Robinson v. Shelby County Public Defender, et al
Filing
30
ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr on 06-21-2018. (Mays, Samuel)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
PATRINA ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
v.
SHELBY COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER,
et al.,
Defendants.
No. 2:17-cv-02768-SHM-dkv
ORDER
Before
the
Court
is
Defendants
Shelby
County
Public
Defender and Shelby County Government’s Motion to Dismiss, filed
on December 8, 2017.
(ECF No. 16; see also ECF No. 16-1.)
Plaintiff Patrina Robinson responded on January 12, 2018.
No. 23.)
Defendants replied on January 25, 2018.
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
alleges
that
(ECF
(ECF No. 24.)
Defendants:
(1)
discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her race, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”); (2)
subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work environment, in violation
of Title VII; (3) retaliated against Plaintiff, in violation of
Title VII; (4) discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff,
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (5) discriminated against
Plaintiff, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., as amended by the ADA
Amendment
Act
(2008) (“ADA”).
of
2008,
Pub.
L.
No.
110-325,
122
Stat.
3553
(Id. at 13-16.)
For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
I.
Background
Plaintiff is an employee of Defendant Shelby County Public
Defender.
(ECF No. 1 at 2.)1
Plaintiff alleges that in December
2014 she applied for a position as Case Coordinator, Social
Worker, or Legal Assistant (the “Coordinator position”).
at 3.)
(Id.
The Coordinator position would have raised Plaintiff’s
annual salary by $15,000.
(Id.)
Plaintiff was interviewed for
the Coordinator position, but was not hired.
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that in March or April 20152 she “reported
an attorney named Laurie Sansbury, a white female, for making
threats against two African American female attorneys.”
4.)
(Id. at
Plaintiff alleges that in June 2015 Sansbury retaliated
against Plaintiff by “harassing . . . [Plaintiff], including
physically bumping into [Plaintiff] in a hostile manner during a
1
Unless otherwise noted, all pin cites for record citations are to the
“PageID” page number.
2
The Complaint is not clear about whether Plaintiff reported Laurie Sansbury
to management in March 2015, April 2015, or both. (Compare ECF No. 1 at 4
(“On or about April 9, 2015 . . . [Plaintiff] reported an attorney named
Laurie Sansbury, a white female, for making threats against two African
American female attorneys.”) with (Id. at 6 (alleging, in a section titled
“April 2015 Incident and Aftermath,” that Plaintiff reported Laurie Sansbury
to management in “approximately March 2015.”).)
2
staff
seminar.”
Sansbury
(Id.
harassed
[Plaintiff’s]
at
5.)
Plaintiff
desk
and
Plaintiff
by
glar[ing]
also
“stand[ing]
at
her
alleges
in
that
of
tapping
while
front
her
fingers on the desk” and “follow[ing] [Plaintiff] around the
office and taunt[ing] her.”
(Id.)
Sansbury allegedly assigned
Plaintiff an excessive workload, stalked and verbally harassed
Plaintiff at work, and intentionally overlooked Plaintiff for
promotions.
reported
the
(Id. at 7.)
harassment
against Sansbury.
Plaintiff alleges that, although she
to
management,
(Id. at 6.)
no
action
was
taken
Instead, “[a]fter reporting the
issues to management, management began harassing [Plaintiff]” by
adding “extra work duties [] to her already full case workload.”
(Id. at 8.)
On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff was assigned to transcribe an
interview.
(Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that, as she was
leaving for the day, another employee “blocked [Plaintiff] from
exiting
today.’”
[the
her
cubicle
(Id.)
and
stated,
‘I
need
those
transcripts
After Plaintiff said that she “would complete
transcripts]
as
soon
as
she
was
able,”
the
employee
allegedly blocked Plaintiff from exiting her cubicle “for three
to five minutes.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that in August 2015 she asked another
employee
about
a
Jail
Release
3
Coordinator
position
with
Defendant Shelby County Public Defender.
(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff
was later told that a white male had been selected for the Jail
Release Coordinator position.
