Weatherspoon v. Oldham
Filing
31
ORDER granting a condition writ of habeas corpus. Weatherspoon is GRANTED a conditional writ of habeas corpus, releasing him, unless the state trial court holds a bail hearing that comports with Due Process within 30 days of the issuance of the writ to determine whether continued detention is justified. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 2/26/2018. (Mays, Samuel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
DELCHON WEATHERSPOON,
Petitioner,
v.
BILL OLDHAM, SHELBY COUNTY
SHERIFF,
Respondent.
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No. 17-cv-2535-SHM-cgc
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Delchon Weatherspoon’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
filed on July 25, 2017 (the “§ 2241 Petition”).
(ECF No. 1.)
Weatherspoon challenges the constitutionality of his pre-trial
detention on the ground that the state trial court required an
unattainable financial condition of pretrial release without
making any inquiry into Weatherspoon’s ability to pay or
considering alternative, non-monetary conditions of release.
(ECF No. 1-7 at 480-81.) 1
Weatherspoon argues that the state
trial court failed to comply with the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
481.)
1
number.
(Id. at
Weatherspoon seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his
Unless otherwise noted, citations to the record refer to the PageID
release, or, in the alternative, ordering an additional hearing
that comports with Due Process.
(Id. at 470.)
Respondent Bill
Oldham, Shelby County Sheriff, Weatherspoon’s custodian,
responded on November 6, 2017.
replied on November 13, 2017.
(ECF No. 21.)
Weatherspoon
(ECF No. 22.)
For the following reasons, Weatherspoon’s § 2241 Petition
is GRANTED.
Weatherspoon is GRANTED a conditional writ of
habeas corpus, releasing him, unless the state trial court
holds a bail hearing that comports with Due Process within 30
days of the issuance of the writ to determine whether continued
detention is justified.
I.
Background
Weatherspoon is charged with attempted first degree
murder.
times.
He is alleged to have stabbed his girlfriend multiple
(ECF No. 1-1 at 12, 15-16.)
The General Sessions Court
for Shelby County, Tennessee, set Weatherspoon’s bail at
$200,000. 2
Weatherspoon filed for a writ of certiorari in the
Criminal Court for Shelby County, seeking a bail reduction.
(See ECF No. 1-1.)
At the hearing before the Criminal Court, Weatherspoon
called no witnesses.
He submitted three exhibits: an affidavit
2
Weatherspoon provides no record of the hearing before the General
Sessions Court.
2
of indigence, the General Sessions Court file, and the Pretrial
Services Investigation Report.
(Id. at 11-14.)
The State of
Tennessee (the “State”) presented the testimony of Sergeant
Daniel Cordero of the Memphis Police Department.
(Id. at 14.)
Cordero testified that Weatherspoon had confessed to the crime.
(Id. at 15.)
Cordero testified that Weatherspoon had admitted
chasing the victim down the street and stabbing her between 10
and 13 times.
(Id.)
Cordero testified that Weatherspoon had
admitted seeking a weapon to kill the victim and another
individual.
(Id. at 16.)
Cordero also testified that
Weatherspoon had said “he wanted [the victim] to feel the pain
he was feeling in his heart.”
(Id. at 16.)
The State
submitted photographs of the victim’s injuries after the
attack.
(Id. at 20-22.)
After hearing the proof, the state trial court found, in
open court, that the bail amount of $200,000 was appropriate
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118.
(Id. at 34.)
Weatherspoon appealed the state trial court’s decision to
the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to Tenn. R.
App. 8 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144.
(See ECF No. 1-2.)
May 11, 2017, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied
Weatherspoon’s motion for reduction of pretrial bail.
3
(Id.)
On
Weatherspoon appealed the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
3.)
(ECF No. 1-
On June 8, 2017, the Tennessee Supreme Court denied
Weatherspoon’s motion for reduction of pretrial bail.
(ECF No.
1-4.)
