiff violated the FDCPA.
115.)

(ECF No. 11 at

As the Magistrate Judge recognized, however, “federal

question jurisdiction is determined from the ‘well-pleaded

5

allegations of the complaint’ and cannot be based on a
potential defense.”

(Id. at 47-48 (quoting Vaden v. Discover

Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009)).)

Defendants’ objection is

without merit.
Defendants do not object to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion that removal of this case from the Circuit Court to
this Court was procedurally improper.
10; ECF No. 11; ECF No. 12.)
Report is warranted.
IV.

(See generally ECF No.

Adoption of that part of the

See Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-51.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Report is ADOPTED and the
case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Shelby County,
Tennessee.

So ordered this 6th day of September, 2017.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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