Loggins v. Costco Wholesale Corporation

Filing 52

ORDER granting 28 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr. on 5/21/19.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

DENNIS E. LOGGINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION
d/b/a “COSTCO,”
Defendant.

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No. 2:17-cv-2688

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation’s
(“Costco”) September 17, 2018 Motion for Summary Judgment.

(ECF

No. 28.) Plaintiff Dennis E. Loggins responded on January 7, 2019,
after receiving several extensions.
on January 25, 2019.
For

the

(ECF No. 39.)

Costco replied

(ECF No. 43.)

following

reasons,

Costco’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.
I.

Background
Loggins, an African-American man over the age of forty, began

working at Costco in December 2014 as a Bakery Manager in Costco’s
Northeast Memphis warehouse.

(ECF No. 39-2 at 734.) 1 In September

2015, he was demoted to Baker and transferred to Costco’s Southeast

1

Unless otherwise noted, all pincites are to the “PageID” number.

Memphis warehouse.

(Id. at 740.) 2 Loggins was directly supervised

in his new position by Chris Kaufman.

(Id.)

Loggins received five counseling notices after starting at
the Southeast Memphis warehouse.

He received two for excessive

absenteeism, one in April 2016 and one in August 2016.
740-41.)

(Id. at

He received one on August 30, 2016 for failing to swipe

out at the end of his shift three times within thirty days.
at 744.)

(Id.

He received one on October 7, 2016 for working overtime

without authorization.

(Id.)

for disobeying company rules.

He received one on February 7, 2017
(Id. at 746.)

Loggins remains a

Costco employee, and none of the counseling notices resulted in a
decrease in pay, a change in job duties, a demotion, or otherwise
affected Loggins’s employment status.

(Id. at 749.)

On August 24, 2016, Loggins wrote a letter to Costco’s CEO.
(Id. at 741.)

Loggins said he had been demoted from his Bakery

Manager position based on race and age discrimination.

(Id.)

Loggins

daily

also

harassment,

said

that

including

Kauffman

“frivolous

had

subjected

write-ups”

and

comments about [his] age and fitness for the job.”

him

to

“disparaging
(Id. at 742.)

After receiving the August 30, 2016 and October 7, 2016 counseling
notices, Loggins called Scott Riekers, a Costco human resources

2

The 2015 demotion is not a cause of action in this case.
736.)

2

(ECF No. 39-2 at

manager, and said the counseling notices were in retaliation for
Loggins’ August 24, 2016 letter.

(Id. at 745.)

On February 13, 2017, Loggins again contacted Riekers and
said his February 7, 2017 counseling notice was in retaliation for
his filing a workers compensation claim.

(Id. at 746.)

On March

3, 2017, Costco received a memorandum from Loggins that said his
February 7, 2017 counseling notice was discriminatory and issued
in retaliation for his earlier complaints of discrimination about
his demotion.

(Id. at 747-48.)

On March 13, 2017, Loggins’ attorney sent a letter to Costco’s
corporate headquarters that asserted Costco was harassing and
discriminating against Loggins based on his race and in retaliation
for his having filed workers compensation claims against Costco.
(Id. at 748.)

On June 28, 2017, the EEOC issued a Notice of Right

to Sue to Loggins.
18, 2017.

(Id.)

Loggins filed this lawsuit on September

(Id.)

Loggins filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on April 1, 2013,
which was voluntarily converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on June
13, 2013.

(Id. at 749.)

decree on April 4, 2017.

The bankruptcy court issued its final
(Id.)

Loggins never disclosed any claim

against Costco to the bankruptcy court.

(Id.)

Loggins brings claims against Costco for age discrimination
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.
3

§§ 621 et seq.; race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; retaliation under the ADEA
and Title VII; hostile work environment based on his age under the
ADEA and on his race under Title VII and Section 1981; and
intentional

and/or

under Tennessee law.

negligent

infliction

of

emotional

distress

(ECF No. 1 at 9-11.)

Loggins contends that, since starting as a Baker in the
Southeast Memphis Warehouse, Kaufman has called him an “old man”
and “too slow” on several occasions.

(ECF No. 39-1 at 716.)

He

contends that Costco employees have heard other employees call
Loggins “old man.”