Weatherspoon then filed this § 2241 Petition.
(ECF No.
1.)
II.
Legal Standard & Jurisdiction
A. Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizes a district court to
entertain an application for the release of any person “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
See Phillips v.
Court of Common Pleas, 668 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We
have long recognized that pretrial detainees pursue habeas
relief instead under § 2241.”); Girts v. Yanai, 600 F.3d 576,
587 (6th Cir. 2010).
The Sixth Circuit has held that a
pretrial § 2241 habeas corpus petition is a proper vehicle to
raise alleged constitutional violations of the right to bail
pending trial.
Atkins v. People of State of Mich., 644 F.2d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 1981).
4
A petitioner who seeks relief under § 2241 is entitled to
de novo review of the state court proceedings.
F.3d at 810.
Phillips, 668
All habeas petitioners, including those who
proceed under § 2241, must exhaust available state-court
remedies before proceeding in federal court, “and this usually
requires that they appeal an adverse decision all the way to
the state’s court of last resort.”
Id. (citing Klein v. Leis,
548 F.3d 425, 429 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Weatherspoon has exhausted his available state-court
remedies.
(See ECF Nos. 1-2 – 1-4.)
The state trial court’s
decision is reviewed de novo.
B. Due Process Clause
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in part, that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”
Due
Process has two components: substantive and procedural.
Substantive due process “prohibits States from infringing
fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (citing Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
process guarantees fair procedure.
113, 125 (1990).
Procedural due
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.
“Procedural due process rules are meant to
5
protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken
or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
The essential elements of a procedural due process claim
under the Fifth Amendment are: “(1) a life, liberty, or
property interest requiring protection under the Due Process
Clause, and (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without
adequate process.”
Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180,
185 (6th Cir. 2012); see Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407
(6th Cir. 2001) (citing LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Hous.
Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1108 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Neither party
disputes that the right to pretrial release is a protected
liberty interest or that Weatherspoon has been deprived of that
right.
Due process of law does not guarantee any specific type of
procedure.
(1974).
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610
“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Neinast v. Bd. of Tr. of
Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 597 (6th Cir. 2003).
determine whether a particular procedure complies with due
6
To
process, courts apply the three-part balancing test stated in
Mathews:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due
process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors.
First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative
burdens
that
the
additional
or
substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
C. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the government from denying individuals equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
The
Equal Protection Clause may be invoked to analyze governmental
actions that draw distinctions based on specific
characteristics or impinge on an individual’s exercise of a
fundamental right.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Superior Commc'ns
v. City of Riverview, Michigan, No. 17-1234, 2018 WL 651382, at
*10 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 2018) (“The Equal Protection Clause
prohibits discrimination by the government that ‘burdens a
fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally
treats one differently than others similarly situated without
7
any rational basis for the difference.’” (quoting TriHealth,
Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Hamilton Cty., 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th
Cir. 2005)).
D. Tennessee Release from Custody and Bail Reform Act
of 1978
Article I, section 15 of the Tennessee Constitution
mandates “[t]hat all prisoners be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident, or the presumption great.”
Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15.
The Release from Custody and Bail Reform Act of 1978 (the
“Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40–11–101 - 40–11–144, establishes
the procedure for determining bond for bailable offenses.
The Act provides that all defendants, except those charged
with capital offenses, are presumed bailable.
§ 40–11–102.
Tenn. Code Ann.
Courts applying the Act first consider releasing
the bailable defendant on the defendant’s own recognizance.
T.C.A. § 40-11-115; see Graham v. Gen. Sessions Court of
Franklin Cty., 157 S.W.3d 790, 793 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).
requires consideration of eight statutory factors.
Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-11-115(b); Graham, 157 S.W.3d at 793. 3
3
The statutory factors include:
(1) The defendant's length of residence in the community;
(2) The defendant's employment status and history, and
financial condition;
(3) The defendant's family ties and relationships;
(4) The defendant's reputation, character and mental condition;
8
That
If the statutory factors do not support release on the
defendant’s own recognizance, the court considers conditions of
release.