Plaintiff
alleges
that
(Id.)
in
August
2015
she
“received
a
reprimand for [] not properly signing out on the EIO board,”
although “it was general practice in her department to not use
this signing out procedure.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that she
was “the only employee who received a reprimand for this alleged
failure.”
(Id.)
Also in August 2015, Plaintiff requested sick leave from
August 19, 2015,
through August 21, 2015.
(Id.
at 8.)
A
management employee asked Plaintiff to “bring her a doctor’s
note, despite the policy only requiring a doctor’s note for more
than four (4) days of sick leave.”
(Id.)
“When [Plaintiff]
asked why she needed a doctor’s note for less than four (4) days
of
sick
leave,
[the
manager]
stated
that
manager and she can do whatever she wanted.”
she
is
the
office
(Id.)
Beginning on June 1, 2016, Plaintiff took several months of
leave to seek treatment for a major illness.
(Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff alleges that, when she returned to work in January
2017, she was told she “was no longer an employee of [Defendant]
Shelby
County
because
[Plaintiff]
had
been
on
Long
Disability[,] which placed her on unemployed status.”
4
Term
(Id. at
12.)
Plaintiff alleges that she is aware of several people who
took leave “for extended periods of time (including for medical
reasons) and returned to their same positions without having to
reapply.”
(Id.
at
13.)
Plaintiff
concedes
that
she
later
received an email “that [she] was to report to duty on January
17,
2017
and
[Plaintiff]
that
missed
[Defendants]
due
[Plaintiff] in limbo.”
to
the
would
errors
(Id. at 12.)
pay
that
for
the
days
initially
left
Plaintiff alleges that
“she was pressured to work in a different area of [Defendants’]
office.”
(Id.)
On October 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Complaint.
(ECF
No. 1.)
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal-law
claims.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, United States district courts
have original jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” The
Complaint alleges that Defendants discriminated and retaliated
against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII, § 1983, and the
ADA.
(ECF No. 1 at 13-16.)
Those claims arise under the laws
of the United States.
5
III. Standard of Review
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the
Court
must
determine
whether
the
complaint
alleges
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
The plausibility standard is met
“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendants are liable
for the misconduct alleged.”
556).
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
Although the complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations”
to
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss,
“a
plaintiff's
obligation to provide the grounds of her entitlement to relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a
formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
555
(internal
quotation
marks
and
alteration omitted).
The Court is required to “accept all of plaintiff's factual
allegations
as
true
and
determine
whether
any
set
of
facts
consistent with the allegations would entitle the plaintiff to
relief.”
G.M. Eng'rs & Assoc., Inc. v. West Bloomfield Twp.,
922 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
However,
the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the
6
form
of
factual
allegations
if
those
conclusions
plausibly drawn from the facts, as alleged.
cannot
be
See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)
(noting
that
in
reviewing
a
motion
to
dismiss,
the
district court “must take all the factual allegations in the
complaint as true,” but that the court is “not bound to accept
as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Rule 12(b)(6) “allows the Court to dismiss, on the basis of a
dispositive issue of law, meritless cases which would otherwise
waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery.”
Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler
Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.
10, 2009).
IV. Analysis
A. Title VII Race Discrimination Claim
Defendants
move
to
dismiss
Plaintiff’s
Title
VII
race
discrimination claim because “Plaintiff has failed to set out
facts
in
reasonable
her
Complaint
inference
of
violation of Title VII.”
under
which
actionable
the
Court
racial
could
find
discrimination
(ECF No. 16-1 at 67.)
a
in
Plaintiff
contends that she “has exceeded the standard for pleadings and .
7
. . successfully set out a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VII.”
(ECF No. 23 at 103.)
The essential elements of a Title VII race discrimination
claim are (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected
group;
(2)
that
she
was
subjected
to
an
adverse
employment
decision; (3) that she was qualified for the position; and (4)
that
either
similarly
situated
nonprotected
employees
were
treated more favorably or she was replaced by someone outside
her protected class.
See Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610
F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2010).
An
adverse
employment
decision
is
a
“materially
adverse
change in the terms and conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment.”
Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999).