(Id.)

Southeast

warehouse

Memphis

He contends that others working at the
were

differently because of their age.

called

(Id.)

“old”

and

treated

He contends that Kaufman

once gave him an energy drink while on the job, telling Loggins
that it would speed up his work and help him move faster.

(Id. at

716-17.)
Loggins contends that Clay Cooper –- a white male baker at
the Southeast Memphis warehouse under forty years old –- regularly
engaged in the same conduct that caused Loggins to get poor
performance reviews and counselling notices, but that Cooper was
never similarly reprimanded.

(Id. at 719.)

Loggins also contends

that Jimmy Sommerville, another African-American Costco employee
at the Southeast Memphis warehouse, told Loggins that Don Bowden,
4

the Southeast Warehouse General Manager, used a racial epithet to
describe Sommerville.

(ECF No. 39-2 at 752.)

Loggins contends that his August 30, 2016, October 7, 2016,
and February 7, 2017 counseling notices were in retaliation for
the internal discrimination complaint he made on August 24, 2016.
(ECF No. 39-1 at 724.) 3 Loggins also contends that he was given
“write-ups” that “tend[ed] to track the dates of Loggins’ protected
activities.”
Loggins

(Id.)
contends

that

Costco

created

a

hostile

work

environment based on his race and age because he received frequent
counseling notices and trips to the office, because Kaufman told
him on ten to fifteen occasions that he was “too old” or “too
slow,” because Kaufman gave him an energy drink, because Bowden
once told him that he “‘did not hire [Loggins] because he was too
old,’ but that he hired him because he was an experienced baker,”
because Bowden used a racial epithet to describe Sommerville, and
because Bowden also used a racial epithet in conversation with
Jamie Boslaugh, a white female employee married to an AfricanAmerican man.

(ECF No. 39-2 at 752-53.)

3

In his response brief, Loggins references counseling notices given on three
dates –- October 15, March 16, and April 16 of unspecified years –- that do not
correspond to any counseling notices identified in Loggins’ responses to
Costco’s statement of undisputed material facts. (ECF No. 39-1 at 724.) Loggins
cites no evidence for these alleged counseling notices. Because Loggins admits
that he was issued counseling notices on August 30, 2016, October 7, 2016, and
February 7, 2017, (ECF No. 39-2 at 744, 746), the Court understands his response
brief to mean these counseling notices when it refers to the alleged counseling
notices of October 15, March 16, and April 16.

5

II.

Jurisdiction
The Court has federal question jurisdiction.

Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, district courts have original jurisdiction “of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”

Loggins asserts a right to relief against Costco

under Title VII, Section 1981, and the ADEA.

Those claims arise

under the laws of the United States.
The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Loggins’ statelaw claim.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

That claim derives from a

“common nucleus of operative fact” with Loggins’ federal claims
against Costco.

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 725 (1966); Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576,
588 (6th Cir. 2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
III. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant
a party's motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The moving party must show that the nonmoving party, having
had

sufficient

opportunity

for

discovery,

support an essential element of its case.

lacks

evidence

to

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(1); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir.
2018).
6

When confronted with a properly-supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
56(c).

See Fed. R. Civ. P.

“A ‘genuine’ dispute exists when the plaintiff presents

‘significant probative evidence’ ‘on which a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for her.’”
760

(6th

Cir.

2015) (en

EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753,
banc)

(quoting Chappell

v.

City

of

Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 913 (6th Cir. 2009)). The nonmoving party
must do more than simply “show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.”

Lossia v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc.,

895 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).
Although summary judgment must be used carefully, it “is an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action[,] rather than a disfavored procedural shortcut.”

FDIC

v. Jeff

Cir.

Miller

Stables,

573

F.3d

289,

294

(6th

2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
IV.

Analysis
A.

Judicial Estoppel

Costco contends that all of Loggins’ claims are barred by
judicial estoppel because he never disclosed them during his

7

Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings.

Costco’s argument is not well-

taken.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “protect[s]
the integrity of the judicial process . . . .”
v. Maine,

532

U.S.

742,

743

(2001).

It

New Hampshire

“prevents

a

party

from . . . achieving success on one position, then arguing the
opposite to suit an exigency of the moment.”

Teledyne Indus.,

Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990).