793.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-116; Graham, 157 S.W.3d at
Any conditions imposed must be “the least onerous
conditions reasonably likely to assure the defendant’s
appearance in court.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-116; Graham, 157
S.W.3d at 793.
If no conditions of release can reasonably assure the
defendant’s appearance, the court must set bail.
Ann. § 40-11-117; Graham, 157 S.W.3d at 793.
Tenn. Code
Tennessee law
does not prohibit monetary bail, even if conditions of release
can reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance.
Cf. Fields
v. Henry Cty., Tenn., 701 F.3d 180, 187 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Malmquist v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, No. 3:10–cv–1014, 2011
WL 5982670, at *10–11 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 29, 2011)).
The
monetary bail must be “as low as the court determines necessary
to reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant at trial.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118; Graham, 157 S.W.3d at 793.
court considers nine factors in setting the bail amount.
(5) The defendant's prior criminal record, including prior
releases on recognizance or bail;
(6) The identity of responsible members of the community who
will vouch for defendant's reliability;
(7) The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of
conviction and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors
are relevant to the risk of nonappearance; and
(8) Any other factors indicating the defendant's ties to the
community or bearing on the risk of willful failure to appear.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-115(b).
9
The
Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-11-118; Graham, 157 S.W.3d at 793.
When
balancing the statutory factors, 4 the court must “determin[e]
the amount of bail necessary to reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant while at the same time protect[]
the safety of the public. . . .”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40–11–
118(b).
In Tennessee pretrial bail proceedings, the State must
meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.
See State v.
Burgins, 464 S.W.3d 298, 310 n.7, 311 (Tenn. 2015).
To review
a general sessions court’s bond determination, the defendant
must file a petition for writ of certiorari in criminal court.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144(b); see State v. Moore, 262 S.W.3d
767, 772 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Coppock, No. E200700026-CCA-R3CD, 2008 WL 115820, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan.
4
The statutory factors include:
(1) The defendant’s length of residence in the community;
(2) The defendant’s employment status and history and financial
condition;
(3) The defendant’s family ties and relationships;
(4) The defendant’s reputation, character and mental condition;
(5) The defendant’s prior criminal record, record of appearance
at court proceedings, record of flight to avoid prosecution or
failure to appear at court proceedings;
(6) The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of
conviction and the likely sentence;
(7) The defendant’s prior criminal record and the likelihood
that because of that record the defendant will pose a risk of
danger to the community;
(8) The identity of responsible members of the community who
will vouch for the defendant’s reliability . . . ; and
(9) Any other factors indicating the defendant's ties to the
community or bearing on the risk of the defendant's willful
failure to appear.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118.
10
14, 2008); Tenn. Code Ann. § 27–5–108(a)(1); Tenn. R. App. P.
8.
The criminal court reviews the general sessions court’s
decision de novo.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27–5–108(c).
Review of the criminal court’s determination can be had
by filing a motion for review in the court of criminal appeals.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144; Tenn. R. App. R. 8.
The court of
criminal appeals then reviews the criminal court’s
determination for abuse of discretion.
State v. Martucci, No.
C.C.A. 213, 1990 WL 36251, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 3,
1990).
Review of the court of criminal appeals’ decision can be
had by filing a motion for review in the state supreme court.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-144; Tenn. R. App. R. 8.
The Tennessee
Supreme Court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard.
Cf. Hicks v. State, 179 Tenn. 601, 168 S.W.2d 781 (1943)
(reviewing bail pending appeal); Goins v. State, 192 Tenn. 32,
237 S.W.2d 8 (1950) (same).
III. Analysis
A. Due Process
Weatherspoon argues that he was deprived of his liberty
interest in pretrial release without adequate process.
Weatherspoon contends that the state trial court’s failure to
11
set bail without considering his indigency and the availability
of a less restrictive non-monetary alternative condition or
combination of conditions of release violated his Due Process
rights.
