Pleasant-Bey v. Shelby County Government et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 20 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Thomas L. Parker on 10/31/2019. (kah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
BOAZ PLEASANT-BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT,
ROBERT MOORE, and GATEWOOD,
Defendants.
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No. 2:17-cv-02502-TLP-tmp
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
Plaintiff Boaz Pleasant-Bey, an inmate at the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center
(“TTCC”) in Hartsville, Tennessee, sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Chief
Jailer Robert Moore moved for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s individual capacity
claims against him, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 20.) Officer
Charles Gatewood later joined in Chief Moore’s motion. (ECF No. 33.) For the reasons below,
this Court DENIES Chief Jailer Robert Moore and Officer Charles Gatewood’s Motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts that he is a Muslim and, as a Muslim, he wears a kufi or a turban. (ECF
No. 1 at PageID 2–3.) He alleges that a staff member at the Shelby County Jail told him that he
could not wear a kufi in the jail per Chief Moore’s instructions. (Id. at PageID 3.) And
Defendant Gatewood once “aggressively” grabbed at his kufi, forcing Plaintiff to remove it and
walk to his cell. (Id.)
Plaintiff also claims that the Defendants “created and enforced unconstitutional
policies/customs that prohibit inmates from conducting religious services at the jail.” (Id. at
PageID 4.) He claims that Defendants forced him to eat non-halal foods and refused to hire a
qualified Sunni Muslim Imam to hold traditional Islamic sermons. (Id. at PageID 2–4.)
Plaintiff alleges that these policies violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B), the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at PageID 3–4.) He sues Defendants in their official and individual
capacities and seeks monetary damages and abolition of all contested policies. (Id. at PageID 5.)
After screening the Complaint, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims: (1) for denial of
religious services by failing to hire a full-time Imam, (2) for failure to provide halal food options,
and (3) those under RLUIPA. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 31–35.) The Court, however, allowed
Plaintiff’s claims to proceed against Shelby County, Chief Moore, and Officer Gatewood for
violating his First Amendment right to wear religious headgear. (Id.) Now, Chief Moore moves
for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiff’s claims of individual liability, (ECF No. 20), and
Officer Gatewood joins in the Motion. (ECF No. 33.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Chief Moore and Officer Gatewood seek relief under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court reviews a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) using the same standard as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 279 (6th Cir.
2009).
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A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the
complaint’s allegations by arguing the allegations establish no claim for which relief can be
granted. To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court also looks to Rule 8. Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 622, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Engler v. Arnold,
862 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2017). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009)).
A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must “construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all allegations as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th
Cir. 2007). A court need not accept as true all legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences. Hananiya v. City of Memphis, 252 F. Supp. 2d. 607, 610 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing
Lewis v. ACB Business Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In sum, “[t]o withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, ‘a complaint
must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some
viable legal theory.” Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Commercial Money Ctr., Inc., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007)). Put another way, “[t]he
Court’s narrow inquiry on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is based upon whether the
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claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, not whether the plaintiff can
ultimately prove the facts alleged.” Time & Sec. Mgmt., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 422 F. Supp. 2d
907, 910 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
ANALYSIS
Defendants Moore and Gatewood claim qualified immunity from suit because Plaintiff’s
right to wear a kufi was not clearly established. (ECF Nos. 20-1 at PageID 66–68; 33 at PageID
103–05.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that his right to wear a kufi is clearly established,
absent a legitimate penological interest in restricting his ability to exercise his religion under the
First Amendment. (ECF No. 23 at PageID 75.)
I.
Qualified Immunity Doctrine
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects municipal officials from individual liability
for performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Higgason v.
Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 876 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This ensures that public officials can discharge their
duties without fear of “potentially disabling threats of liability” for damages. Barnes v. Wright,
449 F.3d 709, 715 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 514 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’
by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 229 (1991).
To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court must decide (1) “whether the
facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2)
“whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged
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misconduct.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)). The Court may determine whether the right was clearly established before
determining whether Plaintiff alleges a violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 242. Once a
defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff must invoke some authority showing
that “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987).
II.
Clearly Established Right
In determining whether a right is clearly established, the Court looks to decisions of the
Supreme Court, then to decisions of the Sixth Circuit, and finally to other courts of appeal, and
asks whether these precedents placed the constitutional question at issue “beyond debate.”
Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 739–40 (2011); Andrews v. Hickman Cty., Tenn., 700 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 2012)).
District court decisions do not constitute clearly established law. See Camreta v. Greene, 563
U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in
either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a
different case. . . . Otherwise said, district court decisions—unlike those from the courts of
appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of
qualified immunity.”).
Turning to Plaintiff’s claim, prison inmates do not lose their First Amendment right to
exercise their religion due to incarceration. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Plaintiff
alleges that he is a Muslim following the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, who “always wore
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a kufi when he left home.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Plaintiff thus alleges that his religion
mandates that he follow this tradition. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2–3.)
But some level of restriction on prisoners’ exercise of their religious beliefs is part of
incarceration. Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985). Courts therefore must
“balance the prisoners’ constitutionally protected interest in the free exercise of their religious
beliefs against the state’s legitimate interests in operating its prisons.” Hayes v. Tennessee, 424
F. App’x 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mintzes, 771 F.2d at 929.) Prison regulations
impinging on inmates’ constitutional rights are valid if they are “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.
III.
Legitimate Penological Interest
Although the Sixth Circuit has not specifically addressed an inmate seeking to wear a
kufi, many other Circuits have held that restrictions on religious headgear (like a kufi) are valid
when the defendants state a legitimate penological interest in doing so. See, e.g., Portley-El v.
Zavaras, 188 F.3d 519 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding a religious headgear policy was valid
“[b]ecause such religious headgear may be used to conceal drugs, weapons, or other contraband,
and may spark internal violence among prisoners”); Freeman v. Arapaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th
Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir.
2008) (“[T]o establish a free exercise violation, [plaintiff] must show the defendants burdened
the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith,
without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”); Muhammad v.
Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Allowing inmates to wear . . . religious articles . . .
conceivably could undermine the TDJC’s legitimate penological interests, primarily its
overriding concern for prison security.”); Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991)
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(rejecting a challenge to a rule limiting religious headgear when the defendant stated a strong
interest in uniform dress regulations); Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1216 (8th Cir. 1982)
(finding no constitutional violation by the limitation of religious garb where the defendants
asserted a need to safeguard institutional security); St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109, 116 (3d
Cir. 1980) (upholding limitations on religious headgear for security reasons).
Defendants’ contention that the right to wear a kufi is not clearly established ignores the
constitutional mandate that prison policies infringing on a prisoner’s right to exercise his religion
must be rationally related to legitimate penological interests. Id. at 78. And the cases
Defendants cite upholding prison restrictions on religious headgear are distinguishable from this
case—the defendants in those cases proffered a legitimate penological interest in each case when
the Court found that the prison officials did not violate the prisoner’s constitutional rights.
For example, in Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 375–77 (7th Cir. 1991), the court upheld a
restriction on religious headgear when defendants cited security concerns and their interest in
uniform dress regulations. And in Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 578–79 (2d Cir. 1990)
the court held that prison officials could properly ban Rastafarian crowns when those officials
cited the danger that the inmates could conceal and transport controlled substances or other
contraband in that headgear, threatening prison security. In Sanding Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d
1525, 1528 (9th Cir. 1987) the court found appropriate defendants’ no-headwear policy when
defendants noted cleanliness, security, and safety reasons underpinned the challenged policy.
Finally, in Butler-Bey v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1987), the court upheld a prohibition
on wearing fezes where prison officials testified to concern that prisoners were smuggling
contraband, threatening institutional security.
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Defendant is correct that the right to wear a kufi is not clearly established when
defendants proffer a legitimate penological interest for that restriction. See id. But Defendants’
pleadings and motions here identify no legitimate penological interest underpinning the removal
of Plaintiff’s kufi. If Defendants have a legitimate penological interest in keeping Plaintiff from
wearing a kufi, they have yet to show what the interest is.
At this stage of the proceeding, the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true.
DIRECTV, 487 F.3d at 476. In doing so, Plaintiff has stated a claim for violating his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion absent a legitimate penological interest in
preventing him from wearing his kufi. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3); see Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d
1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding a prison warden has not established the defense of qualified
immunity where he identified no penological interest in support of the restriction) (emphasis
added). Without a legitimate penological interest in preventing Plaintiff from wearing his kufi,
Plaintiff states a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Chief Moore and Officer Gatewood
have no right to judgment on the pleadings based on qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings because of
qualified immunity is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of October, 2019.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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