Hastings v. State of Tennessee et al

Filing 11

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND MODIFYING IN PART 9 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Sheryl H. Lipman on 1/24/2019. (shl)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
NEDRA HASTINGS, on her own behalf and
on behalf of her minor child, N.H.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SHELBY COUNTY GOVERNMENT et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 2:17-cv-02687-SHL-cgc

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND
MODIFYING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Before the Court are Magistrate Judge Charmiane G. Claxton’s (“Magistrate Judge”)
Report and Recommendations (“R&R”), filed October 23, 2018, (ECF No. 9), recommending
dismissal of Plaintiff Nedra Hastings’ claims on behalf of herself and her minor child and
certification that an appeal would not be taken in good faith, and Ms. Hastings’ Objections
thereto, filed November 6, 2018, (ECF No. 10). The Court construes Ms. Hastings’ Objections
as a Motion for Leave to Amend. For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R on
the issue of the dismissal of the Amended Complaint but MODIFIES the R&R to GRANT
leave to amend.
A magistrate judge may submit to a judge of the court recommendations for the
determination of certain pretrial matters. 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A)–(B). “Within 14 days after
being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A district court reviews de novo only those proposed findings of fact
or conclusions of law to which a party specifically objects. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After reviewing objections, a district court “may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations” of the magistrate judge. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A general objection that does not identify specific issues from the
magistrate’s report,” on the other hand, “is not permitted because it renders the recommendations
of the magistrate useless, duplicates the efforts of the magistrate, and wastes judicial economy.”
Johnson v. Brown, No. 13-242-GFVT, 2016 WL 4261761, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2016)
(citing Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Ms. Hastings’ Objections to the R&R provide no law to support a different result than
that reached by the Magistrate Judge. She also does not challenge any specific factual findings.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Although the Court observes that Ms.
Hastings is acting pro se, and thus it accords her the widest possible latitude in construing her
filings, Ms. Hastings’ Objections merely gainsay the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendations. This is not sufficient to satisfy her burden as to any challenge to the
conclusion in the R&R that the Amended Complaint fails to state cognizable claims. See
Johnson, 2016 WL 4261761, at *1. The Court has reviewed the R&R for clear error, finds none
and agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Ms. Hastings may not bring claims on behalf of her
minor child because she is not an attorney, and that the Amended Complaint otherwise fails to
state a claim.
In her filing, Ms. Hastings bemoans the fact that the Court has taken her Complaint under
advisement for more than a year, and that it is now denying her relief without giving her an
opportunity to clarify her claims. (ECF No. 9.) The Court thus construes her Objections, in part,
as a Motion for Leave to Amend. If the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

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Recommendations, dismisses her Amended Complaint and denies leave to amend, Ms. Hastings
seeks, in the alternative, leave to appeal. 1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that, where a plaintiff has already amended
once as a matter of course, the plaintiff must obtain either written consent of opposing parties or
leave of the Court before amending, and further that the Court “should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But the Court need not grant leave to amend in
cases involving “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). “A proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not
withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d
417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Thiokol Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, Revenue Div., 987
F.2d 376, 382–83 (6th Cir. 1993)). Where the facts alleged in a complaint clearly demonstrate
that a plaintiff has no legitimate legal claims, denying leave to amend and dismissing a complaint
is not an abuse of discretion. See 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, Civil § 12.34 (2018) (collecting
cases).
To give Ms. Hastings every possible opportunity to present a cognizable claim, the Court
concludes that leave to amend should be granted. The factors to consider before granting leave
to amend support this conclusion. First, although Ms. Hastings has already amended the
Complaint once, (ECF Nos. 1, 6) see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A), and despite the lack of written
consent to amend from any of the 48 named Defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), because
she has not yet served her Complaint on any named defendant, there is no particular risk of
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The Court assumes that Ms. Hastings seeks leave to appeal in forma pauperis because
she previously sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Magistrate Judge granted.
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prejudice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). She also has not engaged in a dilatory motive or bad faith
in seeking leave to amend. Finally, dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s claims can be “a harsh
remedy that should be utilized only in extreme situations.” Cf. Van Alexander v. City of
Pontiac, No. 07-11419, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112020, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2008)
(analyzing a motion for involuntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Under the
circumstances here, the Court finds that Ms. should be afforded one more opportunity to amend
her Complaint to cure its defects. Therefore, the Motion for Leave to Amend is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the R&R by DISMISSING the
Amended Complaint, but MODIFIES IN PART the R&R by GRANTING leave to amend.
Ms. Hastings shall file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the entry of this
Order, or the action will be subject to dismissal for failure to prosecute.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 24th day of January, 2019.
s/ Sheryl H. Lipman
SHERYL H. LIPMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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