“In order

to invoke judicial estoppel, a party must show that the opponent
took a contrary position under oath in a prior proceeding and that
the prior position was accepted by the court.”

Id.

Judicial

estoppel can bar causes of action that were previously undisclosed
to a bankruptcy court during bankruptcy proceedings.

See Lewis

v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 141 F. App’x 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2005).
Judicial estoppel does not apply here.

The property of a

Chapter 7 estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” including
causes of action.

In re Senior Cottages of Am., LLC, 482 F.3d

997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).

“[A]

Chapter 7 estate does not include . . . the assets [a debtor]
acquires after the bankruptcy filing.”

Harris v. Viegelahn, 135

S.Ct. 1829, 1835 (2015) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)) (emphasis
in original).

There is no dispute that Loggins’ claims accrued
8

after he filed for bankruptcy.
of his Chapter 7 estate.

His claims were not the property

Pursuing his claims in this case is not

inconsistent with his position in bankruptcy court. 4
B.

State Law Claim

Loggins “agrees” with Costco “that this claim should be
dismissed.”

(ECF No. 39-1 at 727.)

Judgment

Loggins’

on

state

law

Costco’s Motion for Summary

claim

for

intentional

and/or

negligent infliction of emotional distress is GRANTED.
C.

Race and Age Discrimination

Only someone who has suffered an adverse employment action
can

sustain

a

race

discrimination

claim

under

Title

VII

Section 1981 or an age discrimination claim under the ADEA.

and
See

Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007);
Mitchell v. Vanderbilt Univ., 389 F.3d 177, 181 (6th Cir. 2004);
Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2002).

An adverse employment action is “a materially adverse

change in the terms and conditions of [a plaintiff’s] employment”
such as “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”

Redlin v. Gross Pointe Pub. Sch.

Sys., 921 F.3d 599, 607 (6th Cir. 2019) (first quoting Spees

4 Costco’s reference to a continuing duty to disclose is inapposite.
That duty
applies in Chapter 13 proceedings, not Chapter 7 proceedings. See Harris, 135
S.Ct. at 1835 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)).

9

v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir. 2010); then
quoting White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 402 (6th
Cir.

2008)).

Costco

contends

that

it

is

entitled

to

summary

judgment on Loggins’ race discrimination and age discrimination
claims

because

Loggins

does

not

allege

that

he

suffered

a

materially adverse employment action.
Loggins “agrees that he has not suffered a materially adverse
action . . . .”

(ECF No. 39-1 at 719.)

He contends, however,

that this “is not fatal to [his] Title VII and ADEA claims . . . .”
(Id. at 719.)

Loggins cites no authority for his contention.

“In

the absence of an adverse employment action, a plaintiff cannot
sustain a discrimination claim.”

Block v. Meharry Med. Coll., 723

F. App’x 273, 278 (6th Cir. 2018).

Whether a plaintiff proceeds

on direct or circumstantial evidence makes no difference.
Policastro, 297 F.3d at 539 n.1.

See

Because Loggins concedes that he

has not suffered an adverse employment action, his race and age
discrimination claims fail as a matter of law.

Costco’s Motion

for Summary Judgment on Loggins’ race and age discrimination claims
is GRANTED.
D.

Retaliation

“A plaintiff in a Title VII or ADEA action may establish
retaliation either by introducing direct evidence of retaliation
or by proffering circumstantial evidence that would support an
10

inference of retaliation.”

Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc.,

515 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008).

“Direct evidence is that

evidence which, if believed, requires no inferences to conclude
that unlawful retaliation was a motivating factor in the employer's
action.”

Id. at 543-44.

Loggins cites no direct evidence of retaliation, such as an
explicit statement by Kauffman or Bowden that they were taking an
adverse

employment

discrimination

action

claim.

He

in

response

relies

to

instead

Loggins’
on

internal

circumstantial

evidence.
When

a

plaintiff

advances

a

circumstantial

case

for

retaliation, the McDonell Douglas/Burdine evidentiary framework
used to assess discrimination claims applies.

Id. at 544.

The

plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case
of

retaliation

by

showing

that

(1)

he

engaged

in

protected

activity, (2) this exercise of his protected activity was known to
the defendant, (3) the defendant thereafter took an employment
action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) there was a causal
connection

between

employment action.

the
Id.

protected

activity

and

the

adverse

“The burden then shifts to the employer

to produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions once the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to
make out a prima facie case.

