Weatherspoon v. Oldham
Filing
40
ORDER denying 33 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 4/16/2018. (Mays, Samuel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
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DELCHON WEATHERSPOON,
Petitioner,
v.
BILL OLDHAM, SHELBY COUNTY
SHERIFF,
Respondent.
No. 17-cv-2535-SHM-cgc
ORDER
Before the Court is Petitioner Delchon Weatherspoon’s
Motion for Partial Reconsideration, filed on March 2, 2018.
(ECF No. 33.)
March 14, 2018.
Respondent Sheriff Bill Oldham responded on
(ECF No. 34.)
For the following reasons, Weatherspoon’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration is DENIED.
I.
Background
Weatherspoon is charged with attempted first degree
murder.
times.
He is alleged to have stabbed his girlfriend multiple
(ECF No. 1-1 at 12, 15-16.)
The General Sessions Court for Shelby County, Tennessee,
set Weatherspoon’s bail at $200,000.
(ECF No. 1-1.)
Weatherspoon sought to reduce his bail in the Criminal Court of
Shelby County.
(Id.)
After a hearing, the Criminal Court
decided the $200,000 bail was appropriate.
(Id.)
Weatherspoon
ultimately sought review by the Tennessee Supreme Court.
Nos. 1-3, 1-4.)
was denied.
(ECF
His request for reduction of his pretrial bail
(Id.)
On July 25, 2017, Weatherspoon filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “§ 2241
Petition”).
(ECF No. 1.)
His § 2241 Petition argued that the
Criminal Court had failed to comply with the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution when
setting his bail.
(ECF No. 1-7 at 481.)
Weatherspoon
contended that Due Process required the state court to consider
indigency and the availability of a less restrictive nonmonetary alternative condition or combination of conditions of
release.
(ECF No. 22 at 617.)
He also contended that the
state court must apply a clear and convincing evidence standard
to determine whether Weatherspoon posed an immitigable risk of
flight or danger to the community.
(Id. at 616 (A court must
“ma[k]e reviewable findings that clear and convincing evidence
supports the conclusion that the detainee poses a risk of
flight or danger to the community . . . .”).)
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On February 26, 2018, this Court entered an Order granting
a conditional writ of habeas corpus, releasing Weatherspoon,
unless the state trial court held a bail hearing comporting
with Due Process, within 30 days of the issuance of the writ,
to determine whether continued detention was justified.
No. 31.)
(ECF
The Court decided that Due Process required the state
court to consider indigency and the availability of a less
restrictive non-monetary alternative condition or combination
of conditions of release.
(Id.)
The Court concluded that,
absent binding authority to the contrary, the state court was
not required to apply a clear and convincing standard.
(Id.)
On March 2, 2018, Weatherspoon filed his Motion for
Partial Reconsideration, contending that the Court should
reconsider whether the state court must apply a clear and
convincing standard.
II.
(ECF No. 33-1 at 734.)
Legal Standard
Weatherspoon cites no authority for his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
contemplate such motions, but the Sixth Circuit has held that a
motion to reconsider may be properly treated as one to alter or
amend a judgment under Rule 59(e).
60, 62 (6th Cir. 1979).
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Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d
A court may grant a motion to alter or amend a judgment
under Rule 59(e) only if there is “(1) a clear error of law;
(2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in
controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.”
ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty., 607 F.3d 439, 450 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620
(6th Cir. 2005)).
A Rule 59 motion cannot be used to reargue a
case on the merits or to reargue issues already presented.
Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 F. App'x 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008)
(citing Sault Ste Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler,
146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)); Beltowski v. Bradshaw, No.
1:08 CV 2651, 2009 WL 5205368, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2009)
(“The motion for reconsideration should not provide the parties
with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.”); Saia v.
Flying J, Inc., No. 15-CV-01045-STA-EGB, 2016 WL 3200298, at *4
(W.D. Tenn. June 8, 2016) (“Rule 59(e) does not permit
Plaintiff to return to the standing issue with citations to new
cases or additional legal arguments”), aff'd, No. 16-5853, 2017
WL 6398013 (6th Cir. July 11, 2017).
III. Analysis
Weatherspoon does not argue that any factor under Rule 59
would justify reconsideration.
He does not identify an
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intervening change in controlling law or newly discovered
evidence, nor does he demonstrate a manifest injustice or clear
error of law.
Weatherspoon cites twelve cases he did not cite in his
petition or reply brief.
(See ECF No. 33-1.)
those cases are not binding. 1
The majority of
The binding authorities turn on
facts different from the facts in this case.
(See id. at 737-
38 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (addressing
due process requirements for civil parental rights termination
proceeding); Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1992) (addressing due process
requirements for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for an
incompetent person).)
Weatherspoon could have cited these
authorities in his original argument, but did not.
He may not
use his Rule 59 motion to reargue the case on the merits or to
reargue issues already presented.
Weatherspoon argues that “no Supreme Court case to
consider the required standard of proof under the Due Process
Clause has held that a deprivation of bodily liberty can be
1
The nonbinding cases are also distinguishable. For example,
Weatherspoon cites In re Humphrey, which held that a clear and convincing
standard is appropriate when determining whether no less restrictive
alternative will ensure defendant’s future court appearances. 19 Cal. App.
5th 1006, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513 (Ct. App. 2018). In re Humphrey relied on
the California constitution, which requires that courts apply a clear and
convincing evidence standard when determining bail for felony offenses
involving acts of violence. Cal. Cont. Art. 1, § 12(b). Tennessee law
does not.
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made if it is supported by a mere preponderance of the
evidence.”
(ECF No. 33-1 at 734.)
He cites no Supreme Court
case holding that a state court’s denial of bail must be based
on clear and convincing evidence.
Clear error exists “when the
reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.”
Max Trucking, LLC v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp., 802 F.3d 793, 810 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985)).
Because neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth
Circuit has addressed the required standard of proof when
setting bail in state criminal proceedings, the Court did not
clearly err in determining that a preponderance of the evidence
standard does not violate Due Process.
Weatherspoon has failed to establish that any factor under
Rule 59 justifies reconsideration.
His Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is DENIED.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Weatherspoon’s Motion for
Partial Reconsideration is DENIED.
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So ordered this 19th day of April, 2018.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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