He argues that adequate process “requires notice, a
hearing at which the person can be heard, with counsel, at
which a court applies a transparent and heightened legal
standard (clear and convincing evidence), and issues findings
on the record that the detainee poses an immitigable risk of
flight or danger to the community.”
(footnote omitted).)
(ECF No. 22 at 617
Weatherspoon also argues that the state
trial court failed to “state its reasons [for denying
conditional release] on the record” and that “the evidence
presented at the hearing . . . could not have supported a
constitutionally sufficient finding.”
(ECF No. 1-7 at 489-90.)
Weatherspoon relies on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983),
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
Sheriff Oldham responds that the state trial court did not
violate Tennessee law because the court appropriately weighed
the statutory factors when determining the bail amount, and
that the court did not impinge on Weatherspoon’s Due Process or
Equal Protection rights because it did not set bail based on
Weatherspoon’s financial condition.
12
(ECF No. 21-1.)
In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that Due Process
requires some consideration of indigency when a court decides
whether to imprison a defendant for failing to pay fines
imposed at criminal sentencing.
The Supreme Court held that a
state could not revoke probation and incarcerate an indigent
defendant based solely on non-willful failure to pay a fine or
restitution.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
If the defendant was
making a reasonable, good faith attempt to pay the fine or
restitution and was unable to do so by reason of indigency, it
would be “fundamentally unfair to revoke probation
automatically without considering whether adequate alternative
methods of punishing the defendant are available.”
69.
Id. at 668-
A court must inquire into the reason for the nonpayment
before it revokes a defendant's probation for nonpayment.
at 672.
Id.
“If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court
must consider alternate measures of punishment other than
imprisonment.”
Id.
The Supreme Court opined that a sentencing
court could imprison only probationers who made sufficient bona
fide efforts to pay if it “determines that alternatives to
imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet
the State's interest in punishment and deterrence.”
13
Id.
In Pugh, the Fifth Circuit addressed indigency when
considering whether Florida’s pretrial bail scheme was
constitutional.
572 F.2d at 1055.
Florida allowed six types
of pretrial release in non-capital cases.
Cash bail was one.
Id.
Id. at 1055-56.
Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately
rejected a constitutional challenge to Florida’s bail scheme,
the court discussed general constitutional principles governing
the calculation of bail.
The court reasoned that “the fixing
of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon
standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of
that defendant.”
omitted).
Id. at 1057 (internal quotation marks
The court said that “[a]ny [bail] requirement in
excess of th[e] amount” that is “necessary to provide
reasonable assurance of the accused's presence at trial” would
“be inherently punitive and run afoul of due process
requirements.”
Id.
It also said that “[t]he incarceration of
those who cannot [pay bond], without meaningful consideration
of other possible alternatives, infringes on both due process
and equal protection requirements.”
Id.
Bearden and Pugh addressed situations where an
individual's inability to pay a set fine or bail amount would
result in detention.
Both cases held that due process requires
courts to consider and balance the relevant state interest and
14
the individual’s indigency when setting fines or bail amounts.
In Bearden, the Supreme Court instructed sentencing courts to
consider a probationer's ability to pay, alternatives to
imprisonment, and “the State's interest in punishment and
deterrence,” before revoking probation and imprisoning the
probationer for failure to pay fines or restitution.
461 U.S. at 672.
Bearden,
“To do otherwise would deprive the
probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through
no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine.”
Id. at 672-73.
In Pugh, the Fifth Circuit instructed that bail determinations
“must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of [each individual] defendant” -assurance of the defendant's presence being the relevant state
interest -- and must take indigency and alternative conditions
of release into account.
quotation marks omitted).
Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057 (internal
The Fifth Circuit concluded that a
“master bond schedule” that did not take those factors into
account could not withstand constitutional challenge because it
would not tailor bail to the amount necessary to assure the
state’s interest in the presence of each individual in
subsequent proceedings.