If the defendant satisfies this
11

burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant
was not its true reason, but instead was a pretext designed to
mask retaliation.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Prima Facie Case
Costco contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Loggins’

retaliation

claims

because

Loggins

fails

to

cite

sufficient evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action.
Loggins cites the counseling notices he received after he filed
his internal complaint as evidence of retaliation. 5
An adverse employment action in the retaliation context is
broader

than

in

the

discrimination

context.

See

Hawkins

Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 345 (6th Cir. 2008).

v.

It is

“not limited to an employer’s actions that solely affect the terms,
conditions or status of employment, or only those acts that occur
at the workplace.”

Id.

An adverse employment action for a

retaliation claim is one that “could well dissuade a reasonable

5

Loggins also contends that he was given “write-ups” that “tend[ed] to track
the dates of [his] protected activities.” (ECF No. 39-1 at 724.) Loggins,
however, cites no evidence for these unspecified write-ups. Loggins does not
contend that the counseling notices amounted to an adverse employment action.
He contends instead that “retaliation can, like claims of discrimination, be
based upon hostile environment. . . . When based on hostile environment, such
retaliation does not require a showing of adverse action.” (Id.) Loggins cites
no authority for this proposition. It is not well-taken. As discussed infra,
Loggins fails to cite sufficient evidence that he suffered from a hostile work
environment.

12

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
The antiretaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA
“protect[]

an

individual

not

from

all

retaliation,

retaliation that produces an injury. . . .”
at 67.

but

from

Burlington, 548 U.S.

The type or severity of injury required to dissuade a

reasonable

worker

discrimination

has

from
been

making

or

described

supporting
in

a

different

charge
terms.

of
In

Burlington, the Supreme Court gave an example of an action that
could

be

sufficiently

injurious

because

employee’s professional advancement . . . .”

it

impacted

“the

Id. at 69.

Some

Sixth Circuit cases have followed this example.

See Szeinbach

v. Ohio State Univ., 493 F. App’x 690, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (denying
summary judgment because there were disputed material facts about
whether an investigation “had a significant negative impact on
[plaintiff’s] professional advancement”); Lahar v. Oakland Cty.,
304 F. App’x 354, 357 (6th Cir. 2008) (reprimands were not an
adverse employment action because there was no evidence that they
“affected [plaintiff’s] . . . prospects for advancement”).

Some

Sixth Circuit cases describe the required action as something more
specifically injurious.

See Cregget v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of

Educ., 491 F. App’x 561, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A written reprimand,
without evidence that it led to a materially adverse consequence
13

such as lowered pay, demotion, suspension, or the like, is not a
materially adverse employment action.”)

Others describe less

severe injuries, such as a “disciplinary action” or a “pattern of
intimidation,” as potentially sufficient to dissuade a reasonable
worker.

Taylor v. Geithner 703 F.3d 328, 338 (6th Cir. 2013).

Loggins fails to cite sufficient evidence of an adverse
employment action under any formulation.

Counseling notices and

their attendant counseling meetings are not by themselves enough.
See Hall v. Dekalb Cty. Govt., 503 F. App’x 781, 790 (11th Cir.
2013) (“Plaintiff’s written counseling . . . was not materially
adverse because he failed to allege that it had any significant
impact on his employment.”); McKinney v. G4S Govt. Sols., Inc.,
179 F. Supp. 3d 609, 630 (W.D. Va. 2016) (“[Plaintiff] has not
presented any evidence that the two employee counseling ‘writeups’ could contribute to a demotion or termination.”). Loggins
cites no evidence that his August 30, 2016, October 7, 2016, and
February

7,

2017

counseling

professional advancement.
demoted,

suspended,

or

notices

negatively

affected

his

It is undisputed that Loggins was not
had

his

pay

lowered

because

of

his

counseling notices.
Loggins does not cite sufficient evidence that the counseling
notices were disciplinary actions.
having received them.

He cites no ramifications from

He cites nothing about how counseling
14

notices factor into promotion, demotion, or termination decisions.
He cites no evidence about a Costco disciplinary policy and how
counseling notices fit into it.