Examples of adverse employment actions include “a termination of
employment,
a
demotion
evidenced
by
a
decrease
in
wage
or
salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly
diminished
material
responsibilities,
or
indices that might be unique to a particular situation.”
other
Bowman
v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461-62 (6th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff
workloads.”
alleges
that
Defendants
(ECF No. 1 at 7.)
gave
her
“excessive
That allegation constitutes
“inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” that
the Sixth Circuit has held is “not sufficient to constitute an
8
adverse employment action.”
Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617
F.3d 380, 391 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that she was “glare[d] at,” “follow[ed] .
. . around the office,” and “block[ed] . . . from leaving her
office . . . for three to five minutes.”
(ECF No. 1 at 5-10.)
Plaintiff does not allege that those actions altered the “terms
and conditions of [her] employment.”
Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662.
The actions alleged are not adverse employment actions.
Plaintiff successfully alleges a single adverse employment
action.
Defendants told her she “[could] not to return to her
previous position [with Defendants] due to her having been out
on sick leave and returning ‘later than expected.’”
at 12.)
(ECF No. 1
Plaintiff alleges that she is “aware of several people
to leave [their employment with Defendants] for extended periods
of time . . . and return[] to their same positions.”
(Id. at
13.)
Plaintiff’s allegation is not sufficient under Title VII
because she does not allege that similarly-situated nonprotected
employees
alleged
were
that
employees,
respects.”
treated
those
or
that
more
treated
they
favorably.
more
were
favorably
Plaintiff
were
has
not
nonprotected
“similarly-situated
in
all
Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th
9
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff fails to state a
claim for race discrimination under Title VII.3
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
is
GRANTED
insofar
as
it
seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for race discrimination under
Title VII.
B. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim
Defendants
move
environment claim.
to
dismiss
Plaintiff’s
(ECF No. 16-1 at 64-67.)
hostile
work
Plaintiff responds
that “[i]n her detailed Complaint, there can be no question as
to the plausibility of Plaintiff’s claims that she was subject
to [a] hostile work environment due to her race.”
(ECF No. 23
at 103.)
To establish the existence of a hostile work environment
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcomed
racial harassment; (3) the harassment was race based; (4) the
harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by
creating
an
environment
that
was
intimidating,
offensive; and (5) [the] employer [is liable].”
hostile,
or
Clay v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 706 (6th Cir. 2007).
3
In her Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states that she
“did not plead that the failure[] to promote her to the [Coordinator
position] was due to race as she set out facts sufficient to find
plausibility that it was due to retaliation.” (ECF No. 23 at 103.) The
Court discusses Plaintiff’s failure to promote claim below in Part IV.C.
10
To satisfy the third prong, a plaintiff must produce “(1)
direct evidence of the use of race-specific and derogatory terms
or
(2)
comparative
evidence
members
both
treated
of
about
races
in
how
a
the
alleged
mixed-race
harasser
workplace.”
Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir.
2011).
To satisfy the fourth prong, a plaintiff must show that
“the harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.’”
Clay, 501 F.3d at 707 (quoting Williams
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560, 562 (6th Cir. 1999)).
That showing “requires the court to examine, under the totality
of
the
circumstances,
‘the
frequency
of
the
discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interfere[d] with an employee's performance.’”
Id.
(quoting Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724,
733
(6th
teasing,
Cir.
2006))
offhand
(alteration
comments,
and
in
original).
isolated
incidents
“[S]imple
(unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in
the terms and conditions of employment.”
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1988).
11
Faragher v. City of
Several
of
Plaintiff’s
based harassment.
allegations
do
not
address
race-
Plaintiff alleges that Sansbury “would often
stand in front of [Plaintiff’s] desk and glare at her while
tapping
her
workloads,”
[Plaintiff]
harassed”
fingers
on
“stalked
in
an
the
desk,”
attempt
Plaintiff,
to
and
Plaintiff
at
[Plaintiff]
gave
work,”
intimidate
allege facts showing
“stared
[her],”
“intentionally
[Plaintiff] for promotions.” (Id. at 5-7.)
[]
at
“verbally
overlooked
Plaintiff does not
the use of race-specific terms or
employees of other races were treated differently.
7.)
“excessive
that
(Id. at 5-
Plaintiff alleges that a supervisor “physically block[ed]
[Plaintiff] from leaving her office,” but does not allege that
she was blocked because of her race.
(Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff
alleges that she was blamed “for not checking the doors” at the
office, but does not allege that she was blamed because of her
race.
(Id. at 9.)
Even assuming Plaintiff had alleged race-based harassment,
she
does
not
allege
facts
showing
that
the
unreasonably interfered with her work performance.
harassment
She alleges
that she was required to bring a doctor’s note, “despite the
policy only requiring a doctor’s note for more than four (4)
days of sick leave.”
“only
employee
who
(Id. at 8.)
received
a
12
She alleges that she was the
reprimand”
for
“allegedly
not
properly
signing
out
on
[Defendants’]
board.”
(Id.
at
6.)
Those isolated forms of harassment, although inappropriate, are
not so “extreme [as] to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment.”
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; see also
Wilson v. Dana Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 867, 882 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
(finding that “[p]laintiffs were subject to repugnant conduct”
but granting a motion to dismiss because “no reasonable jury
could determine that [p]laintiffs . . . suffered harassment that
was severe, pervasive, and extreme”).
Plaintiff’s most serious allegation is that a supervisor
“physically block[ed] [Plaintiff] from leaving her office . . .
for three to five minutes.”
Courts
considering
(ECF No. 1 at 10.)
similar
allegations
have
found
them
insufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim.
See
Chavers v. Shinseki, 667 F. Supp. 2d 116, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(plaintiff’s allegation that defendant “blocked plaintiff’s exit
path from a classroom with a steel cart, told her he would not
move until she gave him a kiss, but did not put his hands on
plaintiff, even when she attempted to physically move him away”
was insufficient for a hostile work environment claim); Gordon
v.
Duke,
allegation
279
that
F.
Supp.
defendant
3d
46,
(D.D.C.
“confronted
13
her
2017)
in
her
(plaintiff’s
office
and
physically blocked the doorway to prevent her exit” fell “far
short of establishing [a hostile work environment]”).
The Supreme Court has said that to determine “whether an
environment
is
factors,
“the
“whether
it
Harris
v.
‘hostile,’”
frequency
[was]
Forklift
courts
of
the
physically
Systems,
must
consider,
discriminatory
threatening
Inc.,
510
other
conduct”
or
U.S.
among
and
humiliating.”
17,
23
(1993).
Plaintiff does not allege that she was blocked from leaving her
office on more than one occasion.
She does not allege that the
supervisor physically assaulted or threatened her.
The
conduct
insufficiently
Plaintiff
frequent
and
alleges,
serious
taken
to
as
a
support
whole,
her
is
claim.
Plaintiff’s allegations are not actionable under Title VII.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
environment under Title VII.
for hostile work
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED insofar as it seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for
hostile work environment.
C. Title VII Retaliation Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation
should be dismissed because “[t]he Complaint does not indicate
that Plaintiff engaged in any activity protected by Title VII”
and
“Plaintiff
has
not
set
forth
facts
that
indicate
[any
adverse employment actions] would not have happened but for her
14
participation in any activity protected by Title VII.”
16-1 at 68-69.)
(ECF No.
Plaintiff responds that Defendants retaliated
against her when they denied her the Coordinator position and
the Jail Release Coordinator position.
(ECF No. 23 at 105-07.)
To state a claim of retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff
must allege that: (1) she acted in a manner protected by Title
VII; (2) Defendants knew of that exercise of protected activity;
(3)
Defendants
subsequently
took
an
adverse
action
against
Plaintiff; and (4) the adverse action had a causal connection to
the protected activity.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
A
plaintiff's
burden
to
establish
a
materially
adverse
employment action is less onerous in the retaliation context
than in the anti-discrimination context.
“might
have
dissuaded
a
reasonable
Id.
worker
Any action that
from
making
or
supporting a charge of discrimination” is a materially adverse
employment action in the retaliation context.
Id.
“[P]etty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” are
not materially adverse actions.
Id.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation because
she does not satisfy the third or the fourth element.
engaged
in
a
protected
activity
when
she
Plaintiff
complained
Sansbury’s behavior to management in March or April 2015.
