Bradshaw v. Principal Financial Group d/b/a Principal Life Insurance Company

Filing 22

ORDER RESERVING Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Amend pending filing of Plaintiff's proposed amendment. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 10-18-2017. (Mays, Samuel)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
PATRICIA BRADSHAW,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP d/b/a )
PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Defendant.
)

No. 2:17-CV-02174-SHM

ORDER

Before the Court are two motions: (1) Defendant Principal
Financial

Group’s

Partial

Motion

to

Dismiss

Plaintiff’s

Com-

plaint and to Strike Plaintiff’s Jury Demand (“Partial Motion to
Dismiss”), filed on May 15, 2017 (ECF No. 10); and (2) Plaintiff
Patricia Bradshaw’s Motion to Amend Complaint, filed on June 12,
2017 (“Motion to Amend”) (ECF No. 15).

Defendant responded to

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on June 26, 2017.
For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Partial Motion
to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend are RESERVED pending
filing of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment.
I.

Background
Defendant

issued

long-term

disability

insurance

(the “Plan”) to Plaintiff through her employer.

coverage

(ECF No. 1 at

2.)1

On or about June 3, 2005, Plaintiff was diagnosed with ma-

lignant, metastatic melanoma.

(Id.)

Because of her illness,

Plaintiff stopped working on August 8, 2005.
Plaintiff

began

receiving

long-term

(Id.)
disability

benefits

from Defendant under the Plan on or around November 9, 2005.
(Id.)

Defendant also helped Plaintiff receive Social Security

Disability Income (“SSDI benefits”), hiring a lawyer and helping
Plaintiff obtain records.

(Id. at 3; ECF No. 15 at 119.)

De-

fendant informed Plaintiff that, if Plaintiff received SSDI benefits, the amount she received from Defendant under the Plan
would be reduced.

(ECF No. 1 at 3.)

Plaintiff began receiving

SSDI benefits before October 20, 2006.2

Plaintiff mailed Defend-

ant a check for $11,439.76 to compensate Defendant for the overpayment of long-term disability benefits on October 20, 2006.
(See ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 1-3 at 63.)
Plaintiff’s SSDI benefits were terminated on May 2, 2013.
(ECF No. 1 at 3)

Defendant paid Plaintiff’s attorney to appeal

the termination of Plaintiff’s SSDI benefits.

(Id.)

Defend-

ant’s representatives told Plaintiff that, if she did not begin
1

Unless otherwise noted, all pin cites for record citations are
to the “PageID” page number.
2

The record does not show when Plaintiff began receiving SSDI
benefits. Plaintiff represents, and Defendant does not dispute,
that she mailed Defendant a check for overpayment of long-term
disability benefits “[a]fter Plaintiff was approved for SSDI
benefits.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff mailed the check on October 20, 2006. (ECF No. 1-3 at 63.)
2

receiving SSDI benefits again, her long-term disability benefits
would be increased to the amount Plaintiff had received before
receiving SSDI benefits.

(Id.)

Plaintiff began receiving SSDI

benefits again on or about September 26, 2014.

(Id.)

On October 20, 2014, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter informing her that her long-term disability benefits were being
terminated.

(Id.; ECF No. 1-4 at 64.)

Defendant’s letter stat-

ed that Plaintiff “no longer [met] the definition of Disability
beyond 10/9/2014.”

(ECF No. 1-4 at 64.)

On March 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Complaint.
1.)

The

Complaint

alleges

that

Defendant’s

(ECF No.

termination

of

Plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits violated the Employer
Retirement

Income

and

Security

Act

of

1974

(“ERISA”)

breached a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
6.)

and

(Id. at 5-

On May 15, 2017, Defendant filed the Partial Motion to Dis-

miss.

(ECF No. 10; see also ECF No. 11.)

Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend.

On June 12, 2017,

(ECF No. 15.)

Defendant

responded to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on June 26, 2017.

(ECF

No. 16.)
II.

Standard of Review
a. Rule 12(b)(6)

In addressing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court
must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

3

plaintiff and accept all well-pled factual allegations as true.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
527 (6th Cir. 2007).

A plaintiff can support a claim “by show-

ing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
(2007).

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563
This standard requires more than bare assertions of le-

gal conclusions.

Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d

356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001).

Any claim for relief must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
(2007) (per curiam).

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

“Specific facts are not necessary; the

statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the
. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
ing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.)

Id. (cit-

Nonetheless, a complaint must

contain sufficient facts “to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face’” to survive a motion to dismiss.

Ash-

croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570).
b. Rule 15(a)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that a
Court should give leave to amend a pleading freely “when justice
so requires.”
In the absence of . . . undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously

4

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. -- the leave sought should . . . be ‘freely
given.’
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Head v. Jellico Hous. Auth., 870 F.2d 1117, 1123 (6th Cir. 1989).
“[A] motion for leave to amend must state with particularity the grounds for amendment.”

Patterson v. Novartis Pharms.

Corp., 451 F. App'x 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Evans v.
Pearson Enters., Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 853 (6th Cir. 2006) (same).
“[T]he court must have before it the substance of the proposed
amendment” to determine whether “justice so requires.”

Roskam

Baking Co. v. Lanham Mach. Co., 288 F.3d 895, 906 (6th Cir.
2002).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff has not provided the substance of her proposed
amendment.

Plaintiff claims that her Motion to Amend should be

granted so that she can “restate her allegations of breach of
contract based upon Defendant’s oral assurances, separate and in
addition to the Plan.”
cient.

(ECF No. 15 at 210.)

That is not suffi-

Absent a proposed amended complaint, the Court cannot

determine whether Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is proper under
Rule 15(a)(2).

Plaintiff must file her proposed amendment by

October 30, 2017.

5

The Court reserves its determination on Defendant’s Partial
Motion to Dismiss until the proposed amendment has been filed.
IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Partial Motion to
Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend are RESERVED pending
filing of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment.

So ordered this 18th day of October, 2017.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. ____
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

6