The counseling notice forms

describe their purpose in primarily constructive terms:
The purpose of this Employee Counseling Notice is to
alert you to the fact that your performance and/or
behavior is not meeting Costco’s expectations and is in
violation of Costco’s policies. The goal of this Notice
is to provide you with constructive feedback what will
help you to perform your job duties to the best of your
abilities,
while
also
complying
with
Costco’s
expectations and policies.
(ECF No. 28-7 at 472.)
The counseling notices do say that, “further violations of company
policy can result in additional disciplinary action, up to and
including termination.”

(Id. (emphasis added).)

The use of

“additional” could suggest that counseling notices are included
among Costco’s disciplinary actions.

That possibility would not

permit a reasonable jury to find in Loggins favor without more
evidence about how counseling notices could injure a reasonable
employee such that he would be dissuaded from making a charge of
discrimination.

Loggins cites no such evidence.

satisfy his prima facie burden.

He fails to

Costco’s Motion for Summary

Judgment on Loggins’ retaliation claims is GRANTED.
E.

Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment occurs “[w]hen the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult
15

that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of

the

victim’s

environment.”
(1993).

employment

and

create

an

abusive

working

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

To establish such a claim, Loggins must show that: (1) he

belonged to a protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on age or race; (4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions

of

employment

and

create

an

abusive

working

environment; and (5) Costco knew or should have known about the
harassment and failed to act.

See Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co.,

726 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2013).
To

determine

standard,

the

whether

Court

must

the

alleged

consider

harassment
the

meets

totality

that

of

the

circumstances, including: “the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening or
humiliating,

or

a

mere

offensive

utterance;

and

whether

unreasonably interfere[d] with an employee's performance.”
23.

it

Id. at

The Court must use both an objective and a subjective

test: “the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive
and

the

victim

abusive.”

must

subjectively

regard

the

environment

as

Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 462 (6th

Cir. 2000).
16

Costco contends that Loggins’ hostile work environment claim
fails because Loggins has not cited sufficient evidence to show
that the alleged conduct was based on Loggins’ age or race or that
the

harassment

was

severe

or

pervasive

actionable hostile work environment.

enough

to

create

an

Costco’s argument is well-

taken.
Loggins’ counseling notices are not sufficient evidence of a
hostile work environment.

Loggins offers no evidence, other than

his own speculation, that they are based on his race or age.
Loggins cites nothing to rebut Costco’s evidence that it had a
legitimate reason for issuing each counseling notice.
Loggins does not cite sufficient evidence that he suffered
severe and pervasive harassment based on his race.
evidence

Loggins

cites

is

his

deposition

The only

testimony

that

Sommerville told him that Bowden used a racial epithet to describe
Sommerville.

Loggins does not allege that such a comment was made

to him or that he ever heard such a comment.

Putting aside the

fact that this evidence is hearsay, a single, second-hand comment
about someone other than Loggins is not sufficient to create a
hostile work environment for Loggins based on his race. 6

6

Loggins cites no evidence for his contention that Bowden used a racial epithet
in conversation with Boslaugh. Even if Loggins had, it would make no difference.
Loggins does not allege that such a comment was ever made to him or that he
ever heard such a comment.

17

Loggins does not cite sufficient evidence that he suffered
severe

and

pervasive

harassment

based

on

his

age.

Loggins’

allegations that Kaufman made ten to fifteen remarks that Loggins
was “too old” or “too slow,” that Kaufman gave him an energy drink,
and that Bowden made one remark about Loggins’ age cannot establish
that Loggins was subject to severe and pervasive harassment. The
Sixth Circuit has found more egregious harassment insufficiently
severe and pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim.
See Snyder v. Pierre’s French Ice Cream Co., 589 F. App’x 767,
769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that a manager calling plaintiff
“old man” and “too slow” on a daily basis, regularly asking
plaintiff if he needed a walker or a cane, and saying that he would
not have hired plaintiff because plaintiff was too old was not
enough to establish severe and pervasive harassment).
Costco’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Loggins’ hostile work
environment claim is GRANTED.

18

V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Costco’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

So ordered this 21st day of May, 2019.

/s/_Samuel H. Mays, Jr._____
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

19