15
of
(ECF
No. 1 at 4, 6; see Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714,
730 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that protected activity includes
“not only the filing of formal discrimination charges with the
EEOC, but also complaints to management and less formal protests
of discriminatory employment practices”).)
not
to
hire
Plaintiff
for
the
Defendants’ decision
Coordinator
position
was
a
materially adverse action.
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants did not hire her
after Plaintiff complained of Sansbury’s behavior.
alleges
that
she
December 2014.
applied
for
the
Coordinator
(See ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff
position
in
She alleges that she
reported Sansbury’s behavior to management in March or April
2015.
(Id. at 4, 6.)
Although Plaintiff alleges that she “did
not receive the [Coordinator] position for which she had been
groomed
and
Defendants
had
been
denied
performing,”
her
the
she
does
position.4
(See
not
allege
when
generally
id.)
Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants took an adverse
action against her after Plaintiff’s protected activity.
Plaintiff
retaliation
fails
claim.
to
She
satisfy
does
not
4
the
fourth
allege
facts
element
of
a
supporting
a
In her Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argues that she
was denied the Coordinator position “after [she] reported racial
discrimination in March and April 2015.” (ECF No. 23 at 106.) Even if the
Court construes Plaintiff’s Response as “clarify[ing] allegations in her
complaint whose meaning is unclear,” Plaintiff fails to state a claim for
retaliation because she does not satisfy the fourth element. Pegram v.
Hendrich, 530 U.S. 211, 229 n.10 (2000).
16
causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse
action.
She contends that “[i]t is reasonable to infer and
plausible that denying [Plaintiff] the position and pay was a
way
to
punish
her
discrimination.”
for
[filing]
the
(ECF No. 23 at 106.)
report
of
racial
Because Plaintiff has
not alleged when she was denied the Coordinator position, that
argument
fails.
temporal
proximity
occurs
very
A
causal
only
close
in
protected activity.”
F.3d
516,
525
connection
when
time
“an
after
can
adverse
an
be
inferred
employment
employer
from
action
learns
of
a
Mickey v. Zeidler Tool and Die Co., 516
(6th
Cir.
2008).
Plaintiff
cannot
rely
on
temporal proximity because she has not alleged when she suffered
an adverse employment action.
Plaintiff’s other allegations also fail to state a claim
for retaliation.
her
when
they
She alleges that Defendants retaliated against
refused
Coordinator position.
to
hire
her
for
(ECF No. 1 at 6.)
the
Jail
Release
She alleges that she
“was given a verbal and written reprimand . . . and treated with
hostility by management instead of properly interviewed for the
position for which she inquired.”
allege
that
she
actually
(Id.)
applied
for
Plaintiff does not
the
Jail
Release
Coordinator position or that her inquiry required an interview.
The alleged reprimand is a “de minimis employment action[]” that
17
is not actionable under Title VII.
Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462.
Plaintiff’s
sufficient
allegations
are
not
to
state
a
retaliatory adverse employment action.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
retaliated against her
when another attorney bumped into her and glared at her in a
threatening manner, a white attorney followed her, she was given
low ratings on her evaluations, she was given additional tasks
at work, she was asked to produce a doctor’s note when she
requested
sick
leave,
and
she
office for several minutes.
allegations
“[A]
are
negative
blocked
from
leaving
(ECF No. 1 at 104-09.)
insufficient
performance
was
to
establish
evaluation
does
an
adverse
not
her
Those
action.
constitute
an
adverse employment action, unless the evaluation has an adverse
impact on an employee's wages or salary.”
Gov't
of
Nashville,
474
F.3d
307,
322
Tuttle v. Metro.
(6th
Cir.
2007).
“[C]hanges in . . . working conditions that cause no materially
significant disadvantage” are also insufficient to establish an
adverse action.
Kocsis v. Multi–Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876,
886 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
Defendants’
actions did not constitute adverse employment actions.
Plaintiff alleges that
when
she
“was
pressured
Defendants
to
work
in
retaliated against her
a
different
area
of
[Defendants’] office” on her return from sick leave in January
18
2017.