Id.
Citing Pugh and Bearden, several federal district courts
have held that state laws setting a particular monetary bail
15
amount for a person’s release from detention without
individualized considerations of indigency violate the Due
Process Clause.
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty.
Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 2015 WL 9239821, at *6-*9 &
n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (granting class-wide preliminary
injunction enjoining state policy requiring monetary payment
for probationers to obtain release pending a revocation hearing
“without an inquiry into the individual's ability to pay the
bond and whether alternative methods of ensuring attendance at
revocation hearings would be adequate”); Jones v. The City of
Clanton, No. 215CV34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Sept. 14, 2015) (holding that the “use of a secured bail
schedule to detain a person after arrest, without an
individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence and the
need for bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Williams v.
Farrior, 626 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (“[I]t is
clear that a bail system which allows only monetary bail and
does not provide for any meaningful consideration of other
possible alternatives for indigent pretrial detainees infringes
on both equal protection and due process requirements.”);
Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, No. 15-CV-04959-YGR,
2018 WL 424362, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2018); cf. Abdi et
al, v. Nielsen et al, No. 1:17-CV-0721 EAW, 2018 WL 798747, at
16
*4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2018).
These district court decisions
stand for a general proposition: requiring money bail as a
condition of release at an amount impossible for the defendant
to pay is equivalent to a detention order, which is only
appropriate when the state shows and the court finds that no
condition or combination of conditions of release could satisfy
the purposes of bail, to assure the defendant’s appearance at
trial or hearing and the safety of the public.
See, e.g.,
O’Donnell v. Harris County, Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D.
Tex. 2017) aff’d, No. 17-20333, 2018 WL 851776 (5th Cir. Feb.
14, 2018); Coleman v. Hennessy, No. 17-CV-06503-EMC, 2018 WL
541091, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2018).
Weatherspoon argues
that no such showing or finding was made in state court.
Weatherspoon cites Salerno, arguing that deliberately
imposing unaffordable bail is equivalent to effective detention
and requires the same procedure as a denial of bail.
In
Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), against a substantive due process
challenge.
481 U.S. at 747.
That act allowed courts to deny
bail for serious crimes of violence, offenses for which the
sentence is life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses,
and certain repeat offenders.
Id.
In addition to showing
probable cause that the defendant committed the crime, the
17
government was required to prove by clear and convincing
evidence in a “full-blown adversary hearing” that “no
conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person.”
Id. at 750.
Applying general Due
Process principles, the Supreme Court considered whether the
act impermissibly infringed arrestees’ liberty interest.
The
court opined that an arrestee’s liberty interest is
fundamental, and thus, as a general proposition, “the
government may not detain a person prior to judgment of guilt
in a criminal trial” unless a recognized exception applies.
Id. at 749 (discussing the “well-established authority of the
government, in special circumstances, to restrain individuals’
liberty prior to or even without criminal trial and
conviction”).
The Supreme Court concluded that the Bail Reform
Act was constitutional because it served a “compelling” and
“overwhelming” governmental interest “in preventing crime by
arrestees” and was “carefully limited” to achieve that purpose.
Id. at 749–50, 755.
The act also carefully delineated the
circumstances under which detention would be permitted.
Id. at
751.
The private interest at stake here -- pretrial liberty -is substantial.
See supra, at 13-18.
When an indigent
arrestee faces the possibility of pretrial detention or its
18
functional equivalent, courts have held that the minimum
process a state must provide is an opportunity to determine
whether no condition or combination of conditions of release
could satisfy the purposes of bail: to assure the defendant’s
appearance at trial or hearing and the safety of the public.
Id. at 15-17.
That process is particularly important when an
arrestee is indigent.
Id. 5
The Tennessee Bail Reform Act mandates consideration of
conditions of release when setting a bail amount.
Code Ann. §§ 40–11–116 - 40-11-118.
See Tenn.
