Bernard v. Illinois Central Railroad Company

Filing 41

ORDER denying 29 defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on 8/21/2018. (Pham, Tu)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
_________________________________________________________________
JAMES E. BERNARD,

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Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendant.

No. 17-cv-2689-JPM-tmp

________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
_________________________________________________________________
Before the court by order of reference for determination is
defendant Illinois Central Railroad Company’s (“Illinois Central”)
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, filed on February 6, 2018.
(ECF No. 29.)
32.)

Plaintiff James E. Bernard has responded.

(ECF No.

For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Bernard’s initial Complaint asserted claims against Illinois
Central under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3.
initial

Complaint

detailed

(ECF No. 1 at 6-7.)

allegations

of

discrimination

The
and

accompanying charges of discrimination (“Charge”) that Bernard
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
dating back to 2009.

(Id. at 3-6.)

Bernard did not include an

EEOC Charge or Right to Sue letter in support of his initial

Complaint.

Illinois Central informed Bernard by letter, dated

December 21, 2017, that all claims referenced in the initial
Complaint except those relating to the most recent failure-to-hire
Charge from 2015 appeared to be time-barred, and requested that
Bernard amend his complaint to remove such claims.
at 5-6.)

(ECF No. 29-2

On December 27, 2017, counsel for Bernard indicated that

he was reviewing the Complaint.

(ECF No. 29-2 at 9.)

On January

3, 2018, the presiding District Judge ordered Bernard to attach a
copy of a Right to Sue letter as well as any EEOC Charge or Charges
on which he would rely.

(ECF No. 13.)

That same day, Bernard

filed with the court a Notice of Right to Sue, issued by the EEOC
on June 2, 2017, and apparently in response to his 2015 EEOC
Charge. (ECF No. 14.)

The parties thereafter continued to confer

and it appears that counsel for Bernard agreed that any claims,
with the exception of those relating to the failure-to-hire Charge
from 2015, would be time-barred.

Illinois Central alleges that

attorney Dewun Settle nonetheless indicated that, because he was
not yet formally retained by Bernard, Illinois Central would need
to move to dismiss the untimely claims.

(ECF No. 29-1 at 3-4; ECF

No. 29-3 at 2.)
On January 18, 2018, Illinois Central filed a Motion to
Partially Dismiss Complaint.
Bernard

filed

an

Amended

(ECF No. 16.)
Complaint,

On January 26, 2018,

which

removed

both

the

references to the previous EEOC charges and claims associated with
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them.

(ECF No. 20.)

The presiding District Judge thus denied

Illinois Central’s Motion to Partially Dismiss Complaint as moot.
(ECF No. 22.)

Illinois Central then filed the present motion,

asserting that Bernard should be ordered to pay the attorneys’
costs and fees associated with filing the motion to dismiss.

(ECF

No. 29.)
II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

“Rule 11 sanctions may be awarded when a party's conduct is
objectively unreasonable or if there is no reasonable basis in
support of a party's claim.”

Hawtorne-Burdine v. Oakland Univ.,

Nos. 17-1201/1514/1630, 2018 WL 1150604, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 16,
2018); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)-(c).

Attorneys’ fees and

costs may also be awarded against an attorney who “multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.”
1927.

28 U.S.C. §

Sanctions do not require a finding of bad faith, see

Hawtorne-Burdine, 2018 WL 1150604, at *2, “[h]owever, there must be
some conduct on the part of the subject attorney that trial judges,
applying the collective wisdom of their experience on the bench,
could agree falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the
bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense
to the opposing party.”

Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556

F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).

In

considering whether counsel’s conduct was reasonable under the
circumstances, a court may consider the time available to the
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signor for investigation; whether the signor had to rely on a
client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading;
whether the pleading was based on a plausible view of the law; or
whether the signor depended on forwarding counsel or another member
of the bar.

See Century Prods., Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 250-

51 (6th Cir. 1988).
The filings reveal that Illinois Central and Bernard conferred
numerous times regarding the issues surrounding Bernard’s initial
complaint.

There is no indication that Bernard’s conduct was

objectively unreasonable such that sanctions would be appropriate
under either Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

Based on the parties’

discussions and Bernard’s January 3, 2018, supplementation of his
Complaint with the Right to Sue letter, Illinois Central should
have been aware that Bernard was not intending to pursue any claims
except those arising from the 2015 EEOC Charge.

It further appears

that counsel were conferring during and around the holidays and
various days of inclement weather which impacted business.

And, it

appears during this time that there was some dispute as to which
attorney would be appearing on behalf of Bernard.

While counsel

for Bernard could have been more prompt in amending his pleadings
or more clear in responding to Illinois Central’s concerns, the
court

declines

to

find

that

such

unreasonable given the circumstances.

conduct

was

objectively

Accordingly, sanctions are

not appropriate, and Illinois Central’s motion is DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
United States Magistrate Judge
August 21, 2018
Date

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