(ECF No. 1 at 12.)
assignment
was
an
adverse
Plaintiff contends that her new
employment
action
because
she
was
“made to work with the female white attorney who creat[ed] a
racially hostile work environment for [Plaintiff].”
at 110 (internal citations omitted).)
(ECF No. 23
Plaintiff has not alleged
sufficient facts to support a claim of racially hostile work
environment.
She has not alleged that she suffered a change in
pay, benefits, or job status as a result of her reassignment.
See
Kocsis,
97
F.3d
at
885–87
(holding
that
“reassignments
without salary or work hour changes do not ordinarily constitute
adverse
employment
claims”).
decisions
in
employment
discrimination
Plaintiff’s reassignment to a different position was
not a materially adverse action.
Plaintiff
fails
to
state
a
claim
for
retaliation.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.
D. Section 1983 Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim should be
dismissed because the “Complaint . . . does not identify any
policy,
practice
injuries.”
sufficiently
Defendant[s]
or
custom
that
(ECF No. 16-1 at 69.)
pled
her
violated
§
1983
their
19
led
to
Plaintiff’s
alleged
Plaintiff argues that she has
claim
because
internal
“[she]
alleged
hiring,
anti-
discrimination,
[]
anti-harassment,
and
anti-discrimination
policies that led to Plaintiff’s injuries.”
(ECF No. 23 at
110.)
A local government may not be held vicariously liable under
§
1983
for
injuries
inflicted
by
its
employees
or
agents.
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
A local government is only liable under §
1983 when a “policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.”
Id.
To sufficiently allege that a municipality such as Defendant
Shelby County Government, violated § 1983, “a plaintiff must
adequately plead (1) that a violation of a federal right took
place, (2) that the defendants acted under the color of state
law, and (3) that a municipality's policy or custom caused that
violation to happen.”
639,
660
(6th
Cir.
Bright v. Gallia County, Ohio, 753 F.3d
2014)
(internal
citations
omitted).
A
conclusory allegation that a municipality had an unlawful policy
or custom, without identifying the policy or stating a pattern
of conformance to the custom, is not sufficient.
See Huffer v.
Bogen, 503 F. App'x 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing a §
1983 claim against a county defendant when the complaint “failed
to
identify
any
policy
or
custom
constitutional violation”).
20
that
resulted
in
a
Plaintiff
fails
to
state
a
claim
under
§
1983.
The
Complaint does not sufficiently allege that Defendants had a
policy or custom that caused a violation of Plaintiff’s rights.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to
dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
E. Americans with Disabilities Act Discrimination Claim
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff’s
ADA
claim
should
be
dismissed because “Plaintiff does not allege that she missed so
much as a single paycheck, or that she even had a single reduced
paycheck,” and “[Plaintiff] does not make any allegation that
[the change in position] was a demotion, that it paid less, or
that it had materially different responsibilities from her prior
position.”
has
(ECF No. 16-1 at 72.)
“plausibly
set
out
a
claim
Plaintiff contends that she
for
disability
harassment
discrimination and disability retaliation” by alleging that “she
was terminated for several days and subsequently transferred and
reassigned to a new position working with her harasser.”
(ECF
No. 23 at 111.)
“To recover on a claim for discrimination under the ADA, a
plaintiff
must
show
that
he
or
she
(1)
is
disabled,
(2)
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
position, with or without accommodation, and (3) suffered an
adverse employment action because of his or her disability.”
21
Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891 (6th Cir. 2016)
(internal citations omitted).
Assuming Plaintiff could satisfy the first two elements,
Plaintiff’s
ADA
claim
fails
because
she
did
not
suffer
an
adverse employment action when she was reassigned to a different
position.
Plaintiff does not allege that she suffered a change
in pay, benefits, or job status as a result of her reassignment.
She
concedes
[Plaintiff]
that
Defendants
missed
due
[Plaintiff] in limbo.”
in
position
is
not
to
agreed
the
to
errors
“pay
that
(ECF No. 1 at 12.)
sufficient
to
for
the
days
initially
left
Plaintiff’s change
constitute
an
adverse
employment action.
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
is
GRANTED
insofar
as
it
seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED.
So ordered this 21st day of June, 2018.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. ___
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?