Even if conditions of
release could satisfy the purposes of bail, however, the state
court may impose monetary bail.
Id.
Here, the state trial court on de novo review did not
consider whether non-monetary conditions of release could
satisfy the purposes of bail.
(See ECF No. 1-1.)
After
holding a hearing and considering the parties’ arguments, the
court focused solely on the statutory bail-amount factors at
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118.
(Id. at 34.)
Applying those
factors, the court considered Weatherspoon’s financial
condition, i.e., his indigency.
5
(Id.)
It also considered the
Due Process does not guarantee, however, that indigent arrestees
will never be subject to monetary bail. See United States v. Mantecon–
Zayas, 949 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding trial court could properly set
unaffordable bail, resulting in the defendant’s detention, provided that
the trial court complied with the procedural requirements for a valid
detention order).
19
(Id.) 6
nature of the offense.
Balancing the § 40-11-118
factors, the court determined that Weatherspoon’s bail should
remain at $200,000 because Weatherspoon presented a risk of
danger to the community.
(Id.)
Under the three-part Mathews test, the procedure the state
trial court used risked an erroneous deprivation of
Weatherspoon’s liberty interest.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
The procedure did not include determining whether a nonmonetary condition or combination of conditions of release
could assure Weatherspoon’s appearance at trial and the safety
of the public.
The government’s interest in protecting the
community from danger is compelling.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749
(“The government's interest in preventing crime by arrestees is
both legitimate and compelling.”)
However, no fiscal or
administrative burden would have been imposed had the state
trial court properly considered non-monetary conditions of
release, and determined whether no non-monetary condition or
6
Weatherspoon argues that the Act precludes the state trial court
from considering public safety when considering the nature of the offense.
He points to a separate factor, which limits the use of a defendant’s prior
criminal record to determine the defendant’s potential risk of danger to
the community. (ECF No. 1-7 at 490 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11118(b)(7).) Weatherspoon reasons that only that factor can be used to
assess the defendant’s risk of danger to the community. His reading is not
supported by the statutory language. Before listing the factors, the Act
provides that the court should consider the nine factors “to reasonably
assure the appearance of the defendant while at the same time protecting
the safety of the public. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-118(b) (emphasis
added). Although the seventh factor addresses the risk of danger, that
does not affect the balancing mandated by the Act as to the remaining
factors. The state trial court properly considered public safety when
considering the nature of the offense.
20
combination of conditions was adequate, before setting a bail
amount.
See id.
inadequate.
The process afforded Weatherspoon was
See id.; see also Rodriguez-Ziese v. Hennessy, No.
17-CV-06473-BLF, 2017 WL 6039705 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017)
(finding violation of Due Process rights where magistrate judge
failed to consider defendant’s ability to pay the bail amount
or whether non-monetary alternatives could serve the same
purposes as the financial condition of release).
The state
trial court violated Weatherspoon’s procedural Due Process
rights by failing to consider non-monetary conditions of
release.
Weatherspoon also argues that the state trial court should
apply “a transparent and heightened legal standard (clear and
convincing evidence)” and “find[] on the record that the
detainee poses an immitigable risk of flight or danger to the
community.”
(ECF No. 22 at 617 (footnote omitted).)
Under the
federal Bail Reform Act, the government must meet a clear and
convincing standard of proof.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
The
Tennessee Bail Reform Act establishes a preponderance of the
evidence standard.
Burgins, 464 S.W.3d at 310 n.7, 311.
lower standard is not a constitutional violation.
That
Weatherspoon
cites no authority, and the Court has found none, that requires
a clear and convincing standard as part of a state’s pretrial
21
release procedure.
Numerous state courts have concluded that a
lower evidentiary standard is permissible under the Due Process
Clause.
See, e.g., Ex Parte Shires, 508 S.W.3d 856, 866 (Tex.
App. 2016) (state statute that required preponderance of the
evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence standard did
not violate detainee’s procedural and substantive due process
rights) (citing Salerno); Com. v. Pal, No. 13 CR 2269, 2013 WL
10571435, at *14 (Pa. Com. Pl. Nov. 27, 2013) (a prima facie
standard rather than a clear and convincing standard is
appropriate in assessing bail under state law); Querubin v.
Com., 440 Mass. 108, 120, 795 N.E.2d 534, 544 (2003) (holding
state statute’s preponderance of the evidence rather than a
clear and convincing standard did not violate detainee’s due
process rights); Ayala v. State, 262 Ga. 704, 706, 425 S.E.2d
282, 285 (1993) (holding state has the burden of proving by
a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court should
deny bail to secure the defendant's appearance in court or to
protect the community).
A state need not require a clear and
convincing standard in its pretrial release proceedings.
Tennessee’s preponderance of the evidence standard in pretrial
release proceedings does not violate Weatherspoon’s Due Process
rights.
22
To the extent Weatherspoon contends that the state trial
court must articulate its reasoning in writing to comport with
Due Process, his argument fails. 7
Although the state trial
court must find that no non-monetary conditions of release
could satisfy the purpose of bail before setting bail and
explain that finding, the reasoning need not be a written.
O’Donnell, 2018 WL 851776, at *8.
Weatherspoon seeks a writ of habeas corpus ordering his
release or ordering an additional hearing that comports with
due process.
This Court lacks authority to remand a federal
habeas corpus proceeding to state court.
United States v.
Robinson, 407 F.Supp.2d 437, 444 (E.D. Mich. 2005); see Coombs
v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 265 n.10 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
that a federal court “do[es] not have authority under the
federal habeas statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254, to remand
a habeas corpus petition to a state court for an evidentiary
hearing”); Coulter v. McCann, 484 F.3d 459, 466 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“There is no authority in the habeas corpus statute for a
federal court to remand or transfer a proceeding to the
competent state court.”); Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438, 1449
7
Weatherspoon argues that, “[w]hen issuing an order of detention, a
court must at least state its reasons on the record.” (ECF No. 1-7 at 48990.) He cites United States v. Mantecon-Zayas, 949 F.2d 548, 550 (1st Cir.
1991) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 491 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring), both of which require written findings by the decision maker.
(Id.)
23
(11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] federal district court or court of
appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over a state criminal
case and hence has no authority to ‘remand’ a case to the state
courts.”).
The Court does have authority to grant a conditional writ
of habeas corpus.
See, e.g., Chanthanounsy v. Cumberland Cty.
Sheriff, No. CIV. 02-71-P-C, 2002 WL 1477170 (D. Me. July 9,
2002) (granting conditional writ of habeas corpus, releasing
alien, unless Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) held
bail hearing within 30 days of issuance of writ to determine
whether continued detention was justified.), aff'd, No. CIV.0271-P-C, 2002 WL 31112190 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2002); cf.
Rodriguez-Ziese, 2017 WL 6039705, at *1 (staying writ until
specific date to allow state court to conduct constitutionally
adequate bail hearing).
Weatherspoon is GRANTED a conditional writ of habeas
corpus, releasing Weatherspoon, unless the Shelby County
Criminal Court holds a bail hearing that comports with Due
Process within 30 days of the issuance of the writ to determine
whether continued detention is justified.
24
B. Equal Protection
Weatherspoon argues that the state trial court’s failure
to consider his indigency and non-monetary conditions of
release violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Having granted Weatherspoon relief on his Due Process claim,
the Court need not address Weatherspoon’s Equal Protection
claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Weatherspoon’s § 2241 Petition
is GRANTED.
Weatherspoon is GRANTED a conditional writ of
habeas corpus, releasing Weatherspoon, unless the Shelby County
Criminal Court holds a bail hearing that comports with Due
Process within 30 days of the issuance of the writ to determine
whether continued detention is justified.
So ordered this 26th day of February, 2018.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
25
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